Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Third Report

3 Serbia

41. The conflicts of the last decade have all revolved around Serbia; Misha Glenny told us that he feels "very strongly that the key relationship for the European Union in this region now is Serbia."[46] Serbia's regional dominance—as the 'Piedmont' around which Yugoslavia was constructed—makes a positive dialogue with a reformed Belgrade the key to bringing stability to the Western Balkans.[47]

Political development

42. However, reform in Serbia has taken place only slowly, despite the promise of political change following the October 2000 revolution against the Milosevic government. Perhaps the most potent symbol of this failure to grasp the nettle of reform is the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindic in March 2003.

43. Gabriel Partos outlined the political paralysis that has plagued Serbia. He wrote in his submission to the Committee: "Since the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindic in March 2003, successive Serbian governments have been lacking a firm sense of direction. The current four-party administration of the moderate nationalist Vojislav Kostunica relies for its majority in parliament on the support of ex-President Slobodan Milosevic's Socialist MPs. That has been a serious obstacle in the way of establishing a proper level of co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague…Divisions within the governing coalition add to what many observers see as a drift in policy."[48] The FCO went further, and stated in their submission: "This Government is faced with a daunting set of challenges, a small parliamentary majority, lack of public support (the last poll recorded a total of only 20% support for the government), divergent views held by the various parties and little experience."[49]

44. Stifling efforts at reform are the interlinked networks of organised criminals, hard line military and supporters of the Milosevic regime, which threaten political stability. Touching on the threat of the networks of gangsters, Misha Glenny asked whether "we want to have another situation where a Prime Minister or President of Serbia is pushing through, with the encouragement of Western Europe and the United States, unpopular policies and eventually…is shot as a consequence?"[50]

45. While many people in the west see Serbia as the perpetrator of crimes of ethnic cleansing, the perception of many Serbs that they are victims and the loss of status of their country are major obstacles to progress. Dr Eyal told us that it was important to dispel "the very deep-seated attitude of all Serbs, in all walks of life, that they are the victims of the West and that regardless of what they do, we will never take them seriously."[51] Commenting on Serbian disaffection, Gabriel Partos said: "I think that there is a much deeper disappointment among Serbs about the fact that the state which used to be respected in Europe, which they regarded as being large and influential, has now been reduced to borders last seen during the nineteenth century."[52] On top of the sense of victimhood and the criminal threat, both Gabriel Partos and Misha Glenny commented that two major distractions dominated debate amongst the Serbian political elite—the relationships with Montenegro and with Kosovo.[53]


46. The question of Montenegro's independence is perhaps the less emotive issue in Belgrade. A referendum most likely in early 2006 will decide the future of the union between Serbia and Montenegro. This process will occur under the terms of the Belgrade Agreement, which the EU's High Representative for Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, brokered in March 2002. At present, the two states exist in a state union which replaced Yugoslavia in February 2003, but with a great deal of economic divergence.[54]

47. Describing the current situation, the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro wrote: "Relations between Serbia and Montenegro have, after a lengthy hiatus, been constructed afresh on new foundations and insofar as important institutions are concerned…have actually started to function. In February 2006 at the latest it is anticipated that a referendum will be conducted whereby the citizens of both member republics will decide whether to continue to live together in a single state ...[but] one can say with confidence that there is no danger of violence erupting over this."[55] We heard on our visit that Serbia would like to approach the EU as a member of the state union, but would accept the will of the people as expressed in a referendum.

48. However, the question of the union, if not one liable to plunge into conflict, is a serious and distracting challenge for the political elite. Gabriel Partos told us that it is "likely to re-emerge as one of the key issues on the regional agenda next year. It has the potential to slow down much-needed political, economic and administrative reforms in both republics as attention focuses on whether—or in what shape— he Serbia-Montenegro union should continue."[56] We address the question of Montenegro's independence in Chapter 4 below.


