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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 87 House of COMMONS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE FOREIGN AFFAIRS committee
Thursday 13 January 2005 HIS EXCELLENCY KAI EIDE Evidence heard in Public Questions 262 - 303
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Thursday 13 January 2005 Members present Donald Anderson, in the Chair Mr David Chidgey Mr Eric Illsley Mr Andrew Mackay Andrew Mackinlay Mr Bill Olner Sir John Stanley ________________ Witness: His Excellency Kai Eide, Norwegian Ambassador to NATO, examined. Q263 Chairman: Ambassador Eide,
may I welcome you most warmly to the C HE Eide: Mr Chairman, first of all, thank you very much for inviting me to come and have this meeting with you. I am very honoured to be here. Of course, I do have another job. As you said, I am now Norway's Permanent Representative to NATO, so I had to return to that after my few weeks in June-July May on this particular assignment. As you will understand, the last few months have been taken up by Afghanistan, Iraq and other issues related to NATO. I am somebody who has been for many years interested in the Balkans and have tried to follow developments as much as possible. I have also tried to keep track of what is going on in Kosovo, but, of course, not at the same intense level as during those weeks. Q264 Chairman: You clearly have kept in touch with developments. You made a series of recommendations last July. I notice, for example, that one of the points you made was, "The Serbs understand that they cannot and should not remain outside the political process". Alas, following that the Serb community in Kosovo boycotted the election. Has that development or any other caused you to amend any of the conclusions you reached in the recommendations you made? HE Eide: Let me put it this way. I do think that many Kosovo Serb leaders also were deeply disappointed that there was not a unanimous recommendation from Belgrade in favour of participating in the elections. Why have they not re-entered the political structures and the political process? I think it is very hard for the Kosovo Serbs to do that without feeling that they have Belgrade behind them. I feel that they hesitate when it comes to doing that without feeling that there is that backing present. At the same time I do think that they also look at the situation with regard to what is happening in the key areas that affect them, such as reconstruction, decentralisation, etc. I think it is regrettable that they have not chosen to re-enter the political process and we try to say to them all the time, and I was able to say that to the leaders in Belgrade only a few weeks ago, that there is no other way than for them to re-engage; the process as such in Kosovo is not going to stop because they stay out of the process and therefore the only way of protecting the interests of the Kosovo Serbs and their own interests in the processes that will follow is to re-engage. Q265 Chairman: That said, you made a number of recommendations both in terms of managing
the interim and also the longer- HE Eide: I hold to those recommendations.
I believe that what I tried to do was to develop what I saw as a
comprehensive strategy leading from what are the immediate steps that need to
be taken and a strategy that would include the question of the future
status. That kind of strategy is still
required and I do also believe that the Special Representative on the ground of
the United Nations, Soren Jessen- Q266 Sir John Stanley: Ambassador, would you agree as far as final status is concerned that ultimately there can only be one of two options: either Kosovo is going to have to remain under some form of ultimate international government or it will have to be an independent nation state? Do you agree that in the long term there is an inescapable choice between those two options? HE Eide: I believe that is fair to say. I have said also in the report that it is unthinkable that Belgrade will in the future have authority over Kosovo and that Kosovo will be governed, I did not say by Pristina but from Pristina, with the EU in the lead international role, and I believe that to be the case. Q267 Sir John Stanley: Do you agree or not that the likelihood of the international community, whether through the EU or the UN, wanting on a permanent basis to have responsibility for Kosovo is really almost inconceivable? They will not want to have that as a permanent responsibility. Do you agree that is correct? HE Eide: I agree absolutely. Q268 Sir John Stanley:
Therefore, that being the case, it would indicate that the only viable long- HE Eide: I cannot see any other option in the long run, the long run not being that long. Q269 Sir John Stanley: You just anticipated my next question. Could you give us your view, if that is what all the logic points to and you have confirmed it, that is that the ultimate final status will be Kosovo as an independent nation state, as to the timescale in which this needs to be achieved, bearing in mind the very crucial point you made in your report that "seen from internal Kosovo perspective, the longer we wait the more would the frustration in the Kosovo majority population increase"? HE Eide: I still believe that to be true, of course, that the frustration will increase. There will, of course, be a mid-year review next year with regard to standards and how to proceed from there. I really do hope that there will be an outcome from that which will be sufficient for us to say, "Yes, we have now to initiate a process of identifying the status", not saying, "Now we start the status negotiations", but the process of identifying the status. How long that process will be and what shape it will take will, of course, be a matter which the international