1.Memorandum submitted by the Association
of Chief Police Officers
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Association of Chief Police Officers
recognises the vital importance of good community relations in
counter-terrorism. The ACPO business areas of "Terrorism
and Allied Matters" and "Race and Diversity"
work closely ensuring that community aspects of counter-terrorism
are built into our work both nationally and locally.
1.2 Our overall objective is to ensure counter-terrorist
policing is as effective as possible and conducted with the support,
trust and confidence of communities. A minute proportion of the
population is involved in terrorism, and there is a risk that
we will create alienation and disaffection by our own actions.
Our work plan seeks to treat the terrorist threat as an opportunity
to ensure we have stronger links and support within communities,
which will ultimately help deliver better policing services.
1.3 Counter-terrorism does not sit in isolation
from other work and the wider themes of community cohesion and
reassurance informs our response. We recognise the need to engage
communities in our work, a key element of the Police Reform Agenda,
and our ambition is to develop meaningful engagement within the
context of counter-terrorism.
1.4 This submission outlines the community
context we are dealing with, it explains some of the policing
response and it describes examples of the specific work being
carried out. The final section contains some recommendations for
government that we believe will help in responding to community
concerns.
2. THE CONTEXT
The Threat
2.1 The threat to the UK from international
terrorism has been assessed at a high level since 11 September
2001. It is important to recognise that international terrorism—ie
that linked to the methods and ideology of Al Qa'eda—represents
a threat we have not seen before. The scale of devastation, death
and injury contemplated by international terrorists is truly shocking.
2.2 We believe the threat to be widely recognised
in communities of the UK. However, the lack of a delivered terrorist
device has led to "alert fatigue" in some quarters and
simple disbelief of the threat in others. Countering this scepticism
is difficult for two key reasons. Firstly, terrorist intelligence
must be carefully managed in order to protect sources. Secondly,
good information that might illustrate the reality of the current
threat is currently sub judice.
3. VULNERABILITY
3.1 Police forces in the UK have been alert
to the possibility of increased tension caused by fears of terrorism.
3.2 Muslim communities fear a backlash from
those who associate terrorism with Islam. There are few police
forces in England and Wales that monitor "Islamophobia"
as a specific type of incident. Forces that do record Islamophobic
incidents have found very low numbers of reported incidents.
3.3 Specific recording of faith hate crime
has been established by ACPO as a minimum standard of service
for all forces and will become national practice after the publication
of the new Hate Crime Manual. In the meantime we have launched,
in partnership with the Muslim Safety Forum, a nation-wide project
to encourage third party reporting of Islamophobic incidents,
responding to fears that much of this type of crime goes unreported.
3.4 Jewish and Israeli communities feel
particularly vulnerable to attack. They have been mentioned repeatedly
as a target in messages purportedly recorded by Al Qa'eda leaders
and there have been attacks on Jewish targets abroad, for example,
Istanbul and Djerba. The Jewish Community Security Trust has recorded
an increase in acts of anti-Semitism in the first seven months
of 2004.
3.5 Recently a joint CST and ACPO seminar
was organised to ensure links and co-ordination with Jewish communities
were as strong as possible. A national operational response plan
exists in the event of a threat to Jewish premises or gatherings.
3.6 There is particular concern about the
vulnerabilities of businesses to terrorist attack. A failure to
address the threat could see re-location of key businesses away
from the UK. Forces have been circulated a menu of options for
working in partnership with businesses under the banner of Operation
Rainbow and there are a number of examples of successful preventative
measures.
4. POLICE OPERATIONS
4.1 Muslim communities are concerned about
what is increasingly seen as unfair targeting by police under
counter-terrorism powers. Many Muslims refute the need for arrests
under the Terrorism Act where charges have not followed.
4.2 Additionally, many see the increase
of Asians stopped and searched under Section 44 of the Terrorism
Act, publicised in the recent release of 2001-02 stop and search
statistics, as an example of Islamophobia.
4.3 When police activity is combined with
the view, held in some quarters, that the threat is exaggerated
at best and non-existent at worst, counter-terrorist activity
is seen as wholly disproportionate.
4.4 From a police perspective there have
been 460 arrests for international terrorism since 11 September
2001 (the widely quoted figure of 609 includes domestic and Irish
terrorism) and a significant number are as a result of short-term
detention at points of entry into the United Kingdom. 54 of the
460 have been charged with terrorist act offences but over half
(236) of all those arrested have been charged with other criminal
offences.
4.5 A charge rate of over 50% compares favourably
with the rate achieved for similarly complex and difficult investigations.
Critics can point to a very low conviction rate for the terrorist
charges, but this is not a result of wholesale acquittals, rather
the slow progress to court of many cases. We expect to see a number
of high profile court cases concluded and reported upon within
the next 12-18 months.
4.6 In practice, the number of pre-planned
operations has been relatively small and each one the subject
of much discussion and consideration. All operations are co-ordinated
by an Executive Liaison Group. Community considerations and impact
are a critical agenda item that helps steer subsequent police
activity.
4.7 It fully recognised that each counter-terrorist
operation creates enormous publicity and Muslims are concerned
that it has the effect of linking Islam with terrorism. Police
press releases avoid reference to heritage or faith of those arrested
and they include a reminder for editors not to link Islam and
terrorism. We are assiduous in avoiding careless association of
Islam with terrorism.
4.8 In 2002-03 there was a 300% rise in
the number of Asians stopped and searched under Section 44 Terrorism
Act compared to the previous year (744 to 2989). This increase
occurred in the calendar year following the 11 September attacks,
and the total number of all Section 44 stops increased by 150%
(8550 to 21577). The proportion of Asian stops was 16% of the
total.
