Written evidence submitted by Rinna Elina
Kullaa, University of Oxford, UK/University of Maryland, USA
1.1.1 Brief introduction to the author:
Born on 28 May 1977 in Helsinki, I remain a Finnish citizen. I
am currently a DPhil candidate at the University of Maryland in
Washington DC, United States. The topic of my doctorate is the
foreign policy of the Former Yugoslavia following the Second World
War. Professor John Lampe, formerly of the United States Embassy
in Belgrade, is my supervisor. My study of Serbian politics began
in 1999. Since then I have travelled to Serbia each year to conduct
interviews and independent research toward my BA and MPhil degrees.
I completed an undergraduate senior thesis on topic of "Opposition
to Milosevic in Serbia in the 1990s" at Columbia University,
New York City, May 2001. The topic of my MPhil thesis (completed
in June 2004 at the University of Oxford under the supervision
of Professor Richard Crampton) is "Democratisation in Serbia
after Milosevic and the Split between Zoran Djindjic and Vojislav
Kostunica." Other academic experience includes lecturing
at the University of Helsinki. I am the author of several articles
and essays on Serbian politics in the 1990s and after the fall
of Milosevic. I served as an advisor to the Ambassador of Cyprus
at the United Nations in New York during 1999 and 2000. I currently
have no affiliation with any governmental or political actor.
I am an independent researcher, author and doctoral student.
ISSUES ADDRESSED
IN THE
MEMORANDA WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO SERBIA
AND MONTENEGRO
(2) The prospect of economic and political
growth in the near future.
(3) Implications of continuing instability
in the Western Balkans for the wider region, and Europe as a whole.
THE PROSPECT
OF ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL
GROWTH IN
THE NEAR
FUTURE
2.1.1 Political growth in Serbia and Montenegro
was hindered by infighting amongst leaders of the former democratic
coalition DOS, which defeated Milosevic in October 2000. The feud
between the Democratic Party (DS), under the leadership of Prime
Minister Djindjic, and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), led
by Federal President Vojislav Kostunica, dominated debate on most
political issues between December 2000 and March 2003. Since 2003
Political groupings have evolved to include additional centres
of power, but pivotal control remains centred around the DS and
the DSS.
2.1.2 Between 2000 and 2003, political decisions
on important issue were made almost entirely along these party
lines. Topics of contention included volatile issues such as Serbia's
future cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, future policy towards Kosovo, and questions
of economic renewal and democratisation of the Serbian political
space.
2.1.3 Amassing of support around Djindjic
and Kostunica, immediately after the ousting of the Milosevic
regime encouraged the continuation of partnerships between political
parties, organized crime and the security forces of the Milosevic
regime.
2.1.4 Dismantling the power structures of
the Milosevic regime was a formidable task in 2000. Over the course
of a decade, the Milosevic government had built strong connections
with internal security and armed forces supported by an economic
system based on illegal sale of goods such as arms, narcotics,
tobacco and alcohol. This vast, exploitative domestic grey economy
severely obstructed the creation of a functioning market economy.
2.1.5 Networks constructed under Milosevic
were able to survive after 2000 and remain intact to this day
for three reasons. Firstly, economic profits made by various actors
on the ground and regimes involved in the Yugoslav conflicts in
the 1990s were far more significant than most literature on the
Yugoslav conflicts suggests. The strength of the surviving profit-making
networks from the Yugoslav wars and attitudes toward them of the
democratic leadership remains a key factor in Serbia's democratisation
processes today.
2.1.6 Secondly, the DS-DSS dispute led to
the protection of some of the most powerful existing networks.
