House of Commons - Home Affairs

Select Committee on Home Affairs Written Evidence

26.Memorandum submitted by the Muslim Council of Britain

INTRODUCTION

1. This response is submitted by the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). The MCB is the leading umbrella organisation representing the interests of Muslims in Britain, whilst working for the common good of society as a whole. In its short history, the MCB has built a reputation for consultation, co-operation and co-ordination amongst British Muslims, and a step change in contact between them and the wider society. The MCB has over 400 active affiliate organisations, some of them being umbrella organisations themselves.

2. The MCB have been extremely concerned about the terrorist threat posed to the UK and have acted as far as its power and influence allow in trying to undermine that threat. We have sent letters to all our members and mosques, produced sermons and recently we have produced a booklet; all of these measures have emphasized the need for the Muslim community to be vigilant and cooperate fully with the authorities in identifying and defeating terrorism. This should not however be seen as an acceptance that a threat exists from the Muslim community.

3. In preparing this response paper the MCB have included the results of an extensive consultation process and survey with all of its affiliate members. The submissions cover the issues which the Committee is specifically considering in light of the concerns and issues facing the Muslim community in Britain.

ANTI-TERRORISM CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001

4. The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (hereinafter referred to as ATCSA) was introduced as a reaction to the tragic events of September 11 2001. The legislation has created a twin- track criminal justice system, whereby suspects falling within the ambit of "special anti-terrorism legislation" have fewer rights than other suspected criminals. It has given police almost unlimited powers for stop and search. The powers of stop and search as well as the process leading to and including detention under the Act are manifestly draconian and fall far short of the well known and greatly cherished values of British justice and the recognised civilised international norms.

5. Anti-terror measures always compete with and threaten the states obligations to respect the human rights of all within its jurisdiction. The very fact that anti-terror measures will be proactive means that there is an inevitable danger that they may be applied in a way discriminatory to those who are already vulnerable ie certain nationalities (or non-nationalities, races and religions). While public life has not changed, there has been a clear readjustment in some sections of society. Traditional right wing enemies of democracies that prey on vulnerable minorities have shifted their focus of aggression upon minorities whom they perceive to be targeted by the pro-active anti-terror measures.

6. It has been stated by the Government that the threat is from members of the Islamic faith. Police practice of targeting Muslims for raids and arrests have also reflected this assumption. Large sections of mainstream media and extreme right elements have mirrored this campaign by also focusing their attention on the aforementioned phenomenon and concluding that there is a broader security threat posed by Muslims in the UK. The result is an unprecedented boost to Islamophobia which members of the public now recognise as a legitimate and acceptable form of discrimination.

7. Targeting Muslims and leaving a right wing media to explain and justify such official discrimination results in a circular argument giving the very justification required to maintain a state of emergency. However this can only prove counter-productive to meeting our security needs by diverting increased resources on policing an increasingly marginalised community and alienating the very community whose cooperation is the most vital.

8. It is of the utmost importance that the challenges facing Muslim community in the UK are properly understood and considered before decisions affecting its future are made. We therefore specifically request the Secretary of State take on board the conclusions and recommendations of the Report on Islamophobia published by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI).

ANTI-TERRORISM CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001 PART 4

9. Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2001, provides for indefinite detention of non-nationals suspected of links to a terrorist organization, but against whom there are no criminal charges. The UK has found it necessary to derogate from Article 5 ECHR. This represents perhaps in Europe today the single most serious violation of human rights linked to the adoption of counter terrorism measures. The UK is the only country in the Council of Europe to have considered it necessary to derogate from Article 5 of the Convention and the only country in the world to have derogated from Article 9 ICCPR.

10. The fact that only non-British nationals may be interned indefinitely sends alarming signals to British society that foreigners can and should be treated in a way that we cannot treat British nationals. The Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has expressed deep concern about this provision and has recommended to the Government that it seek to balance the security concerns with the protection of human rights and its international obligations.

