Select Committee on Home Affairs Third Report


3 Changes in the approach of the Home Office towards PSA targets

The new Home Office objectives and PSA targets

19. In the 2004 Spending Review, the Home Office announced a new set of five objectives, supported by seven PSA targets to be achieved by 2007-08. These succeed the seven high-level aims and ten PSA targets agreed as part of the 2002 Spending Review—progress towards meeting these was reported in this year's Departmental Annual Report (DAR).[10]

20. The Home Office now has five formal 'objectives', listed in the following table:
Objective I: People are and feel more secure in their homes and daily lives.

Objective II: More offenders are caught, punished and stop offending, and victims are better supported.

Objective III: Fewer people's lives are ruined by drugs and alcohol.

Objective IV: Migration is managed to benefit the UK while preventing abuse of the immigration laws and of the asylum system.

Objective V: Citizens, communities and the voluntary sector are more fully engaged in tackling social problems and there is more equality of opportunity and respect for people of all races and religions.

21. These objectives are supported by seven new PSA targets:

PSA 1: Reduce crime by 15%, and further in high crime areas, by 2007-08.
PSA 2: Reassure the public, reducing fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, and building confidence in the Criminal Justice System without compromising fairness.
PSA 3: Improve the delivery of justice by increasing the number of crimes for which an offender is brought to justice to 1.25 million by 2007-08.
PSA 4: Reduce the harm caused by illegal drugs (as measured in the Drug Harm Index encompassing measures of the availability of Class A drugs and drug related crime) including substantially increasing the number of drug misusing offenders entering treatment through the Criminal Justice System.
PSA 5: Reduce unfounded asylum claims as part of a wider strategy to tackle abuse of the immigration laws and promote controlled legal migration.
PSA 6: Increase voluntary and community engagement, especially amongst those at risk of social exclusion.
PSA 7: Reduce race inequalities and build community cohesion.

22. Much of the supporting detail of these PSA targets is contained in 'Technical Notes.' The text of these is, for convenience, printed as an appendix to this report.

Changes since the 2002 Spending Review

23. There have been three main changes in the approach of the Home Office to PSA targets since the 2002 Spending Review. First, in general there are fewer and simpler formal objectives, given expression in fewer and simpler PSA targets. Second, there is a trend in favour of 'directional' PSA targets that do not specify a target level of improvement. Third, so-called 'standards' have replaced PSA targets in relation to some areas of performance, denoting a commitment to maintain, rather than to improve upon, current levels of achievement. We examine each of these changes in turn.

Fewer and simpler objectives and PSA targets

24. The Home Office has changed its approach towards setting objectives. First, there are fewer of them: five replacing seven. Objective I that "people are and feel more secure in their homes and daily lives" replaces two aims: one relating to crime and the fear of crime, the other to organised and international crime, including terrorism. Objective II similarly combines two previous aims.

25. The new objectives are also more concise. A striking example of this is the contrast between the new Objective III and Aim 5 set out as part of the 2002 Spending Review:

Objective III: Fewer people's lives are ruined by drugs and alcohol.

Aim 5: To reduce the availability and abuse of dangerous drugs, building a coherent, co-ordinated drugs strategy covering education and prevention, supply and misuse. To focus on effective intelligence and detection, preventative measures at local level, community regeneration and—with other relevant Departments and agencies—the provision of necessary treatment and rehabilitation services. To reduce the incidence of drugs in prisons and provide appropriate follow-up and remedial services.

26. Any of the other four 2004 objectives could similarly have been contrasted with the 2002 aims which they have replaced. These aims had been used to express not just desired final outcomes but also the intended strategy to achieve these outcomes as well as various desirable intermediate outcomes. The new objectives state just the desired final outcomes.

27. The change in approach towards objectives is matched by similar changes in respect of PSA targets. The overall number of targets is fewer than in the past. The seven new PSA targets compares with ten set out in the 2002 Spending Review and eighteen set out in the 2000 Spending Review.

