Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
12 OCTOBER 2005
DR DAVID
CHANDLER AND
PROFESSOR JAMES
PETTIFER
Q40 Sir John Stanley: In the last session
we focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina externally and I should now
like to come to look at it internally. Apart from the state of
the economy, which certainly gives the High Representative a lot
of concern, the biggest single political issue internally is the
future evolution of the constitution, coupled with the future
role of the High Representative who of course doubles up as the
EU Special Representative. Those two are linked. I should like
to ask you both what you feel is going to be the longevity of
the High Representative/EU Special Representative position? Do
you think that position is going to be needed for five or ten
years? Secondly, though Dayton, against almost all the odds, has
been a remarkable achievement in securing the degree of stability
it has, everybody I talk to acknowledges the cumbersome nature
of it. There are 15 to 20 separate prime ministers, three huge
great layers of government, everything triple-hatted. That was
necessary and without that civil government would not have returned
to Bosnia Herzegovina, but clearly that needs to evolve. So could
you give us your views on how Bosnia Herzegovina should be evolving
and what are the particular constitutional evolutions which you
think the British Government should be particularly pressing for?
Professor Pettifer: David Chandler
knows a lot more about Bosnia than I do, but my general philosophy,
particularly having spent an awful lot of time in Kosovo over
the last four years, is that things take a lot longer than we
think and that Lord Ashdown's position should be maintained with
the full powers for a long time. Whether those powers need exercising
or whether some of them can be quietly left to wither away with
the growth of better Bosnian institutions, would be what we should
hope for. David should really comment on this and not me.
Dr Chandler: As usual the whole
thing is the reverse of the way it looks. A lot of people have
argued that Dayton is so cumbersome that it is really difficult
to transform things, but in fact Dayton was a hugely flexible
agreement. The only people who signed up to it were the neighbouring
countries and the Bosnian Government. Everyone else involved,
the international institutions and international agencies, all
wrote their own mandate and they are not bound by Dayton. As you
will be aware, in most of the Dayton Agreement the Office of the
High Representative's role, when it was initially thought of,
was just for one year and was a co-ordinating role. No-one imagined
that the role of the Office of the High Representative would be
transformed. No-one imagined that 10 years after Dayton was signed
there would be a continual extension of mandates of international
institutions. Dayton has been extremely flexible and even though
there are 15 to 20 prime ministers and all these Bosnian government
structures, that is in the fictional world. Somewhere I have a
twelve-page document which is just a list of the edicts which
Lord Ashdown has put into place just this year alone. In the real
world policy making is something which is totally owned by the
international community. It is difficult when we talk about transformation,
because it is the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an ad
hoc body, whose legal standing was only confirmed after the
event, which basically decides the remit of the High Representative,
although sometimes the High Representative argues that he decides
his own remit. It is the most flexible framework around. The interesting
thing is that the transformation has not been so much with the
constitution, or with more say for the people of Bosnia, but within
the Peace Implementation Council. The shift from this ad hoc
international body without any clear target, started after the
Kosovo war, where we have seen a shift towards a much more centralised
EU regulation within Bosnia. You see that formalised with the
double-hatted nature of Paddy Ashdown when he assumed the post
in 2002. That is when the post of the European Union Special Representative
was created. I know from speaking to Lord Ashdown, and I am sure
he will tell you next week when he is here, that when he took
on that post he imagined that he would be the last High Representative
of the Peace Implementation Council, although I am not sure that
he imagined the real powers would necessarily disappear at the
same time, but rather that their format would change and be much
more linked to forms of EU regulation. Constitutionally it is
interesting. In the lengthy and drawn out process of EU guidance
in preparation for the accession process—the stabilisation
and association process and prior negotiations in that process,
the Dayton constitution has changed. So the chair of the Council
of Ministers has a permanent position rather than a rotating position
like the presidency and his job is to liaise with the European
Union. There is the Directorate for European Integrations which
goes through all the laws and works out how to bring them in line
with the EU acquis even though there is no formally signed stabilisation
and association process agreement. This very much centralises
the law making process and fairly much undermines the Dayton fiction
of numerous different realms of political authority; all that
is fairly much centralised in reality. In real terms Dayton has
been transformed, but the transformation has largely been informal
through the PIC and the transformation towards much more direct
EU regulation; the EU now seconds civil servants to help write
the Bosnian laws and to implement them. It is very much direct;
all the information comes from Brussels to Sarajevo rather than
through some convoluted process like a democracy, where there
is a real system of government.
