Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
conclude that the accession of the states of the Western Balkans
to the European Union is most desirable and in the interests of
all parties, provided that they meet all the criteria for membership.
We recommend that the Government continue its work to bring the
region into the EU and engage fully with the other member states
to ensure their support for the prospective members in the Western
Balkans. (Paragraph 10)
2. We conclude that
the Stability and Association Process (SAp) took too constrained
an approach to the Western Balkans, and welcome the Instrument
for pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). We recommend that the Government
set out in its response to this Report how the IPA will work.
We also recommend that the Government urge the EU not to take
a parsimonious approach towards the Western Balkans at the risk
of creating a relatively impoverished region within its borders,
and to consult widely with local governmental and non-governmental
organisations in the disbursement of pre-accession funds in line
with CARDS aims. (Paragraph 16)
3. We conclude that
the presence of the United States of America in the Western Balkans
is a crucial ingredient for stability, especially in the fight
against terrorism and organised crime. We recommend that the Government
encourage the USA to maintain its prominent role in the Balkans,
notwithstanding the many other challenges Washington faces. We
also welcome the European Union's determination to shoulder a
greater part of the burden, and conclude that co-operation between
the EU and USA is essential for the maintenance of peace in the
region; the United Kingdom has a special role to play in bringing
US, EU and NATO personnel together at all levels. (Paragraph
22)
4. We conclude that
the Russian Federation has strong interests in the Western Balkans,
in particular in the region's stability, and that the Government
should encourage Moscow to contribute to the stabilisation and
development of the region. However, we have concerns that the
Russian Federation might approach the problem of Kosovo in an
obstructionist manner. We recommend that the Government engage
closely with its EU partners to ensure a positive and proactive
role for Moscow in the Balkans, and stress the importance of stability
and progress in the region to all interested parties, including
the Russian Federation. (Paragraph 26)
5. We conclude that
Croatia has an important role in guiding other Western Balkan
states on the path to the EU, and that such support will help
Croatia's accession process as well as helping its neighbours.
However, we also conclude that Croatia has yet to comply fully
with the Hague Tribunal, and we recommend that the United Kingdom
make clear to Croatia that insufficient effort to secure the arrest
of Gotovina will retard its EU ambitions. (Paragraph 31)
6. We conclude that
many of their neighbours have much to offer the weaker states
of the Western Balkans. We recommend that the Government emphasise
to pre-accession states such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania
that effective and constructive engagement with their neighbours
will reap dividends in the future and win friends in Brussels.
We also conclude that regional co-operation is essential to the
effective development of the Western Balkans. We recommend that
the Government urge neighbouring states such as Albania, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Greece, Hungary and Romania to increase regional co-operation,
and support infrastructural schemes in the Balkans. (Paragraph
37)
7. We conclude that
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
makes a most valuable contribution to the establishment of democratic
values in the Western Balkans. However, we have concerns that
the Russian Federation might undermine its work, and we recommend
that the Government work closely with its EU and US partners to
make clear to Moscow that the OSCE plays an essential role in
stabilising the Balkans. (Paragraph 40)
8. We conclude that Serbian democracy is young
and fragile and that the international community, particularly
the EU and the United Kingdom, must work to promote Serbian political
and economic development. (Paragraph
53)
9. We conclude that Serbia must fulfil its
obligations to comply with the Hague Tribunal and deliver its
war crimes indictees, and we urge the Government to maintain pressure
on Serbia to fulfil its international obligations.
(Paragraph 60)
10. We conclude that defence reform and membership
of NATO's Partnership for Peace are of the greatest importance
for Serbia and Montenegro's integration into the Euro-Atlantic
framework. We recommend that the Government stress that defence
reform is a necessity for both countries and that Serbia cannot
enter PfP until it complies with the Hague Tribunal.
(Paragraph 66)
11. We conclude that
Belgrade's unwillingness to comply with the Hague Tribunal is
one of a number of serious obstacles on the path to EU integration.