28. In addition, the individual targets are all shorter than those they replace, and, in most cases, simpler as well. Thus the new PSA 1 to reduce crime by 15% is both shorter and simpler than the previous PSA 1, which included a number of sub-targets in relation to specific crimes. Similarly, the new PSA 3 to bring 1.25 million offences to justice replaces a previous PSA 3 that committed not only to a specified number of offences brought to justice, but also to an improvement in all Criminal Justice System areas, a greater increase in the worst performing areas and a reduction in the proportion of ineffective trials. Likewise, PSA 5, to "reduce asylum claims as part of a wider strategy to tackle abuse of the immigration laws and promote controlled legal migration", replaces a target which specified quality and speed of decision-making, and which quantified improvements and the deadlines for achieving them (e.g. 75% of substantive asylum applications to be decided within two months by 2004).

29. In one case, it appears that detail previously embodied in the text of a PSA target has now been moved to the Technical Notes. The new PSA 2 to "reassure the public, reducing the fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, and building confidence in the Criminal Justice System without compromising fairness", amalgamates and adapts two previous PSA targets. One was PSA 1 which included a commitment to reduce the fear of crime. The other was PSA 4, which committed the Home Office to "improve the level of public confidence in the Criminal Justice System, including increasing that of minority ethnic communities, and increasing year on year the satisfaction of victims and witnesses, whilst respecting the rights of defendants". The omitted references to minority ethnic communities, victims and witnesses reappears in the Technical Note, which specifies that achieving the confidence and satisfaction of these groups is integral to achievement of the target. Thus in this case an apparent gain in simplicity has been achieved by transferring material to the Technical Note, in conjunction with which the target is meant to be read.

30. This case is, however, an exception. Other lower-level targets are still sometimes set by the Home Office.[11] But overall, there is a genuine trend towards simpler and shorter PSA targets, corresponding to the simpler and shorter objectives.

31. In its written submission, the Home Office explained the thinking behind this trend:

We currently have ten PSA targets, most with multiple sub-targets. We plan to move to a smaller number of PSAs for the next Spending Review period, setting overall targets for outcomes, but providing services with more flexibility on how these targets are met. We believe that this will encourage local flexibility and innovation, simplify performance monitoring arrangements, and provide scope for greater use of locally negotiated targets or Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs), whilst also ensuring that key Government priorities are met.

Having explicit outcome targets has helped to drive up performance over the last few years, and are now an accepted part of service delivery. The shift in focus we propose reflects a growing maturity in the way we use targets, building on our own experience and feedback from delivery services. It also reflects the Government's wider commitment to driving improved performance, not through multiple national targets, but through greater devolution of responsibility to the frontline, backed by tightly defined standards, strong performance management, and targeted intervention for poorer performers.[12]

32. The Home Office therefore places PSA targets in their wider context of performance management. Fewer and simpler PSA targets aid the Home Office's relationship with local service providers by allowing for greater local discretion whilst ensuring that overall desired outcomes are clearly specified. We would add that this reinforces the need for the real reduction of centrally determined targets that are set outside the PSA framework.

33. The trend towards fewer and simpler objectives and targets has further benefits. In principle, it should enhance their role in setting a strategic direction. As the Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, Mr John Gieve, put it, "you can only have a limited number of top priorities".[13] Moreover, the trend towards simplicity helps Parliament and the public to understand exactly what these priorities are, thus aiding accountability.

34. The purging of detail from the targets is intended also to help to avoid both incentivising the wrong types of activity and alienating local criminal justice personnel. Mr Gieve told us that:

When targets were first being introduced our predecessors announced targets on vehicle crime, domestic burglary and robbery and we are on track to hit those reductions, although robbery remains in doubt…. At the time those were the priority crimes…. As we have been able to bring these down… there has been a sense certainly in some areas that vehicle crime and burglary is not the real problem any longer, there is some other local problem. So we have deliberately generalised this to an overall crime target in order to allow the local areas, the police and local authorities, to keep crime numbers going down and we want them to keep burglary and car crime going down but to respond to the problems of their own areas.[14]

35. The trend towards simplicity does contain some risks. First, it risks disincentivising efforts in important areas not covered by the new targets. For instance, the new target to reduce crime by 15% contains a natural bias towards volume crime. Success in reducing relatively rare, but highly serious, offences such as violent crime will have a small statistical impact on the overall crime figures and will not therefore not contribute significantly to meeting the target. Mr Gieve acknowledged that this was a potential danger but argued that in practice the good sense of police forces could be relied upon not to divert resources away from serious crime to volume crime in order to meet the target: "I think the police understand and we understand that with any quantified target you have to operate it sensibly".[15]

36. Second, there is a risk that with fewer and simpler targets and objectives, there will be less information available to judge the performance of the Home Office. In principle, the more strategic nature of both the new objectives and PSA targets is a good thing: it forces a more rounded appreciation of what is being achieved. However, this in turn requires relevant information—in particular, KPIs and supporting data—to be made available.