4.9 Given the vast majority of the stops
(80%) were in London, where the Asian population is 13%, and take
place largely in parts of London surrounded by large Asian populations,
then there is not, on the face of it, statistical evidence of
heavy targeting of Asians. Stereotyping Muslims as terrorists
is simply bad policing and likely to prove counter-productive
and our guidance to officers and staff warns against Muslim profiling.
Current terrorist methods include extensive reconnaissance of
potential targets. The use of Section 44 stop and search to disrupt
and deter this activity is of critical importance and should not
be underestimated.
5. STRATEGIC
RESPONSE TO
COMMUNITY CONCERNS
5.1 ACPO has developed a strategic approach
that has four key elements. These are:
— Improving links in Muslim communities
to develop both community and criminal intelligence.
— Ensuring that forces share best operational
practice to deal with the community context of terrorist incidents.
— Addressing wider problems of victimisation,
alienation and communication with communities—working towards
reassurance and cohesion.
— Enabling our staff to respond with
improved knowledge and capability.
5.2 This work is co-ordinated by the ACPO
National Communities Tensions Team (NCTT) which was set up permanently
earlier this year to help pull together our response. The NCTT
has a wider remit than terrorism and is developing a range of
work related to race and diversity. The Home Office has supported
this work by part-funding the NCTT and working in partnership
on key elements.
5.3 The work has been guided by feedback
from the Muslim Safety Forum, a group of leaders and significant
individuals of Muslim communities that meets monthly with the
police. The forum can be very critical and challenging, and they
have helped shape and influence our response.
6. INTELLIGENCE
6.1 Our intelligence must help identify
all criminality, including terrorist criminality, but it must
also guide police activity in addressing anxieties and concerns
within communities that can lead to tension, disorder, alienation
or non-co-operation.
— The NCTT trawls nationally for community
intelligence. It is establishing national standards in the collection,
analysis and use of community intelligence.
— The demarcation of roles and relationships
between community officers, Special Branch and the security services
have been established with the use of "Green, Amber and Red"
guidance.
— The Metropolitan Police Special Branch
established the Muslim Contact Unit two years ago, which is a
model of best practice in dealing with sensitive issues that concern
Muslim communities. The National Co-ordinator of Special Branch
is integrating community considerations and links into the new
regional intelligence cells. The NCTT is working with individual
force Special Branches to develop their community links and response.
7. OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS
7.1 All terrorist operations now have a
separate community operation order and in the event of a significant
terrorist incident somewhere in the UK all forces have developed
a local community response plan. Additional work includes:
— A good practice guide in respect
of community considerations learnt from counter-terrorist operations.
— A "Community Impact Assessment
Document and Guidance" circulated to forces for use in terrorist
operations.
— A guide to operations in religiously
sensitive premises produced and circulated to forces.
— Muslim contacts identified who can
provide confidential advice concerning sensitive matters and can
be assigned, where appropriate, to operations. For example, visits
recently made to high profile prisoners to allay community concerns.
8. COMMUNITY
REASSURANCE AND
COHESION
8.1 ACPO already has key projects in respect
of community reassurance and cohesion. We are fast tracking elements
of the projects that are likely to have a significant impact upon
communities affected by the terrorist threat. Key elements include:
— Faith hate recording and strategies
to address higher victimisation within Asian and other minority
communities.
— Working with the Home Office on the
community cohesion project, focusing activity towards "vulnerable
localities", those with high deprivation and high crime.
— The Metropolitan Police leading work
on identifying what alienates and radicalises Muslim young people,
and the extent to which this is associated, if at all, with support
of terrorism.
— Work conducted in partnership with
the Prison Service to monitor and mitigate the effects of radicalisation
among young offenders.
9. STAFF CAPABILITY
AND SKILLS
9.1 The key aim is to develop the understanding
and capability of staff to deal with community issues in respect
of counter-terrorism.
— A National Community and Cultural
Resource Unit is being developed, initially focusing on Muslim
staff. All Muslim officers and staff are being invited to seminars
later this year to take this forward.
— All forces have been surveyed to
find out what specific training they provide on Muslim matters
and the findings are being shared.
— ACPO and practitioner conferences
have been held, and briefing documents produced, to raise awareness
of the need to engage communities, share strategies for doing
so, and ensure our policing is appropriate and sensitive.
— Critical incident training, based
on the community issues of terrorist operations, is being developed
for ACPO and other senior officers.
10. RECOMMENDATIONS
10.1 The Government's counter-terrorist
strategy has been based around the four "P"s, Prevention,
Protection, Pursuit and Preparation. The Police service initially,
very explicitly, had an additional "C", for "Communities".
We have since aligned our strategy to the Government's but believe
that an opportunity was missed to ensure the elements of the strategy
that involve communities had prominence and priority. We would
like to see a specific heading of "Community" in the
government strategy.
10.2 We also believe there should be more
co-ordination between Government and Police about communicating
the nature of the threat and the use of counter-terrorism powers.
We can only gain the support of communities when links between
the threat, the formulation of powers and the use of powers are
clear to see. We also need to make clear that the powers that
have been enacted are necessary to address an extraordinary threat
for as long as it remains.
10.3 Likewise it is important that Government
treats the release of sensitive figures, such as the Section 95
statistics in July, in a more co-ordinated fashion, working in
partnership with the service. A failure to do so doesn't just
set back community relations with the police, it can reduce co-operation
and community support for operations and potentially increases
the risk to communities.
10.4 Finally, ACPO has recognised the importance
of working to improve community relations in the context of counter-terrorism.
It has invested significantly in developing this work and in co-ordinating
the response of all forces. The next National Policing plan must
recognise the priority of this work and promote and support the
significant efforts that all forces must continue to make with
communities.
14 September 2004
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