As a consequence of their strong rivalry and relatively equal
power positions, both sides felt they needed selected criminal/security
elements at their disposal to create support and to prevent the
other side from gaining the advantage. Djindjic, as Prime Minister
of Serbia, utilised the Serbian internal security forces to obtain
files containing compromising information regarding Kostunica
and his supporters. Djindjic's authority made it also possible
for him to personally orchestrate the deportation of Milosevic
to the ICTY, in a much-lauded effort that ensured continued international
support for Serbia and Montenegro. However, this authority also
made it possible for Djindjic to gain other advantages over his
opponents with the aid of the previous regime's internal security
structures. Djindjic used his position of influence over existing
media structures to promote media personalities. It was not uncommon
for the DS leadership to feed nightly news directly to the main
television networks in an effort to compromise political opponents,
thus hindering progress toward the development of independent
media. There is even evidence to suggest that these efforts may
have led to the murder of General Gavrilov, who allegedly shared
information with Kostunica concerning Djindjic's use of said security
structures. Moreover, Djindjic's overwhelming authority enabled
him to remove the DSS from government in the spring of 2002 with
measures that did not adhere to parliamentary rules and procedure.
This removal of democratic political opponents through the manipulation
of political power compromised the integrity of the Djindjic government
and the entire democratisation process in Serbia. Mirroring this
behaviour, Kostunica attempted to utilize federal armed forces
and approached some wealthy owners of compromised business and
media interests for political gain. Most importantly, he often
acted against positive steps such as the deportation of Milosevic
and the dissolution of old state industries seemingly merely because
these initiatives had been proposed by Djindjic and the DS.
2.1.7 Thirdly, policy choices of both Djindjic
and Kostunica discouraged the obliteration of organized crime.
Djindjic, a practical entrepreneur, chose to use and attempt to
control existing criminal networks rather than combating them
to build new industry. He attempted to transform organised crime
units into legitimate commercial actors under his personal supervision.
His highly personalised political style gave credibility to this
legally questionable approach, despite the fact that he represented
Serbia internationally as head of such collective bodies as the
Democratic Party and the Serbian government. Kostunica also failed
to remove corrupted domestic elements. Kostunica preserved the
authority of leaders of the federal armed forces, perhaps fearing
the consequences of dismantling these forces. However, his puzzling
decision to retain the military leadership of the previous regime
was explained publicly as an act of loyalty and gratefulness to
these forces that had refrained from harming the Serbian public
and opposition during the stand off with Milosevic following his
defeat. According to this logic, actors formerly loyal to the
Milosevic regime now "deserved" their posts, having
acted with the people and the DOS leadership in 2000.
2.1.8 The creation of opposed poles within
the democratic coalition after the exchange of power in 2000 discouraged
economic renewal in Serbia, despite immediate international support
at the outset of 2001. Dissolution of state-owned companies and
privatisation in general were delayed by the manipulation of economic
renewal issues as pawns in the feud between the DS and the DSS
in the Parliament as well as in the press.
2.1.9 The approximately paralleled electoral
support for the DSS and measure of Djindjic personal influence
(not electoral support) led to successive elections in Serbia
with no clear political direction. Inconclusive election cycles
disappointed the electorate.
2.1.10 By early 2003 it had become clear
to Djindjic and his closest associates that he was unable to control
and transform many of the security/organised crime networks. Protection
of these illegitimate economic elements had stifled the reconstruction
of the economy. Frustrated by failed attempts to legitimise the
illegal elements through his personal influence, Djindjic attempted
to eliminate some of these illegitimate actors. This led directly
to the Prime Minister's assassination in March 2002.
2.1.11 To its credit, Serbian political
leadership was able to survive the assassination of its undisputed
leader. The leadership even dismantled some of the existing criminal
networks in the year following Djindjic's assassination. However,
contrary to many reports, some networks survive today. Evidence
of their power and public notoriety includes apparel with a criminal
network's insignia worn by clan members during the assassination
trial this year. As long as these networks exist, the birth of
a lawful society, placement of the military and the police under
civilian control and a healthy market economy for Serbia remain
wishful thinking.
2.1.12 The existence of criminal/security
networks in Serbia was prolonged by the approach adopted by most
international actors towards the Djindjic- Kostunica feud. The
international community found it easy to embrace Djindjic but
tended to disregard Kostunica. Since 2001, Djindjic and the DS
were characterised as Europe-friendly, progressive, cooperative
players. Kostunica, portrayed as his polar opposite, was viewed
as anti-Western, nationalist, and uncooperative. These characterisations
were based heavily on the politicians' communication with international
actors and had little to do with domestic policies. Such views
are not surprising considering the undeniable intellectual capacity
and formidable personal charm of Djindjic. Kostunica on the other
hand is known for his slowness in political decision-making and
inability to distinguish between domestic and international audiences.
