19.Memorandum submitted by the International
Centre for Security Analysis
The following submission seeks to inform policy-makers
and emergency-planners of the significant lessons to be learnt
from the growing body of literature examining human behaviour
in a disaster. These point to the paramount need for professionals
to incorporate community responses to particular crises within
their actions, rather than seeking to supplant them as ill-informed
or less productive. This is because emergencies offer society
an important means to reaffirm fundamental human bonds that have
been particularly corroded over recent times. Actions that enhance
the benefits of spontaneous association, as well as developing
a sense of purpose and trust across society are, at such times,
of equivalent if not greater importance than effective, technical
responses.
AFFILIATIONS
The lead-author to this contribution is currently
the Director of the International Centre for Security Analysis
(ICSA) based in the War Studies Group of King's College London
(KCL). This is a 5* research assessment exercise accredited department
within one of the UK's leading research institutions.
Much of the analysis derives from a two-year
study into the "Domestic Management of Terrorist Attacks",
which was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC),
as part of its "New Security Challenges" programme.
A final report on the research undertaken is due to be delivered
to the ESRC by the end of October 2004.
The specific aspects explored in this submission
derive largely from the work of Professor Frank Furedi, of the
University of Kent, into the sociological aspects of human resilience
within contemporary society, as well as that of Professor Simon
Wessely, of the Institute of Psychiatry at KCL, into the psychological
consequences of terrorism.
CULTURAL MEANING
AND SOCIAL
RESILIENCE
How we, as a society, respond to a crisis, depends
only in part on the nature of that crisis or the agent causing
it. This cultural or social element is what explains our different
and evolving attitudes to disaster across time and in different
societies.
Why is it, that at certain times and in certain
societies, a widespread loss of life—such as that which
occurred in the London smog of 1952, or that which happens on
an annual basis upon our roads—can fail to become a point
of discussion, whilst at others, even a very limited loss—such
as the loss of only seven lives aboard the Challenger spacecraft
in 1986, or the four lives lost as a consequence of the Hatfield
train crash in 2000—can become key cultural reference points?
In his work, Furedi has pointed to the evolving
context and framework of cultural meanings to explain such variation.
Broadly, this suggests that emergencies take on a differing role
dependent upon what they represent to particular societies at
particular times, rather than solely on the basis of more objective
indicators, such as real costs and lives lost.
The loss of the Challenger spacecraft represented
a low-point in our cultural assessment of our own technological
capabilities. It was a blow for the assumption of steady scientific
progress that no number of everyday car accidents could replicate.
On the other hand, Hatfield became represented as the paradigmatic
example of why we were right to mistrust politicians and "profit-seeking"
corporations.
In their own ways, both these examples point
to the growing disconnection of ordinary people in the contemporary
world from the professional elite, whether political, corporate
or scientific. In turn, this reveals the extent to which once
taken-for-granted, core social bonds and affiliations have been
eroded in the course of little more than a single generation.
It is this incoherent cultural outlook that
represents by far the greatest problem in developing our responses
to the possibility of terrorist attack. How the public would respond,
is shaped far more by its underlying assumptions and allegiances
prior to, and subsequent to, any emergency, than the specific
aspects of that emergency itself.
Yet, the standard way of dealing with disaster,
is one that prioritises pushing the public out, beyond the yellow-tape
perimeter, and subsuming their initial actions to those of the
professionally-trained emergency services. This is despite the
fact that the public themselves are the true first responders
in any such situation.
Effectively, we deny people any role, responsibility
or even insight into their own situation at such times. Yet, any
examination of the existing historical literature on human behaviour
in a disaster, readily points to the central importance of ordinary
human action. People are at their most social and rational at
such times and this behaviour should be encouraged and developed
rather than subsumed.
Disasters, including terrorist attacks, destroy
physical and economic capital. On the other hand, they present
a tremendous opportunity for the creation and enhancement of social
capital. It is this that the authorities and professionals should
be alert to and wary of displacing, in their haste to put forward
more meticulous and technically competent solutions.
In the aftermath of the Sarin gas attack on
the Tokyo subway in 1995, many of those affected were ferried
to hospital in private cars. As a chemical attack, professionals
might argue that this presented a risk of further contamination,
but in the eventuality it did not, and only 11 people lost their
lives due, in part, to the spontaneous actions of concerned citizens
who acted when ambulances were not available.