11. Part 4 exemplifies the typical excesses of counter-terror legislation. Lord Justice Laws in the Court of Appeal accepted the Secretary of State's argument that the act is not discriminatory, as it could not justifiably apply such extreme measures to UK nationals and that to do so would only increase the aggregate human rights abuses committed. The absurdity of that argument is self-evident and brings not only the Government but also the Judiciary into disrepute. But the very point that detaining British citizens indefinitely on the same basis cannot be justified compromises the proposition that derogation from ECHR was necessary. It is the security threat alone that must justify derogation and not nationality; such arguments show that the security threat itself actually does not warrant derogation. The law requires the government to respect the human rights of all within its jurisdiction without discrimination. There is no justification for a law that targets only non-nationals if nationals are perfectly capable of carrying out the proscribed act. Current practice gives the perception that the Government is playing fast and loose with civil liberties and her international obligations and brings into question the sacredness of the values that we are supposed to be protecting from terrorists.

12. It must be recognized that states of emergencies can procure pressures on intelligence and enforcement agencies that are not in the interests of national security and rooted in prejudice. These realities combined with unchecked powers have resulted in grave human rights violations against vulnerable minorities in the not too distant past. The miscarriages of justice involving the Birmingham Six, Judith Ward, the Guildford Four and the Maguire's are examples of the results that flow from pressures being brought on the police, security services and the government. The MCB is concerned that the current environment is making the possibility of similar miscarriages more possible.

13. Another social effect of excessive legislation is to make acceptable what was once unacceptable when it comes to people who are perceived as being of a different race or religion. The recent judgement of the Court of Appeal making acceptable the use of evidence extracted by torture marks a retrogressive turning point in the British civil culture as repugnant as the reintroduction of slavery. None of the other 44 states that have incorporated the European convention on human rights has introduced detention without charge or trial, let alone allowed evidence generated by torture. Similarly, none of the 150 states of the UN convention have publicly taken such a position.

14. The effect of unjust laws directed at a distinguishable minority because of a threat they are purported to pose to the majority will mean that the majority will inevitably internalise that relationship and manifest that relationship in the form of prejudice. We draw attention to Paddy Hillyard's study (Suspect Community—People's Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain), which noted that one of the results of the police treating the Irish as a suspect community is that the public are encouraged to do the same.[28]

15. All those detained under Part 4 are Muslim. In line with the observations of the Newton Committee, Lord Carlile and the JCHR, the MCB, as a result of the Muslim Communities experience, express deep concern as to the way the ATCSA has been applied exclusively to members of the Muslim community. It is noteworthy that no consideration appears to have been given to the carrying out of community/race or religious impact assessments prior to the passing of the legislation discussed in this submission. No qualitative surveys have been carried out as to the implantation of these new powers.

16. Traditionally racist entities over the past two years have pointed to the fact that all detained under Part 4 are Muslims as a major limb in their argument that all belonging to the Islamic faith should be removed from the UK. Recent research, such as that undertaken by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and xenophobia,[29] has revealed a huge increase in anti-Islamic feeling since 11th September 2001. The backlash has manifested itself in various forms. The number of reported verbal and physical assaults against Muslims has risen sharply and mosques across the country have been vandalised and Muslim cemeteries desecrated.

17. The recent report by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI), has warned that more and more Muslims feel excluded from society and simmering tensions, especially in northern English towns, are in danger of boiling over and that there is a real danger of Britain becoming "institutionally Islamophobic".

STOP AND SEARCH

18. The pervasive nature of xenophobia is not restricted to extreme elements in society. When xenophobia is not challenged effectively by the state it quickly takes root in the higher echelons of society. Recent history tells us that it takes its most repugnant and powerful form when it is adopted by officialdom. It is difficult to pass a day without an aggressive tabloid and broadsheet newspaper piece that seeks to persuade its enthralled readership that Islam and Muslims present a threat to the UK. It is inevitable that decision-makers and enforcement agents will internalise prejudice and manifest this in their practice. According to the Home Office's own press release of 2 July 2004, Stops and searches under s 44 of TACT for Asians has risen by 302% from 744 to 2,989. The MCB believes the Muslim community is vindicated in its view that they are being targeted and victimised by this Act.

