15. Memorandum submitted by
the Police Federation of England and Wales
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 The Police Federation of England and
Wales—the voice of the operational police officer—is
the staff association for over 95% of police officers. Established
by statute, we are responsible for the welfare of officers and
the provision of an efficient police service.
1.2 The Police Federation welcomes the opportunity
to submit written evidence to the Committee. This submission has
been prepared specifically for the inquiry, although sections
draw heavily upon our responses to Policing: Building Safer Communities
Together and Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform. We
would be happy to provide additional memoranda on request and
look forward to providing oral evidence.
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 Since the last Royal Commission of the
Police in 1962 the nature of criminality has changed beyond recognition.
From the staggering increase in the prevalence of illicit drugs,
to new challenges such as combating online fraud and paedophilia,
crime is constantly evolving—all set against a background
where the public's demand for visible community policing remains
undiluted and undiminished. We believe the sheer scale of the
challenges give added credence to our call for the appointment
of a Royal Commission to identify holistic solutions to take policing
into the 21st century.
2.2 Despite a political reluctance to appoint
a Royal Commission we are pleased the Police Reform process will
be subject to the scrutiny of the Committee; albeit a largely
retrospective analysis of Police Reform Part One. Nevertheless
we hope our submission—enumerated broadly in accordance
with the Committee's call for evidence (1 July 2004)—provides
a valuable and relevant insight into the views and experience
of operational police officers.
2.3 In the absence of a Royal Commission
or Committee of Inquiry this inquiry may provide the service with
the most "politically impartial" opportunity to review
the reform process and inform the Government. Consequently, we
have made particular efforts to consider the road ahead, rather
than restrict our examinations solely to changes that have already
taken place.
3. MISCONCEPTIONS,
CONCERNS AND
THE FUTURE
3.1 The Police Federation is wrongly perceived
by some as viewing reform solely through the prism of pay and
conditions. In reality this is patently not the case. We have
a dual-statutory responsibility: a responsibility not only for
the welfare of our members, but also to ensure the overall efficiency
of the police service. This is a responsibility we take very seriously
and we seek to utilise our experience to improve the future shape
of policies and procedures. Our recent advice on Sentencing, Child
Abuse, Domestic Violence, Sex Offences and Criminal Justice procedures
has highlighted the practicalities of policing in these areas
and provided practical solutions to ensure victims are placed
at the centre of the Criminal Justice system. Sadly our advice
in respect to road policing has yet to be heeded.
3.2 Our single greatest concern vis-á-vis
reform has been the disjointed and piecemeal approach instituted
by successive governments. Reform has taken place in the absence
of a cogent vision, and the service is in effect journeying into
the unknown without a route map. Moreover, the reform process
has been punctuated by an assortment of inquiries and reports,
which have been used variously to justify aspects of "modernisation",
circumventing the practice of consensus building through meaningful
consultation. The contemporaneous Morris and Commission for Racial
Equality (CRE) inquiries, and Review of Police Disciplinary Arrangements,
are therefore all examples of the distinct deficiency in holism
that has characterised police reform.
3.3 A key message we wish to convey is the
pressing need to take stock and address the following question:
What is the Government's vision for policing?
The service is at a crucial juncture, expecting
a second raft of profound changes, yet it remains deeply unconvinced
as to the effectiveness of many of the reforms of Police Reform
Part One. These are the foundations on which further reforms will
be built. It is therefore imperative that they provide what the
service needs, and the public demands.
Resourcing
3.4 We are concerned that Policing: Building
Safer Communities Together fails to address the vital issue of
resourcing: community engagement and non-abstractable neighbourhood
policing teams will be labour-intensive commitments additional
to existing response commitments, which are already stretched.
There is evidence that BCUs do not have the tactical capacity
to tackle organised crime perpetrated within and across BCU areas.
Moreover it is noteworthy that ACPO observe:
"It is crucial that those local priorities
are not merely added to the current central priorities or existing
local policing task without an increase in capacity or capability"[17].
3.5 These resource problems are mirrored
elsewhere in policing, for example, the introduction of the National
Intelligence Model (NIM) has been made a statutory requirement
yet there has been no injection of additional funds to meet the
new demands that it created. All new requirements must be properly
costed and funds provided. We would be interested to know how
many local intelligence packages have not been actioned, or indeed
not formulated due to lack of resources.