Q41 Sir John Stanley: Could you just
focus on the specific question I put to you at the end? What do
you think the British Government should be pressing for, both
in terms of the continuation or not of the High Representative/Special
Representative and the degree of push you think the British Government
should be giving for constitutional change?
Dr Chandler: Getting rid of the
post of the High Representative or the EU Special Representative
would be a good idea, just in terms of practicalities as well
as in terms of human decency. Even within the EU it is problematic,
because Bosnia is about to sign up in terms of the stabilisation
and association process. For every other country the EU is very
keen to have democracy, human rights and the rule of law, but
in Bosnia there is a Special Representative with the power to
sack elected officials, to take away people's bank accounts, to
dismiss them without any court of appeal and to impose legislation.
You can see there is a slight element of double standards there.
Within the EU there is a bit of a division: the Parliament argues
that the Special Representative needs to be abolished, whereas
the European Council, where the power is, has argued that he has
special "anomalous" powers and that as long as he only
uses them in a soft way it is okay: this is expressed as the "pull
of Europe" rather than the "push of Dayton"—though
in practice the exercise of external power is the same. What has
happened is that his authority has been softened through a load
of other ad hoc institutional mechanisms, such as establishing
special hand-picked commissions. There is a hand-picked commission,
say to look at the reorganisation of Mostar, there is some agreement
on smaller issues, but there is a large division on the larger
issues between the Croatian representatives and Bosniak representatives.
Then the High Representative brings in an edict to resolve this
and centralise the administration, but by arguing that there was
some agreement anyway and that he was just putting the icing on
the cake this is then hailed as just the use of soft power. There
has been experimentation within that and I guess—though
anyone can guess—that the High Representative hat will be
abolished; the EU Special Representative hat may sustain itself,
unless it comes up as a public issue. Unfortunately, not many
other candidate countries are in the position to raise the issue
of democracy in Bosnia, because obviously they are trying to be
nice to the EU rather than critical; they do not really have the
freedom of discussion. I think it will sustain itself for the
middle-term future, but it is only a guess.
Professor Pettifer: As far as
the EU is concerned, I personally am a strong Euro-sceptic anyway
so shall be accused of being jaundiced, but I think the EU changes
the rules every day on this. I have followed with great care what
has been happening with the Turkish application and we all know
what goes on in Turkey still. Less of it goes on and hopefully
there will be much less of it, but the EU has given the Turks
a wide open door with these things still going on which we would
all disapprove of. I do not think that there is one EU position:
there are EU positions for different countries.
Chairman: Sir John, may I invite you
to put a question which I think you raised with me yesterday as
to whether the provincial reconstruction team concept, which I
believe was in Bosnia, can be developed in Kosovo?
Q42 Sir John Stanley: I think that is
more appropriate for the military when we get there, but I am
very happy to put it on behalf of the Committee. Do you consider
the very successful structure of liaison observation teams, and
there are lots in Bosnia Herzegovina, is capable of being transferred
into Kosovo?
Professor Pettifer: There are
many, many things which need changing with KFOR. One of the things
the March events showed was that the structure of what is colloquially
known as "capital command" in KFOR, where the French
commander or the British commander speaks to London before deciding
what to do on some issue which the KFOR command wants him to deal
with, does have to be changed. In all the analysis of the March
trouble we saw that KFOR was not really capable of acting in a
coherent way with a coherent command structure and of mobilising
people on the ground quickly to trouble spots. I am not familiar
with the details of the Bosnian example, but I think any better
system would be well worth looking at.
Q43 Mr Chidgey: May I come back to Kosovo,
really to try to summarise some of the points which have been
discussed in various degrees so far so that the Committee can
be clear about your views? We have mentioned, for example, the
March riots and put a question mark against the failure of UNMIK
in that regard. Do you feel that there were failings in the administration
in Kosovo resulting in UNMIK's problems? If so, what could be
done to rectify them, so we can be clear on that?