We recommend that the international community offer incentives
to Serbia to win support for the EU and to weaken the political
stranglehold of the nationalist Radical party. We also recommend
that the Government re-examine its visa policy to permit short
visits to and educational opportunities in the United Kingdom
for more people from Serbia and Montenegro. (Paragraph 71)
12. We conclude that
tensions in the Presevo Valley are still high and could precipitate
local conflict, but we welcome the success of the Covic plan so
far. We also welcome solid engagement by the international community,
and recommend that the Government support the work of non-governmental
organisations dedicated to reducing ethnic tensions and improving
human rights in the Presevo Valley, Vojvodina and other border
areas, and if necessary consider providing troops for peacekeeping
purposes. (Paragraph 76)
13. We conclude that
the United Kingdom, alongside its EU partners, should increase
its support for projects such as judicial reform, changes in tax
regime, customs reform and other areas of technical assistance
which contribute to Serbian development; the Government should
also examine the possibility of reduced tariffs on agricultural
exports because continued economic weakness is in no one's interests.
We also welcome comments from our witnesses concerning the reduced
threat of organised crime in Serbia, but stress that much work
remains to be done. We recommend that the Government support initiatives
to weaken the hold of organised criminal gangs. (Paragraph 81)
14. We conclude that
Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures is desirable,
but must not occur at the expense of Serbia's legal obligations
to the Hague Tribunal. (Paragraph 82)
15. We conclude that
independence for Montenegro in 2006 is probable, and that it is
unlikely to lead to serious violence or instability. However,
we recommend that the Government strive to minimise the risks
of conflict. We conclude that the international community, including
the United Kingdom, should seek to ensure that the details of
the referendum conform to international norms, should play a role
in monitoring any referendum in Montenegro to ensure its fairness,
and should accept the results of a free and fair poll. We also
recommend that the Government work with the local authorities
to tackle organised crime and help build administrative capacity
in Montenegro, for instance by offering technical support to the
government in Podgorica. (Paragraph 94)
16. We conclude that the increasing possibility
of Montenegro's independence adds to the case for a Post headed
by a United Kingdom-based diplomat in Podgorica.
(Paragraph 96)
17. We conclude that
continued action to resolve the tensions in Kosovo is essential
if the international community is to establish effective state
institutions and to reduce the poisonous atmosphere of ethnic
hatred in Kosovo. (Paragraph 100)
18. We conclude that reform of UNMIK is necessary
to satisfy growing discontent with its performance, most particularly
in the economic arena, and we support Ambassador Kai Eide's suggestion
of a two stage reform. However, we recommend that the Government
urge UNMIK not to rush a transfer of competences if the indigenous
capacity for administration is not in place.
(Paragraph 105)
19. We conclude that
Kai Eide's proposals to transfer competences to and broaden consultation
with the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government are sensible
and could reduce local resentment of the international community
in general and UNMIK in particular. However, we also conclude
that the recent events such as the selection of Ramush Haradinaj
as Prime Minister and the Serb boycott of elections for the Kosovo
Assembly have further polarised the political climate in Kosovo
and could damage efforts to transfer responsibilities in a peaceable
manner. We recommend that the Government work to strengthen moderate
political forces in Kosovo, perhaps by fostering ties with political
and civil society organisations in the United Kingdom and throughout
Europe. (Paragraph 110)
20. We conclude that
decentralisation of government is an excellent way to increase
trust in Kosovo's institutions. We recommend that the Government
work to support Kai Eide's proposals, and provide support for
schemes improving inter-communal relations at a low level such
as the Gnijlane/Gjilan-Presevo-Kumanovo-Trgoviste (GPKT) project.
We also recommend that the Government along with its EU partners
maintain pressure on the Kosovo leadership to devolve government
to the lowest level. (Paragraph 114)
21. We conclude that
the March riots revealed major deficiencies in the security arena.