19. From data released by the MPS, out of 23,441 stops and searches by the Metropolitan police using Section 44 (1&2) only 199 arrests were made in 2002-03. This is only 0.85%, which is a staggering low success rate. The MCB endorses fully recommendation 5, 6, 16 to 19 of the MPA scrutiny panel's recommendation on this matter and asks the Secretary of the State to expedite the critical review of the use of stops and searches powers under s 44.

20. The community's distrust of the use of stops and searches is further fuelled by the lack of clarity as to why they are being stopped. This confusion is further compounded in the MPS itself as officers are under trained and not clear as to how, why and when they should be using these powers. There are many officers who believe the use of stops and searches is not, and should not be, based on intelligence; rather the power is there to be a "disruptive" element against terrorist cells. The MCB endorses the MPA scrutiny panel's recommendation 6, 16 to 19 and 29.

21. The fact that there is no accurate measurements of how many Muslims are being affected by this Act, in terms of Stop and Search, charge and the changes of those charges, is of great concern and adds to the alienation felt by the community. The respondents to MCB's survey have indicated that "the lack of official record keeping and publishing is adding to the suspicion that Muslims are being profiled and targeted by this Act." The MCB endorses the MPA scrutiny panel's recommendation 14, 20 and 27 and strongly believes that recording faith together with ethnicity will be one of the foremost solutions addressing this problem.

22. In this regard the Secretary of State is directed to the written and oral evidence (8 July 2004) the MCB gave to the Home Affairs Select Committee on our concerns about the impact of anti-terrorist legislation on the Muslim community.

ACCOUNTABILITY

23. Khurshid Ahmed, a commissioner at the Commission for Racial Equality, recently highlighted the impact that the operation of anti-terrorism law has had:

24. Of those surveyed by the MCB, 52% did not have a need to make a complaint to the police, 9% had complained and were satisfied with the response, but 39% felt that there would be no benefit in complaining to the police. Although recent statistics show a 300% rise in stop-and-search of Asians, predominantly Muslims, there has been no corresponding rise in complaints, the Independent Police Complaints Commission say this indicates that many people have lost confidence in the authorities.[31]

25. For many the case of Babar Ahmed is symbolic of police attitudes towards complaints from a suspect community. Early in 2004 a police officer was immediately suspended pending investigation when a complaint was brought that he had beaten a black man in Manchester. It had taken the IPCC nine months to investigate the claim by Babar Ahmed that he had been beaten during a terror raid and forced to prostrate and told by a police officer "where is your God now!" It is alleged that Mr Ahmed suffered over 40 injuries including a black eye and severe bruising.[32] During the latter investigation the police officer in question was free to continue policing. The difference in the two approaches speaks volumes to members of the public. We are concerned how rare the use of an apology is when the police/authorities have clearly acted wrongly.

26. When 10 Manchester Muslims were arrested in dawn raids in April 2004 by over 400 officers the Sun stated "Intelligence chiefs believe Al Qa'eda fanatics planned to blow themselves up amid 67,000 unsuspecting supporters. A source said: `The target was Old Trafford.'"[33]The same paper also stated "a police source said: `The plot involved several individual bombers in separate parts of the stadium. If successful, any such attack would have caused absolute carnage. Thousands of people could have been killed.'" The newspaper also had access to detailed information regarding the evidence collected by the police that day—specific football tickets. There can be little doubt that members of the Police force improperly disclosed confidential information contrary to existing police disciplinary code. It was also felt that the police source would have known the very serious and damning consequences of the leak and the fact that it's only possible purpose could have been to feed anti Muslim hysteria.

27. The Muslim Safety Forum[34]requested the Chief Constable Greater Manchester Police to carry out an investigation into the improper disclosure of information.[35] The Chief Constable's office acknowledged that the source of the newspaper article may well have been members of his force but concluded that it was "impractical" to investigate.

28. The blithe manner in which complaints from the Muslim community are dealt with give the strong impression that they are being discriminated against and that their rights can and will be breached with impunity.

PROSCRIBING LEGITIMATE POLITICAL THOUGHT—CRIMINALISING COMMUNITIES

29. From the 25 proscribed international organizations under the Terrorism Act 2000, 20 are of Muslim background and most, barring the obvious few whose prime objective is violence, are associated with liberation movements that have never posed a threat to mainland national security.