community will have to look at when we reach mid-2005. Q270 Sir John Stanley: Given the rising tide of frustration (and that was brought home to us when we as a committee visited Kosovo) and potential for instability that that could create, do you think that for the whole process to achieve an independent nation statehood for Kosovo five years is a reasonable timescale? Do you think ten years? What would be your own personal view with your background of having explored it with your report? HE Eide: Sir John, I think we are here talking about two or three issues. There is the process of identifying status and then the implementation. I think the process of discussing and negotiating the final status will have to be rather shorter, which could pass through several phases, which would then I believe culminate in some kind of conference like the one we had in Dayton or Rambouillet. Before that there will of course have to be a process of preparing for such a conference. When that has been done I believe that there will have to be a transition period where Kosovo is not given full powers as a nation state from the very outset but that the international community will have to decide about the duration of a transition period. During that transition period, of course, certain powers would have to be vested in the international community. I believe that if you say five years that would not be an unreasonable timetable. Q271 Chairman: The five years mentioned by Sir John? HE Eide: Yes. I think that would not be unreasonable. Much longer than that would be difficult. What does that mean? I think the international community would have to prepare itself to stay and be present in Kosovo for a period much beyond that, but now I am talking about the intermediate period before the date when the final powers, so to speak, are transferred to Kosovo authorities. Q272 Mr Chidgey: Ambassador, if I can carry on to a degree with that theme and particularly concentrate on standards before status, which you highlight in your report, I want to draw attention to your contention that the current process has proved ineffective. If I may quote from your report, you say that there is a growing recognition that the standards before status approach is untenable in its present form and must be replaced by a broader policy where standards implementation takes Kosovo in an orderly way from the present through future status discussions and into a wider regional and European integration process. I have two particular questions and then a general one. In your report you argue for a broader standards policy. Is there a risk that this policy shift could leave the minorities unprotected and result in Kosovo's independence before the achievement of decent standards? HE Eide: Here is the original standards implementation, 119 pages. When looking through this there is a great number of details and small points that will have to be implemented no doubt at one stage, but what I felt was that this process, which is so crucial, was developing into a bureaucratic process and not a political process, and that therefore we had to say to ourselves, "What are the priorities at this stage in order to move Kosovo forward?". I therefore argued for a prioritised standards process before and after status, which means certain standards have to be fulfilled before final status can be given and then we will have to continue with the standards implementation until Kosovo then is integrated into a wider European framework. Q273 Mr Chidgey: That begs the question, Ambassador, which standards will be the priorities? HE Eide: From my point of view it was obvious that following the events of March those standards relating to the safety and security of the minorities were the key standards. We have to try and concentrate (and there are some elements of that in all standards) on those aspects that relate to that and that the Kosovo Albanians must understand that without this, and this is what I saw as the immediate challenge, it will be very hard to proceed. Q274 Mr Chidgey: Thank you, Ambassador. That is very helpful. My general question relates to the experiences that I certainly discovered on our return to the Western Balkans recently. It seemed there was a general concept, and I would call it a sort of collective clutching at straws, in the attitudes of many of the people that we met in the sense that they seemed to have a concept in their minds that membership of the EU would solve all these problems - the economy, the security issues, the development, the identity if you like, of Kosovo within the international scene, but at the same time there was no recognition of the requirement to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria which we apply to every applicant's status sometimes more effectively than others, you might argue. There seemed to be a complete lack of any recognition of the rigour of that process going from an aspiration to being accepted as a potential applicant to going through the acquis, to becoming a member. I have to say that this is like trying to wave a magic wand or whatever. There was no reality in their political appreciation. What is your perspective on this? HE Eide: I agree completely with you. I think there is, not only there but across the Balkans, an impression that EU membership and NATO membership will solve things for them and if we can only get there that is it. There is less enthusiasm for the nitty-gritty and the work that has to be done in order to move forward. It does not surprise me. I do not think they have been exposed to the requirements; they do not understand what the requirements are, and therefore I believe also that much more of a dialogue between the European Union and Kosovo and Belgrade and others is also required in order to create a better understanding