48. Third supplementary memorandum
submitted by the Association of Chief Police Officers of England,
Wales and Northern Ireland
INTRODUCTION
1. ACPO welcomes the opportunity to set
out its views on the above document. The White Paper has come
at the end of a very long consultation process and ACPO has worked
extensively with government to ensure that we were able to play
our full part in shaping the measures proposed. We have been pleased
the government's willingness to listen to our views and amend
some of its proposals.
2. The Association continues enthusiastically
to support the aim of the White Paper—that of delivering
a more coherent effective policing service, with clearer and more
explicit accountability and more responsive to local needs at
the neighbourhood level.
3. However, we have a number of reservations
about a few of the proposals in the document. Some of them raise
important questions that are not answered, eg about funding; others
revolve around what measures that seem to propose a highly prescriptive,
centrally controlled model of policing with new lines of confused
and conflicting lines of accountability.
4. We are concerned that if these are not
resolved then chief constables' ability to deliver the improved
policing to which we all aspire will be hampered.
5. For ease of reference I have split the
issues into five headings, although inevitably many of them overlap:
ROLES AND
ACCOUNTABILITIES
The tripartite arrangement
6. The relationship of the three partners
in the tripartite arrangement that governs policing and the respective
part that each plays in the delivery of policing is clearly of
vital importance. Our concern is that the appropriate balance
between policy setting and operational delivery should not be
upset and we need clarity of role definition that we do not see
in the current proposals.
7. What the White Paper does propose seems
to us to be a highly detailed and prescriptive model of policing
which would have the effect of extending the role of central government
into the detailed control of local resources. This would curtail
the flexibility of authorities and chief constables to manage
their resources according to defined local needs. Not only would
this make the delivery of a locally responsive police service
much more difficult, it must almost reduce the accountability
of Police authorities and chief constables for policing outcomes.
The role of the Home Secretary
8. We feel that the balance of central direction;
responsibility for local operational delivery; scrutiny processes
and ministerial interventions, as proposed, needs to be redressed
to allow an effective operational model to be developed.
9. Within this model we see the role of
the Home Secretary as:
— Setting the strategic direction of
policing;
— Defining minimum standards of delivery
and some targets and then;
— Monitoring delivery of the outcomes
through an effective scrutiny and performance management regime.
10. It is then the role of the police authorities
and chief constables to deliver those outcomes locally. If the
Service fails to deliver then the Home Secretary should be able
make appropriate direct interventions, something that he already
has the power to do.
11. Within these recommendations is a range
of highly prescriptive measures that aim to force local policing
activity through empowering BCU commanders—there seem to
be no corresponding measures to empower chief constables in a
similar way yet those same Chief Constables are the only ones
held directly to account.
New Local Accountabilities
12. In addition, we see the need for (and
have consistently supported) the notion of a new model of local
accountability with stronger local direction. The White Paper,
however, seems to offer a confused line of highly bureaucratised
accountabilities, which will further constrain the proper ability
of the chief constable to manage his/her resources to meet changing
operational risk. This will inevitably drive chief constables
into spending too much time defending and not enough time
delivering. We believe that for the Service to deliver
effective policing at local levels this issue needs to be resolved.
Accountability should be clear, simple, unbureaucratic and be
aligned with lines of management. It is crucial that people can
identify with sufficient clarity who exactly is accountable for
success or failure to deliver policing services.
13. The role of local government and Crime
& Disorder Reduction Partnerships also needs to be absolutely
clear. Their effective engagement is vital if locally identified
neighbourhood problems are to be tackled effectively. However,
that engagement also has to be appropriate. We feel strongly,
for instance, that regional government has no role in setting
local CDRP targets but should be focused on monitoring
their impact on national targets.
14. In the past we have also experienced
some difficulties with other agencies' abilities to engage wholeheartedly
in partnership activity, often because of conflicting demands.
Another important part of the role of the Home Secretary, we suggest,
should be to secure effective buy in from to crime and disorder
reduction from other ministries and that central government objectives
and projects are corporate and complementary.
