Select Committee on Home Affairs Sixth Report

4 Britain's communities and community relations

Minorities in the United Kingdom

61. After this brief overview of Britain's minority communities, much of this report does focus on issues affecting the Muslim community. The Committee is itself not entirely comfortable with this emphasis, as we do not wish to add to the stereotyping of the Muslim community, of which we heard much criticism during our inquiry. Nor do we wish to diminish the importance of issues faced by other communities.

62. Nonetheless, many of the issues highlighted by the Cantle Report particularly concerned the Muslim community and its relations with the wider community. The fact that international terrorists have claimed Islamic justification has caused huge problems for the overwhelmingly law-abiding Muslim community. On the evidence we received, Muslims in Britain are more likely than other groups to feel that they are suffering as a result of the response to international terrorism.

63. The following tables, drawn from the 2001 census of England and Wales, give figures for the minority ethnic populationof which the census category of Asian or Asian British is the largest elementand for religion, drawn from a voluntary question, answered by 92% of those to whom it was put, as well as for ethnic origins of Muslims and religion of Asians or Asian British.

Numbers % of total population
Total population in England and Wales 52,041,916100%
Total minority ethnic 4,521,0507.9%
Asian or Asian British 2,273,7374.0%

Numbers % of respondents
Christians37,338,486 71.75%
Muslims1,546,626 2.97%
Hindus552,421 1.06%
Sikhs329,358 0.63%
Jews259,927 0.50%
No religion 7,709,26714.81%

White MixedAsian or Asian British Black or Black British Chinese or Other Ethnic Group
% of total Muslims 11.62%4.15% 73.65%6.88% 3.70%

Muslim HinduSikh ChristianOther[50]
% of total Asian or Asian British 50.1%23.46% 13.93%4.06% 8.45%

64. Most of the White Muslims fall into the category of "Other White", which would include, for example, Turksalthough it is worth noting that 4% of Muslims, more than 60,000 people, described themselves as White British.[51] Smaller Muslim groups include Algerians, Bosnians, Jordanians, Kurds, Lebanese, Mauritians, nationals of the Gulf Emirates, Nigerians, Palestinians, Sudanese, Syrians and Tunisians.[52]

65. By and large, minority ethnic groups have a younger age structure than the White population, reflecting past immigration and fertility patterns. In the Bangladeshi community, for example, 38% were aged under 16, as were 35% of Pakistanisthe equivalent figure for the White group is 19%.[53]

66. The vast majority of Muslims live in England, 60 percent of them in the south-east (mainly in Greater London), but there are also sizeable Muslim groups elsewhere. Scotland's Muslim community is currently estimated to be between 40,000 and 60,000,[54] while according to the 2001 Census the Muslim population of Northern Ireland totalled 1,943.[55] There is also a small number of predominantly Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims in Wales.

67. The 2001 census shows that half the entire Black and minority ethnic (BME) population is in London, and 76% in London, the West Midlands and three other areas. Further, while every area has BME residents, and almost all have seen an increase in BME residents between 1991 and 2001, there are still many parts of the United Kingdom which are largely mono-cultural in terms of residents.

68. Some ethnic minorities out-perform the majority community in a number of ways. For example, Indians and Chinese are, on average, doing well and often better than Whites in schools and in the labour market: Chinese and Indians do better than Whites at GCSE, while Indian men now earn more than Whites. As the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit point out, their success shows that there are no insuperable barriers to successful economic and social integration. [56]

British Muslims: a disadvantaged community?

69. The major ethnic communities that are predominantly Muslim suffer disproportionately from unemployment. For example, in 2001-02, Bangladeshis had the highest male unemployment rate in Great Britain at 20%: four times that for White British or White Irish men. The picture is similar for women: Bangladeshi women had the highest unemployment rate of all at 24%, six times greater than that for White British or White Irish women. For all ethnic groups unemployment was highest among young people aged under 25. Over 40% of young Bangladeshi men were unemployed, while young Pakistani men and women had unemployment rates above of 20%. The comparable unemployment rate for young White British men and women were 12% and 9% respectively.[57] The relationship between religion and employment is not clear-cut, as the following extract from a Cabinet Office report shows:
Religion and employment

"Cultural or religious attributes may also influence the labour market position of ethnic minorities, although quantitative data in this field is limited. The relationship between religious groups and employment outcomes is not simple and it should not be assumed that a "religious effect" necessarily exists. Religion may simply be a proxy for other factors determining employment, such as education and fluency in English. However, it has been found that unemployment risk does vary significantly by religion. Even after controlling for a range of factors, Sikhs and Indian Muslims remain almost twice as likely to be unemployed as Hindus. Pakistani Muslims are more than three times as likely as Hindus to be unemployed.

