Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence

Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 December 2004


  During my appearance in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee on 30 November I agreed to provide further information on a number of points raised by members. These are set out below and in the attached annexes. I hope the Committee finds this supplementary information useful and I look forward to reading your report in due course.


  The UN Secretary General's report of 17 November 2004 reported that more minority community members have been displaced in 2004 than have successfully returned to their homes. As at 10 December 2004, 1,951 people (of whom 1,628 are Serbs) who had been displaced in the March violence had not yet returned to their homes. The office in Kosovo of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has told us that the number of returns to Kosovo from internal and external displacement so far in 2004 is 2,165, of which 733 are Serb, 361 Roma, 501 Ashkalia/Egypt, 429 Bosniak, 133 Gorani and eight Albanian. A full breakdown of the figures as at 30 November is attached at Annex A[24]. I would, however, draw your attention to the caveats given by UNHCR, which include the following: All presented figures are based on the information collected monthly from the field, received from various and credible sources. Information is updated accordingly. Due to the complexity of information gathering, this set of information does not necessarily reflect all return movements at the time of reporting.

  The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has stated that there is no mechanism in place to monitor departures from Kosovo, in part due to the complexities inherent in doing so, for example identifying those who had left for good, or those who had left on holiday or for schooling.

What is the UK doing to raise the issue of human trafficking with the Governments of Moldova, Ukraine and Romania and does the FCO intend to support the proposal of a shelter for trafficked women in Kosovo?

  We have already provided information on the UK Government's efforts to tackle organised crime in the Western Balkans, and in particular, human trafficking in Kosovo. The attachment at Annex B answers the Committee's specific queries.

Which UK officials attended the conference in Kosovo on 16 November and why was there no UK Minister present?

  The meeting to which the Committee refers was held by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Mr Soren-Jessen Petersen, with the aim of forming a constructive dialogue with European countries on the issue of forced returns to Kosovo. The UK delegation was led by senior officials from the Home Office. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland were also represented at official level. As the meeting had been timed to coincide with a visit that the Swedish and Norwegian Ministers were making, their Ministers were able to attend.

Why has the UK contribution to policing in Kosovo been reduced, what is the current UK contribution to policing in Kosovo and what is the policy on deploying retired officers in Kosovo?

  The UK continues to contribute a substantial number of police officers in Kosovo, meeting in full its requirement as requested by UNMIK. Of the 15 EU members deploying police to the mission, the UK is the third largest contributor.

  Currently the UK has 80 serving and 20 retired police officers in Kosovo. These include:

    —  64 serving (62 from Ministry of Defence Police and two from other UK forces) and 20 retired officers are with UNMIK Civpol.

    —  Eight serving officers from other UK forces serve in the Kosovo Central Intelligence Unit (CIU),

    —  Two serving and two retired officers are posted to the OSCE-run Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS)

  UK officers occupy key positions in the mission, including Deputy Commissioner of Police Crime Pillar in UNMIK Civpol, the Head of the Kosovo Central Intelligence Unit, Directors in all three (Operations, Administration and Crime) pillars of UNMIK Civpol Headquarters, Head of various operational and special units, and Commanders, or Deputy Commanders, across the five Regions. Overall, UK police occupy 55% of the identified key posts in UNMIK Civpol. At the Kosovo Police Service School, British officers occupy two of the four senior management posts.

  The UK currently has retired officers serving in Kosovo, Macedonia, Jordan and Iraq. Retired officers can often provide specialised skills and experience of high value to missions as well as increasing the pool of potential secondees above that which can be sourced from serving officers alone. The FCO has a special unit responsible for placing UK officers to police missions overseas, called the International Policing and Civilian Placements Team. They recruit both officers who are already retired, and officers who are due to retire imminently from active service. They do not recruit officers who have been retired for such a period of time as would make the skills and experience out-dated. Serving officers are seconded to the FCO during their deployment to a mission and the FCO reimburses forces for each officer's salary and other deployment costs (for example, accommodation allowances). Retired officers are contracted to the FCO for their deployment and the FCO pays their salaries direct.