4. THE NATIONAL
POLICING PLAN:
STANDARDS, PRIORITIES
AND TARGETS
4.1 The Police Federation fully recognises
the need for a form of national policing plan to highlight national
priorities and engender effective policing across the three levels
of crime; local policing delivered by Basic Command Units (BCUs)
and local forces, cross border and national/international. The
pertinent question, however, is whether the Government's National
Policing Plans[18]
have balanced local needs and central priorities.
Narrow focus—narrow success
4.2 From the outset the Police Federation
repeatedly raised strong concerns that the National Policing Plans
gave scant recognition to several core elements of policing:
— Until very recently, reassurance
policing—ie a uniformed police presence on the streets—has
been chronically under-valued and under-funded. This is in no
small part a result of the Treasury's requirement for funding
to be dictated almost exclusively by quantitative value assessments.
— Traffic policing has suffered in
a similar respect. Whilst there is a passing reference to traffic
policing in the National Policing Plan (November 2003), there
is no associated target. This has contributed to the parlous state
of many traffic divisions: nationally police officers dedicated
to traffic duty have fallen annually and a number of forces now
have less than 30 dedicated traffic officers. Although it may
be argued that this merely demonstrates Chief Constables' allocate
insufficient resources to "non-priority" areas in their
quest to chase targets, this state of affairs is ultimately the
direct result of the rigidity of the target framework instituted
by Government.
— Purely quantitative assessments of
call handling—ie measuring the time taken to answer and
duration of emergency phone calls—have had negative impacts
upon quality of service. We strongly believe emphasis should be
upon the accuracy of information gleaned, and the consequent response
and result, not the length of time of the call or the number of
calls answered in a given period of time.
4.3 All too often central government fiats
have been seen as both a means and an end, and they lack the requisite
contextualisation to deliver tangible benefits eg call handling.
We provided both written and oral evidence in this respect to
the Public Administration Committee, and we support many of the
conclusions in their report—"On Target: Government
by Measurement"[19]—particularly
the broad emphasis on:
— reducing the number of onerous and
unwieldy targets;
— increasing local involvement in target
setting;
— enhancing autonomy; and
— measuring progress in performance
rather than absolute targets.
4.4 More targets simply do not automatically
produce better policing. Whilst there has been a welcome degree
of recognition, and indeed rhetoric, to this effect at a government
level in response to our concerns, attempts to introduce less,
but more relevant, targets have not been an unmitigated success.
In reality, many central targets still merely spawn yet more targets
at a local level, and our experience certainly does not support
any such claim that a decrease in central diktats has filtered
through and reduced bureaucracy at the frontline.
4.5 We advocate renewed efforts to introduce
a scaled-down, relaxed regime of targets that is locally assessed
and rewards cooperation. This would ensure for a more accurate
reflection of the quality, not just quantity of policing delivered,
whilst not detracting from the need for national policy direction.
This must be coupled with a recognition that many aspects of policing
are inherently intangible: prioritisation should not and does
not always require target-setting. In addition, continued efforts
must be made to develop other means of assessment that are not
rooted in wholly quantitative analysis. If the Government are
to fully embrace localism, local intelligence, not targets, must
be the key means to drive performance.
5. THE EXTENT
TO WHICH
A "PERFORMANCE
CULTURE" IS
EMBEDDING ITSELF
IN THE
POLICE SERVICE
5.1 "Performance culture" is a
rather ambiguous phrase as "performance" is not a new
concept to policing. It does however indicate a refocus in delivery—ie
in terms of policing strategies—and a change in assessment
of delivery, both of which have been a feature of attempts to
improve performance through the use of centralised instruments.
National focus is not always relevant to local needs and a broad-brush
approach is therefore not always appropriate.
5.2 The problems associated with myriad
performance targets are indicative of the less productive consequences
of the introduction of a "performance culture". In this
sense it is clear that a target-based performance culture has
enveloped all those who perform tasks that can be arbitrarily
quantified. Where this is not the case police officers are not
subject to the same straitjackets or additional bureaucracy. The
failure to reduce arbitrary targets and bureaucracy is therefore
evidence that a target-based "performance culture" is
entrenched in elements of the service, but that a qualitative
performance culture is far from being embedded.