"There is also evidence of divergent experiences between religious groups in terms of employment profiles and income differentials. Sikhs, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims experience particular under-representation in professional employment, with this area showing higher concentrations of Hindus and Indian Muslims. In terms of earnings, Muslim men and women are over-represented in the lowest income band. Almost a quarter earned less than £115 per week, compared to around one in ten Sikhs and Hindus. Yet despite over-representation among low earners, Indian Muslims actually record the highest share within the highest income band.

"Judging whether religion is a factor that affects the employment chances of a given individual is complex. It is clear that Indian Muslims are strikingly different from Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims in their labour market achievements, suggesting that far more is at play than just religious effects: problems might well be linked rather more to specific group circumstances, for which religion is a proxy, than to religion itself."

Source: Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, March 2003

70. Muslims are also subject to other disadvantages. They are largely concentrated in areas of multiple deprivation, living in dwellings designated as unfit or in serious disrepair. They experience disproportionate rates of unemployment, illness and disability and dependence on means-tested benefits. A recent report by the Open Society Institute noted:

"Compared to other faith communities, Muslim men and women in Great Britain had the highest rate of reported ill health in 2001. A total of 13% of Muslim men and 16% of Muslim women described their state of health as "not good" compared to around 8% for the population as a whole. Taking into account age structures, Muslims also had the highest rates of disability. Compared to households of other faith groups, Muslim households are the most likely to be situated in socially rented accommodation, to experience overcrowding and to lack central heating. Compared to other religious groups, Muslims had the highest proportion of people in the working-age population without any qualifications."[58]

71. Another significant area of disadvantage is education. In 1999, a higher proportion of girls than boys in each ethnic group achieved five or more GCSEs at grades A*-C (or equivalent). Indian pupils are more likely to get these qualifications than other ethnic group, with 66% of Indian girls and 54% of Indian boys doing so in 1999. This contrasts with only 37% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi girls and 22% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi boys. Between 1997 and 1999 all ethnic groups, with the exception of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, saw a rise in achievement of five or more A*-C grade GCSEs by sixteen year olds. This meant that the gap between the lowest and highest achieving ethnic groups widened over this period.[59]

72. The number of Muslim prisoners went up by over 190% between March 1993 and June 2003, when 6,136 of the 73,657 prisoners in England and Wales (8.3%) were Muslim.[60] Evidence from the 2000 British Crime Survey showed that ethnic minorities run greater risks of crime than white people. According to the survey, "Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, in particular, are more likely than others to say that they felt 'very unsafe' at night, both in their homes and walking alone in their neighbourhood".[61]

Have community relations got worse?

73. As we noted in paragraph 13, terrorism clearly brings a new dimension to existing issues. Witnesses were divided on whether community relations had deteriorated since September 2001. Some felt that there had not got significantly worse, particularly when set against the racist violence of the 1970s and 1980s.[62] Others argued that the situation varied from place to place and from community to community.[63] The Minister of State at the Home Office, Ms Hazel Blears MP, cited the 2003 Home Office Citizenship Survey, according to which 71% agreed that their local area was a place where people from different backgrounds got on well together and 17% disagreed: she described this as "a fairly high level of cohesion".[64] But she also noted that the positive figures were higher in the South and South-East than in the North and lower (64%) in the most deprived areas than in more affluent ones (77%): there was thus both a North/South divide and an income divide.[65]

74. But most believed that the situation had got worse and that divisions between communities had increased. The Muslim Council of Britain said that over 76% of their members felt that the attitude of the general public towards Muslims had changed for the worse since September 2001.[66] The Director of Public Prosecutions, Ken MacDonald QC, told us:

"terrorism is creating divisions between communities, which of course is one of its purposes; it is intended to do that. We have evidence from our point of view of an increase in […] low-level tensions […] One is talking about racially and religiously aggravated crimes involving racist and religiously motivated abuse of cab drivers at night, shop owners, people in the street, that sort of low level aggressive criminal conduct which we find has increasingly been accompanied by that sort of abuse, so it was a feeling which my front line prosecutors have that there are increasing tensions at that sort of low level which are probably inspired or contextualised by the threat of international terrorism."[67]

75. PeaceMaker, "an anti-racist youth development organisation that aims to bring together young people from a diversity of backgrounds in positive environments to foster active citizenship and social responsibility", and which carried out a consultation programme for the Committee, noted that both Muslim and non-Muslim young people spoke of an increase in segregation: [68]
Predominantly Muslim groups of young people:

Are attitudes to minorities amongst white people worse than before 9/11?