Would the current draft of the EU Constitutional Treaty allow the UK to recognise Montenegro independence unilaterally if such a situation arose in the future?

  The situation under the Constitutional Treaty would be the same as under the current Treaties. Recognition of a third state remains the prerogative of national governments. However, for wider political reasons, EU member states may wish to do so in unison ie through adoption of a common policy. But the UK or any other Member State could prevent the adoption of a common policy which had the effect of recognising the independence of a third country, because we have retained our veto for primary policy decisions in foreign policy. The Constitutional Treaty introduces only one new area of decision making by Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). (In addition to implementing measures and the appointment of Special Representatives, where the Council is acting on a proposal from the EU Foreign Minister, which he has made on the specific request of the European Council, which acts by consensus). A decision on recognition of a third country would not fall into any of the categories listed for QMV in Article III-300 in the Constitutional Treaty. So there could be no question of the EU position over-riding the UK's position. This would not prevent other EU Member States bilaterally recognising the third state if they so wished. If the UK wished to recognise Montenegro, we could still do so without an EU common policy.

What further practical steps could the UK Government take to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina's EU accession?

  Many of the most important elements of practical support for Bosnia and Herzegovina's (BiH) integration with the EU necessarily are provided by multilateral and international organisations, given the scale of reform. The British Ambassador in Sarajevo, UK Government Ministers and officials support the efforts of the Commission and the Office of the High Representative and lobby the BiH authorities on their behalf. The UK Government also provides substantial support for the reform processes in BiH through a range of activities. We continue to look for further opportunities to contribute to this process where our resources allow.

  The UK already provides significant financial (over £750,000 in the financial year 2003-04) and other support to the High Representative in BiH, whose Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) closely reflects the 16 priority areas for action identified in the EU Feasibility Study published in November 2003. The MIP focuses on entrenching the rule of law, reforming the economy, and strengthening the capacity of BiH's governing institutions, especially at State level, which are all key to helping BiH meet the conditions for the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU.

  The UK also contributes 19% of the EU's CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) programme in the Western Balkans, including in BiH. CARDS provided

65 million to projects in BiH in 2004.

  In addition to these multilateral and international funds and initiatives, the UK also funds a number of bilateral projects designed to deliver reform in areas key for progress towards EU standards—in particular Civil Service and public broadcasting reform. The UK also contributes to the EU Police Mission working on police reform, another initiative that is helping the BiH authorities to meet EU norms in key areas.

Kosovo-Macedonia border delineation issue

  The delineation of the border between Macedonia and then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), now Serbia and Montenegro (SaM), was agreed in February 2001. The agreement meant an area of land was transferred to Macedonia from SaM (including Kosovo) of about 2,500 hectares, with the aim that the administrative arrangements would better reflect the geography on the ground, ie the border would follow a river. Although this was accepted by the UN and the EU, the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) in Kosovo did and does not accept the validity of the 2001 delineation agreement.

  Locals (mainly on the Kosovo side of the border) involved in agriculture and wood cutting have objected to this at a local level. And the various people involved in or affected by this issue talk about different areas of land in dispute. For example, a group of Kosovar (Albanian) farmers in August 2004 said that the land that they owned and wanted back from Macedonia was about 150 hectares. There are many other references to an area of land of about 500 hectares and one claim that it is 2,700 hectares. It is difficult to establish what the Kosovo side think is the amount of land in dispute as there is no Kosovo body with locus to make a formal claim. However, we understand from the constitutional framework, that the SRSG should lead on this. In November 2004, UNMIK agreed to set up a working Commission, which representatives from Macedonia, Pristina and Belgrade (Serbia and Montenegro) have agreed to attend. This is welcome progress on this sensitive issue.

How is the UK is supporting judicial reform in Macedonia?