6. ACCOUNTABILITY
MECHANISMS FOR
POLICING AND
THE FUTURE
OF THE
"TRIPARTITE" STRUCTURE
6.1 The British police service is probably
the most accountable in the world. In response to Policing: Building
Safer Communities Together, and in the absence of a Royal Commission
into the Police, we recommended that an appropriate independent
national body should conduct an objective evaluation to identify:
— the responsibilities of the respective
tripartite partners;
— how they are funded and whether the
funding is adequate;
— how effective they have been;
— mechanisms through which the various
partners can be held accountable; and
— a rational partnership structure,
including arrangements for engagement and accountability.
6.2 The Home Office Strategic Plan 2004-08,
Confident Communities in a Secure Britain, however, proposes an
"Improvement Agency" that will most likely lead to yet
more additional layers of accountability. We believe the service
needs transparent forms of accountability that recognise the different
tiers of policing and guard against political interference or
populist single-issue agendas. However, this should be delivered
by strengthening the tripartite arrangement. Police Authorities
should be more focussed and involved, and this could be achieved
by better local understanding of this role through the provision
of better public information.
6.3 The most prudent course of action would
therefore be to retain Police Authorities as they are currently
constituted in terms of membership. The present make-up of Police
Authorities has only been in place for a short time and they have
a good record of reflecting the make-up of local communities.
7. THE ROLE
OF THE
POLICE STANDARDS
UNIT AND
THE NATIONAL
CENTRE FOR
POLICING EXCELLENCE
7.1 We recognise the need for organisations
autonomous of the Home Office to independently analyse performance,
identify best pratice and catalyse change, and we fully support
their work. The current configuration of the cited organisations
tasked to oversee policing in England and Wales—the Police
Standards Unit (PSU) and National Centre for Policing Excellence
(NCPE), to which may be added Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
(HMIC)—is however imperfect in a number of respects.
7.2 The principle flaw in these organisations
is twofold and paradoxical: whereas on the one hand there exists
a considerable degree of overlap, and thereby potential for unnecessary
and costly duplication of work, on the other hand much of the
work we believe they should undertake is not addressed.
7.3 The PSU, for instance, "disseminate[s]
good practice"[20]
whilst the NCPE strives to "spread good practice in operational
policing throughout the service"[21].
This demonstrates the parallels in the remits of these organisations,
and it should be borne in mind that each has its own bureaucracy.
7.4 More importantly, however, the overlapping
remits can paradoxically create holes through which important
work may fall. An example of this is the patent lack of analysis
into intelligence capability pan-service, and it is with no sense
of self-congratulation that we iterate that the Police Federation
first raised serious concerns in respect of the intelligence flaws
highlighted in the Bichard Report[22]
over a decade ago. Either these "oversight" organisations
are deficient and ineffective in carrying out such investigations
or their role, remit and raison d'être should be called
into question and reappraised.
7.5 In the past month, the announcement
that the Home Office is to establish a Stop and Search Action
Team, following the rise in stop and searches under terrorism
legislation, demonstrates that disparateness is not restricted
solely to HMIC, PSU, Centrex and NCPE. We believe policy oversight
would benefit from a substantial injection of clarity and coherence.
During the passage of the Police Reform Bill (2002) we called
for a rationalisation of these organisations into a single body,
but it must be ensured that the scope of any such organisation
is clearly defined; fully accountable and operationally detached
from the Home Office to ensure its work is thorough and its conclusions
independent. There would be no value in replicating the body in
the Home Office.
8. IMPROVED USE
OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
8.1 Over the last decade several high profile
convictions have been the direct result of revolutions in science
and technology, for example, the evidential use of DNA. However,
whilst the use of both science and technology has undoubtedly
improved, it has fallen short of the level of service that could
have been achieved if reforms had been conducted in the spirit
of wider consultation eg the introduction of Airwave. Furthermore,
we have been witness to successive failed attempts to introduce
a joined-up IT system—crucial in order to reduce police
bureaucracy—culminating in the debacle of the National Strategy
for Police Information Systems (NSPIS). Similarly, we are not
convinced that with 600 staff and a budget of £350 million
the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) provides
value for money.
8.2 The utilisation of science and technology
varies considerably between forces, and this in turn can lead
to a gap between public perceptions and the reality on the ground.
In addition, requisite training—essential in order to make
full use of new technology—is all too often either insufficient
or non-existent.