49. Kosovo is a much more emotive issue in Serbia. The riots of March 2004, which left 19 people dead, as many as 1000 injured in Kosovo and forced 4100 to flee their homes, resulted in revenge attacks on mosques in Belgrade and Nis and raised doubts about the international community's policies in Kosovo. At present, Kosovo is formally an autonomous part of Serbia as is made clear in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 which reaffirms "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."[57] However, the FCO wrote in their submission: "There has been a growing recognition within the international community that the status question cannot be left indefinitely. The violence this year…further highlights that the uncertainty over Kosovo's future status is a source of instability in Kosovo, and potentially throughout the region."[58]

50. The existing policy had followed the "standards before status" approach established by former Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Michael Steiner, which required Kosovo to meet satisfactory standards of rule of law, multiethnic tolerance and democratic governance, before the assessment of Kosovo's final status. However, Jonathan Eyal said in his submission: "After the ethnic riots in March this year, it has become increasingly clear that [the standards before status] position is no longer tenable, that the resolution of Kosovo's legal status must be part and parcel of addressing the question of standards of government inside the territory…Final status negotiations may not begin until well into 2005, but they cannot be postponed for much longer."[59] Kai Eide also told us that status negotiations were now essential, and that he could see no option in the long run other than Kosovo's independence.[60]

51. Belgrade, however, staunchly opposes the possibility of an independent Kosovo. Gabriel Partos wrote in his submission to the inquiry: "Serbs (both in Kosovo and in Serbia at large) want Kosovo to remain within the SaM union, or if that union is dissolved, in Serbia itself. But there is an increasing realisation that, whatever the historical links, Kosovo cannot be kept against the will of the vast majority of its inhabitants. However, very few Serb politicians are prepared to declare that in public for fear that it would undermine their support among the electorate."[61]

52. The Kosovo issue is a major concern for Serbia's moderate politicians because of the political strength of the hard line nationalist Radical Party led by Vojeslav Seselj, who is in The Hague awaiting trial for crimes committed in the war in Bosnia. Misha Glenny told us: "The radicals have two sources for their electoral strength. One is poverty and economic decline and the other is nationalism."[62] Nationalism brought the Radicals to a close second in the last presidential elections, and they hold the most seats in the parliament—some 27%.[63] Misha Glenny told us: "Going [to Belgrade] now and telling Serbian politicians that they have to support the idea of a final status which is likely to result in independence of Kosovo is turkeys voting for Christmas. It is no good asking Serbian politicians to do that."[64] Consequently, moves to discuss Kosovo's final status which include independence run a serious risk of sparking nationalist anger in Serbia, although this sentiment should reduce over time. In combination with the Montenegro question, which is less emotive, the Kosovo issue threatens to strengthen regressive forces. We examine the situation in Kosovo in greater detail in Chapter 5 below.


53. We conclude that Serbian democracy is young and fragile and that the international community, particularly the EU and the United Kingdom, must work to promote Serbian political and economic development.

Co-operation with the Hague Tribunal

54. The chief stumbling block in relations between Serbia and the West is the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Co-operation with the ICTY is a prerequisite of Serbia's reintegration into the international community. The FCO submission stated: "The UK attaches particular importance to all countries of the region meeting their international obligations of full co-operation with the ICTY.'"[65]

55. To date, Belgrade has not complied with the demands of the ICTY. Carla del Ponte told the United Nations Security Council on 30 November 2004:

Prime Minister Kostunica has made it clear that he is not willing to arrest fugitives, but only to try to convince them to surrender…this policy has not produced any result so far, and it is in blatant contradiction with the international obligation of the country, namely Article 29 of the ICTY Statute and numerous Security Council resolutions. The Serbian government has deliberately chosen to ignore its legal obligations.[66]

However, Belgrade protests that it is working towards compliance with the ICTY. The Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro said in its submission: "The Government has undertaken to fulfil…all the demands which the Hague and the International Community have placed upon it, wherever it is physically possible and even at the expense of jeopardising the democratic reforms."[67] We await results, although the surrender of Vladimir Lazarevic, a general wanted by the ICTY, is a step forward for Serbia.[68]

56. In their assessment of Serbia's co-operation with the ICTY, the FCO said in their submission: "The ICTY continues to be the most difficult issue for SaM. There was some, albeit insufficient, co-operation from the previous DOS government, including a number of arrests and extraditions (most famously Milosevic), but co-operation largely came to a halt in autumn 2003."[69] The Minister for Europe, Denis Macshane, made clear to us that the United Kingdom remained uncompromising on the issue of co-operation with the ICTY. He said: "We are nine months from the tenth anniversary of Srebrenica…and yet those accused of having some connection or responsibility for those crimes are not being hunted down by the authorities, not being given up for arrest by those supporting them…I find that wholly unacceptable and something the British Government I hope will never easily countenance."[70]

57. Dr Whyte endorsed the United Kingdom's approach to the ICTY, saying: "I would say the view that should be taken is the hard line taken by the British Government…inside both NATO and the EU…consisting of full compliance with the internationally mandated tribunal."[71] He went on to explain the importance of co-operation with the ICTY, saying: "This is a part of the world where nothing is just symbolic, where symbols are of extreme importance."[72] The USA has taken a similarly tough approach by withholding financial aid until Serbia and Montenegro comply with the ICTY.[73]

58. The pressure for compliance with the ICTY is intense, which is a source of concern to some commentators because of the fragility of Serbia's young democracy. A submission from Rinna Kullaa, from the Department of History at the University of Maryland, assessed the impact of the ICTY on Serbia.