  • Muslim young people feel that other groups now have an excuse to be racist towards them
  • They feel there is more violence towards Muslim people
  • The media stirs up trouble by creating stereotypes of Muslim terrorists
  • As a consequence, Muslim young people feel that white people think all Muslims are terrorists

What are the practical consequences for Muslim young people?

  • They are scared
  • They are angry
  • Life has become very difficult and confusing for Muslim young people
  • There has been an increase in racism towards Muslim young people
  • Communities appear to have become more segregated and insular
  • Many Muslim young people have become more serious about practising their religion and feel they need to do more for their religion

Predominantly White Groups of young people:

Are attitudes to minorities amongst white people worse than before 9/11?

  • White young people feel that most white people are quicker to judge minorities after 9/11
  • Some white young people clearly stated that they did not like Muslim people
  • Many white young people appear to be scared of Muslims
  • They feel that there is more racism since 9/11
  • White young people state that people blame ordinary Muslims for not doing anything to stop terrorism

What are the practical consequences for Muslim young people?

  • They feel that Muslim young people will be worried about what white people think
  • Some white people may feel that Muslims should get out of Britain
  • They feel that Muslim young people keep a lower profile than before 9/11
  • White young people feel that Muslim young people "stand out" more now
  • White young people feel that Muslims now follow their religion more seriously
  • They feel that Muslim young people are scared


76. The Muslim Council told us that more than 76% of their members felt that the attitude of the general public towards Muslims had changed for the worse since 2001 and that Islamophobia was increasingly becoming acceptable and was already a legitimate form of discrimination.[69] It is also clear from PeaceMaker's evidence that young Muslims felt that they were worse treated than before September 2001: indeed most of the young people in the survey believed that the overall attitude towards Muslims had worsened.[70] Work by bodies such as the Islamic Human Rights Centre,[71] the Minority Rights Group and the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia[72] also points to an increase in Islamophobia.

77. Mr Khan, of the Muslim Council of Britain, told us that it was clear that there had been a rise in Islamophobic attacks; he believed that this had led also to attacks on Hindus and Sikhs, who had been mistaken for Muslims.[73] Neither Sikh nor Muslim witnesses were able to provide other than anecdotal evidence to support this view,[74] but we think it is a reasonable assumption.

78. The Home Office told us that although Muslim organisations monitored incidents of Islamophobia, there was no independent or central data collection organisation.[75] The Minister of State did not believe that it would be appropriate to set up a statutory body, but pointed to a number of models on which it would be possible to build.[76] One of these was the Community Security Trust, which advises and represents the Jewish community on matters of security and anti-Semitism, and which has helped the Hindu Forum monitor anti-Hindu incidents.[77]


79. According to the Community Security Trust, there have been rising levels of anti-Semitic incidents since 1997. The figure for 2004the most recent year for which statistics were availablewas 532, the highest since the current system was introduced in 1984. (The second highest figure was 405, in 2000; the Board of Deputies put this down to the start of the current Palestinian-Israeli violence.)[78] Gerry Gable, the publisher of Searchlight, also believed that there had been a rise in attacks on the Jewish community since 2001.[79]

80. Both the Board of Deputies and Mr Gable linked attacks on Jews to international developments, particularly in the Middle East, and noted that some attacks were carried out by Muslims. The President of the Board, Henry Grunwald QC, also drew our attention to the specific threat by al-Qaeda to attack Jews anywhere in the world.[80] Sadiq Khan, the Chair of the Muslim Council of Britain's Legal Affairs Committee, accepted that anti-Semitism from some elements in the Muslim community was an issue, especially in universities.[81]

81. Mr Khan's point about universities was echoed by evidence from the Parliamentary Committee against anti-Semitism and the Union of Jewish Students (UJS).[82] The UJS believed both that there had been a noticeable rise in academic intolerance and anti-Semitism and that there was a constant presence on or around campus of extremist groups who were either anti-Semitic or had a history of anti-Semitic behaviour.[83] The UJS also pointed out that student unions were not covered by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which imposes a duty to promote good race relations.[84]