37. We broadly welcome the Home Office's decision to reduce the number and simplify the content of its targets and objectives. We believe it is right that national target-setting should be concerned with setting a strategic direction but not to micro-manage matters that are best left to local discretion. However, this reinforces the need for a real reduction in centrally determined targets that are set outside the PSA framework. We also consider that the scope for further simplification is very limited, if the PSA targets are to reflect accurately the full range of Home Office priorities.

38. In addition, we recommend that key performance indicators (KPIs) and supporting data are routinely published so that Parliament and the public can form a rounded appreciation of the performance of the Home Office in attaining these targets and objectives.

The trend towards 'directional' PSA targets

39. Not only are the new PSA targets generally simpler and shorter, they are also frequently less specific, avoiding commitments to particular levels of improvement. For instance, PSA 2 pledges to "reassure the public, reducing the fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, and building confidence in the Criminal Justice System without compromising fairness". There is no target level of improvement. Similarly, PSA 5 promises to "reduce unfounded asylum claims", PSA 6 to "increase voluntary and community engagement" and PSA 7 to "reduce race inequalities and build community cohesion". The relevant Technical Notes for these PSA targets do not supply target figures, and in oral evidence it was confirmed to us that even minimal improvements in these areas would satisfy the criterion for meeting the targets.[16]

40. There are two clear exceptions to the trend away from quantified PSA targets. PSA 1 and PSA 3 both contain quantified commitments: respectively, to reduce crime by 15% and to bring 1.25 million offences to justice.[17] All the other PSA targets are what Mr William Nye—Director of the Performance and Finance Directorate of the Home Office—described to us as "directional".[18] They set out a desired direction of progress but do not make quantitative commitments. In a sense, they are not targets at all: they define what the Home Office seeks to improve, but not by how much. In oral evidence, the Permanent Secretary, Mr Gieve, justified this policy of not including target figures:

Well that is something which I have rather encouraged, taking out arbitrary numbers. You can tell whether something is going up or down. That is a very precise measurable fact, whether it is going up or down, and sometimes it is better to say, "We're going to reduce, we're going to get the thing moving in that direction" than to try and pick a figure of 5% or 10% or whatever and although that appears to give precision, it does not really give precision and it may be quite difficult to say how far you can expect to go.[19]

41. Responding to the criticism that even minimal progress in the direction set by the target could be claimed as having met the target, Mr Gieve told us that where the aim is, for instance, a reduction in asylum claims, "if they barely go down, then that is a marginal success. Obviously we are going for a substantial reduction and that will be more of a success".[20]

42. The trend away from quantified targets is clearly an attempt to avoid some of the risks attendant upon such targets. If they are set at the wrong level or defined too narrowly, they can create perverse incentives and interfere unnecessarily with the ability of local service providers to determine their own local priorities.

43. An example of a badly judged PSA target was the commitment in 2002 to increase the number of failed asylum seekers removed from the country to 30,000 by March 2003. The Home Secretary subsequently accepted that this target had been "massively over-ambitious" as only 12,000 were expected to be removed by the deadline. The target was effectively abandoned and no equivalent target has since been set.[21] In our report on Asylum Removals, published in May 2003, we commented that:

We deprecate the setting of wholly unrealistic targets which serve only to arouse false expectations and which can only prove demoralising for all concerned. We are at a loss to understand the basis for the belief that a target of 30,000 removals a year was achievable, and ministerial pronouncements on the subject are obscure. It is surely not too much to expect that, if it is thought necessary to set targets for removals, they should be rational and achievable.[22]

44. In its reply to our report, the Government stated that it—

recognises that the 30,000 target was too challenging and beyond the capability of IND [the Immigration and Nationality Directorate] to deliver. A revised target has now been set "Enforcing the immigration laws more effectively by removing a greater proportion of failed asylum seekers". The Government considers this to be a more realistic target, and one which will enable performance to be measured more effectively, since it makes no assumption about numbers of applications.[23]

45. In our view, the lesson to be learnt from this episode is not that it is always a mistake to set quantitative targets. This particular quantitative target was a mistake because it was set at an absurd and unachievable level. The Committee made similar criticisms of the Government's targets in relation to illegal drugs, on which we commented "it is unwise, not to say self-defeating, to set targets which have no earthly chance of success".[24] Unrealistic targets may have perverse effects, as indeed may realistic but poorly-judged targets. But all this confirms is the need to take great care in setting targets: it does not mean that quantitative targets should be avoided completely.