However, we commend the work of the international community since
then to reduce the number of national caveats and the adoption
of a system of reserves for KFOR, and we recommend that the Government
continue its work to reduce the remaining caveats on troops. We
also recommend that the Government encourage its NATO partners
to prepare KFOR for any eventuality which may provoke further
instability in Kosovo. (Paragraph 119)
22. We conclude that
the international community must do more to develop the Kosovo
Protection Corps (KPC) into a modern, democratically accountable
force with minority representation. We recommend that the Government
call on its partners in NATO to turn the KPC into a force complying
with NATO standards, and to provide both finance and personnel
for training. (Paragraph 122)
23. We conclude that
policing is of the utmost importance for Kosovo's stability, for
the region and for the EU, but that much work needs to be done
before Kosovo can stand alone. The Government and its UN partners
must increase their contribution to policing in Kosovo, by working
towards a more coherent international policing effort; one means
to do so might be for fewer states to focus on policing efforts,
on the same line as building capacity in the customs service.
We also commend the work of the OSCE police training school to
establish a multi-ethnic police force, but stress that much needs
doing, such as training local police officers in modern investigative
techniques and ensuring Serb participation. (Paragraph 128)
24. We conclude that the trafficking of women
and girls both to and through Kosovo is a major problem, and that
while the UNMIK initiatives are welcome, they do not go far enough.
We recommend that the Government work with the EU, US and UN to
establish a unified strategy on trafficking in women and girls,
and that it encourage UNMIK and KFOR to treat any links to trafficked
women and girls by its personnel with the utmost severity. We
also recommend that the Government increase its contribution to
schemes for victims of trafficking, such as offering financial
support to refuges and NGOs in Kosovo dealing with the problem.
(Paragraph 134)
25. We conclude that the state of Kosovo's
economy is a source of intense political discontent, and that
its problems in part stem from doubts about Kosovo's final status.
We also conclude that other serious problems, such as an ineffective
judicial system, endemic corruption, a scarcity of skilled professionals
and the reduction of remittances from Western Europe retard the
growth of Kosovo's economy. We recommend that the Government promote
EU and UN schemes to revitalise Kosovo's economy, offer expanded
scholarship opportunities to Kosovans, and increase its contribution
of personnel to train people in Pristina, in areas such as accounting
and the policing of economic crime. (Paragraph
141)
26. We conclude that the international community
must work to resolve the issue of Kosovo's status as soon as possible,
since deferring the decision will contribute to growing tensions
and make the province increasingly unstable and hostile to the
international community. (Paragraph 145)
27. We endorse Kai
Eide's proposals for combining standards and status, and agree
that a re-evaluation of the standards process is essential. However,
we recommend that the international community should not let the
search for stability divert efforts from establishing minority
rights in Kosovo. We recommend that the Government make clear
to politicians in Kosovo that the fulfilment of human rights standards
is a non-negotiable condition for progress towards status discussions,
and that it urge its US and EU partners to do the same. (Paragraph
150)
28. We conclude that
the scheme for decentralisation put forward by Belgrade would
result in an unacceptable transfer of population and could result
in effective partition of Kosovo. We recommend that the Government
press on its interlocutors in Serbia that their contributions
must take into account the interests of the local population,
as well as the views of Pristina and the international community.
(Paragraph 155)
29. We conclude that
Kai Eide's proposal for increasing the role of the EU while the
UN scales back its operations in Kosovo is a good way forward,
provided the EU establishes a more cohesive policy towards Kosovo.
We also conclude that such a process must include the United States,
given its popularity amongst Albanians, and take great consideration
of Kosovo Albanian and Serbian political sensibilities. We recommend
that the Government urge its partners in Brussels to formulate
a long term plan for expanding the EU's role in Kosovo, and in
particular to outline how it intends to advance this work when
it holds the Presidency of the EU in the latter half of this year.
We also conclude that any resolution of the status issue must
emerge from a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and we recommend
that the Government work with its partners to establish a channel
of communication between the two parties, perhaps by establishing
a EU or UN accredited diplomat as an envoy between the two cities.
