3.Memorandum submitted by the Board of
Deputies of British Jews and the Community Security Trust
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Board of Deputies of British Jews
(BOD) and Community Security Trust (CST) welcome the opportunity
to respond to the Committee's request for views.
The BOD is the representative body of the Jewish
community, and was established in 1760. The CST is the defence
agency of the community and was established in 1994. It works
closely with the BOD, the police and relevant departments of state.
1.2 The BOD and CST regard Islamist extremism,
incitement and terrorism to be among the greatest threats to national
security, the security of the Jewish community and community relations
generally. This is not to dismiss threats from other areas or
extremists, but these generally have a national liberation focus
or are reactive, in that they are a response to extremism by others.
1.3 We also believe there to be a growing
public perception that stigmatises the Muslim community. In particular
it conflates Islam with Islamist terrorism. The two are not the
same. This is polarising relations between British Muslims and
non-Muslims, damaging communal relations and encouraging Islamist
extremists.
The polarisation is enhanced by terrorists'
own use of a religious rationale, and by leading British Muslim
organisations adopting an ambiguous, sometimes hypocritical, attitude
to the use of indiscriminate terrorist violence against civilians,
depending on the theatre of conflict, political context and identity
of the actors. Terrorism must be opposed as a methodology, irrespective
of who uses it and why. The failure of leading Muslim organisations
to do this is one factor in the false association that some people
make between Islam, Muslims and terrorism.
1.4 In this connection, there is an intense
debate within Islam as to what constitutes legitimate violence
according to Islamic laws concerning the definition of Jihad.
Terrorists who cite Islam as their inspiration often claim a theological
justification for their actions. The European Council for Fatwa
and Research, headed by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, devoted its
annual conference in Stockholm in 2003 to the topic "Jihad
and denying its Connection to Terror". The conference highlighted
the premise that any action defined as Jihad by Muslim scholars
is compulsory for Muslims and cannot be categorised as terrorism.
The conference ruled that "Jihad can by no means be bracketed
with terrorism as circulated by some media . . . occupation is
the worst form of terrorism, and that is why resisting occupation
is not terrorism as stipulated by international law and conventions."
It is this approach which seeks to legitimise any action taken
by Muslims to end what they regard as the illegitimate occupation
in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Israel and Russia.
1.5 It is this approach which also results
in the portrayal by leading British Muslim organisations of recent
anti-terror legislation as de facto racism against Muslims.
The ongoing Iraq crisis has led many Muslims to feel that there
is a war against Islam. This perception is fuelled by Islamists
who encourage polarisation and division, in the hope that ordinary
Muslims will accept their extremist worldview.
2. THE ISLAMIST
THREAT
2.1 We reject any attempt to vilify or denigrate
Islam, or indeed any other religion. We recognise our common Abrahamic
origins and the closeness between Judaism and Islam. The BOD in
particular, on its own or via the activities of some of its members,
has long been associated with Jewish/Muslim dialogue. Alif Aleph
UK, the Maimonides Foundation, and the Three Faiths Forum are
all initiatives that were started by BOD members.
In particular the BOD encourages local "bottom
up" initiatives, whereby members of synagogues and mosques
have been encouraged to meet and explore religious commonalities.
These are generally unpublicised and ongoing, whereas some of
the "top down" initiatives have lapsed as a consequence
of international tension.
2.2 The BOD is committed to dialogue between
Jewish and Muslim community organisations and maintains a liaison
with the Muslim Council of Britain. Although this dialogue has
on occasions been fractured, continuing initiatives include advice
offered by Jewish doctors to Muslim doctors to ensure that male
circumcision is carried out to the highest medical standards:
advice given to Muslim Halal authorities to ensure that slaughter
of meat is carried out to the highest standards; advice given
to Muslim educationalists seeking state funding for Muslim day
schools.
2.3 However, and despite the foregoing,
we remain concerned by increasing anti-Semitism from extremist
Islamist influences within the Muslim community.