8.3 Mirroring the growing compartmentalisation
evident elsewhere in policing, the provision of science and technology
services has become increasingly disparate, funding is short-termist
and insufficient to maximise gains. The Forensic Science Service
(FSS) is a case in point and we have strongly opposed its quasi-privatisation
from the very outset. Individual forces are now forced to pay
more for the FSS services and this has led to a decrease in the
number of times it has been utilised by individual forces to secure
prosecutions. Long-term opportunity costs therefore far exceed
any of the short-term benefits accrued from this venture, and
our greatest fear is that the change in status of the FSS represents
the setting of a highly imprudent precedent for the rest of the
police service.
8.4 Whilst we support the rollout of Airwave,
the health and safety of officers and other users remains paramount.
The introduction of Airwave should have been facilitated by a
far wider and more meaningful consultation process.
8.5 The Police Federation wholeheartedly
supported the announcement that the Comprehensive Spending Review
(12 July 2004) will take forward the conclusions of the Bichard
Report in relation to the introduction of requisite intelligence
systems. We hope the report's recommendations not only catalyse
change with respect to intelligence, but also engender a new understanding
of the importance of long-term ring-fenced funding right across
the whole service.
9. THE GOVERNMENT'S
RESPONSE TO
THE O'DOWD
REPORT ON
POLICE BUREAUCRACY
9.1 Police bureaucracy, particularly unnecessary
paperwork and arbitrary targets, is expensive, highly inefficient
and the bane of frontline officers. The extent of the problem
was highlighted by the Diary of a Police Officer[23]
which, inter alia, identified that police officers, on
average, spend over 40% of their time in police stations.
9.2 The Police Federation supported many
of the O'Dowd Report's recommendations, but whilst we are mindful
that reducing bureaucracy will take time, two years down the line
we are yet to witness satisfactory progress on the frontline.
9.3 The primary aim of any purge of police
bureaucracy should be to decrease the time police officers spend
performing unnecessary tasks such as repeatedly inputting the
same data on different information systems. Unfortunately there
is no simple panacea to these problems. Chronic under-investment
in technology must be addressed and we support the introduction
of joined-up IT systems and hand-held equipment to enable officers
to conduct their work expeditiously. Whilst Fixed Penalty Notices
(FPNs) simplify processes in a number of ways, in some areas full
files are still required in cases where FPNs are not accepted.
Moreover, any increase in resources must be coupled with a parallel
change in ethos to ensure that combating bureaucracy is no longer
sidelined by the wider reform process.
10. POLICE TRAINING
10.1 Whilst it has been assured that new
monies injected into policing by the Comprehensive Spending Review
(July 2004) guarantee no reduction in police numbers, it is clear
that funding for police training will receive no such protection.
In April 2004, for instance, it was announced that Stage Two probationer
training will be cut by 20%, from 15 to 12 weeks—a move
we strongly opposed. Training is the foundation of high quality
policing and it is perverse that Government value the work of
the police, yet consistently under-value and undermine the very
training that enables them to be envied throughout the world.
10.2 Problems associated with training are
not restricted to probationers and it is clear that training is
still seen by many as an abstraction, not an investment. In recent
written and oral evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights
the Police Federation raised concerns in relation to the paucity
of refresher training for custody officers, and this is typical
of the deficiency in police training right across the service.
The Bichard Report, for instance, highlighted that confusion reigns
with regard to many aspects of the Data Protection Act and this
is a direct result of a comprehensive failure in training provision.
10.3 Additional areas where training provision
is insufficient and varies greatly between different forces include
PACE, stop and search and diversity. Moreover, training is disproportionately
targeted at the higher ranks. As a result many senior officers
have limited understanding of the training requirements of federated
ranks.
10.4 Police training should be given the
same priority as it is afforded abroad. In comparison to our European
colleagues we are very much the poor relation to training. Whilst
countries such as Sweden have several years probationer training,
there still exists no credible accreditation or qualification
framework in England and Wales. Furthermore, the police service
lags far behind other areas of the public sector in this respect,
notably health and education.
