Examination of Witnesses (Questions 165-179)
30 NOVEMBER 2004
MR DENIS
MACSHANE
MP AND MS
KAREN PIERCE
Q165 Chairman: Minister, may I welcome
you again, with Ms Karen Pierce, your colleague. As you know,
today we are dealing with the Western Balkans as part of the continuing
inquiry of the Committee. We are looking at the southern area,
the more difficult area. Perhaps I should say the order in which
we propose to take the subjects: Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro,
Bosnia and Herzegovina and, finally, Macedonia. Minister, you
will recall that in March there were the riots in Kosovo which
left 19 dead and over 1,000 injured, with many internally displaced
persons. It is said that that came as a wake up call to the complacency
of the international community, and that was followed by the report
commissioned by the UN Secretary-General, and written by Kai Eide,
the Norwegian Ambassador to NATO. It made a number of key recommendations.
Ambassador Eide said, for example, and I quote: "The international
community is today seen by Kosovo Albanians as having gone from
opening the way to now standing in the way. It is seen by Kosovo
Serbs as having gone from securing the return of so many to being
unable to ensure the return of so few." Most people apparently
felt in the area that UNMIK[1]was
both remote and arrogant. Can you give some indication of the
Government's response to that? Where in your own judgment, and
that of the government, did UNMIK fall short, which precipitated
these ethnically based riots in March of this year?
Mr MacShane: I would say, Mr Chairman,
having visited regularly in Kosovo since being appointed a Minister
in 2001, that those events were an accident waiting to happen;
that with 60 to 70% unemployment amongst the people of Kosovo,
if you look at the photographs of the rioters many of them still
had their sixth form school satchels in their hands, with UNMIK
unable to deliver what the Kosovans want, which is a country over
which they have some sense of control, with the KFor[2]troops
not adequately prepared at that time for riot controls. We had
examples of some contingents having to open with heavy machine
gun fire because they had no experience, no training, and no planning
for riot control. British and Irish troops behaved exceptionally
well, and we have since altered the terms under which troops from
Europe and other countries serve in Kosovo so that they can get
involved in riot control situations adequately. I also believe
that political statements from all the politicians in the region
were not helpful. I remember saying, if I could quote a private
office conversation with my Private Secretary, that remarks made
in the parliament in Belgrade at the beginning of March, to the
effect that Kosovo was for ever going to remain under Serb control
would be a tremendous provocation. I remember discussing it with
colleagues. I have said all this to Mr Kostunica and Serb politicians,
and should I issue a statement? And he said, "No, no, stay
out of it."
Q166 Chairman: If it was an accident
waiting to happen, if the Foreign Office had sufficient foresight
to recognise that this was going to happen, what did the Foreign
Office do about it?
Mr MacShane: We did what we have
been doing consistently, since the excellent report which you
produced in 2001, which is to urge the authorities in Belgrade,
the authorities in Pristina to have a proper dialogue, to understand
that a new relationship was needed, that is the first point; to
urge the UN in New York to have less UNMIK and more Kosovo, as
I have put it; to urge the Kosovan authorities to accept their
responsibility for the Serb communities in their midst, and to
say that KFor has to understand its riot control and police mission
and not simply the heavy military mission that it undertook when
NATO arrived in 1999.
Q167 Chairman: Are you saying that those
efforts fell totally on deaf ears?
Mr MacShane: Not on deaf ears.
I am always close to Oscar Wilde when he said there is only one
thing worse than advice and that is good advice; but the plain
fact is that in both Belgrade and Pristina you have people who
think profoundly that they are right and the other side is wrong,
and we have in the United Nations, in my judgment, insufficient
flexibility and adaptability to see that UNMIK should be a very
temporary mission there and the object should be to transfer authority
and responsibility locally.
Q168 Chairman: What has happened since
March? What have we done our best to insist upon, which has resulted
from these March riots?
Mr MacShane: KFor's modus operandi
has changed; the "caveats", to use a technical phrase,
that a lot of the military contingents there used to have, have
now been lifted so KFor soldiers can operate. When I met the German
General Officer commanding KFor just after the riots he said,
"Look, I have 18,000 troops under my command, nominally,
and I can put about a tenth of them on the streets if something
like this happens," and I thought that was ridiculous. That
was because we have some European countries that would not allow
soldiers to leave the barracks unless there was almost a Cabinet
meeting to authorise it. It is not the way the British Army operates
but lots of other countries are profoundly committed to retaining
vetoes of how their troops move and operate and do not want their
soldiers to be under the command of an international force, like
in KFor, but doing what the General wants, not what the capital
of the country wants. Secondly, we have had the Eide report, which
you have referred to, which has highlighted the problems of the
UNMIK operation bases in Kosovo, and called for a more dynamic
policy, called for a streamlining of UNMIK, and that has been
accepted by the Secretary General. I am now dealing with my fourth
Special Representative in Kosovo. I thought Ministers were meant
to come and go and civil servants were permanent, but I am now
dealing with the fourth UN Super Functionary in Kosovo.