2. COHERENT POLICING
Level 2 shortfall
15. There is a considerable emphasis in
the White Paper proposals on strengthening policing at the neighbourhood
level, something that we also agree needs to happen (although
we would like to be clearer about what neighbourhood policing
means). The formation of SOCA aims at tackling national level
and organised crime, again a move that we support. The White Paper
does not, however, address a concern that we have previously raised
about a shortfall in resources of between five and seven hundred
million pounds at Level 2 (the level above neighbourhood where
criminals operate across command and county boundaries).
16. The formation of NCS left a resource
void at the regional level which was not filled and which forces
have struggled to fill consistently. The formation of SOCA has
the capacity to stretch this gap as its work extends into new
areas and is more international in flavour.
17. Treating different levels of policing
as though they can be compartmentalised is unhelpful as our reality
is that we have to be able to operate effectively and seamlessly
from neighbourhood up to international levels because that is
exactly what the criminals do. Communities will assume that this
is what we can do and we know that if we fail at any level the
impact will inevitably be felt at the other levels.
18. This issue cannot be resolved by another
ring fenced fund; it is another area where chief constables and
police authorities have to be properly funded and given the freedom
and flexibility to manage those resources to best effect.
19. Ways of developing and encouraging new
collaborative arrangements between forces and the role that regions
should play will be part of this process and they need to be explored
to a greater extent although this is something that may arise
from work currently being carried out by the HMCIC.
3. WORKFORCE
MODERNISATION
Direct entry to the service
20. We strongly believe that the Service
has shown and continues to demonstrate that it can recruit, train
and develop leaders of the highest calibre of at every level and
we have not seen any convincing evidence that contradicts this.
We already recruit directly a range of specialist skills where
chief constables believe this to be necessary and appropriate,
but we have seen no operational benefit in these becoming sworn
officers.
21. We cannot see, therefore, what problem
direct entry for sworn officers is trying to fix. However, to
ensure that we retain the ability to access a changing job market
we believe that we should have the option to do so. However, it
could only effectively be achieved with a full understanding of
the character of operational police leadership. There is a unique
set of learned skills and experience beyond those of generic leadership
that may be learned by an operational manager in another environment.
22. This issue is by no means peculiar to
the police service. No one would expect, for instance, an operational
manager from Marks and Spencer to be able to transfer to the army
and straight away lead an attack on Baghdad—there would
be a rigorous, highly specific and probably lengthy, induction
process before this was allowed to happen.
23. What we wish to see appreciated is that
senior police officers must have particular and necessary pieces
of operational experience if we are to avoid major risk to public
safety. The ability to command major operations, the ability to
command firearms incidents, authorisations for surveillance, the
ability to understand the sensitivities involved when police operations
are engaged in sensitive areas—just a few examples which
show that a lead in time is required for this expertise to be
gained. Direct entry without that understanding is not acceptable
to us.
24. If we are going to recruit in this way
then the process has to remain under the control of chief constables
who will have to ensure that they design a clearly defined induction
process individually tailored to bring entrants up to the right
levels of skills and experience.
The recruitment of top teams and Chief Constables'
PDRs
25. There are two significant changes to
employment processes suggested in the White Paper relating to
selection of top teams and the assessment of chief constables.
Firstly, it suggests that police authority chairs should appraise
chief constables through a PDR process and set their performance
related pay. Secondly, it goes on to propose that chief constables,
in turn, should autonomously select the remainder of their top
teams. Perhaps this is seen as a trade off to satisfy stakeholders
but we feel that it does not show an appreciation of the issues
involved.
26. Clearly, it is entirely right that the
performance of chief constables should be assessed and appraised,
but we need to ensure that the process is fair to all parties
and does not have unintended consequences. The processed proposed
does not take account of the full spectrum of the chief constable
role and a PDR should be broader than merely assessing whether
targets have been met and that a performance payment should or
should not follow.
27. We feel that there are three elements
within the PDR process:
— An assessment of the chief constable's
performance against the policing plan and targets.
— An appraisal of the professional
organisation of the force and the professional performance of
the chief officer in that context.
— An adjudication of performance pay
and bonus.
Our stance is that it is inappropriate for all
three parts to be carried out by police authority chairs.