A similar scenario was witnessed at the recent
and terrible hostage crisis in Northern Ossetia in Russia. When
the siege was eventually broken, the authorities were largely
unprepared. Most of the injured were taken to hospital by car.
After the recent episode of flooding in Boscastle,
Cornwall, as with the Lynmouth flood disaster in Devon of 1952,
it was inevitably ordinary people who were both first on the scene
and first to take appropriate and supportive action.
After the Bali bombing of October 2002, many
steps were taken by local responders on the ground to deal with
the injured and indeed, begin the process of organising to have
them flown to special burns units in Australian hospitals. By
the time the professional emergency responders arrived much of
this work was well in hand. Indeed, the disaster plan that these
latter then worked to created new problems that had already been
addressed. Scrapping the actions of local responders, many of
the injured were ferried to hospitals where there were no specialist
units to help.
The point here, is to identify the extent to
which pushing people out at such times may appear logical and
professional, but in actuality it can be counter-productive, failing
to capitalise upon the spontaneous social bonds and behaviour
that emerges in these situations.
TECHNICAL FOCUS
VERSUS CULTURAL
RESILIENCE
Many of the counter-terrorist measures put in
place since 11 September 2001 can, at best, be described as largely
technical in character. Apart from specific, security service
related actions, these have included discussion about the need
for greater surveillance, better intelligence, new protective
clothing for the so-called "first responders", along
with new gadgets to detect chemical, biological or radiological
agents, concrete blocks and fences around many public buildings,
endless checks at airports and stockpiles of vaccines, amongst
many others.
The problem with all of these, is that by seeking
to secure society from the outside by such means, we fail simultaneously
to engage society from the inside with a view to winning a debate
as to what we are actually for as a society.
Much research points to the fact that, in addition
to the need for technical means to protect oneself in an emergency,
by far the most useful tool is a clear sense of mission, purpose
and direction. If we were to broadly caricature resilience as
the ability to pick oneself up after a shock or emergency, and
to keep on going, then the primary task is surely to have a clarity
as to who we are, what we are for and where it is exactly that
we are heading.
Yet, such political debate as to cultural values
and direction, is most noticeable by its absence. Instead, as
indicated above we seek to secure ourselves from the outside.
Ironically, this preponderance of technical means and purported
solutions—for we have yet to see whether many of them truly
work—simply encourages an already existing sense of social
suspicion and mistrust.
We are encouraged to be "alert" as
to the activity of our neighbours, or those sat opposite us on
any public transport. But rather than bringing people together
as the times demand, such approaches simply serve to push people
further apart. In that regards at least, we truly are "doing
the terrorists' job for them".
SOLUTIONS
Handling social concerns as to the possibility
of a terrorist attack is no easy feat. In part, this is because
social fears today have little to do with the actuality or even
possibility of the presumed threats that confront us. Rather,
they are an expression of social isolation, cynicism and mistrust.
In that regards, any real solution needs to
be conscious of the need to build up social bonds, rather than
undermining these. The public need to be included and engaged.
But they need to be included and engaged well before the emergence
of any particular crisis, and they need to be included and engaged
in matters pertaining to far broader social issues than merely
fears about terrorism, or indeed any fears.
The starting point for any effective solution
is to put the actual threat posed by terrorism into an appropriate
context. Outside of the events in New York, Washington and Madrid,
there have been no terrorist attacks in the developed world. To
suggest otherwise is both alarmist and disingenuous.
What's more, what attacks there have been consistently
fail to point to any serious capabilities amongst terrorists in
the specific area of chemical, biological and radiological weaponry
the public fear most. Yet, to read the debate over the last three
years one would be forgiven for thinking otherwise. Certain terrorists
may wish to develop and deploy such weapons but, given their current
capabilities, this remains very much an aspiration rather than
a possibility.
Above all, if as a society, we are to ascribe
an appropriate meaning to the events of 11 September 2001—one
that does not enhance fear domestically, encouraging us to become
even more dependent on a limited number of expert professionals,
who will tell the public how to lead their lives at such times—then
we need to promote a far more significant political debate as
to our aims and purposes as a society.
Surely, those who risk their lives fighting
fires or fighting wars do so, not so that their children can in
turn go on to do the same in the future, but rather because they
believe that there is something more to life worth fighting for.
It is that "something more" that contemporary society
appears to have lost sight of. And it is a loss we ignore at our
peril.
Bill Durodié
International Centre for Security Analysis
King's College London
6 September 2004
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