Q169 Chairman: When you took office,
whenever it was?
Mr MacShane: Mr Peterseon, yes,
came in.
Q170 Chairman: So the fourth since you—
Mr MacShane: Since I became Minister
responsible for the Balkans in 2001. So there has not been that
continuity of administration. But I think he is going in the right
direction, he has certainly been well received by colleagues in
New York, by the EU and by capitals in Europe, and the object
all along for the British Government is to plead for more
responsibility to be given to Kosovan authorities, and we are
now seeing the transfer of competences which, frankly, I think
should have been transferred some time ago.
Q171 Chairman: That leads naturally and
finally to the Eide report in July, which suggested effectively
a restructuring of UNMIK, in two stages. First, the streamlining
of the administration, more transparency of the pillar structure,
then a more substantial restructuring in 2005. We believe that
the Secretary-General and the Security Council have accepted the
Eide report. What comments do you have on what he has recommended?
Mr MacShane: I think the recommendations
certainly go in the right direction. A lot depends on the quality
of people sent down there; that we have people prepared to accept
responsibility, who are living there permanently and who understand
that Kosovo has to become Kosovo and accept that it has responsibility
over as much area of its life as possible under United Nations
Security Council resolutions, and I think next year we will see
a lot more of that happening. But there are other players involved
and when a huge part of what UNMIK has to do is to deal with a
security situation because the political relationship between
Belgrade and Pristina is not satisfactory, then they cannot get
on with just, as it were, doing themselves out of business. My
constant worry, Mr Chairman—and I put it on the record for
the Committee—is not so much the occasional flare-up—even
the most worrying sort that we saw in March, but a long period,
years and years, decades of stagnation.
Q172 Chairman: Of drift.
Mr MacShane: Of drift, of nobody
quite having an answer, nobody prepared to cut "Gordian knots",
if you will excuse the cliché. I have said to friends in
Kosovo and in Serbia that my worry is that in 30 or 40 years'
time there will still be a bit of UN, there will still be a bit
of KFor, still be Kosovo not quite being Kosovo, still being Belgrade
and Serbia—and I am concerned about the plight of Serbs
and the Serbian patrimony and cultural history in that area—and
we should not allow that to happen.
Chairman: Thank you. Ms Stuart, please.
Q173 Ms Stuart: Do not worry using technical
terms such as national caveats because I think they are relevant
to what you have just said. Our understanding was that the troubles
in March were officially described as a failure in intelligence,
but probably were more a failure of troop deployment on the ground,
and I understand that the German Bundestag are having a parliamentary
inquiry into the conduct of their own troops and they have been
changed subsequently. Is there anything that you can say on the
record as to how we perceive what has happened to those national
caveats on the ground, because they have not all been lifted?
Mr MacShane: Unfortunately there
are not really many British troops left in Kosovo because the
Ministry of Defence decided to transfer British soldiers principally
up to the Bosnia and Herzegovina region for operational reasons.
In discussion with the military on the ground they could not call
out their troops; they were not equipped with riot shields, water
cannons, tear gas, the usual necessities for dealing with an angry,
disturbed crowd. I am not sure that Intelligence could have dealt
with that. As I understood it, this was in response to the tragic
death of three young Kosovans further north, in Mitrovica, which
reported quite erroneously and irresponsibly in the Kosovan Press
as having happened at the hands of Serbs. So what was a tragic
incident was turned into an ethnic cause of the violence by very
irresponsible reporting by Kosovan newspapers, which I condemned
then and I condemn now. By the time the crowd started moving on
the streets there were so many scores and thousands of them that
the very thin blue line which represents the UN in Kosovo was
not able to contain them. Some soldiers were not able to leave
the barracks and those that did were not equipped—did not
even have plastic shields, they were having to open fire with
heavy machine gun rounds. So a lot of lessons were learnt. We
have an Army unit in place in Kosovo when what we probably need
is a very good CRS-type police force or gendarmerie, or an Army
trained, for example, like British soldiers and Irish soldiers
because of the difficulties in Northern Ireland.
Q174 Ms Stuart: May I just press you
more specifically because if lessons were learned what were they?
And despite the fact that there were fewer troops there, it would
be helpful for the Committee for its report, that there are specifics
to say what has happened as a result of this in changes on the
way that troops are being deployed.
Mr MacShane: NATO has taken this
very seriously; it was a wake up call to NATO and as a result
a number of countries have lifted their caveats. That is to say,
soldiers of the Crown[3]now
do what their local General Officer commanding instructs them
to do, and do not phone up their capital cities to get specific
permission from ministries. The Danes, the Belgians, the Spanish
still have caveats in place[4]and
I would, through this Committee, ask them to withdraw those caveats,
so that Danish, Spanish and Belgian soldiers can do what soldiers
should do, which, when a riot breaks out, is to move into appropriate
positions as decided by their officers commanding on the ground.