30. Most of the Belmarsh detainees are held because they support the Chechen cause for self-determination and from the publicly available information there is no evidence that they either planned or intended to bring harm to the UK. They are certified as non-UK nationals whom the Secretary of State reasonably believes as being "suspected international terrorists". Serious as those allegations are, on the facts of the cases, it still does not amount to "a threat to national security". Article 15 of the ECHR, permits derogation from Convention rights, "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation".

31. There is a danger that struggles for the right to self-determination (Article 1 of the UN Charter) recognised by many as legitimate can be deemed as unlawful, under the Act. Bosnian attempts to resist Serbian ethnic cleansing in 1992 was deemed by many in the Ministry of Defence to be unjustified aggression and support for that could have been proscribed under the present act; however the Government today accepts that a campaign of crimes against humanity had been perpetrated against the Muslims then.

32. Domination, discrimination and denigration of groups and individuals are causes and sometime justifications for terrorism and its proponents. It also the case that certain groupings of people may be vulnerable to oppression because they are powerless and marginalised in international politics and therefore unable to exert political influence in any given state or to express themselves to a sophisticated media in a modern democracy. However there are categories of persons in a modern democracy that will support voiceless oppressed minorities, either those with specific interest in international events or those with a link to those people through geography or cultural and religious interest. Far more often then not a beleaguered and sometimes unfair response by leading international powers will result in international terrorist groups filling in the void left by the lack of political will to ensure compliance with international law.

33. A disproportionate number of the world's population that are oppressed are Muslims, either as minorities, as in Chechnya, or as majorities, as in Algeria. Regardless of nationality and ethnicity Muslims tend to have considerable sympathy with these causes and if "terrorist" organisations also assist in these causes then there is a danger of criminalising specific communities. Even if the Government is restricted from positively influencing the affairs of another nation there is much that could be done to allow citizens to express support for causes without feeling they need to go underground. In this regard we adopt the observations and recommendations of Ben Majekodunmi, Assistant to the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General:

34. The divisive political culture that surrounds anti-terrorist legislation can all too easily be manipulated by countries that practice oppression and their supporters to silence genuine voices of peace and moderation. An example of this was the fiasco whereby Sir John Stevens was misled by a pro-Israeli member of the MPA and the media to publicly state that he did not wish members of the police to share the same stage as Yusuf Al-Qardawi, a sentiment he later retracted. Mr Al-Qardawi is one of the world's most influential Islamic scholars whose consistent condemnation of 9/11 and his practical efforts to assist its victims have earned him global praise as the leading Muslim figure for peace. Similarly in the US the Swiss Professor Tariq Ramadan, listed by Time magazine as one of the world's most influential figures who has also advised the British police and has been identified by Sir John Turnbull as a necessary figure in the fight against extremism, has had his visa revoked preventing him from taking up his teaching position at a university there on the basis that he poses a threat to national security. The State Department acted on the basis of information given to it by pro-Israeli groups based in France.[37]

35. It is not difficult for powerful political interests to tar peacemakers with the brush of terrorism and there exists little or no institutional safeguards to prevent this. If political interests can influence the actual decision makers then the lack of due process in anti-terror legal regimes means that it is an instrument that can be easily manipulated for interests entirely irrelevant to the nation's security or interest. This represents an enormous abuse of authority and trust that can be used in a manner contrary to the national interest. A prime example of this is in the United States. Currently, a Pentagon analyst from the office of Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, is under investigation for spying for Israel. Feith oversaw the Pentagon's defunct Office of Special Plans, which critics said fed policy-makers uncorroborated pre-war intelligence on President Saddam Hussein's Iraq, involving purported ties with the al-Qaeda terror network.[38]

36. Another factor that leads many to perceive that current anti-terrorist legislation is unfair is the fact that well-known terrorist organizations with anti-Muslim ideologies are not proscribed. Kach Kahane, a Zionist organization proscribed both in the US and Israel, the VHP which is responsible for coordinating the massacre of over 2,000 Gujarati Muslims; both are freely able to collect funds for overseas terrorist activities. A failure to fairly administer these overwhelming powers may lead to the perception that legislation is a political tool to suppress political dissent and this bites at its very public legitimacy and therefore efficacy.