of what the process really is and the fact that this is not going to solve everything, that they have to take their share of the job. Also, I must say, much of the solution lies in the regional integration and regional co-operation. Much of the economic progress that they need has to be fostered from within the region, not only from links to the wider Europe. Q275 Mr Chidgey: How do you feel that we in the EU can initiate the beginning of that understanding of acceptance of responsibility? HE Eide: I am of the view that unfortunately several international organisations have not played their role to the full yet both with regard to Kosovo and to other parts of the Western Balkans. I do think in particular with regard to Kosovo that the approach of the EU, and the OSCE for that matter, has been a little bit sporadic, that there is a lack of what I would see as a clear strategy, perhaps also a hesitation with regard to moving more vigorously into the job, which I can understand. Of course, also, the mechanisms that we have in place within the EU, which you know much better than I, for obvious reasons, not coming from an EU Member State, are such that they are naturally developed with regard to sovereign states and not an area like Kosovo without any status. I do believe that some more imagination needs to be produced and that a more robust and constant EU engagement is required to bring Kosovo forward. With that I am thinking of concrete projects but I am also thinking of assistance with regard to capacity building, putting in advisers where that is possible, engaging more and also seeing to it that the population in Kosovo can see that there are prospects, that there is hope. Because when you see today a population where 55 per cent are under 30 years old and 60 per cent are unemployed then you are facing serious trouble. The longer we wait with regard to doing something more vigorous the greater the burden will be along the road that we will all have to carry. I would appeal strongly for a more robust, less ad-hocish and less sporadic engagement from some of these international organisations and I think the EU obviously is the big magnet in this respect, but not exclusively the EU. Q276 Mr Chidgey: You feel that the politicians and the administrators in Kosovo would be prepared to accept that more rigorous intervention by foreign organisations? HE Eide: I think they would understand that they have to accept it. They have to accept that with greater engagement comes more responsibility and that if there is to be a bigger carrot there also has to be an acceptance that they have to be helped along the road. We have to get away from this client atmosphere that we so often have found to a state where politicians understand that they really have to shape up and take the responsibility. Unfortunately, the March events and the first few couple of months after that showed that they were not able or willing to do that, and that is very sad. Q277 Mr Illsley: Ambassador, on the question of final status in response to Sir John Stanley you said that eventually the idea of some form of independence for Kosovo would probably be inevitable in the longer term. Given that last year the Serbian minorities within Kosovo boycotted absolutely the elections and assuming that they would look upon a final status of Kosovan independence as something that they would not wish to see and perhaps not like to live under, is there a danger that by accelerating the process towards a final status we could see an exodus of the Serbian minorities heading back towards Belgrade, back into Serbia or out of Kosovo altogether? HE Eide: There is a risk of that occurring but do you not also believe that if we do the opposite, if we wait and wait and wait, the frustration that exists and that will grow could push the Serbs in exactly the same direction? That is why when I made my recommendations I said that while raising the question of the status has so far been seen as too dangerous, I think it is now too dangerous to leave aside. However, it has to combine with what are the priority standards, and that is seeing to it that we do everything we can in order to enhance security for the minorities and carry out a sensible process of establishing local and central government, seeing to it that return and reconstruction take place. I think we are moving along that road but without that work taking place now then of course a discussion of future status will entail more risk. We are faced with two situations which may both potentially lead to the same result. Q278 Mr Illsley: We are damned if we do and damned if we do not? HE Eide: Exactly. There is no good moment for raising the status issue. Q279 Chairman: Can you help on
this? The Secretary- HE Eide: Chairman, there has been more of a reluctance perhaps on the Russian side with regard to accepting moving into the process of the future status of Kosovo than there has been among the others. There has been more insistence that all standards have to be fully implemented before we can go into that. There has been a different approach taken by the Russians than by the other members of the Security Council. Q280 Chairman: Is that approach such that there might be a danger of Russia obstructing mid-year discussions on the future? HE Eide: I do not dare to speculate on that. We will have to see how positions evolve in light of the progress that we can manage to make in Kosovo. I do not dare to speculate on what the future Russian position may be in that particular area. Q281 Chairman: And Washington? HE Eide: In Washington I feel that there has been general support for the recommendations that I made. There has been, I must say, a strong underlining of the fact that what I called a prioritised standards process must not lead to us putting less emphasis on