Written evidence submitted by Dr Othon
Anastasakis, St Antony's College, University of Oxford
THE WESTERN
BALKANS: THE
ROLE OF
THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND
THE IMPACT
OF ENLARGEMENT
Current situation, both optimistic and pessimistic
Since the fall of Milosevic the situation in
the Western Balkans has been improving steadily and gradually.
There are regular elections at various levels (national, regional,
municipal) which take place everywhere in the area; there is a
certain economic recovery and increasing interest in direct foreign
investment; and there is a process of convergence with the European
Union.
Despite the advances there are important deficits
which obstruct the normalisation of the political and economic
life and jeopardise the security of the area. Issues like organised
crime, non-cooperation with ICTY or ethnic extremism are still
prevalent. On balance, there are both positive as well as negative
developments which justify both optimism and pessimism.
The EU as the only game in town
The region is struggling between the forces
of European-oriented reform and the forces of inward nationalism.
International actors agree that there is a need for the consolidation
and sustainability of the reform process and support for the modernising
and Europeanising forces. The role of the European Union in this
is crucial.
The EU acts as the normative, political and
economic power in the region. With the gradual withdrawal of the
US and its attention focused on other areas, the European Union
has adopted the major responsibility in the development and integration
of the region in Europe; it is also the single largest donor in
the region.
The European Union has a multiple agenda in
the Western Balkan region and a wide-ranging presence. It deals:
(a) with hard and soft security issues through
military and police missions and the fight against organised crime;
(b) reconstruction/cooperation/reconciliation
and the restoration of normalcy among neighbouring states and
communities;
(c) post-communist transition/European integration/adoption
of the acquis.
The first two points make the EU task more difficult
and in many ways different from the previous Central and East
European enlargement experience.
From the EU side, there is an enlargement fatigue
and the struggle to absorb the big shock from the recent big-bang
enlargement; there is still commitment towards Bulgaria and Romania
for 2007; and there is a growing debate on the start of accession
talks with Turkey; there is also some disillusionment with the
slow progress in the Western Balkan area. Despite this discouraging
context, the EU has to keep up with its commitment for the Western
Balkans and convince regional players about it.
Some limited improvements in the EU policies
The Thessaloniki summit in 2003 increased the
EU commitment through the establishment of European Partnerships,
the enhancement of SAP with elements from the enlargement process
and a more explicit roadmap towards potential accession. It offered
a number of pre-accession policies and increased slightly its
CARDS budget. Overall there have been some adjustments in the
right direction but not radical innovations.
The European Partnership (modelled on the Accession
Partnerships) offers the perspective of membership but not a pre-accession
status. It introduces new instruments based on the experience
of previous enlargement like economic policy dialogue, twinning
process, monitoring through annual country reports and tailor-made
benchmarks and incentives. Pre-accession aid remains limited and
no cohesion or structural funds are yet committed for the Western
Balkan countries (with the exception of Croatia). Although "partnership"
in name, the partners are not working on a commonly agreed agenda
but rather on the directives dictated by the EU.
Differentiation in the region; single framework
but own merits approach
Although the EU tries to keep a common and uniform
framework for all the Western Balkan countries, it recognizes
that each country is to be judged on its own merits and performance.
As a result the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs)
are negotiated with each country separately and the speed of EU
integration depends on whether each country is able to implement
its own SAA.
The Western Balkan region is a striking example
of diversity among states and each country is in a different stage
of bilateral relations with the European Union. (FYR Macedonia
has a SAA in force; Croatia also has one, albeit not yet ratified
by all EU members and a positive avis for the start of accession
talks; Albania is negotiating a SAA; Bosnia and Herzegovina has
adopted a feasibility study for a SAA with 16 points to implement;
Serbia & Montenegro is discussing a feasibility study on the
basis of a recently adopted twin track approach; Kosovo is on
a Stabilisation and Association Tracking Mechanism but which does
not include a SAA since Kosovo is not a sovereign entity).
Within this state of affairs it is rather difficult
to see how the European Union will be able to combine its bilateral
relations with a regional policy. Having said that, it is acknowledged
that a regional policy is needed in order to tackle regional issues
and is based on the conviction that what happens in one country
also affects its neighbor.
Lately, a positive process is generated by the
Croatian and the Macedonian SAAs, the positive avis towards Croatian
accession talks, the transferral of responsibilities to DG enlargement
with the advent of the new European Commission.
But overall the Western Balkans is not a success
story for the EU in the way Bulgaria, Romania or Turkey can claim
it to be. The EU needs to find ways to address the impasse in
Serbia and Montenegro, the low standards of governance in Kosovo,
the slow progress in Bosnia & Herzegovina.
Need for more incentives to get the ball rolling
There should be more evident incentives to pursue
the preparation for candidacy and accession. Simply addressing
the priorities in the European Partnerships for the short and
medium term, will not as a catalyst for reform.
The EU should reconsider its conditionality
mix with more carrots than sticks and attach the conditions with
short and medium term incentives.
There is need for focused aid which should be
adequately addressed in the financial provisions for the Western
Balkan countries in the 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives.
There is a need to improve the business climate
with clear timetables and benchmarks which will give clear signals
and engage more FDI.
Understanding the underlying causes of regional
problems and addressing the real concerns
The EU has identified the lack of political
will as an important deficit in the process towards europeanisation
but fails to generate political will through its actions in the
region and to produce enough political will of its own. Moreover,
its philosophy and policy towards the Western Balkans is still
informed by the legacy of the Former Yugoslav conflict and its
security questions.
Surveys show that socio-economic problems constitute
key concerns of the populations in the region, often more important
than pure ethnic issues; these are poorly addressed by local actors
as well as the international community. Economic underdevelopment,
unemployment and macro-economic instability are cited as the main
causes of civil unrest and political apathy towards the political
elites. The EU should confront such questions which are closely
connected with the stability of the political process and the
security of the wider region. While policy makers acknowledge
the issue, it is not always clear whether they always regard this
as a top priority. Their priority instead goes to institution
building, trade liberalisation and regional cooperation.
The need to increase local ownership has been
frequently mentioned but the reality is that the international
community does not trust local players and ends up acting in a
denigrating way. The protectorate mentality is highly prevalent
in that part of Europe. More consultation is needed and sensitivities
to local views should be accounted for. The European Union has
to improve its ambiguous image in the Western Balkans, through
a more effective public relations exercise and a less patronizing
attitude. There is serious skepticism in Serbia-Montenegro, unfavourable
feelings in Kosovo and ambivalent attitudes in Bosnia-Herzegovina
which generate the lack of consensus needed for the reform process.
In sum, the EU can have great leverage in the
region because there is simply no other international option that
can act as an anchor to the process of change. EU membership remains
a long-term project but should not just be an end in itself. It
is what the EU does with the process that matters. In this unusual
and quite difficult regional situation, the EU has to strike the
right balance between sticks and carrots, conditions and rewards,
maintain a genuine commitment and involvement, and respond to
local demands.
Dr Othon Anastasakis
Director
South East European Studies Programme (SEESP)
European Studies Centre, St Antony's College, University
of Oxford
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