11. THE POLICE
FAMILY: CIVILIANISATION
AND THE
USE OF
POLICE COMMUNITY
SUPPORT OFFICERS
11.1 In our view Civilianisation and Police
Community Support Officers (PCSOs) are the principal issues within
workforce modernisation and not separate as set out in the HAC
inquiry. For this reason our viewpoints on the police family precede
the other areas of discussion with regard to issues of workforce
modernisation.
Civilianisation
11.2 Civilianisation is not a new concept
in policing: "police staff", as they are now referred
to, have played a vital role in the support of operational policing
for over 40 years. Police Reform Part One, however, saw a quantum
leap in the role civilians play in delivering frontline policing,
agglomerating the distinctions between fully-sworn officers and
police staff. Much of the Police Reform process has been predicated
on the basis that police officers will be returned to frontline
duties. In reality, however, these roles have been largely filled
by police staff, not fully-attested police officers. The recent
HMIC Thematic Inspection[24]
calls for the process of police staff involvement in frontline
policing, initiated in the Police Reform Act 2002, to be taken
even further.
Police Community Support Officers
11.3 We support the Government's goals to
combat level one crime and increase and strengthen community engagement
in policing, but are strongly opposed to citizen-focussed policing
being led by PCSOs.
11.4 Direct contact between the police and
the public has been at the very heart of policing by consent.
If this direct contact is disrupted by interposed PCSOs, with
police officers only involved to enforce and arrest, far from
achieving policing through co-operation we shall be reduced to
policing by coercion.
11.5 We opposed giving PCSOs powers throughout
the consultation process and during the passage of the Police
Reform Bill through Parliament. Moreover, the provisions in the
Bill giving powers to PCSOs were only unopposed in the final stages
on the basis that, while all forces would be free to recruit PCSOs,
only six forces[25]
would designate powers to PCSOs in pilot schemes which would last
until December 2004. It is noteworthy that many PCSOs believe
they would be more effective if they were given more powers.
11.6 The Comprehensive Spending Review (July
2004) saw the announcement of the roll-out of a further 16,000
Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs)—a 400% increase
in their numbers nationwide—yet only an hour before the
Chancellor's statement we learned that "a national evaluation
[of PCSOs] is being planned".[26]
11.7 We acknowledge that surveys have demonstrated
that the general public welcome the reintroduction of "bygone"
community-based policing. But basing the wholesale introduction
of PCSOs solely on the public's desire to see a return of a uniformed
presence on the streets is disingenuous and spurious: the public
welcome its apparent return precisely due to the decline in community
policing. Statements of public affirmation therefore in no way
constitute a legitimate justification to introduce more PCSOs
prior to the conclusion of independent analysis as to their effectiveness.
11.8 Whilst PCSOs individual efforts and
public spiritedness should not be questioned, the woeful lack
of analysis as to their effectiveness to date is lamentable and
highly contradictory given the number of assessments the police
service is subject to. We are disturbed by reports that some forces
which have suspended police officer recruitment are nevertheless
continuing to recruit PCSOs. We recommend that a broader assessment
of the PCSO role, to encompass operational effectiveness, best
value and the public's reaction to PCSOs, should be carried out
before there is any further significant increase in the number
of PCSOs.
11.9 Research by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation
suggest the welter of different community-based uniformed personnel—PCSOs,
neighbourhood wardens and private security guards—leave
the public confused about responsibilities and the extent to which
they can tackle crime. The HMIC thematic was therefore a missed
opportunity to inject clarity in this respect.
11.10 We recognise some of our members work
alongside PCSOs in a number of operational situations and we are
currently recording their views in relation to PCSOs. Their experiences
will no doubt vary, in no small part because PCSOs have been introduced
in such an ad hoc way nationwide.
11.11 It could be argued that PCSOs constitute
a "cheaper" or "better value" alternative
to police officers because they receive considerably less training.
We believe the opposite is true, and this only serves to illuminate
the inherent contradiction at the heart of civilianising core
policing tasks. As more is asked of these personnel there will
be a parallel call to increase their training and improve their
equipment. As a result the gap between police officers and PCSOs
will gradually decrease, yet PCSOs do not have the accountability
that Police Officers do as Officers of the Crown.
Uncertain funding—uncertain future
11.12 The future of the extended policing
family raises many other questions that have yet to be answered.
Whilst we welcomed the recent pledge that police officer numbers
will not fall, we are concerned that in some forces natural wastage
is not being fully replaced. Moreover it is worrying that at the
Police Federation's 2004 Annual Conference Chris Fox, President
of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), stated that
police numbers had most likely peaked and could still fall.