37. It is in the interest of national security and justice that space which allows citizens to express support for legitimate human rights causes, even though they may coincide with causes pursued by "terrorist" organisations, be jealously guarded and even supported by the state in order that its supporters be not driven underground as was the case with the Irish population in England over a decade ago. The need to differentiate between terrorism and political acts of violence has recently been touched upon in the representations made by the ICJ to the UN:

38. Paramount is the need for the decision maker to take counsel in regards to international affairs from objective experts whose credentials are properly tested and measured in their field. Decision makers must be wary of impartial sources of information which will always be readily and attractively available but in the long term will be detrimental to national security and interests. The process whereby organisations are proscribed must be more transparent and according to strict criteria that are not subject to political influences or led by non-national security concerns.

39. If the Secretary of State does have a wide definition of international terrorism that possibly includes liberation movements it is essential that such terrorism be differentiated from a terrorist threat to national security which may attract extraordinary measures such as ECHR derogation. A failure to treat the two differently may compromise national security as the state may be acting unjustly in the international arena by preventing struggles against oppression, for example organisations that partake in terrorist violence because they are have no alternative, such as was the case with the ANC.

40. But the need to differentiate and focus specifically on defeating terrorism posing a threat to the UK carries it's own weight and logic, and surely to act otherwise while using the language of national security is an abuse of authority.

41. The Secretary of State has indicated that he does intend to replace Part 4 with legislation that will criminalise UK citizens who associate with "terrorist" organizations as well as to allow the use of intercept evidence. Greater attention needs to be paid to ensuring proscription is limited to defeating threats facing the UK and that it is administered impartially. The MCB have serious concerns as to the impartiality of the current proscription process and feel widening the net may entrench an already unfair position. There have been three years since 9/11, it is time a more comprehensive and considered anti-terrorist strategy was thought up rather then simply building on emergency provisions.

COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

42. The Director-General of the Security Service, Eliza Manningham-Buller, has informed the public "it is clear that the threat from Islamist terrorism will be with us for a long time. I see no prospect of a significant reduction in the threat posed to the UK and its interests from Islamist terrorism over the next five years, and I fear for a considerable number of years thereafter."[40] The Home Secretary has stated that the threat to national security was self-evident from information already in the public domain.[41]

43. In January 2003 the Secretary of State told the Today program that the police had "actually picked up those who, actually were planning to set up a cell to threaten our country". It has been reported that both lawyers and journalists believed that the Government had given the media the "green light" to disregard provisions of The 1981 Contempt of Court Act and provide sensationalist coverage of such arrests.[42]

44. The earlier practice of the Government to draw media attention to anti-terror campaigns mirrored US practice, as indeed did the decision to administer indefinite administrative detention without trial. Recently there has been widespread criticism that the US administration is using counter terror campaigns to foster a climate of fear for the purpose of political expedience, this has also has coincided with the growing unacceptability expressed by American civil society and jurisprudence with their practice of indefinite detention. There is a perception that the UK government had not only followed the US in foreign policy but also in domestic policy re derogation and legislation. It is inevitable also that the public will view domestic anti-terror policy through the prism of international policy, and this does little to inspire confidence, especially in terms of the intelligence that leads the government to act.

45. More recently the Secretary of State has refused to elaborate on the terrorist threat facing the UK as to do so "would prejudice any trial" and also because the inevitable scrutiny that follows may "invite ridicule". The first concern is a laudable one but the second can only raise more searching questions about whether a state of emergency justifying derogation actually exists.

46. Concerns from our affiliates varied according to race, age and background, but the one factor that each rated as primarily instrumental in stoking Islamophobia was the impact of how the practice of counter-terror measures were portrayed to the public. While many of those wrongfully targeted under the act are released or acquitted, they can never recover from the stigma attached to them and their community. High profile, extravagant and untruthful media attention on arrests under the Act coupled with relative silence on acquittals and releases have left a devastating impression of the Muslim UK community being a fifth column. Over 76% of our members felt that the attitude of the general public towards Muslims had changed for the worse over the past three years. Islamophobia is increasingly becoming acceptable and already is a legitimate form of discrimination.