This is manifest in three ways:
2.3.1 Tension in the Middle East, both between
Israel and the Palestinians and in the Middle East generally,
inevitably results in an increase in anti-Semitic violence in
Britain, and elsewhere in Europe. This is reflected in the analysis
of anti-Semitic incidents recorded by the CST, which is discussed
below. It has been noted at recent conferences of the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe and was a feature of the
reports by the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and
Xenophobia (EUMC) published earlier this year.
2.3.2 The promotion of anti-Semitic propaganda
by Arab states is not occasional, but consistent, regular and
endemic. It is chronicled by, among others: the BBC Monitoring
Service in its coverage of the Arab media (printed and electronic)
and the weekly sermons delivered at the main mosques in Arab cities;
the Middle East Monitoring and Research Institute (MEMRI); and
the recently launched MEMRI TV monitoring service which reproduces
and comments on anti-Semitic statements and programmes on Arab
TV.
Complaints during the past two years to Arab
foreign ministries forced the abandonment of a television series
which promoted the Protocols of the Elders of Zion on Egyptian
television, a Syrian television series which featured blood libel
themes, and a neo-nazi Holocaust denial conference in Beirut.
The French media commission now propose the banning of the anti-Semitic
Lebanese Hizbollah-linked Al-Manar television broadcasts, and
the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission
have imposed an editorialising control process for Al-Jazeera
television broadcasts.
2.3.3 Much anti-Semitism in the Arab world
comes in the guise of anti-Zionism. Zionism is the expression
of an age-old aspiration by the Jewish people to return to their
Biblical homeland. Zionism is essentially a religious aspiration,
and as such is intrinsic to the identity of the great majority
of Jews. Anti-Zionism seeks to deny to Jews what is accepted for
other peoples, namely the right to a national homeland (as recognised
in the United Nations' vote in 1947 to establish a Jewish state
in the former mandatory Palestine). It may well be perfectly legitimate
to oppose particular policies of the government of Israel. But
anti-Zionism effectively becomes anti-Semitic when it blames Israel
for all the problems of the Middle East, denies Israel's right
to exist, or holds Israel to a different standard of behaviour
than other countries.
Anti-Semitism in the past had at different times
a religious basis, a political basis or a racial basis. It now
chiefly focuses on a "collective basis", ie it is directed
at the principal expression of Jewish group identity, namely the
state of Israel.
The word "Zionism" is increasingly
used in Arab and Muslim circles to mean anything that can denigrate
Islam. For example, the war in Iraq is labelled as a "Zionist"
war, whilst recent media coverage of the Darfur crisis has been
blamed on "Zionists". In the UK, both the Muslim Council
of Britain and the Muslim Association of Britain routinely brand
any critics of Islam as "Zionist" and portray Zionism
as some kind of demonic force with conspiratorial reach and power.
This is detrimental to inter-communal relations. It is also felt
by many Jews that Muslim attitudes to "Zionism" are
essentially rooted in traditional anti-Semitic charges, tropes
and motifs.
2.4 The consequence of the above is that
an increasing proportion of anti-Semitic incidents are perpetrated
by Muslims, Islamist extremists or sympathisers of the Palestinian
cause. This is not to say that all of them are committed by Muslims—they
are not—but that tension in the Middle East and Arab states'
propaganda act as a "trigger" or "ignition point"
for a range of perpetrators of anti-Semitic incidents.
2.5 Islamist ideology is both anti-democratic
and anti-Semitic. Its ideological roots lie primarily in the post-war
development of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al Islami) under
the leadership of Sayid Qutb. He sought to move the Brotherhood
away from its original revivalist ideology to one which sought
confrontation with existing Muslim states and the West in general.
Under the influence of fascism and Nazism, he sought to fuse totalitarian
anti-Semitic ideology with the revivalist ideology of the Brotherhood.
The MAB is the primary source of pro-Muslim
Brotherhood activity in the UK today. Its slogan, "Thinking
Globally, Acting Locally" summarises its pan-Islamist objectives.
MAB and its leading spokesmen have persistently promoted the equation
of Israel with Nazi Germany; called for Israel's destruction;
lauded the leaders of Hamas; justified Palestinian suicide bombing;
and invited radical foreign Imams to preach in Britain. They are
a perfect example of radical Islamists adopting a position of
political leadership in the Muslim community, and then using that
position to promote an extreme and divisive agenda, including
a dangerous ambiguity towards the use of terrorism and political
violence.