11.13 Uncertainty remains as to the future
funding streams for PCSOs and police officers. Firstly, if PCSOs
become financed from the same budget as the police a clear and
indisputable trade-off will exist. Secondly, if Chief Constables
are given greater resourcing flexibility police staff numbers
could increase at the expense of police officer numbers. These
issues must be addressed forthwith in order to give the service
providers confidence that changes are not a fait accompli, or
worse, the next step in a piecemeal process.
The special constabulary
11.14 We welcome the Government's commitment
to the special constabulary. In our response to The Way Ahead,
we recommended that the special constabulary should be built up
and professionalised into an effective, additional auxiliary force,
equivalent to 25% of regular officers.
11.15 For this to be achieved, rebadging
the special constabulary may be a necessary first step. Is "special"
the best name for the constabulary and is it, in fact, a "constabulary"?
Whilst we are very keen to contribute to any debate, we have reached
no firm conclusions on how the special constabulary might be rebadged
before the views of specials themselves have been ascertained.
However, at this stage, we believe that some form of remuneration
may be necessary. This could well be based on the Territorial
Army model of a daily payment and a competency-based bounty paid
annually. Remuneration at this level would provide a further incentive
for those already minded to volunteer, without attracting those
who would only do it for the money. For our part, we are currently
looking into how Police Federation membership might be made available
to specials.
11.16 In our view, the purpose of the auxiliary
professional force which we envisage, and its strength, is to
be visible and accessible on the streets and wherever people congregate,
providing a real police presence to reassure the public. We would
not therefore want special constables to be hidden in an office
away from public view.
11.17 We are very concerned by the idea
that the role of specials should be extended "from a purely
voluntary role outside work to . . . use people `inside' work".
We are concerned by the prospect of special constables working
in shops whilst on duty, particularly as this raises serious questions
with regard to lines of accountability and vicarious liability.
11.18 We are strongly opposed to this proposal
if it involves making employees of accredited security organisations
into special constables, with full police powers, so that as part
of their duties with their employer they could be deployed in
policing operations. All police officers must at all times be
under the sole command and control of their chief officer: dual
reporting to an employer would be unworkable and unacceptable.
Further, the adoption of a policy of such expediency would undermine
the role of the special constable and be an abuse of the office
of constable.
12. ISSUES OF
WORKFORCE MODERNISATION/REFORM
OF POLICE
PAY, CONDITIONS
AND WORKING
PRACTICES
12.1 We disagree with the order of workforce
modernisation. Throughout its history the police service has adapted
to meet new challenges, and workforce changes have been a fundamental
part of this. All too often, however, the term "modernisation"
is merely used as a cloak for changes that could be damaging for
the service.
12.2 The Government wants to see the development
of a "more unified police service" on the grounds that
this will lead to "forces which are truly flexible in terms
of deploying their resources". As part of this unification
process, the Government wants to explore the scope for convergence
between the pay and conditions for all "police staff",
so that "the range of skills and expertise needed in the
modern police service" can be developed. The present structures
are described dismissively by HMI as dealing with "officers
and staff in silos as if somehow they were not part of the same
organisation".
12.3 We believe that the Government and
HMI are confusing uniformity of structure with unity of purpose
and wrongly assume that a uniform structure will deliver greater
flexibility. Although presented as "workforce modernisation",
in our view the Government's proposals are both retrograde and
misguided.
12.4 There are very good reasons why the
present differences between the pay and conditions package of
police officers and that of civilian staff should be maintained:
in the interests of industrial relations efficiency, bargaining
units should consist of those who have a strong community of interest.
Bargaining units which are too widely drawn encompassing disparate
interests are unstable.
12.5 For many years, the Police Federation
has consistently argued that the position of police officers is
unique and that this uniqueness requires unique protection. We
are very conscious that this claim will be dismissed by some as
special pleading and that it is therefore up to us, in the light
of the proposals in the consultation paper, once again to make
out our case.