The work of the ICTY is costly to the international community. The actions of the Prosecutor's Office during the past four years often impeded democratic parties' attempts to resist the Radicals in Serbia. The Prosecutor's Office's statements are often antagonistic and create outrage within the Serbian public…This attitude has been successfully exploited by the Radical Party to increase support for its anti-Western rhetoric. The Radicals have successfully been able to present an imagined connection between Serbian democratic parties, economic hardships and western disfavour.[74]

In Belgrade we also heard that the badly run Milosevic trial permitted the former leader to present himself as a martyr for Serbia.

59. Misha Glenny outlined his views of the problems with the ICTY. He said: "I think that the ICTY has a function but I think that it has become too politicised and I think it has too negative an impact on local politics. If there is some way of reaching a compromise on this issue in terms of devolving the court's powers into local capitals I think it should certainly be explored."[75] The Serbs would undoubtedly support transferral of some trials, although this presents serious difficulties.[76] Witnesses would be easier to intimidate and corruption in or political pressure on Serbia's judiciary could raise doubts about the validity of the courts' decisions. We heard on our visit to The Hague that ICTY officials have serious concerns about transferring trials.

60. We conclude that Serbia must fulfil its obligations to comply with the Hague Tribunal and deliver its war crimes indictees, and we urge the Government to maintain pressure on Serbia to fulfil its international obligations.

The road to NATO

61. Serbia's aspiration to membership of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, has stalled because of the question of compliance with the ICTY. For obvious, historical reasons, support for membership of NATO is significantly lower in Serbia—only about 30% according to the submission from the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro—than the widespread desire for EU accession.[77]

62. The June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul issued a communiqué on Serbia and Montenegro's progress towards PfP. It said:

Serbia and Montenegro has also shown progress in defence reform, and the government has played a constructive regional role, improving relations with its neighbours. We look forward to further progress in these areas, in particular in relation to the government's engagement on Kosovo-related issues. At the same time, the International Court of Justice cases against several of the Allies still stand.[78] We call on the government to fulfil its international obligations, in particular to cooperate with ICTY and render all necessary assistance to secure the arrest and transfer to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of war crimes indictees.[79]

63. Notwithstanding the obstacle of ICTY compliance, defence reform under NATO auspices is a crucial element of Serbia's development. Misha Glenny stressed the importance of the PfP process. He told us: "NATO accession as far as south eastern Europe is concerned and the Western Balkans is a way of engaging with the West and de-politicising their army; ie it has a real impact on how the societies are structured and behave."[80] Dr Whyte agreed and added that NATO accession "on the ground is of less dramatic effect [than EU accession] but symbolically is of equally dramatic effect."[81] Reform of the sectors with the closest ties to the old regime is of optimum importance; we heard in Belgrade about the continued power of Milosevic's supporters in the defence and intelligence sectors.

64. The United Kingdom plays an integral part in defence reform in Serbia and Montenegro. The UK delegation to NATO described the type of work NATO is doing with Serbia and Montenegro, saying:

NATO initiated a tailored co-operation programme with SaM in 2003 covering defence and security sector reform, civil emergency planning, base conversion and social reintegration of redundant officers. Activities under the programme included seminars, expert team missions and SaM officers attending selected PfP activities. This programme has made a valuable contribution to encouraging defence reform and building confidence with the SaM defence establishment. As NATO's designated Contact Point Embassy from 2002 to September 2004, the British Embassy in Belgrade was able to play an active role in helping to develop and implement the NATO programme.[82]

The Minister also told us that "we have had a British army officer working in the Serb Ministry of Defence, to try and say: 'Look, this is the way you get closer to Partnership for Peace' and to encourage a very high level of contact."[83]

65. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has also played a role in engaging Serbia on the issue of defence reform. For instance, the Political Committee's Sub-Committee on Central and Eastern Europe visited Serbia in April 2004 and reported on the discussions held with its counterparts in Belgrade. The discussions ranged over the problem of ICTY compliance and the Chairman of the Sub-Committee made the point that support for Serbia's membership of PfP was "in support of necessary reforms and not because Serbia had filled all the pre-requisites [of membership]."[84]

66. We conclude that defence reform and membership of NATO's Partnership for Peace are of the greatest importance for Serbia and Montenegro's integration into the Euro-Atlantic framework. We recommend that the Government stress that defence reform is a necessity for both countries and that Serbia cannot enter PfP until it complies with the Hague Tribunal.