2.8 The Islamic Revolution in Iran initiated
by the late Ayatollah Khomenei provides a similar ideological
basis for extremism. In his aspirations for a state governed by
Shariah (religious law) alone, Khomenei sought to establish a
theocracy in which governance would be vested in the hands of
the supreme religious leader. Khomenei and subsequent Iranian
leaders have sought to export the ideas and practices of the Islamic
revolution through a range of means which have included providing
funds for religious institutions abroad and the funding and training
of terrorists.
Although Iranian foreign policy is now less
clear cut the government still seeks to export its revolution,
to extend its sphere of influence within the Middle East and to
eliminate the state of Israel. Khomenei's ideology also contained
a violent anti-Semitism.
3. RELATIONS
WITH OTHER
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
3.1 Jewish community bodies maintain relationships
with other minority religious communities in Britain. They include
the Hindu, Sikh and Jain communities, in particular. More generally,
the BOD is active within the Inter Faith Network and various government-sponsored
interfaith groups.
The BOD and CST have longstanding and close
relationships with the Hindu community, which are partly carried
out by the Indian Jewish Association UK, which maintains a programme
of meetings and cultural events. The BOD has advised the Hindu
community on building representative bodies, and the CST maintains
a working relationship with the Hindu Forum and a number of Hindu
Temples.
The Jewish community also maintains relationships
with Sikh community groups, in particular the Sikh Human Rights
Group, whilst the Jewish Jain Association was established by leaders
of both communities.
3.2 We have long maintained close relationships
with the Anglican, Methodist and Catholic churches, particularly
through the Council of Christians and Jews. Longstanding relationships
exist at local level between synagogue and church members in many
places.
4. ANTI-SEMITISM
4.1 Over the past three years the Jewish
community has become increasingly sensitised to the growth of
anti-Semitism in Britain. There is a feeling that a number of
red lines have been crossed in terms of political polemic, following
comments such as those from a leading MP pointing at the influence
of a so-called Jewish Cabal, and the appearance of imagery suggesting
a Jewish conspiracy on the front cover of a major weekly political
journal. Such occurrences are often coupled with a failure to
recognise the anti-Semitic nature of the comments by leading public
figures. The increasing frequency of such incidents has over a
period of time led to a sense of isolation within the community.
(This has been helpfully addressed in recent speeches by the Prime
Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Home Secretary.)
4.2 Anti-Semitism in contemporary Britain
manifests itself in two ways: anti-Semitic incidents, which have
been noted above and which will be further discussed below; and
intellectual or political anti-Semitism.
4.3 The CST monitors incidents and classifies
malicious acts aimed at the Jewish community or Jewish individuals.
This can take several forms, including physical attacks on Jewish
people or property, verbal or written abuse, threats against Jews
or the publication and distribution of anti-Semitic leaflets and
posters.
The CST does not include as incidents the general
activities of anti-Semitic organisations.
Incidents are reported to the CST in a number
of ways, most commonly by the victim or by someone acting on their
behalf. In 2001 the CST was accorded third-party reporting status
by the police. This allows it to report incidents to the police
and to act as a conduit for victims who are unable or unwilling
to report to the police directly. The CST works closely with police
Community Safety Units in monitoring and investigating anti-Semitic
incidents.
Not all incidents will be reported to the CST
and it is therefore thought that the true number of incidents
may be somewhat higher than their recorded total. No adjustments,
however, are made to the figures to account for this.
4.4 The CST recorded a total of 375 anti-Semitic
incidents in the UK during 2003. This was the second highest annual
total since the CST began its current system of monitoring incidents
in 1984, and represented a 7% rise on the 2002 total of 350 incidents.
This increase continues the trend of rising
levels of anti-Semitic incidents. From a low point of 219 incidents
recorded in 1997 the annual figure has risen steadily to its current
level. This rising trend was intensified by the reaction to the
start of the current Palestinian-Israeli violence in 2000 when
the annual total of 405 incidents was by some margin the highest
so far recorded. (Appendix 1)
4.5 The CST is neither qualified, nor does
it have information, to discuss the monitoring of racist or homophobic
incidents by other groups. But it has now embarked on a training
scheme with the Hindu Forum to assist them in monitoring incidents
to the same forensic standard as the CST.