Professor Pettifer: The central
danger in the situation which continues, which I tried to point
out in my memorandum to you, although obviously in a very limited
space, is that the area of Kosovo north of the Ibar river, which
broadly corresponds to Leposavic/Opstina and northern Mitrovice/Opstina,
which is French KFor, although not all of French KFor, has never
really been properly under UN control. This goes back to March
1999. The parallel structure problem continued for a very, very
long time and it still continues to this day. A prominent UN official,
who is certainly not known for his pro-Albanian leanings, said
to me recently "You know, our problem is that we have people
who have killed 65 or 70 people sitting drinking coffee in Mitrovice".
That encapsulates the problem very well. The danger in the future
which I see and which I tried to draw to the Committee's attention,
is that these forces are still there and our capacity to deal
with them may be improving and some lessons have certainly been
learned from March, but whether they have been learned in a way
which gives us the real capacity is a very difficult issue to
assess. My personal view at the moment is that we do not have
it, which is why I wrote what I did to you.
Dr Chandler: It is slightly problematic;
I think it avoids the problem. The problem, as was considered
in the earlier session this afternoon, is that of a political
solution and without that everything is up in the air, there is
a lot of insecurity, etcetera. However, the problem seems to be
deflected. So the idea of the Serbian criminal, tough people toughing
it out in Mitrovice and the bridge watchers who are intimidating
everyone is a myth. I was actually there during the second election,
in Mitrovice near the bridge. It was a fiction. There was no army
of toughs. If you ever went to the bridge over the Ibar you would
see loads of NATO tanks and you could not get across without people
checking you and stuff. It is an easy thing to believe that the
problems caused are internal to the situation rather than something
to do with international policy. If you do not have a solution,
everything becomes more of a problem. The March events are rather
typical. There was rioting, there was a spark in a situation where
a spark could lead to problems, but that does not mean there was
a problem with the specific organisation of UNMIK and the army
of enforcement. Unless you have the army everywhere, it is going
to be very difficult. Unless you attach a soldier to every Serb
pensioner who is there, there are always going to be those sorts
of problems. Rather than focus on the bigger picture, as in Bosnia
as well, minor problems become exaggerated and that is like a
crisis for UNMIK, whereas the crisis is in fact located probably
in Western capitals at a more fundamental level.
Q44 Mr Chidgey: Just to be clear, we
are aware of the arguments that the provisional institutions of
self-government should take more competencies from UNMIK. We have
touched on this. Do you accept that yourselves, or are you terribly
opposed to that? If you do accept it, what competencies could
we actually specify? What might those be that could be taken from
UNMIK?
Professor Pettifer: This is happening;
this has been happening actively for at least 18 months. After
all, part of the UN central headquarters moved out of Pristina
well over a year ago and these things are being handed over. You
are also getting a much more self-confident society. People do
not, as they did in the summer of 1999, spend time thinking too
much about what UNMIK tells them. UNMIK is rather like the weather:
it is there, sometimes it is good, sometimes it is bad, but it
is going on in the sky somewhere above us.
Q45 Mr Chidgey: Is there an initiative
starting at grassroots level to take on board these responsibilities?
Professor Pettifer: Yes. I take
the view, which I must say is not a view all of my colleagues
share, that at the moment the sovereignty issue is primarily about
two things. It is about the economy, because no-one will invest
unless they know whether they own something or not. It is also
about security and borders. At the moment, nobody really knows
what is going to happen to the main industries of Kosovo. The
privatisation process was stalled and Count Lambsdorff was trying
to start it again and then it stopped and no big companies are
going to invest in Kosovo until they know that there is a clear
legal framework for them to do so. It seems to me that this is
the overriding argument for a political decision.
Dr Chandler: I think the experimentation
with local democracy first is probably the worst type of solution.
It is not that people in Kosovo do not know how to organise local
self-help initiatives; even under the Serbian authority they did
it. The problem is a fundamental lack of resources. You cannot
really resolve problems by this focus on locally sustainable solutions.
There is a big focus and a lot of international NGOs are trying
to do that. Even UNMIK has finally thought about economic policy
as well, though without a more fundamental transformation—with
unemployment over 50%, and obviously the statistics are questionable
but most of the grey economy is just sustainable agriculture—it
is going to be difficult to give people any sense of hope in the
future with just the carrot of more local control and more local
authority participation. People are expecting a bit more and those
expectations were raised when there was the war and when UNMIK
took over. They will not be satisfied by simply being told "It
is up to you to organise community self-help groups" because
the resources are not really there.