46. There are three reasons why, on balance, we believe that it would be appropriate for the Home Office to retain some quantitative elements when setting its PSA targets.

47. First, and most important, properly set quantitative targets can and should motivate towards better performance. There are recent examples of this in relation to street crime and asylum applications: with both of these areas, significant improvement was seen as a priority and targets were set accordingly.[25] A further example where the Home Office expects realistic quantitative target-setting to assist in improving performance is the new PSA 1, to reduce crime by 15%. In oral evidence to the Committee, Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Sir Keith Povey, described the intended effect of this target:

Mr Green: Do you find that target-setting is actually a driver of improved performance?

Sir Keith Povey: Most certainly, yes. I would actively encourage target-setting, provided that you have identified the priorities, you know what the performance measures are, you know what the targets are to achieve those priorities and there are not too many of them. … When you look to maintain or improve performance, you have to give some clear steer as to what that means for each individual force, where they want that to get to, otherwise an improvement of 0.1% would mean that they had achieved that particular target.[26]

48. It is true that directional PSA targets are also capable of motivating towards better performance—in particular when supported by robust performance management arrangements. In addition, a quantitative PSA target that has been poorly-judged (either where it is set unrealistically high, or where it can be met without effort) can actually de-motivate. But quantitative PSA targets carry an advantage in helping to ensure that good performance is clearly defined, providing—as Sir Keith Povey put it—a "clear steer". The new PSA 5 relating to immigration, to take one example of an unquantified target, does not do this: it will be formally achieved even if there is only one fewer unfounded asylum claim.

49. Second, the risks of quantified target-setting are already being minimised by other steps being taken by the Home Office. We have already welcomed the decision to have fewer and simpler PSA targets. In practice, more significant than this is likely to be the move away from SDAs and towards monitoring, with targeted intervention for poorer performance, as the key element of the performance management system. Together, these steps ought to sharply reduce the possibility of incentivising the wrong sort of activity and of unnecessarily interfering with local discretion.

50. Third, quantified targets may make it easier to hold Government accountable. We accept the accountability benefit of PSA targets on their own is not automatic, and have already recommended that KPIs and supporting data are published routinely. For the purpose of genuine accountability, the publication of a balanced basket of information—as is done, for instance, in relation to police performance through the Police Performance Assessment Framework—is far more important than the publication of a single figure to indicate the attainment or otherwise of a PSA target. Indeed, the use of quantitative targets may even be seen negatively in this regard, serving to distract attention away from the most important lessons contained in data onto the singular question of whether the targets have been met. It is an advantage of directional PSA targets that they do not distract in this way, and as Mr Gieve argues, "you can tell whether something is going up or down".[27]

51. On the other hand, it is important to recognise that there is an asymmetry of information that places the Home Office in a better position than Parliament or the general public to judge what would actually constitute a substantial success. In this sense, the use of quantitative PSA targets does carry an advantage, although this is necessarily dependant on these targets being set in a way that faithfully reflects strong analysis of existing data rather than on an arbitrary basis.

52. Overall, we think that the Home Office's response to highly publicised failures like the unachievable asylum removals target has been to shift too far in the other direction, of stripping quantifiable elements from its PSA targets. Some of the latest PSA targets are in danger of being seen as little more than generalised aspirations. If it is right for the Home Office to commit to a 15% reduction in crime, then it is difficult to see why similar, realistic, quantified aspirations should not be set in the other major fields of Home Office activity, for instance in relation to immigration, the fear of crime and racial equality. We agree with the recent comment by the Minister of State for Crime Reduction, Policing, Community Safety and Counter-terrorism, Hazel Blears MP, giving evidence to us in our inquiry into police reform, that "if targets are going to be useful, they should be realistic but stretching".[28] We recommend that when the Home Office next reviews its PSA targets, as part of the 2006 Spending Review, a higher proportion of targets should contain "realistic but stretching" quantitative elements.