4.6 European Union monitoring bodies have
notified their intention to use CST categories and monitoring
systems following the decision taken by the OSCE to monitor anti-Semitism
within the 55 member states, confirmed in the Berlin Declaration.
These decisions taken at the Berlin Conference in April 2004 are
subject to ratification by the OSCE Foreign Ministerial Conference
to be held in Sofia in December 2004. Given the increasingly global
nature of the threat posed by anti-Semitism, the Jewish community
welcomes the fact that the UK government signed up to the OSCE
process. We are looking forward to learning how the Government
intends to track progress and report back on compliance with this
agreement.
5. MEDIA COVERAGE
5.1 It is our belief that anti-Semitism
and anti-Semitic incidents are covered sympathetically by the
British media. Press coverage of a synagogue arson or Jewish cemetery
desecration is almost always empathetic and accurate.
However, media coverage of the Israel-Palestine
conflict is often one-sided and superficial, paying little attention
to the underlying causes or its history. As a consequence, the
reporting of significant events in the Middle East often appears
to trigger anti-Semitic incidents in Britain and elsewhere in
Europe.
The attached analysis from the CST Anti-Semitic
Incidents Report 2003 provides a case study. (Appendix 2)
6. CIVIL LIBERTIES/POLICING
ISSUES
6.1 Members of the Jewish community report
no problems with their civil liberties or policing issues.
The close working relationship between the BOD, CST
and the police nationally has led to a recognition of the particular
terrorist and other threats posed to the Jewish community, and
established and rehearsed routines exist to deal with security
emergencies.
6.2 The CST regularly provides advice to
the police in a number of areas: lectures to police cadets in
training; input into police manuals on how to deal with religious
communities; training for police CSU officers; training for police
constables patrolling areas with large Jewish communities.
As a consequence of the longstanding and close
working relationship with the police, the CST is held out as a
model for an ethical community security agency. It has frequently
been commended by senior police officers to other communities.
6.3 The only area where we would wish to
offer a proposal to strengthen police powers relates to terrorist
reconnaissance. Terrorists conduct hostile reconnaissance against
a range of prospective targets, before selecting one for attack.
Such reconnaissance provides a window of opportunity for police
and alert members of the public to foil a prospective attack,
as it requires the terrorists actually to visit the planned target
and surrounding area. Future legislation should be developed to
exploit this unique opportunity by enabling law enforcement agencies
to question suspects and seize papers, camera film, etc, where
there are reasonable grounds to believe that surveillance is being
carried out preparatory to a terrorist attack.
15 September 2004
APPENDIX 1
MONTHLY FIGURES FOR ANTI-SEMITIC INCIDENTS
JANUARY 1996—DECEMBER 2003
| 1996 | 1997
| 1998 | 1999 |
2000 | 2001 | 2002
| 2003 |
| January | 16 | 7
| 14 | 26 | 37 |
16 | 15 | 23 |
| February | 12 | 24
| 16 | 19 | 19 |
14 | 11 | 24 |
| March | 26 | 25
| 20 | 18 | 25 |
20 | 26 | 48 |
| April | 44 | 10
| 23 | 34 | 35 |
33 | 47 | 29 |
| May | 24 | 20 |
22 | 29 | 29 | 32
| 47 | 27 |
| June | 23 | 20
| 38 | 21 | 24 |
30 | 26 | 34 |
| July | 14 | 20
| 18 | 20 | 29 |
28 | 31 | 30 |
| August | 11 | 15
| 18 | 18 | 16 |
20 | 15 | 20 |
| September | 16 | 28
| 14 | 25 | 23 |
50 | 47 | 22 |
| October | 17 | 19
| 20 | 23 | 105
| 48 | 45 | 57 |
| November | 20 | 13
| 11 | 24 | 42 |
14 | 28 | 36 |
| December | 5 | 18
| 22 | 13 | 21 |
5 | 12 | 25 |
| TOTAL | 228 |
219 | 236 | 270
| 405 | 310 |
350 | 375 |
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