Select Committee on Home Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200 - 219)

TUESDAY 12 OCTOBER 2004

SIR KEITH POVEY AND MR PAUL EVANS

  Q200  Mr Taylor: I believe they were. I have one final question. What is your opinion on the proposed creation of a National Improvement Agency? Could such an agency do anything that the Police Standards Unit, the National Centre for Policing Excellence and HM Inspectorate cannot already do? So, can the National Improvement Agency move in and cover ground that is not being covered at the moment?

  Sir Keith Povey: It can if it is structured in the right way. I am not quite sure just what a National Police Improvement Agency will look like. There is some confusion within ACPO and within the Home Office around it. If it is going to be another bureaucratic layer then I do not think it will achieve anything. If it is going to bring some rationalisation to PITO, to Centrex, to some aspects of PSU, to NCPE and then act as an agent for change and driving improvement forward within ACPO, then I think that will fill a gap and will bring some rationalisation to the bodies that play there at the moment.

  Q201  Mrs Dean: Sir Keith, what is the state of progress with introducing a baseline assessment system at the moment?

  Sir Keith Povey: Baseline assessment has been a success story for HMIC. Interestingly, I have had a number of letters from chief constables actually emphasising that, yes, this is the way forward and how pleased they are to see it. In fact, I mentioned Norman Bettison earlier and he sent for my eyes a draft statement to appear in the Police Review Magazine singing the praises of baseline assessment. The object of the exercise was to bring some cohesion to inspectorate activity in forces, to recognise those forces that are performing well and to identify those forces that are under-performing. We look across 26 performance indicators at forces, grade them on a four point scale of excellent, good, fair or bad, and come to a judgment about the performance of that force. Ultimately the object of the exercise, and we are not there yet, will be to identify the better performing forces and reduce dramatically the burden of inspection, so that where you have a force that is performing well, they have got good systems there, they have got good internal inspections and quality assurance departments then we would not inspect them for 12 months, maybe two years, and concentrate resources on those forces that we have identified as under-performing and the ones in the centre, to concentrate resources on those areas of the 26 where they need additional support.

  Q202  Mrs Dean: What is your timetable for introducing self-assessment of those forces?

  Sir Keith Povey: The first baseline assessment took place during the spring of this year and was published in June of this year. We have just gone through a technical exercise to update those because they were based on data that ended December 2003. That exercise will bring us into line with PPAF, so the next full scale exercise will take place next year and then it will be a rolling programme and we will be able to marry the baseline assessment into PPAF, the Police Performance Assessment Framework indicators, and measure a force improvement or otherwise against that original baseline assessment.

  Q203  Mrs Dean: Could you tell us how many forces do you think will be involved in that self-assessment and what criteria will you use to choose them?

  Sir Keith Povey: There are 43 forces in England and Wales and those are the 43 forces that we inspect and those are the 43 forces that will be subject to baseline assessment. Out of those 43 forces I would hazard a guess that six or seven would be so good that we could withdraw inspection activity from them in recognition of that, and at the bottom end of the scale there would be perhaps three, four or five that are so poor that they would be subject to substantial Inspectorate activity and then you have got the raft in the middle.

  Q204  Mrs Dean: Does it not create a risk of having a two-tier inspection regime?

  Sir Keith Povey: Not a two-tier inspection region because within each of the regional offices there is one staff officer of chief superintendent rank who has responsibility for two or three forces and liaises with those forces on a quarterly basis. Every force is subject to the same activity to that extent, to a greater or lesser activity in relation to the outcomes of the baseline assessment but the activity is the same. If you are saying two-tier is no inspection for the better forces and strong inspection for the weaker forces, then, yes, it is, but the inspection activity in those forces is the same in relation to each of the performance areas.

  Q205  Mrs Dean: Will there be a mechanism to introduce full external assessment if a "trusted" force proves to be unworthy of that trust?

  Sir Keith Povey: Yes, there would have to be. The beauty about it is, and this is a real benefit of the reform programme, when I first started inspecting forces I was working on data that was 12 months out of date whereas now I have got almost real-time data that is only a month out of date, so you can quickly identify where a force is slipping or improving and it is something that would have to be monitored fairly carefully.

  Q206  Mrs Dean: Can I turn to Mr Evans. How great is the variation in performance between police forces  across England and Wales? What gives you particular cause for concern? Could you also tell us  what progress is being made in reducing unacceptable variations?