82. The UJS cited a case of anti-Semitic material on an Open University message board as an instance in which university authorities had responded neither quickly nor appropriately to complaints by the Union about anti-Semitic material.[85] The University denied this, arguing that the complaint had been dealt with fully and in a reasonable timescale and that disciplinary action had been taken.[86] The University's response was contested by the Union, whose comments on it were in turn rejected by the University.[87]

83. The Parliamentary Committee against anti-Semitism believed that the existence and extent of anti-Semitism in the United Kingdom were not widely recognised.[88] Mr Grunwald noted that the Mayor of London's submission to this inquiry made no reference to anti-Semitism.[89]

Other issues

84. The Metropolitan Police noted the existence of tension within and between minorities:

"Monitoring initiated post Sept 11th has revealed some evidence of internal Muslim tensions, for example between Moroccan and Algerian groups, and between groups of Somali Muslims resulting in, for example an ongoing turf war in the Lewisham area. Hostilities between Muslims and Hindus have also been evidenced. An incident includes pro-Hindu graffiti and vandalism of a Muslim Society building."[90]

Mr Gable also believed that hostility against Muslims was building in the Hindu and Sikh communities.[91]

85. The evidence we received indicated that for the most part the causes of inter-minority tensions lay outside the United Kingdom. The Board of Deputies of British Jews believed that "tension in the Middle East, both between Israel and the Palestinians and in the Middle East generally, inevitably results in an increase in anti-Semitic violence in Britain, and elsewhere in Europe."[92] The Hindu Forum told us that "major terrorist attacks on temples and places of worship in India usually lead to higher levels of security concerns in the UK."[93] The Muslim Council agreed that, for example, conflict in Kashmir sometimes had repercussions in the United Kingdom.[94] Detective Superintendent Tucker of the Metropolitan Police Diversity Directorate also pointed to events in India which had led to attacks on the Hindu Community in Britain. However, he noted that improvements in police work in the past ten years meant that recent inter-communal violence in India had not been followed by incidents in the United Kingdom.[95]

86. Witnesses from minorities were generally anxious to foster good relations with other communities in this country, despite tensions abroad. For example, although the Muslim Council argued that Muslim liberation movements had been wrongly proscribed under the Terrorism Act and that a disproportionate number of the world's oppressed were Muslims,[96] Mr Khan told us that "problems that occur overseas should stay overseas".[97]

The Neasden Hindu Temple

87. An example of the way in which relations between communities can be adversely affected is the case of the Neasden Hindu Temple. Mr Jagdeesh Singh of the Sikh Community Action Network, when giving oral evidence to the Committee, alleged that the Temple allowed the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), which Mr Singh characterised as a terrorist organisation, to operate from its premises.[98] This allegation of complicity in terrorism, protected by parliamentary privilege from action in the courts, understandably caused great offence to the Trustees of the Temple, who submitted evidence to the Committee to prove their contention that both the Temple and the charity that runs it, the Swaminarayan Hindu Mission, are entirely peaceful and law-abiding.[99] This submission also provided details of a number of prominent figures, including the Prince of Wales and the Prime Minister, who had visited the Temple. In addition to the material submitted by the Temple, which included letters from the local police and local councils, we received a range of submissions in their support, including from Members of the House of Commons,[100] the Mayor of London[101] and representatives of the Sikh community.[102] The Hindu Forum defended the Temple, in both written and oral evidence,[103] and argued that "most of the Hindu community in the UK and the world consider the VHP to be a peaceful organisation".[104] The Muslim Council of Britain, which had described the VHP as among "well-known terrorist organizations with anti-Muslim ideologies",[105] nonetheless noted "the excellent work carried out by the Neasden Temple in promoting understanding and community relations in the country".[106] The Home Secretary told us that the Mission "makes an important contribution to the promotion of interfaith relations in the UK" and that the VHP, "an international Hindu Nationalist organisation", was not proscribed in the UK.[107] He added that no allegation that the Temple was involved in terrorism had ever been raised with the Home Office.

88. We conclude that community relations have deteriorated, although the picture is by no means uniform, and that there are many positive examples to set against our overall assessment. International terrorism and the response to it have contributed to this deterioration, particularly in relations between the majority community and the Muslim community. However, the problems are by no means only associated with these communities or with international terrorism; we have seen that international events, such as communal violence in India, the Kashmir dispute and the Israel-Palestine conflict can be reflected in deepening tensions in this country.