the standards, not scrapping the standards policy; that was certainly never my intention. Q282 Chairman: I want to clarify one or two matters before I call Sir John. In your recommendations you rule out partition, you rule out any continuing relationship with Serbia, and that would mean, for example, rejecting the proposals by the Serbian Government for a decentralised local government structure bringing together the Serb communities within Kosovo? HE Eide: If the Serb plan means bringing together all these areas in one contiguous region then I would certainly do that. Q283 Chairman: Not contiguous but having groups which are responsible for key elements and, I suspect, therefore looking towards Belgrade. HE Eide: I think the process that is now under way, which means to identify certain pilot projects, like municipalities where the Serbs have more control over their own fate and their own situation, is the right way to go. There are many good things to say about the Serb plans, the concerns we share, and certain aspects of it also I do not find difficult to accept. However, I do believe that the process that is under way now with regard to identifying pilot projects such as Gracanica and others is the right way to go. Chairman: In
response to Mr Chidgey: It was from but not in. Q284 Chairman: The formula was what? HE Eide: I said that it should be governed from Pristina with EU in the leading international role, which does not say, of course, how important should that role be. Where is the emphasis? Obviously, as we discussed, there will be a transition period where after a while "from" will become "by". Q285 Chairman: In that transition period, rather like the bucket and the well principle, the UN role would decrease and the EU role would increase? HE Eide: I would find that a sound way of proceeding, yes. Q286 Chairman: But not excluding other organisations like, for example, the OSCE? HE Eide: Chairman, I think the OSCE would have a very useful role to play in Kosovo for a number of years also after the end of the future status process. Here I come back to what I said about the European Union. I do believe, unfortunately, that the whole process, for instance, of capacity building, where the OSCE plays an important role, the Council of Europe and others, is an area where the international community has not come far enough in developing what I would say is a robust, lasting policy. We see so many weekend courses, seminars, conferences, where representatives of Ministries and politicians and bureaucrats are invited to attend in a number of countries. I believe that we need more of what, for instance, we see in the Kosovo Police School, which is an institution that has been established by the OSCE outside Pristina, which has carried out a constant series of training courses for the police and has built up a very good police service. That police service is an example of what we should do in other areas. It is difficult but it is doing good and it is necessary. Q287 Chairman: Is it your view that the European Union is prepared to accept this enhanced role, particularly in the field of capacity building? How has Brussels responded to your package of recommendations? HE Eide: Chairman, the meeting rooms that I normally attend in Brussels are
in another organisation, as you know.
What happens in the corridors of the EU is hard for me to judge but I
would be very pleased if I could see evidence on the ground of a firmer long- Q288 Chairman: You do not see that? HE Eide: I do not see that today. I think there is a significant amount of hesitation and perhaps also confusion about how to move forward with regard to Kosovo. It is not easy because it is not a sovereign state. It is something else, something still undefined, where it is very difficult to engage with the mechanisms that have been established for sovereign states. Q289 Sir John Stanley: March
last year demonstrated that the security situation in Kosovo is much more
fragile and potentially more explosive than I think a lot of people
thought. I think it spells possibly a
growing degree of complacency about the security of the position in
Kosovo. I would just like to go through
the three main security components with you.
Could we start with HE Eide: Sir John, since this is an area that I know better than most other
areas. I think we have gone through a comprehensive process of identifying
where the shortfalls were. They had to
do with national caveats put on national contingents. I have been positively surprised to see how much of that has been
removed and the fact that today I think we are better equipped to handle that
kind of situation than we were before, not only with regard to national caveats
but also in the way we operate on the ground with mobile observation teams
patrolling constantly, trying to get closer in touch with the community, which
is what you really need. It is not only
a question of technical intelligence; it is also a question of contact with the
communities. I think that has improved
significantly. I think also the
relationship between KFor[1] Q290 Sir John Stanley: Thank you. That is very encouraging. The national caveat issue is one that we very much pursued when we were in Kosovo and our colleague, Ms Gisela Stuart, was particularly following that whilst we were there. Can I now turn to the police, starting with the UNMIK civilian police? Can you tell us what improvements you would like to see as far as they are concerned when they are dealing with their security responsibilities? HE Eide: The UNMIK police consists of more than 40 nations. Having been myself head of the UN operation
in Bosnia in 1997 and the beginning of 1998, which was basically a police
operation with 2,000 police officers from more than 30 states, I can assure you
that that is not an easy operation to lead.