The road to the EU

67. The question of compliance with the ICTY also impedes Serbia's path to the EU. Commenting on progress towards the EU so far, the FCO said in their submission: "Serbia and Montenegro's integration into the EU is currently on hold due in part to lack of co-operation with the ICTY and failure to complete an Action Plan to harmonise the two republics' economic systems. The European Commission is considering ways to overcome this."[85]

68. The European Commission assessed Serbia's readiness for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement in March 2004, describing its progress on the SAP as "mixed".[86] The feasibility study stated:

Republican institutions showed resilience and stability following the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic. The ensuing state of emergency, while of great assistance to the Serbian government in combating the immediate threat posed by organised crime, affected, however, the respect for human rights and for the rule of law. The level of progress in political reforms has varied: steady progress in army reform; further progress in the areas of minority rights and regional co-operation; slower than hoped-for reform of the police and judiciary. Efforts have been made to deal with the legacy of the past but this remains an outstanding challenge. Serbia and Montenegro is still failing to comply with its international obligations concerning co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Economic stability has been preserved. However, the pace of structural reforms has slowed considerably, mainly due to the political disputes that have hampered the functioning of the institutions.[87]

Another feasibility study is due in January 2005, but the decision of Javier Solana to cancel a scheduled visit to Belgrade on 21 January 2005 raised serious doubts about a positive verdict from the EU. However, Dr Anastasakis drew attention to the discrepancies between co-operation with the ICTY and the SAp, saying: "As far as linking feasibility studies [to the ICTY] is concerned, and that is a technical process leading towards the start of the Stabilisation and Association process, whether they are sending a war crime criminal to The Hague or not does not tell us much about how able they are to adopt and implement standards. There is this kind of discrepancy. It is, of course, part of the political conditionality but there are other conditions that have to be looked [at] as well here."[88] Compliance with the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership stands as a challenge and an imperative, irrespective of problems with the ICTY. The European Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, however, made clear in January 2005 that without compliance with the ICTY, Serbian cannot advance towards the European Union.[89]

69. The EU can offer incentives for compliance with international standards while maintaining pressure for reform—as its success in encouraging reform in Turkey has demonstrated. With this in mind, we asked the Minister what incentives the United Kingdom and the EU offer Serbia in exchange for compliance with the ICTY. He told us:

We are seeking to negotiate agreements, protocols on trade, customs and other sectoral policies particularly to allow Serbia and Montenegro to grow together...The European Union has put in about 10 million euros-worth of EU funds from CARDS funding. We have given them a preferential trading agreement on sugar, which is a bit sensitive in bits of the sugar producing industry elsewhere in Europe. We, as the British Government, are funding different projects. We are helping out the independent media.[90]

Karen Pierce added that "once the irreducible minimum is past—and it is chiefly Karadzic, Mladic and a constructive regional approach—we, as the British Government, would be prepared to fast-track Serbia through some of the EU and NATO mechanisms."[91]

70. Dr Whyte raised another area in which the United Kingdom and the EU could offer incentives for Serbia to comply with the ICTY. He said: "The mean spiritedness of Western Europe in its approach to the Western Balkans is exemplified best by the restrictive visa regime that exists. The current policy empowers people traffickers and penalises honest travellers. If we want to send a real signal to these people that they are considered as Europeans, we have to allow them to travel here."[92] In Belgrade, we heard that people who grew up in Yugoslavia under Tito's communist dictatorship could travel throughout Europe, but that today their movements are very restricted. This ostracising visa regime is breeding resentment amongst Serbs.

71. We conclude that Belgrade's unwillingness to comply with the Hague Tribunal is one of a number of serious obstacles on the path to EU integration. We recommend that the international community offer incentives to Serbia to win support for the EU and to weaken the political stranglehold of the nationalist Radical party. We also recommend that the Government re-examine its visa policy to permit short visits to and educational opportunities in the United Kingdom for more people from Serbia and Montenegro.