12.6 There are aspects of policing which
are either unique to the police or shared with very few other
occupations such as the armed forces or the fire and emergency
service. Police officers:
— routinely face unexpected danger
in the course of their duties;
— in certain circumstances are expected
to put themselves at risk to protect members of the public and
property;
— can be required to present themselves
for duty when ordered so to do;
— have restrictions placed on their
private lives and business interests;[27]
— are prevented by law from being members
of a trade union or taking part in any form of industrial action;
— exercise a substantial number of
statutory and common law powers including the power of forcible
arrest on suspicion;
— have discretion in the exercise of
those powers;
— are officers of the crown, not employees
of the police authority, who have solemnly affirmed that, whilst
upholding fundamental human rights, they will cause the peace
to be kept and preserved and will prevent all offences against
people and property. This is a "24/7" obligation which
applies even when a police officer is not on duty, throughout
his or her length of service.
12.7 If the Government is considering changing
the status of police officers from officers of the crown to employees
of the police authority, in pursuit of a unified police structure,
the Police Federation of England and Wales would resist such a
change by every lawful means at its disposal.
12.8 We also believe that one of the Government's
hoped-for benefits from a unified structure, increased flexibility
in the deployment of resources, to be illusory: if for example,
everyone from the most junior administrative assistant to the
chief constable were to be on the same pay spine, how would this
in itself increase flexibility of deployment? We fail to see the
connection. Operational or administrative deployment is dependent
on quite different factors, most weightily skills and having,
or not having, police powers. Within the federated ranks there
is already, and there has always been, complete flexibility in
the deployment of resources. Creating new civilian roles with
some powers but not all powers will lead to compartmentalisation
which will reduce flexibility not increase it.
12.9 Another problem the Government would
face in seeking to harmonise the pay and conditions of service
of police officers and civilian staff would be whether, in the
interests of uniformity, to take away benefits from one group
not enjoyed by the other or vice versa. Developing this line of
thought, the following issues, amongst others would need to be
addressed:
— police officers have restrictions
on their private lives: would it be the intention to remove those
restrictions from police officers or to impose them on civilian
staff? If the former, we believe that unnecessary risks would
be incurred while the latter may be unacceptable to the civilian
staff and their trade unions;
— police officers cannot belong to
trade unions or take part in any industrial action. Civilian staff,
of course, can do both. The situation would then arise in which
the police group could not take industrial action in respect of
a pay spine dispute, whereas the civilian group could do so, in
respect of the same dispute on the same pay spine; and
— police officers' pay is increased
annually in accordance with the agreed uprating formula. Civilian
pay is not increased in the same way. Would it be the intention
to take this uprating away from the police, which would be both
unacceptable and add to the current retention problems, or to
accord uprating to civilian staff? One measure or the other would
have to be taken to avoid the ultimate nonsense of a two-speed
pay spine.
12.10 For the reasons we have given, we
are completely opposed to the convergence of the pay and conditions
of police and civilian staff. It is simply not a viable proposition
and would impinge on the operational effectiveness of forces.
13. OTHER ISSUES
RAISED IN
THE GOVERNMENT'S
CONSULTATION PAPERS
(NOVEMBER 2003 AND
FEBRUARY 2004), EG
COMMUNITY ADVOCATES,
NEIGHBOURHOOD PANELS
Community Advocates
13.1 Providing another level of accountability
is not created, there is a place for an advocacy scheme which
would assist members of the public to articulate any concerns
they have about the service and response they receive from the
police. Indeed, if a case can be made for such an advocacy service
in relation to the police, as the Policing: Building Safer Communities
Together recognises, it can equally be made for an advocacy service
covering education, health, transport and public services generally.
13.2 For such an advocacy service to be
effective, there will need to be a hub of paid skilled staff at
the centre of a wheel whose spokes connect with, and buy in from,
the voluntary and professional sectors. We do not think that an
effective advocacy service could be provided by relying on the
voluntary sector alone.
13.3 To be effective, an advocacy service
must be focused on advocacy: it should not also have a performance
monitoring role or increase bureaucracy. We do not therefore agree
that an advocacy service should have a specific responsibility
to monitor the performance of forces against local service level
agreements or response times. Such a monitoring role is the responsibility
of other agencies. If the advocacy service were to be saddled
with a monitoring role, it would deflect it from its main purpose
and result in a duplication of effort.
