25. First supplementary memorandum
submitted by the Police Federation of England and Wales
This memorandum is an addendum to the Police
Federation of England and Wales' previous oral and written evidence
to the Committee's inquiry into Police Reform (September 2004).
It outlines the Federation's position on three issues:
1. Community Support Officers (CSOs), following
a series of focus groups undertaken by the Police Federation;
2. the provision of police training; and
3. the use of police career breaks (in response
to a specific request by the Committee).
1. COMMUNITY
SUPPORT OFFICERS
During the Committee's oral evidence session
Jan Berry and Clint Elliott, Chairman and General Secretary respectively,
of the Police Federation, alluded to a series of focus groups
being undertaken by the Police Federation. At the time of giving
evidence only very general emerging themes were apparent. The
Federation therefore agreed to forward more substantive evidence
before the Committee concluded its inquiry. These focus groups
are now complete and the accompanying report, which will form
the basis of our future research and evaluation, is nearing completion.
The focus groups
A series of eight focus groups were undertaken
in seven forces[38],
chosen specifically to ensure a representative sample of the views
of federated officers across England and Wales. In addition to
this qualitative research, participants also agreed to complete
a questionnaire in order to provide quantitative data.
The overarching aim of the focus group research
was to capture an accurate picture of the introduction of CSOs
nationwide in order to:
To assess the efficaciousness of
CSOs.
Enable the Federation, in the absence
of independently commissioned evidence-based research by Government,
to inform the Home Office and other such organisations/bodies
as to any problems and inconsistencies in the introduction of
CSOs; the views of police officers who work alongside them; and
how we believe these factors should impact upon future policy
in respect of CSOs.
The key findings
A clear majority of police officers
stated that CSOs were performing tasks that sworn officers did
not have time to do. These tasks were nothing new, but were not
always undertaken in the recent past.
Whilst there was a split as to whether
police officers approved or disapproved of CSOs, the vast majority
believed CSOs did not compare favourably with working alongside
either an experienced police officer or a probationary constable.
The vast majority of officers did
not believe CSOs had been given sufficient training (of which
there are currently no national CSO standards, although Skills
for Justice are in the process of compiling some) to prepare them
adequately for the tasks that were required of them, and that
supervisory officers had also received insufficient training in
respect of leading CSOs.
The vast majority of officers were
unequivocal in their belief that CSOs should wear a uniform clearly
distinct to that of police officers.
In addition to these concerns, officers expressed
heavy dissatisfaction at the practice of both CSOs getting too
involvedie exceeding their remitand operating in
potentially confrontational or confrontational environments due
to their lack of skills and the implications upon health and safety,
for instance:
On one occasion a CSO "dragged"
a suspected robber off a bus.
CSOs have been tasked with executing
warrants (be it after a risk assessment).
CSOs have patrolled alone in their
own individual "sectors".
CSOs have been taken on drugs raids
"to make up the numbers"but only in a "passive"
capacitya far cry from the purely "visible (street)
presence" originally envisaged.
CSOs have been tasked to deal with
beggars on the Underground; ticket touts; and in areas where drug
dealing is ubiquitous and hostility commonplace.
CSOs have been used alongside PCs
at pub closing time to ensure as many uniforms on the streets
as possible;
Whilst on joint patrol, PCs had to
call for assistance in order to protect CSOs from members of the
public after "getting excited" and exceeding their remit;
A CSO attended a domestic after hearing
a weapon was involved;
Police Officers made it clear that
CSOs readily state that they find themselves in confrontational
situations which they are unable to deal with.
The Catch-22
The pressure to maintain a "visible presence",
but with minimal training, equipment, skills and powers places
many CSOs in an invidious position: avoid pursing criminals or
entering confrontational situations and risk disappointing the
public; or exceed their remit without requisite skills, experience,
powers or training.
The uniform worn by CSOs is, in part, responsible
for placing CSOs in this quandary. It is abundantly clear from
the focus groups and anecdotal evidence that CSOs are indistinguishable
from police officers to all but the criminal fraternity in society,
many of whom see CSOs as an opportunity to operate with virtual
impunity.
Police-style uniforms raise public expectations.
People expect CSOs to resolve crimes in the same way as would
a police officer, and express acute dissatisfaction or bemusement
when CSOs do not take the action desired. In these circumstances,
the initial reassurance people felt when they saw a visible presence
on the streets was replaced with a profound disappointment with
the whole police service per se. CSOs must have a distinct
uniform and a distinct role.
Public expectations
On the basis of this evidence we believe the
concept of a visible street presence operating in non-confrontational
situations is a myth and a contradiction in terms. To believe
that this essential police patrolling function can somehow avoid
leading to confrontational situations (at no fault of the CSOs)
represents an egregious misunderstanding of the harsh realities
of policing.
Questions
Before the Government even contemplate expanding
the numbers of CSOs we believe they should address a number of,
as yet unanswered, questions:
What is the role of CSOs?
Are CSOs intended to be used in confrontational
roles?
Should there be a clear distinction
between the uniforms of CSOs and police officers?
Why was the time set aside for the
pilots into the use of powers of detention reduced by three months?
Why has there been no independent
cost-benefit analysis into CSOs?
Why are there such great variations
between the use of CSOs between different forces?
2. POLICE TRAINING
In our written evidence to the Committee's inquiry
into Police Reform we highlighted what we believe to be a plethora
of deficiencies that persist in the training of police officers.
Previously we have contributed evidence to the
Committee's inquiry specifically into police training (1998-99).
The resulting report: Police Training and Recruitment (8
July 1999) contained many conclusions and recommendations which
we fully endorse. Regrettably, half a decade on, many of these
recommendations have not been actioned by forces and the Home
Office.