The differences in culture, in the way of performing on the ground, are
significant. That also makes it very
difficult to train and supervise and monitor and teach the local police on the
ground in a uniform way how to proceed.
I am not, I must say, aware of specific steps within UNMIK with regard
to the improvement of their performance but they have, of course, also
established much tighter links with Q291 Sir John Stanley: I was going to do that, yes, so please continue. What about KPS and improvements there? HE Eide: There I must say I believe improvements have taken place and are
constantly taking place. There were, as
I have indicated in my report, plans worked out by the Director of the Kosovo
Police Service School to establish riot control units in the KPS quite some
time ago. The offers were there for
training, the offers were there for equipment but, for reasons of priority
probably, little had been done in order to bring that forward. What is happening today is that we are
moving forward on that and three special police units have been established
with the specific purpose of being able to handle riot control situations. That is ultimately where we have to go and
where Q292 Sir John Stanley: How successful do you feel the efforts have
been to try and ensure the KPS is multi‑ethnic force with HE Eide: I cannot recall precisely how big they are, I think it is around 15 per cent, but please take that with a pinch of salt. Should it be more? Yes, it should be more. What is important is that they engage. I believe it is developing as a rather efficient multi‑ethnic police force. I think the situation has changed rather a lot since I was there as Chairman of the OSCE Council in 1999/2000. At the final ceremony of one of the police school classes there was booing from parents and friends of Kosovo Albanian policemen every time a Serb policeman's name was listed by the director of the school. I think we have moved beyond that. I would like to applaud the efforts that have been made by Steve Bennett, the director of the school who came in and built this up. He really took charge of the whole thing. He was a man who said, "I'm going to stay the course. I'm going to be here until I can say that this is a police force that can handle the situation." That is the kind of attitude and approach we need in other areas. Chairman: Mr Mackinlay is a member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and so I suspect that will be music to his ears. Q293 Andrew Mackinlay: I am concerned about the impact of the United
Kingdom and other Western European governments forcibly repatriating many
refugees back to Kosovo. We have had
some evidence to suggest that the remittances of people who are in the West are
important to the families in Kosovo. I
think we were told in broad- HE Eide: Mr Mackinlay, this is a debate that takes place in a number of Western European countries, including my own. I am not quite sure if it falls within my remit to pronounce on issues that I believe in my country and other countries are issues of internal political controversy. Q294 Andrew Mackinlay: I understand. In four years' time it is highly probable that there will be a "velvet divorce" between Serbia and Montenegro. What impact will that have on the political situation vis‑à‑vis the way forward on Kosovo bearing in mind it is an integral part of Serbia? I do not think many of us here consider it will ever be in the same political unit outside of the European Union with Serbia, but that is the position. Does a "velvet divorce" with Montenegro aggravate the situation, is it neutral or does it help? HE Eide: This whole question of
Serbia and Montenegro adds to the political burden in the political landscape
in Belgrade and complicates the situation further there. That is also why I have said it is so
important that we spend more time having a constant political dialogue with Belgrade
and being in touch with their leaders.
They do have a significant number of challenges ahead of them. I believe it is important in this situation
that the dialogue we have with Belgrade is solid and constant. I believe that there has been a tendency to
pay insufficient attention to that dialogue and I think that is wrong. It is not helpful on Kosovo issues or other
issues that may occur over the next few years.