The new use of standards

53. In addition to its seven new PSA targets, the Home Office has also committed to two "standards", to be "achieved and maintained". The two standards are as follows:
Maintain improvements in police performance as monitored by the Police Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) in order to deliver the outcomes expressed in the Home Office PSA. The links between the indicators in PPAF and the PSAs and the performance improvement in these indicators implied by the PSAs are set out and reported on in the National Policing Plan.

Protect the public by ensuring there is no deterioration in the levels of re-offending for young offenders, for adults sentenced to imprisonment and adults sentenced to community sentences, maintaining the current low rate of prisoner escapes including Category A escapes.

54. The areas of performance dealt with in these standards were previously the subject of PSA targets. The previous PSA 2 committed the Home Office to "improve the performance of all police forces, and significantly reduce the performance gap between the best and worst performing forces; and significantly increase the proportion of time spent on frontline duties". The previous PSA 5 promised to "protect the public and reduce re-offending by 5%".

55. In both cases therefore, it might appear that the term "standards" implies a commitment to maintaining, rather than improving upon, current levels of achievement, and therefore a lesser commitment by the Home Office than in the targets they replace. On closer inspection, however, it is clear that this is only true of one of the two standards. Whilst the re-offending standard does indeed signal a lesser commitment, the police performance standard is explicitly underpinned by the Police Performance Assessment Framework and tied to specific PSA targets as part of the National Policing Plan.

56. The Home Office has explained why it considers the use of a standard to be preferable to a PSA target in the area of police performance:

Effective policing is pivotal to achieving our objectives. The Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) is the key lever in managing achievement of our PSAs and facilitating local target setting. We propose the PPAF measures, through which we currently measure performance on the existing PSA 2, should provide the underpinning police performance targets for the new PSAs 1, 2 and 3. This is because we want our headline PSA targets to focus on the overall outcomes to which the police contribute, and so propose to integrate them rather than retaining a separate PSA on policing.

57. In relation to re-offending, the Home Office has put forward a slightly different argument:

These will remain key performance indicators for the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) and the Youth Justice Board (YJB), and are vital contributions to the new PSAs on crime reduction, drug treatment and fear of crime / CJS confidence.[29]

58. We explored the issues surrounding a target for re-offending in oral evidence from the Permanent Secretary and from Mr Martin Narey, Chief Executive of the new National Offenders Management Service (NOMS):

Mr Narey: Well, I have [Key Performance Indicators] for both the Prison and Probation Services which go much further than the PSAs which we are discussing today and cover a much greater range. I have not done a KPI in terms of closeness to home because it would be deceitful to produce one when the Service is under so much strain. …

Mr Gieve: Can I just say on re-offending, which has been, and is, one of our PSA targets from the last Spending Review that we achieve a 5% reduction, we have got it in our new set of objectives as a standard that we should keep re-offending down, but that is really because it is part of simplifying our crime targets. However, … we are looking to a reduction in re-offending as one principal lever, if you like, to reduce overall crime, so the fact that we have not got a separate PSA does not mean that we are relaxed on re-offending.[30]

59. The Home Office's basic argument in relation to both police performance and re-offending is that improved performance should be seen as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself. Better policing is necessary, but only in order to reduce crime and to make people feel safer and to bring more offences to justice. Reducing re-offending is important, but only insofar as it will reduce crime overall. PSA targets, it is argued, are thus inappropriate for these areas as such targets are only supposed to relate to overall objectives.

60. We believe that there is a far stronger case for dropping the PSA target in relation to police performance than in relation to re-offending. The Home Office has invested a great deal of effort in establishing the Police Performance Assessment Framework, which includes the use of baseline assessments to establish which police forces are under-performing and assumes a package of measures—including a range of targets and close monitoring—to drive up the performance of those forces that have been identified as such. We very much welcome this. Furthermore, police performance contributes directly and centrally to three separate PSA targets. There is therefore little reason to think that it may suffer as a result of not having its own PSA. Finally, the argument of the Home Office that improved police performance is not a goal in itself but a necessary basis for achieving a number of other goals (as expressed in PSA targets 1, 2 and 3) is persuasive and entirely consistent with its general policy of having fewer and simpler PSA targets, which we welcomed earlier in this report.