Q46 Mr Chidgey: Back to the March riots
again and the concept that they contributed to a sense of disillusionment
amongst the Kosovo Serb population. Is that the case? If so, is
there a risk that the Serbs might boycott the forthcoming elections
or that Albanian extremists might gain more influence in the provisional
institutions? My last point is this whole issue of the high rate
of endemic unemployment. How can UNMIK or the provisional institutions
make some attempt, some progress in alleviating the problem? Is
privatisation of state sector industries a route which can be
explored?
Professor Pettifer: I can give
you a pretty quick answer to the first question: as in previous
Kosovo elections, Serb participation will be low, irrespective
of what their leaders say. Different leaders will say different
things: whether to participate is part of the tennis-ball, ping-pong
aspect of politics in Belgrade and for Belgrade politicians to
score points as well as for Kosovo politicians. The second problem
is simply one of legality. There is a lot of money outside Kosovo
waiting to be invested. There is a lot of interest in the base
metal mines, because these kinds of metals are sexy again and
have an economic future. There is some interest in agriculture
and there is a great deal of money in the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora,
particularly in the United States. I have met leading businessmen
from big companies, who are Albanian Americans and who say "Yes,
we'd love to do something, but my board won't accept it until
we know what we own".
Dr Chandler: I agree with what
Professor Pettifer said on pretty much all those issues. The final
point is that everything is temporary, short term, low level as
though there is a vacuum of capacity within UNMIK, not just on
the political status but even on the economy. With Kosovo it just
concentrates the problem of state-building which we see in other
areas as well. There is a power imbalance in that international
powers are taking responsibility, but then the next stage of taking
that responsibility just is not there; there is no vision politically,
economically or socially, which is, in historical terms, fairly
unique. This is why we are creating these phantom states which
are not puppet regimes doing the will of the international community
nor genuine states relating to the will and needs of the population.
It is not like imperialism and, equally, is not like the old UN
idea of states and sovereignty. This particular situation is the
worst of both worlds: no responsibility is taken internationally,
but it is impossible for local actors to assume responsibility
as well. Kosovo just sums that up and it is a sad indictment on
international pretensions in this area.
Q47 Andrew Mackinlay: Picking up that
last point, presumably we would be correct in assuming that basically
no taxes are being collected in Kosovo either for the central
government or for local government.
Professor Pettifer: Oh, no, that
is not the case. About £300 million a year comes in, mostly
through customs. The customs tax has been quite effective and
quite successful: income tax and VAT are much less effective.
Q48 Andrew Mackinlay: One of the things
I am very interested in is the policing side, both in terms of
combating organised crime and the international nature of crime.
The UNMIK police were formed by the UN begging various police
agencies to contribute people. The United Kingdom's contribution,
a very highly regarded one, was by the police service in Northern
Ireland and the chief constable is now withdrawing that. Can you
throw in any observations on that? Can I just tell you what I
mean? I am horrified that the Foreign Office has not been able
to find, either with the chief constable of Northern Ireland and/or
other chief constables, a way of providing what I believe is a
highly regarded British standard of policing, but we are going
to withdraw. I guess the policing is pretty fragile, is it not?
Professor Pettifer: The facts
are that the murder rate in Pristina now is actually lower than
that of Stockholm and the crime rate as a whole is not bad on
things like muggings, rapes, all the serious crimes. This is a
real achievement for UNMIK police. The problem is that of political
assassinations, which remain frequent. The nature of Kosovo society,
both Serb and Albanian, is such that until it is changed out of
all recognition it is going to stay that way and that is the stain
on Kosovo.
Q49 Andrew Mackinlay: Are interface areas
dealt with by the military rather than UNMIK police?
Professor Pettifer: As a generalisation,
although it is difficult to say, the military have withdrawn from
a lot of policing activities in the last two years as the crime
rate has dropped. The mayhem days of 2000-01 are long since over,
but economic crime is all-pervasive, for three reasons. It is
partly because of the very high unemployment. Secondly it is because
of where Kosovo lies: as a central point on the transnational
route, particularly of heroin, from the East into Europe and that
would apply whoever runs Kosovo and whatever government structure
it has. Thirdly, there is a very anti-authoritarian political
culture in the Kosovo-Albanian world which was built of years
of resistance to regimes like that of Milosevic; cooperation with
the police does not come easily.