The Presevo Valley and Vojvodina

72. Serbia faces other problems in its northern autonomous region of Vojvodina and the southern Presevo Valley. Our predecessors reported on the conflict in Presevo in their Report in 2001, welcoming Belgrade's willingness to settle the Presevo question peacefully and recommending that the Government make clear to the government in Belgrade that it would be responsible for human rights in the valley.[93] Since that Report, the conflict in the valley has not presented a major threat to regional stability.

73. The Presevo Valley has strategic importance; it borders Kosovo and Macedonia, and is an important north-south trade route through the mountains. Its population is mixed between Serbs, Macedonians and Albanians. Ethnic tensions between the Serbs and Albanians in the valley erupted in 2001, arising from the reintroduction of the Serbian army to the areas bordering Kosovo—their withdrawal was part of the peace agreement which ended the Kosovo war—and the return of notorious paramilitary units who had previously abused local Albanians; this led to a campaign of bombings against police units followed by Serbian reprisals. The spill-over from Presevo was a major factor in the destabilisation of Macedonia in 2001.[94]

74. However, NATO, the USA and the OSCE persuaded the warring parties to adopt the Covic Plan, which had four chief elements. These were: the elimination of any threat to Serbia's territorial integrity; the demilitarisation of the region; the institution of a multiethnic society, for instance by incorporating Albanians into the police force and government; and a programme for economic development. The plan appeared to hold the peace until a number of bomb attacks on police stations took place in 2003. Swift action by the USA and KFOR appears to have stamped out that threat, although in Pristina we heard that low level conflict remains a problem in the Presevo Valley. One way to improve inter-communal relations in the valley is to improve civil society networks, such as organisations which bring mayors or children of different ethnic background together in low level workshops; these efforts could help dispel the prejudices built up by years of nationalist propaganda spread by the state television station.[95] Unfortunately, tensions are still high in the Presevo Valley; the shooting of an Albanian teenager by Serbian border police on 7 January 2005 for illegally crossing from Macedonia has prompted demands from the Albanian community for the demilitarisation of the border region, and even calls for secession from Serbia.[96] This crisis has the potential to escalate rapidly into more serious inter-communal violence.

75. Another issue is the situation in the northern region of Vojvodina, which has a mixed population of Serbs, Hungarians, Slovaks and Croats, who have lived together comparatively peacefully. However, a number of attacks by hard line nationalist Serbs on ethnic Hungarians in the summer of 2004 raised tensions between Belgrade and Budapest and drew attention to the limited nature of Serbian civil society.[97] We heard informally that one way to improve the situation would be to support non-governmental organisations in Serbia which focus on human rights, and encourage Hungarian and Croatian organisations to support their Serbian counterparts. The debate in Hungary on extending Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries is unhelpful in this context, and potentially provocative.

76. We conclude that tensions in the Presevo Valley are still high and could precipitate local conflict, but we welcome the success of the Covic plan so far. We also welcome solid engagement by the international community, and recommend that the Government support the work of non-governmental organisations dedicated to reducing ethnic tensions and improving human rights in the Presevo Valley, Vojvodina and other border areas, and if necessary consider providing troops for peacekeeping purposes.

The economy

77. Serbia's long standing ostracism from the international community has taken a serious toll on its economy. In 2003 its GDP grew by 1.5%, far below the hoped-for 4%, while the trade deficit topped $4 billion, and the current account deficit has reached $1.8 billion. The government has also failed to rein in the budget, with the likely consequence of increasing inflation, and it strains under $13.8 billion in international debt.[98] Inflation will rise to about 12-13% in 2004.[99] The CIA World Factbook states:

Milosevic-era mismanagement of the economy, an extended period of economic sanctions, and the damage to Yugoslavia's infrastructure and industry during the NATO airstrikes in 1999 have left the economy only half the size it was in 1990… The complexity of Serbia and Montenegro political relationships, slow progress in privatization, legal uncertainty over property rights, and scarcity of foreign-investment are holding back Serbia and Montenegro's economy. Arrangements with the IMF, especially requirements for fiscal discipline, are an important element in policy formation. Severe unemployment remains a key political economic problem.[100]

78. The FCO wrote in their submission: "Despite significant progress, especially in terms of legislation and macro-economic reform, both republics [Serbia and Montenegro] need to continue with in-depth reforms on the rule of law and institution building as well as to deal with a large and unsustainable state-owned sector."[101]