47. As identified in the CBMI report the current wave of Islamophobia gains oxygen from the domestic and international counter terror measures taken by the Government and the way these are reported in the media. The government has been sensitive to Muslim concerns via institutionally defined media and public relations protocol. The MCB commend the sensitive language used in official press releases.

48. The Secretary of State has repeatedly informed the public that he is not against Muslims but he is against "terrorists". This makes little difference to the public who are fed a consistent stream of images of Muslims being dragged from their beds and arrested as suspected terrorists coupled with officialdom warning against Islamic terror. Below is the text of an email recently sent to the MCB, it is typical of the many regularly received by the MCB:

Sent: Thursday, August 26, 2004 10:42 AM

Subject: more

Do I need to say more?

"Dirty bomb" 8 at Bailey

EIGHT men accused of a "dirty bomb" plot appeared at the Old Bailey yesterday for the first time.

O! Look all Muslims!!

They are charged with conspiracy to murder and commit public nuisance with radioactive materials, gases, chemicals or explosives.

49. From our survey many members of the Muslim community feel that the high profile arrests of Muslim terror suspects and the relative silence that follows is part of a campaign to tarnish the community. The wide scale raids against members of the Muslim are in line with the infamous national anti-terrorist strategy of "disruption" which had such counter-productive effects on the Irish community. The controversial policy is designed to unsettle terror cells working within immigrant communities in Britain by carrying out sweeps of arrests which are not necessarily designed to lead to charges. It follows that if as the Director-General of Security Services believes the threat is an "Islamic" one then the strategy needs to target that community. Many Muslim leaders now believe disruption is beginning to severely alienate communities from the police. There is a wealth of information available bearing testimony to the way the anti-terror regime in the 80s forced the Irish community in England underground providing a fertile ground for the cultivation of terrorism. It is astonishing that there have been no measures in place to counter the discriminatory effects of current counter-terrorist legislation.

50. The earlier practice of the Secretary of State to draw spectacular attention to "Islamic terror" arrests has whetted the appetite of many of the right wing press who are now unable to present a picture other then that there is a threat from the Muslim community for fear of losing credibility. There are many measures that should be considered to buffer the negative public perception.

51. There must be a determined approach to prosecuting breaches under the Contempt of Court Act 1981. The serious way in which leaks to the press are considered when Government interests are at stake, such as in the David Kelly affair and the leaking of the Hutton report, stands in contrast to the unconcern expressed when it comes to rights to a fair trial of a suspect or the Muslims communities right to be free from discrimination. When the Attorney General was presented evidence that members of the Government, Intelligence services and media had colluded not only in contempt of court but also that the published information was simply not true, his reaction was merely to send notes to editors reminding them of the 1981 provisions. The Race Relations Act makes it obligatory for the government to legislate and carry out its affairs in a manner conducive to race relations.

52. The long standing practice of the authorities to neither confirm nor deny media speculation into ongoing investigations warrant departure when fabricated stories could cause in the public unwarranted hysteria and distress not to mention fostering racial and religious discrimination. The Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, was aware that The Sun was planning to run a fabricated story claiming that Old Trafford was an "Islamic bomb target", but decided against issuing an injunction against the paper as he decided it "would not be appropriate".[43]If the Government can intrude into individual human rights because of exceptional circumstances surely the very real threat posed to the Muslim community and race relations would justify limited press interference to ensure that the public is not falsely misled to such an extent that it may threaten public security or race relations.

53. Members of the Muslim community feel the Government should take more steps to attempt to reverse the negative image that has resulted from its counter-terror campaign. When critics point to the fact that of the 500 plus arrests of Muslims most have been released it is common to hear the reply from Government sources that there have been 15 convictions and that this was worth it. Despite long-standing calls by the MCB and the Muslim Safety Forum to give details of those arrests none were forthcoming from the Government. It has taken a report from the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) published in August 2004 to inform the public that only three of the 15 were Muslims and of these two have been given leave to appeal against their convictions; the other convictions were of racists and loyalists.[44] This type of information should be more readily produced and promoted by the Government to counter wide public misconceptions and prejudice.