Dr Chandler: About two years ago
I was at the Kosovo police training college in Vushtri because
I thought the idea that if you change the police you can change
the rest of society was quite interesting. It appeals to external
actors because it is easy to change the police because you are
paying their wages and you can tell them exactly what to do, so
everyone behaves extremely well and everyone is nice to minorities
at the college and everyone gets paid. However, in the real world
of Kosovo there are not many mixed communities and most people
who work in the field know that it is like a make-believe trained
police force, because it has been artificially created. It is
a bit like Iraq: something happens and people take off their uniforms
and run away. That is why, even with the best will in the world
and the best training by police officers from Northern Ireland,
it is difficult to transform the police and expect that to have
a knock-on effect on society. In Bosnia this whole idea of democratic
policing and a lot of the issues has been even more interesting
and research shows that it has even undermined the police as a
cohesive unit because the police need to have a certain amount
of autonomy within the institution and trust—unfortunately,
all the regulation and political correctness and being polite
to everybody all the time has caused all sorts of problems internally.
Nowdays, whenever they make arrests people say their human rights
are being abused. It fails in terms of the stated aims of international
advisers and then it fails in a much deeper way even undermining
existing levels of capacity.
Q50 Andrew Mackinlay: I suppose what
I am asking you is: if you were advising the British Government,
would you advise that it would be prudent to withdraw British
policing?
Professor Pettifer: No, Kosovo
will need all forms of international help for a long time, of
which policing is only one. Lots of other expertise would be needed
and that is true of lots of other second world and third world
countries. The role of the police at times becomes politicised
and the problem stemming from that is really not the police, who
have real achievements to their credit, but the rule of law through
the courts and their judiciary and the very poor quality of trials
and the very, very politicised nature of some of the international
prosecutors.
Q51 Ms Stuart: At the end of this we
are going to publish a report which is supposed to go beyond extremely
detailed analytical pessimism as to why nothing is working. At
the moment I am getting the feeling that no taxes are being collected
and there is no relationship between those who govern and are
governed and the economy is not working. It is government by fax
from Brussels in a sense and you are saying that the EU is imposing
its conditions; power struggles rather than democracy because
we have not worked out who is top of the pile and until we have
worked out who is top of the pile we will not get political parties
or any kind of elections which are meaningful to us. Within that
picture what, in your view, would be the three key things you
would say a British Government should do which would actually
improve things?
Professor Pettifer: There is one
thing overwhelmingly which clearly needs to be done, because the
public discourse in Britain about Kosovo is very disappointing:
the geo-political significance of Kosovo to the United States
is never discussed and never appears in any considerations. One
talks of the EU and the EU doing all sorts of things, but what
really matters in Kosovo is what Uncle Sam thinks and in particular,
within Uncle Sam's orbit, what the Pentagon thinks.
Q52 Ms Stuart: What do you think the
Pentagon does think?
Professor Pettifer: I think they
take a very long-term view. I am not fit to speak for them, but
reading analytical material they think that Serbia will always
remain partly linked to Russia, culturally and through the Church
and various other geo-strategic factors. The British view that
Serbia could be changed as a result of getting rid of Milosevic
is seen as wildly optimistic, so I suppose I reflected what I
think of the dominant view in some parts of the Pentagon in the
first paragraph of my memorandum to you. This is a view with which
I know many people may not agree, but Kosovo would not be where
it is now, where you could even discuss political status, without
firm American backing and it is in relation to that one thing
that the British Government needs to work out its position.
Q53 Ms Stuart: If I had asked you the
same question I asked the last witnesses, about whether people
have real ties to the US, you would have said yes.
Professor Pettifer: Long-term
geo-political calculations are involved. Camp Bondsteel is one
of the largest American bases in the world ever built since the
Vietnam War. That is not built that way by coincidence.
Dr Chandler: With regard to the
three key things for the British government to do. Firstly, it
is important to realise that nothing is going to be changed without
economic and social transformation, so investment in large-scale
industry rather than sustainable, quilt-making, projects would
be one thing. The second thing would be that historically Kosovo
has only maintained itself through aid and through remittances
from abroad and I would let people from Kosovo into the EU to
work . . . you did ask.
Professor Pettifer: On a licensed
basis in the old way Italian workers came years ago and people
from the old Yugoslavia came, on a licence.
Dr Chandler: Thirdly, I would
open negotiations with Belgrade in terms of a final political
status settlement.