79. The Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro naturally presented a more optimistic vision of the Serbian economy, declaring that inflation has now been under control for four years, that GDP was likely to surpass projections, that privatisation had moved forward, and that Serbia had signed an agreement with the IMF, World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The economy's fundamental problems, they stated, were "a traditionally high deficit in the exchange of trade, a high degree of unemployment (13%) and still a very high percentage of 'grey economy'".[102] The FCO agreed that corruption and organised crime were serious problems for Serbia.[103]

80. One major concern for the Serbian economy is the threat posed by organised crime, which plays an important role in the economy given the criminalisation of state structures which took place under Milosevic and the UN sanctions regime. However, we were glad to hear from Gabriel Partos that the problem of crime had lessened in the last year. He told us:

I think that the worst of it is now perhaps behind us because of the very firm action the government took back in the spring/early summer of last year and to the extent that organised crime in many ways dominated Serbia, that situation no longer is the case.[104]

81. We conclude that the United Kingdom, alongside its EU partners, should increase its support for projects such as judicial reform, changes in tax regime, customs reform and other areas of technical assistance which contribute to Serbian development; the Government should also examine the possibility of reduced tariffs on agricultural exports because continued economic weakness is in no one's interests. We also welcome comments from our witnesses concerning the reduced threat of organised crime in Serbia, but stress that much work remains to be done. We recommend that the Government support initiatives to weaken the hold of organised criminal gangs.


82. We conclude that Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures is desirable, but must not occur at the expense of Serbia's legal obligations to the Hague Tribunal.

46   Ev 50 Back

47   Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, (London, 2000), see chapter 6 and Misha Glenny, The Balkans:, 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (London, 1999) p 266 Back

48   Ev 1 Back

49   Ev 66 Back

50   Ev 51 Back

51   Ev 6 Back

52   Ev 10 Back

53   Ev 7  Back

54   International Crisis Group, A marriage of inconvenience: Montenegro 2003, 16 April 2003 Back

55   Ev 131 Back

56   Ev 2 Back

57   United Nations Security Council, UNSCR 1244, 10 June 1999  Back

58   Ev 63 Back

59   Ev 4 Back

60   Ev 110 Back

61   Ev 3 Back

62   Ev 55 Back

63   Ev 66  Back

64   Ev 51 Back

65   Ev 58 Back

66   International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Address by Carla del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council, 23 November 2004, Back

67   Ev 132 Back

68   "Wanted Serb general surrenders", BBC, 25 January 2005 Back

69   Ev 66 Back

70   Ev 82 Back

71   Ev 44 Back

72   Ibid. Back

73   "Serbia and Montenegro assistance", US Department of State Press Statement, 13 January 2005  Back

74   Ev 137 Back

75   Ev 54 Back

76   Ev 132 Back

77   Ev 132 Back

78   Yugoslavia launched a claim in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the bombing in 1999 violated its sovereignty; this was a major obstacle to Serbia's entry to NATO. However, the ICJ found in December 2004 that it does not have jurisdiction to rule on the matter in December 2004, see "The international court in decline", International Herald Tribune, 13 January 2004.  Back

79   US Mission to NATO, Istanbul Summit Communiqué, 26 June 2004, Back

80   Ev 53 Back

81   Ev 43 Back

82   Ev 118 Back

83   Ev 82 Back

84   NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Visit to Serbia and Montenegro by the Sub-Committee on Central and Eastern Europe, 5-7April 2004, Back

85   Ev 60 Back

86   EC DG External Relations, The Stabilisation and Association process, Back

87   EC DG External Affairs, The Stabilisation and Association Process: Third Annual Report Back

88   Ev 44 Back

89   "Has anyone heeded the warning", B92, 26 January 2005  Back

90   Ev 82 Back

91   Ev 83 Back

92   Ev 43 Back

93   Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2000-2001, Government policy towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the wider region following the fall of Milosevic, HC 246 Back

94   International Crisis Group, Southern Serbia's fragile peace, 9 December 2003 Back

95   Ev 51 Back

96   "Albanians to decide this week on co-ordination body", B92, 13 January 2005 Back

97   International Crisis Group, Serbia's U-Turn, 26 March 2004 Back

98   IbidBack

99   "Inflation into double digits", B92, 28 October 2004 Back

100   CIA World Factbook, Serbia and Montenegro, Back

101   Ev 66 Back

102   Ev 132 Back

103   Ev 135 Back

104   Ev 6 Back

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