I would strongly appeal to all to try to see to it that the trust and
confidence that is required to move into difficult processes vis‑à‑vis
Belgrade are there and that Belgrade also feels that the incentives that may be
available to others are also available to Belgrade. There is the difficult question of t Q295 Andrew Mackinlay: When we met your deputy in the region I can remember raising with him and his colleagues an incident where the Serb Orthodox Church had declined European Union monies to restore buildings which had been damaged because they were laying down who the re‑builders should be and saying that it should not be Kosovo Albanians and that was a cause of considerable concern to us. Has that attitude changed or is it one which is endemic in these areas where there are Serb communities within Kosovo? Are they shunning help to restore that which has been destroyed or laying down conditions which would be unacceptable? HE Eide: I believe that is still the
situation, although I am not following this Q296 Andrew Mackinlay: Has it been their choice not to proceed? One has to ask whose fault it is. I would not want that to be said in evidence against Kosovo Albanians if it is the case of there being international money available but the conditions being unacceptable to the international community. HE Eide: It seems the money is available but the Serb Orthodox Church has stalled the reconstruction. I think it is always very difficult to make judgments on this because when you are on the ground you find out that there are layers after layers of reasons and arguments. I do not want to make simplistic judgments but I do think it is a great pity that we have not been able to move forward. We have been able to move forward on the reconstruction of houses to a significant extent, I may say. Q297 Chairman: Is that for the same reasons, Mr Eide? HE Eide: We have made progress. Chairman: You have made progress. Q298 Andrew Mackinlay: One final question. Last week there was a cause of anxiety because there was an incident which had all the chemistry, it would seem, for the same kind of situation which triggered the March riots. From what you have said, but I wanted to confirm this, although there was that incident last week that caused some concern that has been successfully contained, as it were? Would that be correct? HE Eide: There was a very tragic situation when a young boy was shot dead
and, as you said, it was contained. I
think there is greater awareness today in Kosovo and in the region that one
should do what can be done in order to avoid new turbulence occurring. I think there is also on the Kosovo Albanian
side a certain nervousness with regard to what the consequences of new
turbulence could be. We have to keep
the pressure on, I must say, in order to see to it that they stay on the right
course and that they try to do whatever they can do to prevent new violence
from occurring and also do what they can do in order to make progress on the
reconstruction, return, etcetera. I
raise that because I am not quite convinced that it is the case today. I think within the Kosovo Albanian
leadership also there are different views.
I do not think that everybody is equally convinced that we have to move
forward, for instance, on the decentralisation and the development of local
government which gives the Serbs what they need to have in order to have a
sustained presence in Kosovo. I am not
sure that even among the leading politicians that that is a view deeply held
and we can only see to it that this happens if we keep the pressure on. What worries me Andrew Mackinlay: I apologise I was a little bit late but have we asked or are we going to ask about the Prime Minister of Kosovo? Chairman: No, by all means raise that. Q299 Andrew Mackinlay: The new Prime Minister of Kosovo is seen by Belgrade as a war criminal. There is talk about an indictment. Do you have an indication as to the timetable of when that uncertainty will be resolved or indeed what the impact would be on the body politic of Kosovo? We cannot wish this away. There is this thing hanging over us and we are not going to see you again for a little while, I guess, so I wonder, to the extent you are able, if you would just take us around that particular issue which is a cause for some concern. I realise I am asking you to crystal-ball gaze to an extent. HE Eide: First of all, I think it is very unfortunate that we are in a
situation where week after week month after month we are talking about whether
this person will be indicted or not. It
is a rather unusual situation and an unfortunate situation. Of course it prolongs an atmosphere of
political uncertainty in a situation where we need something completely
different. It has created a situation
where there is more political confusion in Pristina than we need and there is
more political confusion in Belgrade than we need for the moment, and that Q300 Ms Stuart: Over the
weekend I went back to reading some stuff which was said about the f HE Eide: Ms Stuart, I struggle with much of the same in my own thinking on the region, although I must say when it comes to Kosovo I cannot see any other way out than what we are describing. We can go through all possible other options and I cannot find any. You touched upon sustainability. If you go back to the 1980s, if I am not completely mistaken, there was also 40 or 50 per cent unemployment in Kosovo while there was in Slovenia almost full employment, where Kosovo survived on resources being transferred from Slovenia and Croatia, so the outlook is not particularly encouraging, That is why I also like to emphasise when we have this situation developing with a number of rather smaller countries that it is so important to make them understand that much of their economic prospects depend on their ability to deal with each other. That is their most important market. That is where they have to inter‑act economically and politically. Of