61. In relation to re-offending, however, there is no comparable comprehensive assessment framework: indeed, it seems from Mr Narey's comments quoted above, that there is a practice of not using KPIs in areas where the prison service is under strain. Second, whilst a reduction in re-offending may contribute to a general crime reduction target, it is extremely important as a goal in its own right—indeed, it is the raison d'être of the new National Offenders Management Service. It is also a component part of Home Office objective II: "More offenders are caught, punished and stop offending…" (emphasis added). Finally, as we noted in our recently published report on Rehabilitation of Prisoners, the Home Office has adopted, in any case, an 'internal target' of reducing re-offending by 5%. As we argued in that report, this is unacceptable for two reasons: first, "an internal target is inevitably seen as representing less of a public commitment than a PSA target agreed with the Treasury"; second, it is "inherently confusing that the Home Office is simultaneously committed to 'no deterioration in re-offending rates' and to a quantified reduction in those rates".[31]

62. We conclude that the use of a standard (rather than a PSA target) in relation to re-offending was inappropriate and re-affirm the points we made in our recent Rehabilitation of Prisoners report. In our view, the example highlights the need for standards—no less than PSA targets—to be fully integrated with an agreed strategic direction and performance management regime.

Increasing the value of PSA targets further

63. We have identified three ways in which we believe the Home Office could make more effective use of PSA targets, realising further their main benefits of strategic direction, accountability and performance management.

The relationship between objectives and targets

64. First, we note that there is a mismatch between some of the Home Office objectives and its PSA targets. For instance, Objective 3 is that "fewer people's lives are ruined by drugs and alcohol". But the corresponding PSA target, PSA 4, relates only to drugs. This creates ambiguity as to whether tackling alcohol-related problems is actually a top-level Home Office priority. Objective 2 is that "more offenders are caught, punished and stop offending…". Yet, as we have noted above, the Home Office decided not to have a PSA target on re-offending, being committed instead only to a 'standard' that there will be no deterioration in the level of re-offending.

65. We believe that inconsistency between objectives and PSA targets may generate confusion and a sense that the PSA targets do not give full expression to the Home Office's strategic direction. We recommend that in future, there should be a consistent relationship between objectives and PSA targets, with objectives stating clearly the Home Office's priorities and the PSA targets giving them concrete expression.

The choice of baselines

66. Second, there is scope for greater rigour in the choice of baselines for PSA targets. The choice of baseline year (against which progress is measured) may be of great importance in determining the achievability of a target and how 'stretching' it is. If the baseline is a year characterised by relatively poor performance, the challenge of meeting the target is eased significantly.

67. We asked the Home Office what criteria it used in its choice of baselines. In reply we were told that:

Baselines are set for each target taking into account a range of factors: the time period to be covered by the target; the availability of data before and during that period; and the level of aspiration in terms of improved performance.[32]

68. In oral questioning, we asked the Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, Mr Gieve, what was meant by "the level of aspiration". He accepted that it was an "odd phrase", before explaining that:

at times we have a choice between, for example, keeping the baseline that we had for our last set of Spending Review targets and saying we will reduce crime or whatever it is below that starting point, which we have already got on the table, or, alternatively, pocketing the gains we have already made, setting a new baseline and then trying to move on from there. That is what we have done on crime, but in some cases we have left the baseline where it was. If you like, that is how aspirations can get into the baseline.[33]

69. The performance summary in this year's DAR reveals that almost every PSA target is being measured against a different baseline year. In several cases, different baseline years are used even for sub-targets of the same PSA target, and this trend has continued for the new PSA targets.[34]

70. The lack of information about the reasons for setting particular baselines can lead to suspicions that the Home Office is seeking to manipulate targets. As an example of the kind of controversy that can arise, the new PSA 1 target, for crime to fall by 15% by 2008 from the baseline year of 2002-03, was announced as part of the Spending Review on 12 July 2004. On 22 July the Home Office released the latest British Crime Survey figures which showed a 5% fall in crime overall in 2003-04.[35] This fall meant that within 10 days of the Home Office announcing its new PSA 1, it was already one-third of the way towards meeting it. This in turn led to accusations—denied by the Home Office—that it had set the target in the awareness of the 5% drop in 2003-04.[36]

