Select Committee on Home Affairs Written Evidence


25.  First supplementary memorandum submitted by the Police Federation of England and Wales

  This memorandum is an addendum to the Police Federation of England and Wales' previous oral and written evidence to the Committee's inquiry into Police Reform (September 2004). It outlines the Federation's position on three issues:

  1.  Community Support Officers (CSOs), following a series of focus groups undertaken by the Police Federation;

  2.  the provision of police training; and

  3.  the use of police career breaks (in response to a specific request by the Committee).

1.  COMMUNITY SUPPORT OFFICERS

  During the Committee's oral evidence session Jan Berry and Clint Elliott, Chairman and General Secretary respectively, of the Police Federation, alluded to a series of focus groups being undertaken by the Police Federation. At the time of giving evidence only very general emerging themes were apparent. The Federation therefore agreed to forward more substantive evidence before the Committee concluded its inquiry. These focus groups are now complete and the accompanying report, which will form the basis of our future research and evaluation, is nearing completion.

The focus groups

  A series of eight focus groups were undertaken in seven forces[38], chosen specifically to ensure a representative sample of the views of federated officers across England and Wales. In addition to this qualitative research, participants also agreed to complete a questionnaire in order to provide quantitative data.

  The overarching aim of the focus group research was to capture an accurate picture of the introduction of CSOs nationwide in order to:

    —  To assess the efficaciousness of CSOs.

    —  Enable the Federation, in the absence of independently commissioned evidence-based research by Government, to inform the Home Office and other such organisations/bodies as to any problems and inconsistencies in the introduction of CSOs; the views of police officers who work alongside them; and how we believe these factors should impact upon future policy in respect of CSOs.

The key findings

    —  A clear majority of police officers stated that CSOs were performing tasks that sworn officers did not have time to do. These tasks were nothing new, but were not always undertaken in the recent past.

    —  Whilst there was a split as to whether police officers approved or disapproved of CSOs, the vast majority believed CSOs did not compare favourably with working alongside either an experienced police officer or a probationary constable.

    —  The vast majority of officers did not believe CSOs had been given sufficient training (of which there are currently no national CSO standards, although Skills for Justice are in the process of compiling some) to prepare them adequately for the tasks that were required of them, and that supervisory officers had also received insufficient training in respect of leading CSOs.

    —  The vast majority of officers were unequivocal in their belief that CSOs should wear a uniform clearly distinct to that of police officers.

  In addition to these concerns, officers expressed heavy dissatisfaction at the practice of both CSOs getting too involved—ie exceeding their remit—and operating in potentially confrontational or confrontational environments due to their lack of skills and the implications upon health and safety, for instance:

    —  On one occasion a CSO "dragged" a suspected robber off a bus.

    —  CSOs have been tasked with executing warrants (be it after a risk assessment).

    —  CSOs have patrolled alone in their own individual "sectors".

    —  CSOs have been taken on drugs raids "to make up the numbers"—but only in a "passive" capacity—a far cry from the purely "visible (street) presence" originally envisaged.

    —  CSOs have been tasked to deal with beggars on the Underground; ticket touts; and in areas where drug dealing is ubiquitous and hostility commonplace.

    —  CSOs have been used alongside PCs at pub closing time to ensure as many uniforms on the streets as possible;

    —  Whilst on joint patrol, PCs had to call for assistance in order to protect CSOs from members of the public after "getting excited" and exceeding their remit;

    —  A CSO attended a domestic after hearing a weapon was involved;

    —  Police Officers made it clear that CSOs readily state that they find themselves in confrontational situations which they are unable to deal with.

The Catch-22

  The pressure to maintain a "visible presence", but with minimal training, equipment, skills and powers places many CSOs in an invidious position: avoid pursing criminals or entering confrontational situations and risk disappointing the public; or exceed their remit without requisite skills, experience, powers or training.

  The uniform worn by CSOs is, in part, responsible for placing CSOs in this quandary. It is abundantly clear from the focus groups and anecdotal evidence that CSOs are indistinguishable from police officers to all but the criminal fraternity in society, many of whom see CSOs as an opportunity to operate with virtual impunity.

  Police-style uniforms raise public expectations. People expect CSOs to resolve crimes in the same way as would a police officer, and express acute dissatisfaction or bemusement when CSOs do not take the action desired. In these circumstances, the initial reassurance people felt when they saw a visible presence on the streets was replaced with a profound disappointment with the whole police service per se. CSOs must have a distinct uniform and a distinct role.

Public expectations

  On the basis of this evidence we believe the concept of a visible street presence operating in non-confrontational situations is a myth and a contradiction in terms. To believe that this essential police patrolling function can somehow avoid leading to confrontational situations (at no fault of the CSOs) represents an egregious misunderstanding of the harsh realities of policing.

Questions

  Before the Government even contemplate expanding the numbers of CSOs we believe they should address a number of, as yet unanswered, questions:

    —  What is the role of CSOs?

    —  Are CSOs intended to be used in confrontational roles?

    —  Should there be a clear distinction between the uniforms of CSOs and police officers?

    —  Why was the time set aside for the pilots into the use of powers of detention reduced by three months?

    —  Why has there been no independent cost-benefit analysis into CSOs?

    —  Why are there such great variations between the use of CSOs between different forces?

2.  POLICE TRAINING

  In our written evidence to the Committee's inquiry into Police Reform we highlighted what we believe to be a plethora of deficiencies that persist in the training of police officers.

  Previously we have contributed evidence to the Committee's inquiry specifically into police training (1998-99). The resulting report: Police Training and Recruitment (8 July 1999) contained many conclusions and recommendations which we fully endorse. Regrettably, half a decade on, many of these recommendations have not been actioned by forces and the Home Office.