(Paragraph 159)
30. We conclude that
success in Kosovo is crucial to stability in south eastern Europe,
and that the international community must tread a delicate path
between the claims of the various parties in order to resolve
the status issue. We further conclude that it is unrealistic to
expect the international community to continue to shoulder the
responsibility of governing Kosovo indefinitely and we agree with
Kai Eide that Kosovo is on the path to independence. We recommend
that the Government acknowledge this reality and work with its
international partners to bring about an independent Kosovo with
full safeguards and protection of the rights of the Serb minority.
(Paragraph 160)
31. We conclude that
the hard work of Lord Ashdown in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
is most commendable. However, we also conclude that plans to reduce
the role of the High Representative are essential to the establishment
of an effective non-dependent state in BiH and we have concerns
about the impact of the Bonn Powers on the evolution of democracy
in BiH. We recommend that the Government encourage its partners
to speed the transfer of competencies to the BiH government at
the same time as increasing EU involvement in BiH, in a manner
conducive to the long term development of democratic standards.
(Paragraph 171)
32. We conclude that
the international community should not impose a new constitutional
structure from outside, but should nurture the state structures
that could make constitutional reform easier. However, we also
conclude that while the Dayton Agreement is a complex document,
difficult to reform, some elements of the existing constitutional
structure, such as the powers of the High Representative (HR),
are more informal and flexible. We recommend that the Government
work with its partners to ensure that the more informal elements
of BiH's constitution are fully incorporated into the emerging
state structures, in a democratic manner. (Paragraph 177)
33. We conclude that
nationalist politics is a natural aspect of the democratisation
process in Bosnia and Herzgovina. However, we also conclude that
the centralisation of decision-making has resulted in a failure
to accept responsibility by BiH's politicians. We recommend that
the Government and its EU partners do more to counteract nationalism
by fostering civil society in BiH and to increase the stake of
the Bosnian people in the political process by encouraging the
integration of Bosnian politicians into the European mainstream,
by fostering exchanges and links with international parliamentary
institutions. We also conclude that BiH's politicians must work
harder to re-establish trust between the communities. (Paragraph
182)
34. We conclude that the launch of EUFOR is
of the greatest importance for BiH and for the credibility of
a European security and defence policy. We also conclude that
the United Kingdom has a special responsibility to ensure that
the transition from SFOR to EUFOR is smooth because of the large
number of senior British personnel involved. We recommend that
the Government work to clarify the different responsibilities
of NATO and EUFOR in BiH, and with military contributors outside
the EU. We also recommend that the Government urge its military
partners to continue their work to reduce the number of national
caveats amongst EUFOR troops. (Paragraph
189)
35. We conclude that
the policy of the High Representative to root out the support
networks of the war criminals is sensible and a means to ensure
thoroughgoing reform of BiH. However, we recommend that the Government
seek to encourage co-operative elements in BiH, for instance by
targeting development aid to those regions which have fulfilled
the requirements of the ICTY and by encouraging the EU and its
constituent states to do the same. (Paragraph 197)
36. We conclude that
BiH has made real progress on defence reform, although more needs
doing; Sarajevo must comply with demands from the ICTY before
acceding to PfP. We recommend that the Government continue its
efforts alongside its NATO allies to support defence reform in
BiH. We also conclude that an effective police service would act
as a crucial prop for the Bosnian state and we recommend that
the Government provide expertise and financial support to the
efforts to establish a national system of policing, and to prepare
for potential problems arising from any response to police reform.