71. Similar concerns arise about the baseline year set for voluntary activity as part of the new PSA 6. In order for PSA 6 to be met, two criteria must be achieved. One of these is that voluntary activity by those at risk of social exclusion must be higher in 2007-08 than it was in 2001; the other is that voluntary and community sector contribution to delivering public services must be higher in 2007-08 than it was in 2003-04.[37] Thus there are two different baseline years: 2001 for voluntary activity by those at risk of social exclusion, 2003-04 for voluntary and community sector contribution to delivering public services. Our concern is with the first of these. In this year's DAR, it was reported that voluntary activity overall has already risen by over 6% since 2001. We accept that this is not the same as voluntary activity specifically amongst those at risk of social exclusion, yet the latter is a subset of the former, raising the possibility that the Home Office may have set a target knowing that it was highly likely to be met—and was therefore not "stretching". Whether or not this was the case, the absence of any explanation in the Technical Notes as to why this particular baseline year was chosen leaves the Home Office vulnerable to such an accusation.

72. We accept that the choice of baseline year can often reflect performance management needs, and that there can often be good internal reasons for choosing particular baselines. However, we are concerned about the lack of transparency in doing so, believing that this risks undermining the accountability benefit of PSA targets as an indicator of Home Office performance. We recommend that the Home Office publishes its policy on how baseline years are set, and ensure that—in cases where it is thought necessary to depart from this—the reasons for any such departures are explained in the Technical Notes.

The reporting of achievement against PSA targets

73. The third area in which we consider that the value of PSA targets can be enhanced is that of reporting of achievements against targets. In particular, we single out two aspects: inconsistencies in reporting categories and poor reporting in relation to transitional arrangements.

74. It is noticeable that there are no consistent reporting categories in relation to the achievement of Home Office targets. For instance, in the DAR various phrases are used to describe progress against targets: "on course", "too early to assess", "performance improving", "broadly stable", "early progress but target is challenging". Whilst the first two of these phrases are clear, the interpretation of "performance improving" and "broadly stable" and "target is challenging" is less certain, leaving the reader unclear as to whether the target is likely to be met.

75. HM Treasury has issued guidance in this area, providing some options for consistent reporting categories.[38] This table is reproduced from that guidance:




TERMUSAGE
Met earlyOnly to be used in circumstances where there is no possibility of subsequent slippage during the lifetime of a target
AheadIf progress is exceeding plans and expectations
On courseProgress in line with plans and expectations
SlippageWhere progress is slower than expected, e.g. by reference to criteria set out in a target's Technical Note
Not yet assessedE.g. a new target for which data is not yet available

76. We recommend that the Home Office introduces consistent reporting categories so that it is instantly clear to the reader whether or not the target has been met or is likely to be met. Euphemisms such as "the target is challenging" should not be used if what is meant is "there has been slippage" or "the target is now unlikely to be met". As many of the new PSA targets are directional, we further recommend that the Home Office comes up with consistent reporting categories to describe the magnitude of any improvement.

77. This difficulty is compounded by the way in which some of the figures are presented. For instance, we were surprised that whilst the previous PSA 7 target for asylum removals called for removal of "a greater proportion of failed asylum seekers", the outturn statement in this year's DAR gave totals of removals in 2003 compared to 2002 (17,040 and 13,910 respectively) but did not express either total as a proportion of all failed asylum seekers—thus making it impossible to know whether the target had been met.[39] In relation to some targets, no figure for outcome is offered at all. The Home Office states that it is "on course" to meet PSA 2 to "significantly reduce the performance gap between the best and worst performing forces", yet no figure is provided to support this assessment.[40]

78. We recommend that in its next annual report the Home Office should aim to supply more fully and consistently the information necessary to judge its progress towards targets.

79. The Home Office is also open to criticism in the way that it has reported targets subject to transitional arrangements. In the 2002 Comprehensive Spending Review, the Home Office committed to a PSA target of 1.2 million offences brought to justice by 2006. In the 2004 DAR, it reported its progress towards this target as being "on course", although the graph printed next to the caption suggested that the Home Office was unlikely to reach the 1.2 million target at its current rate of progress. In this year's Spending Review, the Home Office committed to a new PSA target of 1.25 million offences brought to justice by 2008, with a 2006 'milestone' of 1.15 million.[41] In oral evidence, Mr Gieve confirmed to us that "this is one where we have changed the numbers".[42] It is clear to us, as it must have been to the Home Office, that the department was not on course to meet its original 'offences brought to justice' target by 2006. We deprecate the apparent lack of transparency in this year's Departmental Annual Report (DAR) about the impeding failure to meet the original target and the consequent redefinition of the target.