  Judicial reform is a major priority for the international community in Macedonia. A year ago the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) produced a matrix highlighting areas of judicial reform which need to be tackled, with a list of possible projects for donors to consider. The major donors such as the EU (CARDS), OSCE (to which the UK contributes funds) and USAID tend to take on the larger projects. On a bilateral basis, individual countries tackle smaller issues. The UK, through the British Association for Central and Eastern Europe, has contributed through the organisation of a series of seminars on Alternative Dispute Resolution. Working with a local NGO, Polio Plus, the UK has also successfully lobbied for a change in laws ensuring better rights for the disabled. We also supported a project monitoring corruption in criminal cases.

When will Macedonia (and Albania and Croatia) join NATO?

  There is no clear date for accession for Macedonia, Albania or Croatia. NATO considers membership only when Allies assess that aspirant countries have made sufficient progress in implementing the reforms covered by NATO's Membership Action Plan. Membership for these countries depends on further progress across all areas of reform, including political and defence reform, regional cooperation, and fully co-operating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

How is the UK supporting privatisation in Macedonia and the Western Balkans more widely, and the protection of assets?

  Notes are attached at Annexes C and D, using information provided by the FCO and the Department for International Development.

Denis MacShane

Minister for Europe

20 December 2004

Annex B


  The UK is committed to fighting the serious crime of trafficking in human beings, particularly in the key area of South Eastern Europe. The FCO is a member of Reflex, the multi-agency taskforce set up in 2000 to tackle organised immigration crime. Through Reflex we have established a network of Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) covering 22 key source and transit countries in Europe, including Bulgaria, Romania (also covering Moldova) and Ukraine. Their role is to work with host governments and their law enforcement agencies to disrupt and dismantle criminal groups involved in trafficking in human beings. Examples of this work include Reflex Romania and Reflex Bulgaria. The aim of these projects was to establish central intelligence units to focus on organised immigration crime originating in and transiting through Romania and Bulgaria. The UK provided specialist intelligence training and equipment as well as attaching senior UK police and immigration officers in an advisory capacity.

  Reflex has also funded projects to provide specialised immigration training and advice to border guards in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro.

  Tackling trafficking in human beings is a key part of the FCO's Strategic Priority 2. As such, our Posts throughout the world, and in South Eastern Europe in particular, engage regularly with host governments on these issues. We also provide practical assistance to help address this problem. For example, in November 2004, the Balkans Global Conflict Prevention Fund (GCPP) agreed to fund a Save the Children Fund project which aims to build capacity to fight child trafficking in Serbia and Montenegro. This work is due to start in January 2005.

  Sir John Stanley asked about a project to fund a shelter for trafficked women in Kosovo. The shelter is being funded by the Swedish government. We are, however, in consultation with the organisation that runs the shelter about funding an awareness raising project in Kosovo. We hope to receive their project proposal soon.

  We are also involved in the region on a multilateral level. This includes through the OSCE whose Ministerial Council endorsed an Action Plan on Trafficking in Human Beings in December 2003. To implement the Action Plan, the OSCE appointed Helga Konrad, as its Special Representative on the Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings, in spring 2004. She is a former Austrian Minister for Womens' Affairs.

  Helga Konrad heads the "Alliance Against Trafficking in Persons" formed by the OSCE on 23 July 2004. Her remit covers the whole OSCE area, covering countries of origin, transit and destination.

  We also work closely with our EU partners, NATO, international organisations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and NGOs such as the International Organisation for Migration.

Annex C


  This note provides information on the present situation regarding privatisation in selected countries of the Western Balkans. It demonstrates, by country, the work being done by the UK Government in supporting the privatisation effort. Principally, this has been via the Department for International Development (DFID), although they have only been directly involved in the privatisation process in Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The UK has also provided support to the privatisation process through selected lobbying activity and indirectly in each country through the activities of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).


  The EBRD assesses the progress with privatisation across the Western Balkans annually[25]. Figure 1 shows the aggregate progress each country has made in comparison with selected Eastern European countries at different stages of transition. Whilst Croatia and Macedonia have relatively advanced privatisation efforts, particularly for the less politically sensitive "small-scale privatisations", SaM and BiH are have clearly made less significant progress. Figure 2 suggests some of the consequences of this. Compared with the more advanced transition countries, the private sector contributes relatively little to GDP in BiH and SaM.