28. Police Authorities have an obvious role
in assessing the performance of the force (and therefore the chief
constable) against targets set. However, they are not, in the
main, competent to assess the professional skills of chief constables—for
example, how well the force's surveillance units are set up and
operated or the resilience of the homicide investigation arrangements.
This broader professional assessment should be part of the work
of the HMIC.
29. There is also a real danger that if
we relate bonus payments to broader professional assessment at
this stage there will be coercive pressure on the operational
independence of chief constables, with the danger of distortion
of deployments and loss of the balance between local and national
targets. We have a recently agreed a protocol for the payment
of performance related pay which has not been tried and we should
learn from this before expanding it.
30. Overall, therefore we feel that this
is a process that should be owned by the HMIC and that there should
be a formal evidenced contribution from the chairs of police authorities.
31. On the issue of selection of the chief
officer team beyond the chief we feel that if chief constables
are to be held accountable for the performance of their force
they should have a formal role in the selection of the team that
is going to deliver that performance. Currently, this only occurs
as good practice in some police authorities. We feel that that
a joint process formally recognising the role of both chief and
authority should be developed.
4. RESOURCES
32. Too few of the White Paper proposals
are costed and we are not convinced that there is a full appreciation
of how expensive many of the new measures are going to be. This
is especially true in some of the costs involved in defining new
standards of local policing, eg putting local policing teams in
every locality and some of the new accountability processes.
33. It also should not be forgotten that
there will be considerable development costs to defining and implementing
many of the new measures especially around modernisation of the
workforce. Other initiatives outside the White Paper proposals
also have to be taken into account eg from criminal justice and
the new Children's Act.
34. It is not just about finance because,
in addition to the new resources needed, the capabilities of the
service to take on this change will have to be expanded and this
takes both time and money. We are very concerned that the measures
seem to be presented as a set of "cost neutral" developments.
35. Having studied the recommendations,
we cannot see how they could be fully implemented without a considerable
injection of new resources over a number of years.
5. POLICE IMPROVEMENT
AGENCY
36. We continue to support the development
of National Police Improvement Agency, an idea that we put forward
12 months ago. We believe that for it to be effective in its role
in enabling chief constable and authorities to deliver the policing
that we all want. It should be:
— Concentrated on delivering a small
number of key elements of change. Too many tasks would bog it
down in a morass of bureaucracy.
— Small—a commissioning agency,
rather than an "institution" which would again be inherently
bureaucratic.
— Professionally led by the Service—both
in governance and operations.
— Aimed at reducing Duplication of
effort or multiplicity of bodies.
— Driving the agenda of the other support
agencies such as PITO and Centrex.
— Be seen as part of police delivery
and not central scrutiny.
6. CONCLUSION
37. Over the past 10 years the Service has
worked hard to deliver what has been asked of it—a considerable
and long term reduction in crime. We have recognised that now
the Service also has in addition to build a new public confidence
in what we are doing and to be more responsive to local communities
and their wider policing needs.
38. We have energetically embraced this
agenda and are working with government, other partners and neighbourhood
bodies to ensure that this is delivered, but doing this in a way
that does not compromise the gains we have already made.
39. To be able to do this effectively we
believe that chief constables and police authorities have to be
given the freedom and flexibility to manage their resources in
accordance with defined needs. There is real opportunity here
to take a huge leap forward and build enthusiastically on the
new landscape by challenging Chief Officers and Authorities to
deliver and giving them the freedom to do it.
40. Government is developing a much more
comprehensive scrutiny and performance regime and the Home Secretary
has new powers of intervention. This should, we feel, give reassurance
that poor performance on the part of any force or part of a force
can not only be identified but also effectively addressed.
41. It is undoubtedly true that forces are
now managed very differently, even when compared with just five
years ago. The new performance culture is now firmly embedded
in both management processes and the culture of the managers themselves.
42. Because of this we feel that the time
is ripe for government to move to its second phase of reform and
to trust the service to deliver the policing outcomes we all want.
The imposition of new bureaucracies or systematic centralisation
that seeks unnecessarily to micromanage local policing can only
get in the way of those efforts.
25 January 2005
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