2.1.13 The characterisation of Djindjic
as a desirable partner and of Kostunica as his antithesis led
to an overall lack of critical analysis of the Serbian political
scene within the international community. Once Djindjic had been
identified as the international community's partner, it became
difficult to chastise his personal dealings with organised crime
leagues and other actions that were not conducive to the birth
of democratic politics in Serbia. Instead, his criminal connections
were dismissed on many occasions.
2.1.14 Recommendations for actions the committee
should consider: Events between 2001 and 2003 demonstrate that
while the British interests are well-served by support of democratic
forces in Serbia, the post-Milosevic political spectrum does not
offer infallible Serbian partners. In the past, simplistic analysis
identified Djindjic as a politician with a singularly ambitious
democratisation and reform program aimed at destroying former
structures. This view failed to recognise the extent to which
Serbian democratic leadership was willing to employ criminal networks
(used out of necessity during the transfer of power) for political
gain during the democratisation period. Choosing a preferred partner
and imbuing him with all the qualities desired from him led to
erroneous political analysis and failure to react against his
less favourable policies.
2.1.15 The post-Djindjic period has revealed
opportunities for better power-sharing between major political
actors in Serbia. After Djindjic's leadership was inherited confidently
by Boris Tadic in the spring of 2004, co-operation between the
DS and the DSS has improved. Kostunica enjoys a markedly better
working relationship with Tadic than he did with Djindjic because
their personalities are better suited for co-operation and because
Tadic defeated a coalition of Djindjic's closest allies in the
DS leadership (including Zoran Zivkovic and Cedomir Jovanovic).
Political conflict has not disappeared from the Serbian political
stage after the assassination of Djindjic, but new centres of
political power have gained influence. The economic elite non-governmental
organisation G17 was established as a significant political party.
Vuk Draskovic has returned to politics. The Radical Party has
experienced an alarming increase in support. These changes have
forced both the DS and the DSS to share power and consider more
cautious political alignments.
2.1.16 Moreover, the political year 2004
contains strong signs that the Serbian political space continues
to be very fluid. As an example, the first round of Presidential
elections in June 2004 demonstrated the ability of owners of several
conglomerates in Serbia—the Karic family—to set up
a political candidate a few months prior to elections and gain
19.3% of the popular vote. Support for the Radicals, though significantly
higher in the past year, has also not solidified. Their carefully
orchestrated efforts to destabilise Belgrade during the Kosovo
unrest in Spring of 2004 did not inspire the larger public. Under
these volatile conditions, the international community must carefully
observe the situation in Serbia. Due to the United States' preoccupation
with its own domestic agenda and the great anxiety felt by the
Serbian democratic leadership over the possible return of some
of the political actors of the U.S. Democratic Party (most importantly
Richard Holbrooke), the United Kingdom should take this task even
more seriously. The threat of the Radical group if other forces
choose to align with it is real. The temptation for the democratic
parties towards an alignment with the Radicals will increase in
the next year. The Radicals will be able to offer a significant
part of the electorate if one of the democratic parties becomes
desperate for a partner. Moreover, the Radicals are likely to
mainstream their message, probably in the context of their position
on Europe. While the Radicals should be unilaterally resisted,
organised criminal networks and security structures will be best
dismantled by U.K. efforts to engage a wide spectrum of democratic
parties. Domestic problems in Serbia can only be solved when no
Serbian political force feels that it gains from engagement with
organised crime networks and when all security forces have been
made responsive to a democratic political system.
2.1.17 In an electorate as fluid as Serbia's,
actions should be taken carefully to ensure that no currently
broadly democratic party becomes desperate for allies and engages
the Radicals as their partners. Broad engagement by the international
community also prevents the ability of one domestic political
force in Serbia to present itself as "the West's choice"
and cease political cooperation.
IMPLICATIONS OF
CONTINUING INSTABILITY
IN THE
WESTERN BALKANS
FOR THE
WIDER REGION,
AND EUROPE
AS A
WHOLE
3.1.1 Instability among political forces
in Serbia complicates the work of the ICTY, stands in the way
of solving of the question of final status of Kosovo and complicates
discussion over the future of the union between Serbia and Montenegro.