course, that is going to be a tremendous challenge only a few years after the wars we have been through in the region. There is simply no other way and that is why I also think that it is important to say that, yes, integration into Europe must be our objective, but integration of countries and states where the borders between them are as low as possible and where we do our utmost in order to try to stimulate economic and other interaction and co‑operation . It is going to be very very hard but I cannot see any other way of moving out of it. Q301 Ms Stuart: I do not want to put words in your mouth but I think I am almost detecting an answer to the question you declined to give to Mr Mackinlay because if the argument and the way it reaches agreement is an awareness that you need to economically co‑operate within the home territory, then a significant ex-patriot population that simply sends remits back home may continue a kind of ethnic diversion but on foreign soil and therefore become entrenched and will not move forward, which would not be very helpful in the long run. So in the long run the solution has to be found on home territory? HE Eide: Absolutely. A solution has to be found on the home territory. If you look at the situation over the last few years, there can be no doubt that the assistance given by the government to Kosovo is going down, the money sent home by the diaspora is going down. All the sources are not drying up but there is less coming from those other sources. If we do not spend more money and effort on this area what is the result going to be with the kind of unemployment that I mentioned of young people? We are not going to see fewer coming to our countries, we are going to see more in one way or another. The question is what kind of policy do you want to implement here? I think the answer is quite clear. The more we can try to do now in that region the more problems we will be able to avoid in the future not only in that region but also in our own countries. The more we can manage to create a police service in Kosovo that can handle organised crime and corruption there the more we will certainly help ourselves also. Q302 Ms Stuart: This next question is to do with something which we picked up anecdotally when we were there and it was to do with money going into the area and the trail of accountability when outside money is being spent by outside institutions. Do you feel there is more that could be done, that there is an accountability trail and therefore we will not become a source of indigenous corruption? HE Eide: More can always be done, there is no doubt about that. I think this is a problem that we have been aware of for quite some time and where I believe that governments and institutions, organisations, try to follow their money and what happens to it as best they can. Do they always spend it sensibly or in an optimal fashion? There is a question mark there. I would refer you to the capacity building. Many governments today spend millions and millions on seminars and conferences and weekend courses and travelling back and forth. Does it all make sense? I have been working on this for years, Chairman. I think we have come quite a long way when it comes to co‑operation between various international organisations and nations, but it is still too fragmented and serious effort should be made by the international community to co‑ordinate its effort and get the most out of the money that is spent. Q303 Sir John Stanley: Our Committee is particularly charged to focus on the policy of the British Government and we are aware that the UK has played a very wide‑ranging role in Kosovo, not just merely on the security side with the military deployments we have made there and the police contribution we have made, but also in wider economic aid and government capacity building. For example, we found out, which I did not know until we went there, that a very, very senior and expert official from our Customs & Excise department here has actually created a customs service for Kosovo. If you were having this meeting this morning with Mr Blair or Mr Straw, what would you be urging them to do as far as the British contribution in the future in Kosovo is concerned? HE Eide: I would urge them, just as I would urge leaders of other European Union and OSCE countries for that matter, to ensure that what they do is well co‑ordinated and that it is sustained. I consider the UK's contribution to be an outstanding one. I have seen that from my work for the OSCE and NATO. There is no doubt that the role that your troops have played both in Bosnia and Kosovo is really first‑class. They have managed better than anybody to do the job efficiently and to get the confidence of the population in a way that others have not managed to do. I think the British contribution has been an example to many of us. I think we are also doing better now. It is interesting to see that operations are not called "NATO" anymore, they are "NATO-led". The Swedes have made a great contribution. I think many of us have learned from your way of operating on the ground. You played a great role in the policing part. When I was in Bosnia I had a British police commissioner at the end of my time there who went on to work in Kosovo and in many other places around the globe and he made an absolutely outstanding contribution. I applaud the contribution that you make. Q304 Chairman: Ambassador, you have immense personal experience in the region. You have helped us with your accumulative wisdom on it. Perhaps for me the challenge was that if we as the West, as OECD, as the EU, as NATO, do not go to Kosovo and go soon and work with the local people there, they are liable to come to us in all sorts of unwelcome ways. May I thank you very much indeed, on behalf of the Committee, for your evidence. HE Eide: Thank you very much. [1] Kosovo Peacekeeping Force [2] Kosovo Police Service [3] United Nations Mission in Kosovo |