89. Much greater recognition should be given to the problem of both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. All communities, including the majority community, have a responsibility to tackle such problems, condemning without reservation prejudice, discrimination and violence against other communities. Whilst all communities will be sensitive to attacks upon them, no community should turn a blind eye to prejudicial actions by members of its own community.

90. Islamophobic incidents should be treated as seriously as any other form of racism. Islamophobia is not only an issue for Muslims: it is a problem that can only be resolved by the majority community in this country, who must acknowledge its existence.

91. It is unfortunate that there is as yet no reliable central collection of data on Islamophobia. We urge the Muslim community to follow the example of the Hindu Forum in seeking to draw on the experience gained by the Community Security Trust in monitoring anti-Semitism.

92. The rise in anti-Semitic incidents since September 2001 is extremely disturbing and should be acknowledged as such by all. Anti-Semitism among some members of the Muslim community is also worrying. We welcome the condemnation of anti-Semitic attacks by leaders of the Muslim community: it is important that they should continue to do so, forcefully and unequivocally.

93. We are also concerned by anti-Semitism on campuses. We urge university authorities to act swiftly when cases are brought to their attention. The duty to promote good race relations imposed on other bodies by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 should also apply to student unions, subject to the provisions on free speech at universities of the Education Act (No 2) 1986.

94. We note that the allegations that either the Neasden Hindu Temple or the Swaminarayan Hindu Mission, or both, are associated with terrorism have not been substantiated. These allegations are new to the Home Office and are disputed by a wide range of authoritative witnesses, both in the Neasden area and nationally.

The situation in other countries

95. In early 2005 we visited France and the Netherlands to see how two other European countries tackled problems very similar to those facing the United Kingdom. We met politicians, officials and representatives of minority communities, including Muslims. In both countries we also visited local councils (Saint-Denis, near Paris, and De Baarsjes, a borough of Amsterdam), where we had discussions with local politicians and faith leaders and visited schools. The contrasts and similarities between all three countries were instructive.


96. The over-riding French principle of 'laïcité', or secularism, means that there are no official figures for religious belief in France. It is, however, generally accepted that Muslims are the largest minority, and it was suggested to us that France has the most Muslims of any Western European country. The FCO website puts them at 3% of a population of 61.2 million: we were also quoted a figure of between 4 and 6 million. French Muslims are generally secular: we were told that only 22% were practising. Overwhelmingly they are of North African origin, a legacy of France's colonial past. There are about 600,000 Jews, 1% of the population.

97. Among the most significant recent developments had been the passing of a law to ban the wearing of obvious signs of religion in schools. Although this affected kippas, Sikh turbans and large crucifixes, it was widely taken to be aimed at Muslim girls wearing headscarves. We were told that only a few children had been excluded from school as a result of the ban. Some of our interlocutors said, however, that it was too early to tell whether the law had contributed to an increase in the alienation of Muslim youth.

98. We learnt the principle of laïcité meant that the concept of communities was not officially recognisedindeed, 'communautarisme' had a negative connotation. Some of those we met felt that the lack of reliable data on ethnicity and religion meant that it was difficult to craft appropriate and effective policies: there might, for instance, be problems with the work of a new anti-discrimination body. But a council of French Muslims had recently been elected, at official instigation, to represent Islam in its dealings with the state and mirroring existing Jewish and Christian bodies. However disputes over how representative the council was had led to new elections being called.

99. We were also briefed on the way the French legal system tackled terrorism, including through the use of specialised judges and prosecutors. We were told about procedures for handling intelligence, including phone-taps, in judicial proceedings and heard how the system allowed for accused people to be held for up to four years before trial.

100. In our visit to Saint-Denis we heard from local councillors and faith leaders about how they approached community cohesion in an ethnically very mixed areamore than 26% of the population in 1999 did not have French nationalitythat suffers from high unemployment: 25% of those between 20 and 25 were unemployed.

The Netherlands

101. The Dutch Ministry of Justice told us that there are over 900,000 Muslims in the Netherlands (which has a population of 16.2 million). We also heard that Muslims form 13% of the population of Amsterdam, where up to 60% of those under 18 were from ethnic minorities. The Muslim population of the Netherlands rose ten-fold between 1970 and 1997: many came as guest workers, mainly from Turkey and Morocco (countries which were never colonies of the Netherlands and with which there had not been significant exchanges). Asylum policies had also been a significant factor in immigration.

