3. Memorandum submitted by
Norfolk Police Authority
1. NATIONAL POLICING
PLAN
1.1 The Police Reform Act requires the Secretary
of State to prepare and lay before Parliament a National Policing
Plan before the beginning of each financial year. The NPP must
set the Secretary of State's strategic policing priorities for
police forces, and include objectives and issue guidance.
1.2 Unlike the statutory requirements set
out in the Police Act 1966 which require local Policing Plans
to contain details of financial resources, the Police Reform Act
does not require the NPP to be a fully costed plan.
1.3 Obligations cascaded down by the Home
Office to police authorities by the NPP, have to be taken into
account in drafting authorities' own statutory local annual Policing
Plans. Costs of these NPP requirements are not measured against
central government funding allocated to police authorities.
1.4 The consequence has been a growing funding
gap between ability to pay and expectation that has been filled
by escalating Council Tax precepts for policing. The national
average cumulative increase in Council Tax precept for policing
across all authorities between financial year 1999-2000 and 2003-2004
was a totally unsustainable 79%. Since 1995 the average proportion
of funding raised via local taxation compared to that which is
centrally funded has increased from around 13% to well above 20%.
In Norfolk this figure is now 32%. In the FY 2002-03 the average
precept rise across the 43 force areas was 25.4%. In the current
year 2004-05 it was 11.7%. For FY 2005-06 authorities will be
under extreme pressure from the ODPM to restrict precept increases
to "low single figures". The 2003-04 settlement was
the first time that Government abandoned the needs-based formula
in favour of a flat rate increase. The alternative to substantial
council tax increases would have been the imposition of damaging
cuts in officer numbers and resources.
1.5 The NPP takes no account of in-year
legislation that creates further un-funded burdens for police
authorities. Recent examples include the Freedom of Information
Act and the local implementation of arrangements to support the
new Independent Police Complaints Commission by Constabulary Professional
Standards Units. This latter example is notable as the original
funding for the IPPC of about £40 million was substantially
reduced. The resultant lower number of national IPCC investigators
has obviously transferred work to force Professional Standard
Units.
1.6 The recent HMIC thematic report "Modernising
the Police Service" makes the recommendation that the Home
Office should develop a national police resource strategy to underpin
the next release of the National Policing Plan, which would enable
forces to plan more effectively in the medium term.
1.7 The tendency of the NPP to be all embracing
must not overwhelm the ability (and statutory duty) of Authorities
and Constabularies to agree local priorities and targets. The
balance between centralised versus local priorities and targets
needs readjustment.
2. RING FENCED
FUNDING
2.1 Proliferation of ring-fenced funds (up
to 40 different funding pots) and the bureaucracy of bidding for
them is, we believe, contrary to other principles of police reform.
2.2 Time limited and tapered funding means
that once the funding is phased out from the centre, police authorities
face extremely difficult choices in the face of raised public
expectations. This is particularly the case in respect of funding
for Community Support Officers. The CSO initiative has been given
strong Home Office support, is clearly welcomed by the public,
and is pump-primed by Government, but authorities are left to
sustain the CSO strength from the local policing budget, or reduce
CSO numbers, when the specific funding tails off.
2.3 Restrictions applying to the Crime Fighting
Fund (CFF), which exists to sustain officer numbers, means that
there is little or no flexibility for authorities and Constabularies
in seeking efficiencies by adjusting officer strength. Despite
the success of the CFF in raising officer numbers it is increasingly
having a negative effect on the ability to develop civilianisation
or workforce modernisation. In its thematic report on "Modernising
the Police Service" HMIC recommend that the CFF is developed
into a broader workforce modernisation fund, linked to a revised
front-line policing measure that more fully reflects the increasing
contribution of police staff to service delivery.
3. BCU BOARDS
3.1 "Building Safer Communities Together"
makes the case for "civil renewal" developing a more
bottom up approach to community safety in local areas. It suggests
new structures of accountability including Community Advocates,
Neighbourhood Panels, Local Partnership Boards and Strategic Policing
Boards.
3.2 The Authority supports a different model,
one we believe is likely to be more effective because it builds
on the strengths of current structures by establishing BCU Boards
under the auspices of the existing Police Authority framework.
These Boards would be chaired by a Police Authority member but
membership would be drawn from CDRPs in the BCU area, District/Borough
Councillors, and other key members of the community. The Boards
would hold police commanders and their performance to account,
examine local budgets and make recommendations, and provide an
overarching community safety structure. They would co-ordinate
the work of the police at local level, the safety partnerships
and community safety aspects of local strategic partnerships.
Currently there is no accountability mechanism that knits together
these different strands of community safety. The Boards would
give democratic legitimacy to policing at BCU level through the
involvement of elected local councillors.
4. INSPECTION
AND AUDIT
4.1 While acknowledging that the work of
the Police Standards Unit has been a positive development (iQuanta
and engagement to assist forces improve performance) there has
been a proliferation of audit, inspection and monitoring of the
police that has impacted on police time and costs.
4.2 HMIC carry out baseline, best value
inspections, efficiency plan vetting, overtime reduction, and
thematic inspections; PSU undertake inspections in areas like
the National Crime Recording Standards; the Audit Commission have
wide powers of audit; Constabularies and Authorities are also
subjected to internal audit; and finally there are internal inspection
units.
4.3 Some rationalisation of audit and inspection
would release both productive time and funds to the front line.
4.4 We are supportive of the need for rigorous
and adequate accountability for public funds, and therefore support
the PPAF model for performance improvement. However, we believe
it is timely to assess the efficacy and cost benefit of the other
rafts of other measurements and targets for which data has to
be collected, analysed and reported on (such as HMIC returns and
Home Office returns), and whether this absorbs a disproportionate
amount of police time and money. A shift to qualitative assessments
would also be welcomed.
5. COLLABORATION
5.1 The three East Anglian Authorities and
Constabularies (Norfolk, Cambridgeshire and Suffolk) have been
pioneers in collaborating in order to reduce costs and improve
performance. The annual report of the Three Counties Collaboration
Project (attached) has just been published and describes progress
on six separate projects—Call Handling, Property (non-estates),
Major Investigations, Custody, Fleet and Procurement. Three further
projects are now being considered—Wildlife Crime (in particular
illegal coursing), Professional Standards and Civil Contingencies.
We strongly believe that collaboration will produce efficiencies
and enhanced service more quickly and effectively than forced
amalgamations.
28 July 2004
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