  This differential performance reflects several factors. Firstly, BiH and SaM embarked upon privatisation later than most other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, so it is not surprising that they are behind. Secondly, the Former Yugoslavia had a large "socially-owned" sector in addition to the state-owned sector. Whilst nominally owned by the firms' employees, in practice, establishing the precise ownership of these firms was an additional complication in the privatisation process.


  Although some privatisation was attempted in the early 1990s, the sale of socially-owned and state assets on a large scale only started when the liberal Serbian administration was elected in late 2000. DFID was in at the earliest stages of this, advising the authorities on strategy, the status of the many socially and state-owned enterprises, the required legislation, and the establishment of the institutions required to progress the various components of the nation's privatisation strategy. These inputs were closely co-ordinated with a range of multilateral and bilateral donors.

  For two and a half years dramatic progress was achieved, particularly in the privatisation of "attractive enterprises". However, political instability during 2004 and the new government's decision to revise their predecessors' privatisations (abandoned later in the year), significantly reduced the pace of privatisation and the appetite of potential investors. However, momentum seems to be growing again and recent changes to the law, including the facility to write-off firms' state debts in advance of privatisation, will help. The Government hopes to realise some value from privatisation to contribute to its 2005 budget.

  DFID has supported the Serbia Privatisation Agency since April 2002 with a targeted package of technical assistance. The support to the Privatisation Agency came in two forms: a small project to recruit appropriately qualified local staff and remunerate them for an initial period to get the institution off the ground, and assistance provided through a DFID-funded consultancy contract with Deloitte & Touche. The total value of support to date is around £1.4 million.

  The Deloitte & Touche advisers funded by DFID focused on activities not covered by other donors and included:

    —  A part time strategic privatisation policy adviser for the Minister.

    —  A full time expert working within the Restructuring Department of the Agency.

    —  Part time advisers working on the restructuring of enterprises selected as a priority for restructuring.

  DFID's current package of support will continue until the end of 2004. It is envisaged that further advice to the Privatisation Agency will then be provided by the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) through the CARDS programme.


  The privatisation process in Kosovo has been contentious and, as a result, slow. In late 2000, a process of "commercialisation" for the socially owned enterprises (SOEs) was started as an interim measure before a privatisation strategy could be agreed. This involved the leasing of companies for a fixed period. In mid-2002, a privatisation strategy was agreed which, amongst other rules, stipulated that a fee of 20% of the sales price would be distributed to current workers and that all privatisation proceeds would be held in trust pending resolution of Kosovo's final status.

  The Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) was established in June 2002 to manage the privatisation process. It adopted a "spin-off" model whereby the shares of new corporations would be sold off and the proceeds held in trust. A Special Chamber of the Supreme Court was established to process claims from the former owners. Initial waves of privatisation were successful, with the first and second rounds raising

29 million. However, the third wave was cancelled in October 2003 to consider legal questions associated with the process. One aspect of this was the legal risk to the managers of the KTA.

  After long delays, the process was relaunched in July 2004 with the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) beginning a third wave of tenders. This round was successful, raising over

16 million. In October 2004, a fourth wave was launched.

  DFID have not been involved in Kosovo's privatisation process. Initially, USAID had a large influence, but more recently the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) has been most heavily involved. However, throughout this process, HMG has remained engaged, lobbying for the privatisation momentum to continue. The British Office in Pristina has been lobbying Pillar IV (the EU led reconstruction and economic development component of UNMIK activity in Kosovo) and UNMIK (including the SRSG), encouraging them to press ahead with privatisation. This has been supplemented by discussions with UNMIK to clarify the legal issues related to privatisation and through liaison with local stakeholders (including the Government and Trade Unions) to explain the benefits of privatisation and encourage compromise. Additional lobbying has also taken place in New York (to the UN) and Brussels (to the European Union) to push the process forward.


  Both the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation (FBiH) privatise in accordance with their Entity laws. To date, the privatisation of small, former state-owned companies has been relatively successful. Some 74% have been sold in the FBiH and 51% in the RS by the end of 2003. These have been bought mainly by private investment funds or management/employee buy-outs. Nevertheless, neither have they created appreciable cash in the longer term nor have they produced any notable new markets.