  Mr Evans: Initially when they began the measurement process, I believe it was in March 2003, there was established at one point a goal that no force would be more than 10% below the most similar forces with the commitment that all citizens are entitled to a certain standard of policing. At that time I believe there may have been as many as 11 forces that did not meet that standard and at this time I believe five of the forces have met and surpassed that standard, another five are on trajectory to meet the standard and one force we have recently become engaged with we are working with and I am pretty confident that they will be on target to meet the standard. I guess the short answer is the variation is getting lower and lower, if you will. At our peak we were working with eight forces, we are currently working with seven forces and three of those forces we may be disengaging from because they will have met the criteria for disengagement within the next few months.

  Q207  Mrs Dean: Could you talk us through a typical example of specific action that you take to improve a police force's performance?

  Mr Evans: PSU being in its third year, how we operate has evolved over time. I think when PSU first came into existence we would go into a force and throw grants and money at a number of different initiatives, some of them may be thematic. If they had a burglary problem we would give them money to address that. What has changed over time, and it is part of our learning process, is we still do that, we go in and say, "You have got a drug problem, here is some money for drugs and burglary and what have you", but we go in and look first and foremost at a comprehensive diagnostic of the force, what kinds of structures do they have in place, do they have real-time data, do they have accountability structures. We are looking at the management process, if you will, to make sure that there is accountability that all the people in the department at various ranks know what the expectations are, that there is an alignment between the goals and objectives, the priorities of the organisation in the planning, in the budget, in the cadres and what have you. A lot of what we do now is try to do a symptomatic comprehensive diagnostic of do the systems work and when we find problems then we try to work with the chief constable in his ACPO command to make sure that we are putting in place structures that are conducive to good performance.

  Q208  Mrs Dean: The Police Superintendents' Association stated that though the PSU has helped spread good practice, its role is not understood by many senior officers who are fearful of its "invasive nature . . . in the day to day running of their commands". Is this a widespread view among senior officers? What are you doing to reassure such officers?

  Mr Evans: The fact that PSU has only been in existence for three years probably contributes to that. We have only been engaged with a limited number of forces, so not the entire service has experienced PSU. I think that is beginning to change. I think the word of our engagement and how we have engaged with forces and their perception of how we have engaged will change that. We have worked on an alcohol campaign and a violent crime campaign. Recently we have issued guidance on issues like burglary, robbery and vehicle theft. PSU recently issued a performance management guide that has been very well received. We are holding a conference next month on the alcohol misuse campaign and putting out alcohol guidance. I think as we get more and more into areas that a force that has not engaged with us is also involved with, particularly in alcohol and violent crime, I think perceptions may change in that area.

  Sir Keith Povey: Could I add to that. You are right, there is that perception there and intervention is a massive nuclear tool, if you like, if you have the Home Secretary formally intervene in a force. When the PSU first came into existence there was this fear. When the Reform Act went through Parliament that was addressed by making HMIC the gatekeeper to that intervention because there was a perception, rightly or wrongly, that PSU were the Home Secretary's arm of enforcement, if you wish. To bring some professional judgment before the Home Secretary can use that intervention, HMIC have to certify that that force is inefficient or ineffective, or likely to become so, wholly or in part, and it is only then that intervention can take place. There is that safeguard, and I think it is a necessary safeguard, particularly given the length of time the PSU has been in existence. It is a necessary safeguard and one from which the service draws some comfort.

  Q209  David Winnick: Mr Evans, as a senior Home Office official you come with a great deal of experience. You were a former Police Commissioner in Boston. How long were you the Police Commissioner there?

  Mr Evans: Ten years, sir, just about 10 years.

  Q210  David Winnick: I see that the Home Secretary has stated that your track record in reducing crime in Boston was extremely impressive and you are the best person for heading this unit and driving up performance standards in the Police Service. That is quite good for your CV apart from anything else, is it not?

  Mr Evans: Yes, sir.

  Q211  David Winnick: Tell me, Mr Evans, at the moment we are plagued, as you know, by what may be described as youth gun crime, an increasing number of young people who carry a knife almost as part of their clothing but, unfortunately, also guns and are using guns. With your experience as a Police Commissioner in Boston with its crime record, how far do you feel that your experience can help in assisting the police in dealing with this problem here?