Q54 Chairman: Two questions in respect
of Kosovo. International institutions are frequently criticised
elsewhere for paying salaries which distort the local salary structures,
sucking in too many people of competence and thereby weakening
the local administration. Is that a phenomenon you see in Kosovo?
Professor Pettifer: Yes and no.
You have to pay people the going rate and the going rate now is
set by the big contexts of wars like Iraq, Afghanistan reconstruction,
where people are paid astronomic sums. If we do not pay reasonable
amounts in places like Bosnia and Kosovo, you will not get anybody
good at all.
Q55 Chairman: Not just the international
experts, but those within the country, the locals.
Professor Pettifer: Over time
the problem sorts itself out. What we need are the very large
numbers of trained people of Kosovan origin abroad who for various
reasons have not yet decided to commit themselves to the new Kosovo.
These are people, particularly in Switzerland and Germany, with
real top level expertise, particularly in business and in some
technologies and they should be given carrots to come back.
Dr Chandler: Firstly, the fact
that the international administration is the administration undermines
the local administration and people's desire to work in it. Secondly,
there is the lack of any idea that people have a future in Kosovo,
that people would work in government out of a love of doing something
for their country. I know it seems strange, though maybe not in
this particular audience, but there is also a political aspect
to it as well. At the moment, with uncertainty, you are not going
to get quality people committing themselves to something which
is pseudo. It is not part of a larger sovereign state, but equally
there is no real autonomy. Who knows what Kosovo is?
Q56 Chairman: Mr Chidgey did ask about
the March riots and the effects on UNMIK. I should like to turn
to similar effects on the NATO KFOR. What lessons, if any in your
judgment, have been learned since March? Do you believe that NATO
failed to read the situation in time? If so, what changes have
been made to ensure that there would be no recurrence?
Professor Pettifer: There has
been a lot of riot training and much more coherent programmes
to control public order and I think also that some fairly stiff
reprimands have been handed out. The KFOR commanders believed
that X or Y base could mobilise so many people to within five
kilometres in half an hour and it turned out in many cases that
the people were not even on base, let alone capable of being mobilised
with some contingents. The general problem is one of a wider issue
of decision making within NATO; big NATO countries in particular
are not willing to modify their command structures much, or at
all, in international forces.
Q57 Chairman: Are they prepared to modify
the caveats on the use of their own forces, particularly Germany?
Professor Pettifer: They may be,
but the problem is that they are well aware and right to be aware,
of the capacity of Balkan conflicts to accelerate very rapidly
in unpredictable ways, which could raise major force protection
issues. That is certainly a big issue for the United States contingent.
Chairman: In our visit we shall be meeting
General de Kerambon the French commander.
Q58 Andrew Mackinlay: I want to tease
out something which was music to my ears to a certain extent.
Both of you referred to allowing Kosovans, under some controlled
conditions, to work in the European Union. I should really like
you to amplify on that and how you could have it under controlled
conditions. I certainly see, from a domestic MP's point of view,
all this business of the individual, fit, able, probably very
intelligent, sometimes highly qualified or having the capacity
to get qualified, young men in particular, playing cat and mouse
with the immigration authorities here and the question of justice
and so on, with all the criminality which can flow from that.
I should like you to say how we could do this and to what extent.
I just think there is a degree of logic there, with the possibility
of a cadre returning at some stage.
Professor Pettifer: As is quite
well known, I am in favour of a much tougher policy. I recently
published a paper on the Migration Watch website. I do not agree
with everything about Migration Watch, but I do think they promote
a very valuable discussion. I think it is time for a new approach
to Balkan asylum seekers, to reward the hard working, but be tougher
on the people who are a problem.
Dr Chandler: The more decriminalisation
of the system, the fewer criminals there would be.
Q59 Andrew Mackinlay: It is much better
for people to be paying taxes in the United Kingdom than not,
is it not? I am not asking you to agree with me, but I presume
that is what you are alluding to.
Professor Pettifer: Yes. At the
moment I do not think there is much external migration from Kosovo.
There is a pretty standard position with a very large number of
migrants in places like Germany who have been there quite a long
time. The real problem on that scale is in Germany and Switzerland;
as far as I am aware they are not in Britain.
Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much
indeed. You and your colleagues earlier have provided a very helpful
platform for us. Many thanks.
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