  There is a need for restructuring PIFs to have a positive impact on strengthening corporate governance in privatised enterprises. But progress in privatising the large, state-owned companies (companies with assets of over £180 k or employing more than 50 staff) has been patchy. Only a quarter of the companies in the FBiH have been fully privatised and only about one third of those in the RS. And whilst voucher privatisation has taken place in both Entities, this had little impact on the economy as a whole. Indeed there have been a number of notable past privatisation failures, particularly in the RS such as Banja Luka Brewery and the Fruktona fruit juice company. The paucity of privatisation experience, the unwillingness on the part of politicians and the inflexible existing legislation have all contributed to such failures.

  From 1998 to 2001, DFID was involved in providing some technical advice to BiH on privatisation. However, the voucher privatisation that has been implemented has not been successful and the attempts by a range of donors to sell over 50 "strategic" enterprises by tender to individual investors has to date been highly unsuccessful. Over the last year DFID has been working with a range of donors, in particular the World Bank, to agree a range of corporate restructuring initiatives to help complete a privatisation programme, and, more importantly, rehabilitate or close down the many voucher-privatised companies which struggle to survive.


  After independence in the early 1990s the first round of Macedonian "privatisations" took place whereby workers were granted shares of the companies they worked for according to their years of service. The former managers often returned to their previous positions and poor corporate governance as well as limited access to capital meant that few such firms became profitable. As a result, the shares were frequently used to settle debts (for example to utilities companies), and in many companies, the Government returned to its position as majority shareholder, which meant a further round of privatisation. However, few of the previous share transactions were registered, generating uncertainties over legal ownership during the subsequent privatisation process.

  The UK has provided indirect support to this process, through the World Bank's programme. When the World Bank stepped in to advise on selling off the remaining 22 ex-state owned industries in 2002, UK consultants were appointed to advise on the second round of privatisations on a highest price bid basis only. Eventually all 22 were sold to the highest bidders, with no strings attached.

  Privatisation in Macedonia is now largely considered complete. The Agency for Privatisation will be officially closed on 31 March 2005 (it was supposed to close at the end of this year). Since the process began 10 years ago, 1,687 state owned companies have been privatised and

2.2 billion realised, whilst only 79 companies are considered as not privatised. However, some large "strategic" Public Enterprises and Utilities (eg the Water Companies, ESM (Electric Power), the Railway, MK Forest) remain in state hands. A new law on the Transformation of Public Enterprises should be adopted next year and this will clarify the future of these enterprises.

  The near-completion of the privatisation process means that a significant drain on the Government's budget has been eliminated. However, in mid-2004, the IMF noted[26] that the boost to efficiency and foreign investment from privatisation had been smaller than hoped. Their report concluded that the mechanism chosen for privatisation, combined with inconsistent application of International Accounting Standards and continued indirect subsidy from the Government, generated poor incentives to restructure and invest in the newly privatised companies.


  Croatia is probably the most advanced amongst those considered here in terms of its progress with privatisation. The Croatian Privatisation Fund (CPF) anticipates that small-scale privatisation will be completed by June 2005. This ambitious privatisation programme is proving difficult to meet, hampered by slow progress, lower than expected revenues and lawsuits. Some large-scale privatisation has now taken place, including most of Croatia Telecom and part of Ina (Croatia's oil company), but the expected privatisation of HEP (Croatia's power company) continues to be delayed. The Government is being urged by the IMF to step up the privatisation process through the CPF and to accelerate the privatisation of habitually insolvent companies - particularly the shipyards and steel companies, which do not form part of the CPF portfolio.

  Whilst the CPF complains that no international bidders are coming forward and that they have difficulty packaging deals which the market will accept, a lack of transparency explains some of this difficulty. Potential investors from the UK and elsewhere are frequently put off by the time and money involved in conducting due diligence and in producing bids which are rejected on minor technicalities, or the entire process is voided, amid allegations of corruption or mishandling, and a new tender issued. Investors are also deterred by a lack of confidence in the judicial system and the land registry.