The Germans, as has already been indicated, are discussing this
in the Bundestag and I hope again that any German caveats can
be lifted. But bear in mind that Britain does not have many soldiers
on the ground[5]and
so perhaps we are not in the best place now to start giving advice
and instructions to other countries. Ms Pierce would like to say
something.
Ms Pierce: Just to add one point
of detail. Whereas in March ComKFor[6]did
not have his own reserve that he could call on, so had to ask
NATO forces to send national troops, thanks largely to Anglo-French
cooperation in NATO pressing for this he now has a dedicated tactical
reserve which he can also use to exercise in non-emergency situations
as a disincentive, as well as crisis ones
Q175 Ms Stuart: That is helpful for the
record. Following on from the Kai Eide report, there is a big
debate about status and standards, and the linking of status with
standards, and we picked up on the ground that there is a feeling
of unease of that very close link between the two. Could the Minister
tell us whether we are now separating the two slightly more and
moving faster towards status and probably be prepared to compromise
on some of the standards?
Mr MacShane: What I have said
to the Kosovans is that whereas a year ago the only watchword
was standards before status, the discussion now is standards and
status and what I have said to colleagues and friends in Belgrade
is that it is their obligation, in my judgment, to start cooperating
in a much more positive way, to understand that the moment has
come to say, "Do vidjenja" to Kosovo and Kosovo is not
going to be reincorporated fully as a part of Serbia and Montenegro
and they have to allow Kosovo to be Kosovo. What I have said to
friends in Pristina is that if modern Europe were all interdependent
that they have to show that they can accept responsibility for
looking after the interests of all of the people who live in the
area of Kosovo. So what we are seeking to do is to maintain the
emphasis on standards. We want all people living in Kosovo to
do so without fear, and the issue of status undoubtedly is on
the discussion table. It is not a negotiating point yet. We want
to see the local police trained up; we want to see everybody complying
fully with the international tribunal in The Hague. Equally, I
do not think anybody in the international community is happy with
the notion that it is just another five years and another five
years without some resolution.
Q176 Ms Stuart: I have heard you several
terms use the phrase "Let Kosovo be Kosovo". How multi-ethnic
is that Kosovo, which we would allow it to be?
Mr MacShane: We want a multi-ethnic
Kosovo just as we want all parts of Europe to be multi-ethnic.
Q177 Ms Stuart: I would like to pin you
down a little more. Given the events of last March and given that
debate about standards and status, are some of the standards which
the government may negotiate on a bit more negative in relation
to multi-ethnicity?
Mr MacShane: No. It is not fair,
perhaps, to read into the record a map, but you see here this
map of Kosovo and the Serbs are everywhere. So multi-ethnicity,
if that means Kosovan Albanians and Serbs living in the same territory,
is unavoidable. I have been—and perhaps the Committee has—to
villages where the first 400 metres are Serb houses and then exactly
the same houses for the next 400 metres are Albanian houses. So
the bulk of the Serbs in Kosovo live south of the River Ibar and
therefore multi-ethnicity is not a slogan, it is the natural future
of Kosovo in which all of its citizens, all of whom are people
who are European citizens, have the right to live, go about their
business without fear. I do not expect them necessarily to love
each other, and there is no country in Europe where every community
loves every other community, but we live under one rule of law.
Q178 Ms Stuart: Do we have any figures
on what happened to the Serbian population over the last 12 months?
Has there been a shift? We can leave that for later.
Mr MacShane: I am happy to write
to the Committee on that. I have not myself got in my head that
great population movement is an issue. There has been a modest
level of return. I have some figures here but these are returns
2000-04, it is a total of some 10,000 of which 5,200 are Serbs.
But that is over four years, so I do not think these figures are
extremely significant.
Q179 Chairman: What would be helpful
if we had those who are internally displaced and those who had
left for Serbia. Whatever figures are available, if those could
be sent to us?[7]
Mr MacShane: I am happy to do
that, Mr Chairman.
1 UN Mission in Kosovo. Back
2
Kosovo Peacekeeping Force. Back
3
Note by witness: By which is meant soldiers of national
military forces deployed under NATO Back
4
Note by witness: As at 30 November 2004, NATO assessed
that both Belgium and Spain had national caveats applying to their
forces in KFor. In the case of Denmark, the only National Caveat
applied states that Danish forces cannot be placed under EU command. Back
5
Note by witness: KFor currently comprises approximately
17,000 military personnel from over 30 countries (including some
250 troops from the UK) with troops coming from 30 NATO and Non-NATO
nations. Back
6
Commander, Kosovo Force. Back
7
Ev 91 Back
|