102. All our interlocutors agreed that the rise of Pim Fortuyn, which led to the questioning of the prevailing consensus on integration and immigration, and the murder of Theo van Gogh, of which a Dutch-born Muslim was accused, had radically altered Dutch approaches to the integration of ethnic and religious minorities and community relations. The desire to bring minorities into the mainstream of Dutch society was now an important political issue. There was a widely held view that what had earlier been seen as Dutch tolerance had in fact been a failure to confront the challenges that had now been identified.

103. We also heard about the measures taken to encourage integration: these included language lessons for foreign imams and stricter regulation of asylum and dual nationality. Some felt that the lack of social cohesion could not be ascribed only to the threat from terrorists and extremiststhere was a lack of dialogue between different parts of Dutch society and there was a problem of Islamophobia in the majority community. The media were also criticised for stigmatising communities. Representative of the mainstream Dutch media told us they were doubtful how successful they were in reaching minority communities.

104. In De Baarsjes, like Saint-Denis a multi-ethnic community (52% of foreign descent) suffering from social deprivation, we heard from community and faith leaders about their efforts to build community cohesion and inter-faith dialogue and the considerable progress they had made.

105. It is clear that the problems faced by France and the Netherlands have both similarities and differences to those faced here.

106. On the positive side, this country has a long tradition of race relations legislation and reasonably frank and open discussion of community and race relations. At local and national level there is a habit of dialogue, if sometimes patchy, on which solutions can be constructed. Our impression was that neither France nor the Netherlands have explicitly considered these issues in the recent past (though for different reasons) and this meant that, at national level at least, there was some real uncertainty about the most effective way forward.

107. On the other hand, in both countries there was a more explicit willingness, particularly at local level, to recognise the central importance of the Muslim communities and their future development within national society. In France, too, counter-terrorism powers were more developed than our ownpossibly because of their longer experience of dealing with this form of international terrorism.

50   "Other" includes Buddhist, Jewish, any other religion, no religion and religion not stated. Back

51 Back

52   Minority Rights Group International, Muslims in Britain, August 2002 Back

53 Back

54   Muslim Council of Britain press release, 23 March 1999, and The Guardian, estimated that there are 60,000 Muslims in Scotland (17 June 2002 quoted in Muslims in BritainBack

55 Back

56   Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market, March 2003 Back

57   Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market Back

58   Muslims in the UK: Policies for Engaged Citizens, Open Society Institute/EU Monitoring and Advocacy Programme,, pp66-67 Back

59 Back

60   Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Offender Management Caseload Statistics 2003, December 2004 Back

61   Muslims in the UK, p 67 Back

62   Q 265 [Mr Esser and Mr Satchwell] Back

63   Q 178 Back

64   Q 460 Back

65   Q 460 Back

66   Ev 70, HC 165-II Back

67   Q 336 Back

68   Ev 128-129, HC 165-III Back

69   Ev 70, HC 165-II Back

70   Ev 119, HC 165-III Back

71 Back

72   Islamophobia - issues, challenges and action (Trentham Books, June 2004) Back

73   Q 112 Back

74   Qq 118 and 221 Back

75   Ev 48, HC 165-II Back

76   Q 482 Back

77   Ev 5-9 and 42, HC 165-II Back

78 and Ev 8, HC 165-II Back

79   Q 37 Back

80   Q 102 [Mr Grunwald] Back

81   Q 105 Back

82   Ev 83, HC 165-II Back

83   Ev 97-98, HC 165-II Back

84   Q 246 Back

85   Ev 97-98, HC 165-II Back

86   Ev 159, HC 165-III Back

87   Ev 160-166, HC 165-III Back

88   Ev 83, HC 165-II Back

89   "We all deserve an apology", The Guardian, 2 March 2005, page 26 and Ev 55-59, HC 165-II Back

90   Ev 62-63, HC 165-II Back

91   Q 47 Back

92   Ev 6, HC 165-II Back

93   Ev 40, HC 165-II Back

94   Q 163 Back

95   Q 381 [Detective Superintendent Tucker] Back

96   Ev 68, HC 165-II Back

97   Q 111 Back

98   Q 164 Back

99   Ev 95, HC 165-II Back

100   Ev 59, HC 165-II and Ev 117, HC 165-III Back

101   Ev 117, HC 165-III Back

102   Ev 74, HC 165-II and Ev 142-143, HC 165-III Back

103   Ev 42, HC 165-II and Q 204 Back

104   Q 207 Back

105   Ev 69, HC 165-II Back

106   Q205 Back

107   Ev 112-113, HC 165-III


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