  The UK is not directly assisting Croatia's privatisation, although various consultants have worked with the government at times on preparations for the privatisation of large state companies. Additionally, the UK has supported World Bank projects aimed at enterprise restructuring.

Annex D



  The ability of a company to protect its assets depends on several factors. Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA—part of the World Bank Group) can provide foreign investors with some protection, but domestic investment is affected by the domestic legislation. Where domestic legislation exists to a sufficient standard, its implementation, and a company's ability to enforce it through legal proceedings can vary widely. Investment (both domestic and foreign) would likely be deterred by the absence of legislation, but a more serious deterrent in the Western Balkans is the slow or biased application of legislation.


  The UK has IPPAs with some of the countries of the Western Balkans. These bilateral treaties are designed to encourage investment between States by giving investors confidence that their investments will not be subject to unfair treatment or discrimination by the government in the other country. The IPPA provides a legal framework for the investor to seek redress from the foreign government for alleged discrimination. The IPPA also provides a de-politicised dispute resolution process without the need for Governments to become directly involved.


  The English text of the UK/Macedonia Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA) was agreed in October 1999. Since then there have been further negotiations with the Macedonian Government over the Macedonian translation of the IPPA. We are currently finalising some amendments to the text and hope to be able to conclude the Agreement shortly.  

Bosnia and Herzegovina

  An IPPA was signed in October 2002 and came into force in July 2003.


  An IPPA was signed in March 1997 and came into force in April 1998.

Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo)

  No negotiations for an IPPA have been instigated.


  MIGA provides insurance services to private investors in order to promote foreign direct investment into developing countries. Part of the World Bank Group, it pays particular attention to post-conflict and extremely poor countries, applying strict social, environmental and governance standards to the investments it works with.

  The insurance is provided on non-commercial insurance to foreign investors. This provides protection against the risks of, inter alia, expropriation, war and civil disturbance, and breach of contract. MIGA also provides technical assistance to developing countries and operates an arbitration process in the event of dispute between investors and host governments.

  Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia & Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia are all members of MIGA, and foreign investors considering investing in these countries are therefore eligible to apply for MIGA insurance.

Domestic Legislation

  Although many countries of the region possess legislation regarding the protection of assets, the ability to enforce these laws through the courts is often difficult. A slightly different, but nonetheless relevant, measure of this is the ability to enforce contracts. The World Bank "Doing Business Report"[27] gives information on the costs associated with enforcing a contractual agreement in countries of the Western Balkans. The table below shows this with comparison to selected Central and Eastern European transition countries:
Data from 2004 Survey Enforcing Contracts
Number of
Time (days)
(% of debt)
Serbia and Montenegro36 1,02823
Bosnia and Herzegovina36 33019.6
Croatia22415 10
Macedonia27509 32.8
Bulgaria34440 14
Romania43335 12.4
Hungary21365 8.1
Czech Republic22300 9.6

  Whereas the number of procedures and time taken (with the exception of SaM) is broadly similar to the selected Eastern European countries, the significant difference is in the cost involved in enforcing the contract. Whilst Croatia is comparable, Macedonia, SaM and BiH all involve costs of enforcement which are significantly higher than comparative countries.

  Although the countries of the Western Balkans often do have laws on asset protection, there are some for which better legislation is needed, all where better implementation is needed (and programmes for judicial reform are underway in many countries), and some which deter foreign companies from markets. Where necessary, we are lobbying for the necessary changes to be made. For instance, in Croatia, the UK, together with the US, France and the European Commission has lobbied intensely for a change in the Drugs Law, enacted in July 2003, which would remove the poor protection of intellectual property rights which act as a deterrent to foreign pharmaceutical companies. Legislative amendments are currently before the Croatian parliament.

24   Please refer to the UNHCR website-Table 2-Minority Returns by Municipality of Return. Back

25   EBRD Transition Report 2004. Back

26   SM/04/263:FYROM-Ex Post Assessment of Longer-Term Programme Engagement, 22 July 2004. Back

27 Back

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