The national and local delivery of police training
(Home Affairs Committee recommendations 2-6)
The introduction of the Initial Police Learning
and Development Programme (IPLDP) in all 43 forces by early next
year, together with the Police Promotional Review workplace assessment
trials in seven forces, appears to represent a general trend in
the field of training and development. At present there are genuine
fears that standardisation and consistency could suffer as a result,
and questions remain as to where (a) adequate resources and funding
will come from, and (b) this system will be robust, resilient
and sustainable in the medium to long term.
Unfortunately, we fear some forces will be better
placed than others to deliver training. In addition, whilst there
is a semblance of common minimum national standards across all
43 forces, the acceptance and implementation of these standards
is not uniform across the country.
Evaluation and inspection of training (recommendations
7-11)
Whilst we supported the Committee's recommendations
in this respect, we question whether individual forces, the Home
Office and police authorities have fully embraced the concept
of stringent and properly resourced evaluation processes within
forces.
The case for local delivery of probationary training
(recommendation 18)
From 2005, forces will have responsibility for
ensuring the delivery of probationer training, be it through Centrex,
providing it themselves or through other specialist providers
(including FE or HE colleges).
At the present time we believe there appears
to be a lack of direction, planning, coordination and communication;
a lack of resources for the creation of the new curriculum; and
a lack of support from some key stakeholders and insufficient
engagement with Centrex to provide a smooth transition to the
new programme.
Non-specialist post probationers (recommendations
20-21)
Post-probation, unless officers seek either
vertical or lateral career progression, training grinds to a halt
and they are unlikely to receive either the quality of training
or development needed during their remaining 28 years of service.
As a result, the largest single group of police officers only
ever receive cursory training following legislative changes, or
in the form of distance learning. We hope the Core Leadership
Development Programme (CLDP) will go some way to redress the existing
lamentable state of affairs, but without an effective appraisal
system in place this is unlikely.
Custody officer training (recommendation 22)
Few custody officers receive adequate refresher
training, and the quality and quantity of training continues to
vary considerably across forces.
Training and recruiting the police in a diverse
society (recommendation 38)
The Police Federation is a strong supporter
of the full introduction of effective training and recruitment
practices to help build a police service that better reflects
wider society. However, as stated in the oral evidence session,
we are concerned that elements of the service are calling for
positive discrimination to be made lawful.
Positive discrimination would constitute a knee-jerk
reaction from a Service that is under pressure to deliver diversity
but does not have the understanding, the time or the tools to
do so. Lawful positive action has not been managed or explained
properly across the Service. We do not believe that the legalisation
of racial quotas for the recruitment of BME officers would improve
the numbers of BME applicants to the Service or contribute to
the promotion of race equality in the Service in England and Wales
any more than the imposition of religious quotas has improved
the position of Catholic and non-Catholic recruits to the PSNI.
Officers from both majority and minority groups justifiably resent
the different, allegedly better treatment, preferring the certainty
that all recruits are the best people for the job rather than
tokenism.
Community and Race Relations training (recommendations
39 and 40)
We have considerable concerns in this regard.
Probationer training has recently been reduced by a fifthfrom
15 weeks to 12 weekswith no assessment as to how this would
impact upon race and diversity training. In addition, other than
the periodical assessments by HMIC, there is very little evaluation
of community and race relations training at a local level. Not
surprisingly the quality of such training therefore varies significantly
across forces.
3. POLICE CAREER
BREAK SCHEME
Background
The career break scheme was introduced in November
2000 following agreement at the Police Negotiating Board (the
details of which are contained in Appendix A: PNB Circular 00/16,
and Appendix B, which notifies the Home Secretary's endorsement
of the scheme).
Questions of obligations, responsibilities and
contact during the career break, in addition to training needs,
are covered in paragraph 4 of the PNB agreement. These matters
are to be agreed between the chief constable and the individual
officer before the start of the career break. Whereas the PNB
agreement sets out the parameters of the scheme, precise procedures
are a matter for local level.
Take-up rate
The Police Federation does not hold, or have
access, to any statistics on numbers taking career breaks. The
Home Office, in its annual Police Strength Bulletin, publishes
an "all staff" figure, and an "all staff"
figure which excludes certain categories of staff, including those
on career breaks. The difference between the two sets of figures,
as at 31 March 2004 (published 29 September 2004), is 1,363 for
all ranks. However, it is not possible for us to say what proportion
of the difference is accounted for by career breaks or other kinds
of long or short term absence.
Recent media reports were therefore inaccurate
to state that police strength was not as high as stated (due to
officers being on career breaks) because these officers are excluded
from the operation police numbers figure.
The merits of the scheme
The career break scheme has now been in operation
for some three years and we are perfectly satisfied with both
its nature and operation. The PNB cannot be overly-prescriptive
on procedures, as these must be a matter for individual forces,
in accordance both with their own internal procedures and the
nature of each individual case.
Career break schemes represent best employment
practice. They are a very effective way of retaining officers
who may otherwise leave the service, which in turn also makes
them an important diversity tool. The ability to retain officers
in this way means that investments made in their training and
development is not lost to the service.
To the best of our knowledge, the case of Pc
Cray Birch is an exceptional one (and no doubt the reason why
it gained such publicity). We are firmly of the view that such
an exceptional case does not justify contemplating changes to
the scheme. It should be noted that the real issue with this case
was not the merits or demerits of the police career break scheme,
but the inability of the force and CPS to contact the officer
in contrast with the apparent ease with which the media found
him.
22 October 2004
38 Focus Groups: Cheshire Constabulary; Devon and
Cornwall Constabulary; Leicestershire Constabulary; Surrey Police;
West Midlands Police; West Yorkshire Police; and two in the Metropolitan
Police Service. Back
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