(Paragraph 204)
37. We conclude that
the EU is the ultimate destination for BiH, but that certain obstacles
such as the question of compliance with the ICTY and Bosnia's
constitutional structure slow progress. We conclude that BiH must
enter the EU as a whole, and we recommend that the United Kingdom
provide support in certain technical areas, as defined by "market
share" discussions at the EU level, to speed the process
of integration. (Paragraph 211)
38. We conclude that Lord Ashdown's efforts
to establish the rule of law in BiH are commendable, although
democratic accountability remains a serious concern. We recommend
that the Government stress to its EU partners the importance of
establishing an effective rule of law throughout BiH, and that
it take the lead with them in strengthening the physical infrastructure
and personnel to this end, including the training for judges and
legal employees. (Paragraph 215)
39. We conclude that
the economic development of BiH is central to the region's future
stability and that external powers such as the United Kingdom
and the EU can offer much in terms of aid. We recommend that the
United Kingdom continue to support the reunification of the economy
of Bosnia and Herzegovina through schemes such as the state wide
system of VAT. We also recommend that the Government provide training
in areas which would strengthen the economy, such as accounting
and economic policing, second personnel with relevant technical
expertise, and work with its EU partners to implement infrastructural
projects which will integrate the BiH economy into the European
mainstream. (Paragraph 218)
40. We conclude that
the international community must maintain its commitment to BiH,
for fear that the good work to date be lost. Engagement by the
United Kingdom and the EU with BiH is crucial for the success
of the state building effort. We also conclude that the prominent
role of British personnel in BiH makes success a particular concern
and opportunity for the United Kingdom. However, we retain serious
concerns about inter-ethnic relations, and the weakness of both
democracy and the economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Paragraph
219)
41. We conclude that
the international community must maintain its role in Macedonia,
since its interventions to protect the Ohrid Framework Agreement
have proved successful in ensuring stability. We recommend that
the Government maintain its commitment to peace in Macedonia,
continue to support the implementation of the remaining parts
of the Ohrid Agreement, such as the flags and symbols issue, and
contribute where it can to the final agreed delineation of the
border between Macedonia and Kosovo. A lack of engagement by the
international community could result in another crisis in Macedonia.
(Paragraph 226)
42. We conclude that the recognition of Macedonia's
constitutional name by three of the five permanent members of
the UN Security Council should encourage the United Kingdom to
follow suit. We recommend that the United Kingdom work in unison
with Germany, France and other EU partners to recognise Macedonia's
constitutional name, and encourage the Greek Government by an
act of statesmanship to do the same.
(Paragraph 230)
43. We conclude that
Macedonia's membership of NATO is desirable but that rigorous
standards for entry must apply; Skopje must fulfil all the terms
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. We recommend that the Government
provide technical support on defence reform to Macedonia alongside
its NATO partners, with a particular focus on minority representation
in Macedonia's military institutions. (Paragraph 234)
44. We conclude that
the United Kingdom should support Macedonia's efforts to join
the EU, provided the state complies with the necessary criteria.
We recommend that the Government offer Macedonia technical support
in areas as defined by 'market share' discussion at EU level.
(Paragraph 238)
45. We conclude that
support for economic development in Macedonia, particularly in
the area of legal reform, is essential for its long term stability.
We recommend that the United Kingdom support Macedonia in the
technical areas necessary to bring foreign direct investment into
the state, for instance by funding advice from experts in investment
law. (Paragraph 242)
46. We conclude that
while Macedonia's stability is not yet fully guaranteed, the continued
willingness of its people to avert conflict is commendable. We
also conclude that continued engagement is essential to maintain
stability and that offering greater access to pre-accession funds
might ease Macedonia's movement towards the EU; economic development
would lessen the likelihood of future conflict and contribute
to regional stability. (Paragraph 243)
47. We conclude that the work of the British
Council in the Balkans is essential and we commend the good work
of its Belgrade office, for instance by bringing young people
from across the region together in conferences. We urge the British
Council to expand this work, and to increase educational opportunities
in areas necessary for the effective development of the Balkans,
such as those relating to good governance.
(Paragraph 245)
48. We conclude that
the BBC World Service's contribution to broadcasting in the Balkans
is most commendable. However, we regret the lack of Bosnian programming;
we urge the BBC to expand its coverage to include Bosnia and Herzegovina.
We also recommend that the BBC and the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office work together with the governments in the region to improve
the regulatory framework for the media, for instance by providing
technical expertise to help Belgrade simplify the allocation of
radio frequencies in Serbia. (Paragraph 247)
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