80. Given that the Home Office is committing to fewer PSA targets than previously, there are several previous commitments that are not being renewed. As we stated earlier in this report, we support this policy generally and we recognise that there are often good reasons not to persist with targets. One example is the old PSA 11—to reduce levels of repeat re-offending amongst problem drug-misusing offenders by 25% by 2005 (and by 50% by 2008). We criticised this target in a previous report as being unachievable,[43] and the Home Office has responded to this by changing the target.[44]

81. Our concern now though is that it is not always clear from the DAR that particular targets have lapsed. In some cases, performance against old, but still apparently current, targets is not reported at all. This can cause confusion, and we recommend therefore that in next year's DAR, the Home Office reports more clearly on progress against those PSA targets that may have been superseded by new targets agreed in a more recent Spending Review, but which are still live, or would be were it not for these new targets. We recommend that an additional table at the end of its Performance Summary to describe its performance against all these superseded PSA targets together with a brief note explaining whether these targets have been dropped or replaced would effectively address this concern.



10   There has been a change of terminology. What were previously called "aims" are most closely matched by what are now called "objectives". The Home Office now has one "aim" which is to "build a safe, just and tolerant society". Back

11   For example, poorly performing forces get detailed improvement targets from the Police Standards Unit.  Back

12   Ev 1-2 Back

13   Q 23 Back

14   Q 20 Back

15   Q 21 Back

16   Qq 30-31 Back

17   In addition, PSA 4 (relating to drugs) also has some quantitative elements, especially in relation to the number of drug misusing offenders entering treatment. Back

18   Q 31 Back

19   Q 30  Back

20   Q 31 Back

21   See Home Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2002-03, Asylum Removals (HC 654-I), published on 8 May 2003, paras 28-32. Back

22   Ibid., para 32 Back

23   Home Affairs Committee, Second Special Report of Session 2002-03, Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report: Asylum Removals (HC 1006), published on 18 July 2003, p 3 Back

24   See Home Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2001-02, The Government's Drugs Policy: Is It Working? (HC 318-I), published 22 May 2002, paras 40-42. Back

25   In relation to street crime, for instance, a target was set to reduce robbery in the ten Street Crime Initiative areas by 14% from 1999-00 to 2005 and to maintain that level. In the Home Office DAR 2004 (at page 11), it is reported that there was a 17% reduction in the ten Street Crime areas in 2002-03, compared with 2001-02, with further substantial reductions in 2003-04. Back

26   Oral evidence on Police Reform taken on 12 October 2004, to be printed (available on the Committee's website: www.parliament.uk/homeaffairscom) Back

27   Q 30 Back

28   Oral evidence on Police Reform taken on 26 October 2004, to be printed (available on the Committee's website: www.parliament.uk/homeaffairscom) Back

29   Home Office (2004), Consultation on Strategic Targets 2005-06 to 2007-08: consultation briefing note, p 8 Back

30   Qq 93-94  Back

31   Home Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 2004-05, Rehabilitation of Prisoners (HC 193-I), published on 7 January 2005, para 68. Back

32   Ev 2 Back

33   Q 18 Back

34   For instance, PSA 7 uses three different baseline years to establish success. See Technical Notes, printed as an Appendix to this report, at p 37. Back

35   Home Office press release 251/2004, 22 July 2004  Back

36   For newspaper reports, see, for instance, The Times, 22 July 2004, p 7; The Independent, 22 July 2004, p 1. Back

37   See Technical Notes, printed as an Appendix to this report, at p 35.  Back

38   HM Treasury, Public Expenditure System: Guidance for the Spring 2004 Departmental Reports, issued 28 November 2003 Back

39   Home Office (2004), Home Office Departmental Annual Report 2004, p 116 Back

40   Ibid., p 11  Back

41   This 'milestone' was revealed separately in Home Office, Cutting Crime, Delivering Justice: A Strategic Plan for Criminal Justice 2004-08, Cm 6288, July 2004, p 32. Back

42   Q 34 Back

43   Home Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2001-02, The Government's Drugs Policy: Is It Working? (HC 318-I), published 22 May 2002 Back

44   Ev 15 Back


 
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