3.1.2 The work of the ICTY is costly to
the international community. The actions of the Prosecutors' Office
during the past four years often impeded democratic parties' attempts
to resist the Radicals in Serbia. The Prosecutors' Office's statements
and actions are often antagonistic and create outrage within the
Serbian public. The hard line taken by the Prosecutors' Office
in demanding cooperation from the Serbian political forces is
understandable and perhaps desirable. However, the antagonistic
tone and seemingly endless demands of the office (not satisfied
by deportation of Milosevic and several other indicted persons)
represents the disfavour of the international community in the
eyes of the Serbian public. This attitude has been successfully
exploited by the Radical Party to increase support for its anti-Western
rhetoric. The Radicals have successfully been able to present
an imagined connection between Serbian democratic parties, economic
hardships and western disfavour. If this impression of Western
disrespect toward Serbian efforts were lessened, it is likely
that the democratic forces would be able to present more pro-Western
ideas without fearing loss of public support. Much of the Radical
Party's appeal would be neutralised.
3.1.3 The solution of the final status of
Kosovo is fundamentally tied to the current conflict in the FYR
of Macedonia as well as to economic and political problems in
Bosnia and Hercegovina. The political developments in Kosovo since
October 2000, directed by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo,
have distanced the area's political future from the future of
Serbia. The necessary development of a separate administrative
system, including a judiciary and a semi-legislature, although
coordinated by an international body, has resulted in the creation
of a system of governance completely separate from that of Serbia
and Montenegro. Unification of the administrations of Serbia and
in Kosovo has become increasingly unlikely. In the words of one
analyst, these two eggs cannot be joined to make one egg.
3.1.4 If the International Community seeks
an independent Kosovo, these developments have been very successful.
An independent Kosovo, though helpful in ending the conflict between
Serbian leadership and the Kosovar Albanian population, raises
far-reaching security concerns for the rest of the Southern Balkans.
Views of the Serbian electorate in 2004 hint that separation of
Kosovo could through great efforts be made acceptable to the majority
of Serbs in Serbia. However, as unrest in Kosovo in Spring 2004
proved, the Serbian and Roma minorities would assuredly face discrimination
and violence in an independent Kosovo. The level of organised
violence suggests a future in which these minorities would not
be allowed to remain in an independent Kosovo at all. Moreover,
according to studies of popular sentiment amongst Kosovar Albanians,
as many as eighty percent expect the unification of parts of the
FYR of Macedonia populated by Albanians with an independent Kosovo.
Such a division of the FYR of Macedonia would alarm Bulgaria and
Greece and could involve these nations in a conflict capable of
spreading to Turkey and southern Montenegro, where there is an
Albanian minority.
3.1.5 An independent Kosovo would influence
Albania as well. Unification of these two domains would immediately
become under consideration, but might lead to conflict. The Kosovar
Albanian leadership remains distinct from that of Albania, and
a struggle for control of the larger state would likely ensue.
3.1.6 The creation of a Greater Albanian
state would also seriously jeopardise the continued existence
of Bosnia and Hercegovina. This state, currently fragile due to
ethnic fragmentation and economic weakness, would likely face
revolt based on the argument that the Bosnian Serbs could not
be expected to remain separated from Serbs in Serbia while Albanians
are allowed to create a unified nation-state.
Recommendations for actions the committee should
consider:
3.1.7 The basic challenge is to resolve
the future status of Kosovo without creating a Greater Albania,
as this will lead to major unrest in the Balkans and I would be
likely to draw in several states of the European Union.
3.1.8 The International Community's policy
in Kosovo should be reconsidered in light of the broader security
concerns described above. The situation does not offer any clear
solutions for future advancement for Kosovo and preservation of
peace in the area. The implications of an independent Kosovo for
security should be carefully weighed against the price of stagnation
in the area caused by its currently unsettled status.
I am available to appear as a witness at any
time.
Rinna Elina Kullaa
University of Oxford, UK/University of Maryland,
USA
14 September 2004
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