Neighbourhood panels
13.4 We are attracted to the idea of neighbourhood
panels or forums provided that these are not just grafted on to
existing partnership arrangements. We want to avoid a further
proliferation of institutionalised consultation which is why we
have recommended the identification of a rational partnership
structure in paragraph 6.1 [check] above. The panels must include
the neighbourhood policing team—a significant omission from
the model presented in the consultation paper. There is also a
case for including local councillors. Otherwise, we are in broad
agreement with those whom it is suggested might be involved.
13.5 We would also like to explore how members
of the public, without any pre-existing interest in policing and
public safety, might be engaged at the neighbourhood level.
13.6 We would not be in favour of resources
being made available to neighbourhood panels enabling them to
choose to "buy in street wardens—or match-fund to obtain
the service of Police Community Support Officers". Since
neighbourhood panels would be unelected, it is difficult to see
how they could be held accountable for such resource management
decisions.
14. CONCLUSIONS
14.1 Police Reform can be characterised
by a number of interrelated contradictions:
— Despite myriad highly detailed performance
targets, there has not been a semblance of coordination to the
different aspects of reform;
— The Government has energetically
introduced a plethora of new agencies and organisations, but has
procrastinated when faced with the need to introduce new intelligence
systems;
— We are told Policing: Building Safer
Communities Together is a very "green" Green Paper,
yet debate has been stifled and effectively curtailed as to the
effectiveness of PCSOs;
— Whilst there have been calls to increase
the powers of PCSOs, the powers of National Crime Squad Officers—who
are responsible for tackling the highest echelons of crime—may
be reduced on transfer to the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).
14.2 Most important of all we have seen
a pronounced shift from the centralising tendencies that characterised
Police Reform Part One to the "new localism" of Police
Reform Part Two—to all intents and purposes reforming the
reforms.
14.3 This may appear to be a largely pejorative
appraisal but amongst the many contradictions there is much to
applaud. We broadly welcome the change in direction from centralism
to localism and the reform process should be seen in the context
of the substantial increase in funding for the police service,
which we strongly support.
14.4 However, to ensure the new localism
does not become a "new centralism" it is essential that
Government take one hand off the tiller. If not, we could be faced
with the situation where they are still in control yet removed
from the responsibility for service delivery.
14.5 We support attempts to revivify community
policing. Whilst we opposed the introduction of PCSOs with powers
it should be understood that our strong concerns stem from our
fear that the direct relationship between the police and public
will be disrupted by interposed PCSOs. Such a break may never
be healed.
14.6 It is paramount that policing at a
community level is balanced with the need to combat level two
and three crimes. Crime does not take place in a vacuum—what
happens locally is inextricably linked to national and international
crime—and we must ensure that the three levels of policing
support one another. Furthermore, we must guard against competition
for results. Effective policing requires cooperation, integration
and coordination, all of which are dividends of complimentary
based policing. The interests of the police and general public
are intrinsically entwined and we hope common agreement can be
found as to how the service can best meet the challenges of the
future.
12 August 2004
17 "Closer to the Citizen", ACPO's response
to the Home Office Green Paper-"Policing: Building Safer
Communities Together", January 2004. Back
18
National Policing Plan 2003-2006: http://www.policereform.gov.uk/natpoliceplan/index.html. Back
19
Public Administration Committee: On Target? Government by Measurement
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmpubadm/62/62.pdf. Back
20
Police Standards Unit: http://www.policereform.gov.uk/psu/background.html. Back
21
National Centre for Policing Excellence: http://www.centrex.police.uk/ncpe/. Back
22
The Bichard Inquiry Report: http://www.bichardinquiry.org.uk/report/. Back
23
Diary of a Police Officer (2001): http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/prs149.pdf. Back
24
Modernising the Police Service: A Thematic Inspection of Workforce
Modernisation-The Role, Management and Deployment of Police Staff
in the Police Service of England and Wales-http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/modernising.pdf
(20 July 2004). Back
25
Devon and Cornwall, Gwent, Lancashire, Metropolitan Police Service,
Northamptonshire and West Yorkshire. Back
26
Hansard, 12 July 2004 : Column 1122 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/cm040712/debtext/40712-04.htm_40712-04_sbhd3. Back
27
Police officers: must abstain from activities likely to interfere
with the impartial discharge of their duties; shall not take an
active part in politics; and shall not reside at premises which
have not been approved by the chief officer. Notification and
approval requirements apply to the business interests of police
officers, and their spouses and immediate family. Back
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