The national and local delivery of police training (Home Affairs Committee recommendations 2-6)

  The introduction of the Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP) in all 43 forces by early next year, together with the Police Promotional Review workplace assessment trials in seven forces, appears to represent a general trend in the field of training and development. At present there are genuine fears that standardisation and consistency could suffer as a result, and questions remain as to where (a) adequate resources and funding will come from, and (b) this system will be robust, resilient and sustainable in the medium to long term.

  Unfortunately, we fear some forces will be better placed than others to deliver training. In addition, whilst there is a semblance of common minimum national standards across all 43 forces, the acceptance and implementation of these standards is not uniform across the country.

Evaluation and inspection of training (recommendations 7-11)

  Whilst we supported the Committee's recommendations in this respect, we question whether individual forces, the Home Office and police authorities have fully embraced the concept of stringent and properly resourced evaluation processes within forces.

The case for local delivery of probationary training (recommendation 18)

  From 2005, forces will have responsibility for ensuring the delivery of probationer training, be it through Centrex, providing it themselves or through other specialist providers (including FE or HE colleges).

  At the present time we believe there appears to be a lack of direction, planning, coordination and communication; a lack of resources for the creation of the new curriculum; and a lack of support from some key stakeholders and insufficient engagement with Centrex to provide a smooth transition to the new programme.

Non-specialist post probationers (recommendations 20-21)

  Post-probation, unless officers seek either vertical or lateral career progression, training grinds to a halt and they are unlikely to receive either the quality of training or development needed during their remaining 28 years of service. As a result, the largest single group of police officers only ever receive cursory training following legislative changes, or in the form of distance learning. We hope the Core Leadership Development Programme (CLDP) will go some way to redress the existing lamentable state of affairs, but without an effective appraisal system in place this is unlikely.

Custody officer training (recommendation 22)

  Few custody officers receive adequate refresher training, and the quality and quantity of training continues to vary considerably across forces.

Training and recruiting the police in a diverse society (recommendation 38)

  The Police Federation is a strong supporter of the full introduction of effective training and recruitment practices to help build a police service that better reflects wider society. However, as stated in the oral evidence session, we are concerned that elements of the service are calling for positive discrimination to be made lawful.

  Positive discrimination would constitute a knee-jerk reaction from a Service that is under pressure to deliver diversity but does not have the understanding, the time or the tools to do so. Lawful positive action has not been managed or explained properly across the Service. We do not believe that the legalisation of racial quotas for the recruitment of BME officers would improve the numbers of BME applicants to the Service or contribute to the promotion of race equality in the Service in England and Wales any more than the imposition of religious quotas has improved the position of Catholic and non-Catholic recruits to the PSNI. Officers from both majority and minority groups justifiably resent the different, allegedly better treatment, preferring the certainty that all recruits are the best people for the job rather than tokenism.

Community and Race Relations training (recommendations 39 and 40)

  We have considerable concerns in this regard. Probationer training has recently been reduced by a fifth—from 15 weeks to 12 weeks—with no assessment as to how this would impact upon race and diversity training. In addition, other than the periodical assessments by HMIC, there is very little evaluation of community and race relations training at a local level. Not surprisingly the quality of such training therefore varies significantly across forces.

3.  POLICE CAREER BREAK SCHEME

Background

  The career break scheme was introduced in November 2000 following agreement at the Police Negotiating Board (the details of which are contained in Appendix A: PNB Circular 00/16, and Appendix B, which notifies the Home Secretary's endorsement of the scheme).

  Questions of obligations, responsibilities and contact during the career break, in addition to training needs, are covered in paragraph 4 of the PNB agreement. These matters are to be agreed between the chief constable and the individual officer before the start of the career break. Whereas the PNB agreement sets out the parameters of the scheme, precise procedures are a matter for local level.

Take-up rate

  The Police Federation does not hold, or have access, to any statistics on numbers taking career breaks. The Home Office, in its annual Police Strength Bulletin, publishes an "all staff" figure, and an "all staff" figure which excludes certain categories of staff, including those on career breaks. The difference between the two sets of figures, as at 31 March 2004 (published 29 September 2004), is 1,363 for all ranks. However, it is not possible for us to say what proportion of the difference is accounted for by career breaks or other kinds of long or short term absence.

  Recent media reports were therefore inaccurate to state that police strength was not as high as stated (due to officers being on career breaks) because these officers are excluded from the operation police numbers figure.

The merits of the scheme

  The career break scheme has now been in operation for some three years and we are perfectly satisfied with both its nature and operation. The PNB cannot be overly-prescriptive on procedures, as these must be a matter for individual forces, in accordance both with their own internal procedures and the nature of each individual case.

  Career break schemes represent best employment practice. They are a very effective way of retaining officers who may otherwise leave the service, which in turn also makes them an important diversity tool. The ability to retain officers in this way means that investments made in their training and development is not lost to the service.

  To the best of our knowledge, the case of Pc Cray Birch is an exceptional one (and no doubt the reason why it gained such publicity). We are firmly of the view that such an exceptional case does not justify contemplating changes to the scheme. It should be noted that the real issue with this case was not the merits or demerits of the police career break scheme, but the inability of the force and CPS to contact the officer in contrast with the apparent ease with which the media found him.

22 October 2004



38   Focus Groups: Cheshire Constabulary; Devon and Cornwall Constabulary; Leicestershire Constabulary; Surrey Police; West Midlands Police; West Yorkshire Police; and two in the Metropolitan Police Service. Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2005
Prepared 10 March 2005