54. An individual arrested under counter-terror measures suffers a public humiliation the stigma of which is long-lasting. Steps can be taken to redress the grievances of those who are wrongfully arrested and the wider Muslim community who are disaffected by such measures. Such measures would reverse the negative impact of "disruption" and ensure that rightwing elements cannot manipulate anti-terror arrests to promote racial discord.

55. The level of disinformation about Islam that has dominated the media on the back of the anti-terror coverage is unprecedented. Greater promotion of Islam Awareness Week, anti-discrimination posters that promote tolerance of both different religions and races, anti-terror posters that warn that most terror attacks have come from right wing elements—these are all practical steps that can and should be taken to reduce the fast growing phenomenon of Islamophobia.

56. The MCB are extremely concerned with lack of protection that is afforded to the Muslim community per se. The lack of legislation protecting followers of multi-ethnic faiths such as Islam and the failure to outlaw incitement to religious hatred exposes one of the most vulnerable and marginalized minorities in the UK to further harm and contributes to the ensemble of factors that lead many to conclude that Muslims are discriminated and victimized by the current spate of anti-terror measures. Our democracy is deficient for its want of protection for a minority actively discriminated against and mainstream legislation is clearly its proper place. But in the short-term absence of parliamentary will to pass such legislation the MCB would welcome its legislative introduction via counter-terror measures. The arguments for such a provision are strong, because minorities are the most affected by such legislation it is important that all minorities are equally protected, not least the one that is most disaffected.[45]

57. The MCB firmly believes that instead of fulfilling its declared objective of improving and enhancing security, the Act has in reality, by its strong focus on the Muslim community, caused it further alienation and disillusionment. As Lord Carlile in his February 2003 report on the review of Sections 21-23 acknowledged that the Act had "a significant impact upon a particular group of the resident community . . ." Some police have expressed misgivings about a law that in practice has only applied to Muslims (because all those currently detained are Muslim): there is a sense that it causes real resentment among parts of the Muslim community who are both "residents and nationals of the United Kingdom, and possibly makes some aspects of policing more difficult".

58. The ways in which anti-terror powers are being used has led to feelings of isolation amongst the 1.6 million Muslims in the UK. In the Muslim Community there is disillusionment with the Government which, rather than protecting them from the evil of Islamophobia, is effectively criminalising them as a community by discriminate and disproportionate use of the Act. Muslims feel as if they are under siege. The MCB relies on and fully supports the conclusions and recommendations of the Newton Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We also request the Secretary of State specifically take on board the conclusions and recommendations of the Report on Islamophobia so as to give its relevant recommendations the official authority that they currently lack.

23 September 2004

28 Suspect Community-People's Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain, Paddy Hillyard, Pluto Press (1993). Back

29 Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001, European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, May 2002. Back

30 UK Extremism Threat Growing, BBC News Online, 23 April 2004. Back

31 Victims of police are urged to speak out, Eastern Eye, http://www.easterneyeuk.co.uk/iframe_story.asp?NID=793. Back

32 Taken from www.stoppoliceterror.com December 2003. Back

33 The Sun, 20 April 2004. Back

34 The Muslim Safety Forum is an independent body made up of major Islamic organisations. It sits regularly with the MPS to help build better police and community relations. Back

35 Letter to Michael J. Todd, Chief Constable Greater Manchester Police, Re Request for investigation into disclosure of confidential information, 1 June 2004. Back

36 Ben Majekodunmi, Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary General; ICJ Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism: International Monitoring Systems, October 23 (afternoon) Palais des Nations (Room XVI), Geneva. Back

37 Muslim Scholar Loses US Visa As Query is Raised, Stephen Kinzer, New York Times, 8/26/04. Back

38 11 FBI Probes if Official Spied for Israel, Curt Anderson, AP 28/08/2004. Back