  Mr Evans: I think there are strategies that we utilise over there that can be transferred. One of the things that is absolutely critical when you are dealing with gun violence is identifying the sources of the firearms, the guns that are coming into play, and to make sure there is a heavy price to pay for those individuals who supply firearms, weapons, to young people. That is absolutely critical. We used to have special statutes for trafficking in firearms for individuals who would supply firearms to juveniles and what have you. Making sure you are getting the people who are supplying the firearms is absolutely critical. My sense is then you have to have a very, very good handle on intelligence on your drugs situation. What I have found is that drugs and handguns go hand-in-hand. Many people in the drugs business will use firearms to help them conduct their business. It becomes absolutely critical to have a national intelligence model, if you will, that does a real good job identifying those individuals who you believe are carrying firearms. I think one of the lessons learned that I can probably bring is that sometimes we would have gun violence and then every young person in the neighbourhood would be subject to police stops, police searches and what have you. It is absolutely critical that the police have a pretty good idea of who is engaged in carrying guns, dealing drugs, and that we target those people and, in fact, in some ways, go to the point of marrying those people, focusing our attention on the, call them what you will, impact players. Usually what you will find is that these individuals are no strangers to the criminal justice system, they will probably have been through the system multiple times, so making sure that we bring to bear the system on them of police, probation, looking at their behaviour, is critical. Again, you have got a very, very small gun problem here compared to what I have experienced, but I think the one thing you want to make sure is that it does not snowball out of control.

  Q212  David Winnick: It is nothing comparable to what you experienced as Police Commissioner in Boston?

  Mr Evans: Exactly, but clearly you want to nip it in the bud and make sure that there are consequences for individuals who carry firearms. There was a minimum mandatory sentence, anybody caught with a firearm automatically did a year, and that even went to juveniles. It was pretty tough but it was absolutely necessary.

  Q213  David Winnick: You had a system in Boston where there was a broad alliance including the  police, churches and other community organisations. Do you feel there is any way in which that could be undertaken in Britain involving the churches or is the situation here in the UK so different?

  Mr Evans: The short answer is yes. I think what we did in Boston was we reached out to people who we felt were leaders in the community and could have a major impact, who we could share our strategies with, ask for their advice and in the end get almost their imprimatur, their stamp of approval, as to how the police were operating. At the time those were the  clergy. They were the most visible, powerful individuals, particularly in the black community and that was the community most impacted by violent crime. The one thing we did was work very, very closely with that community and the leaders of the community and in many ways what we said was, "Here is our strategy, it is a comprehensive strategy. We are here to help young people who need our help. We will get them services and what have you, but clearly if they are engaging in violent behaviour there will be consequences". There was a comprehensive approach. There was prevention, intervention and enforcement. Very clearly what we tried to do was speak as one. There would be police, prosecutors, probation officers, street workers, clergy, and community health workers, all saying, "We will get you assistance but we are not going to let you kill each other". So, in essence that is something that certainly is transferable. What there has to be is buy-in from community leaders and those leaders are going to be whoever the leaders of the community are.

  Q214  David Winnick: Can I ask you briefly, Sir Keith, because I want to turn to race, listening to Mr Evans and knowing his views and experience, do you feel that what was done in Boston relates to the United Kingdom and can in some way help in reducing gun crime here?

  Sir Keith Povey: Yes, I suspect that it can. The HMIC undertook a thematic on the criminal use of firearms at the beginning of this year and there was great emphasis in there on (a) having a national intelligence database of firearms that have been used in crime, and (b) having the database in NCS of tracing firearms and the two complement each other. The real impact can only be made by involvement of the communities and that was clearly identified in the thematic. Paul is right that gun crime in this country, firearms, accounts for less than 0.02% of all crime, the trouble is that disproportionately it has a massive impact on the fear of crime and public fear of crime.

  Q215  David Winnick: Rightly so, surely. Look at what happened in Nottingham.

  Sir Keith Povey: Yes, absolutely. 41% of all gun crime is committed in the Metropolitan Police area, the rest in the main in West Midlands, Greater Manchester and Nottinghamshire to a lesser extent. Within these forces, within certain areas, there is this culture, and it is drug driven, of "it is good to carry guns at a young age". It is getting into the community so that the community are identifying that is not the way forward, that this is bad news, and they are working in partnership with the police to try to bring some stability there by (a) identifying the sources and (b) identifying the people who are using these weapons.

  Q216  David Winnick: Many of the victims of gun crime are black and the victims have been described in the media in broad terms as Yardie gangsters. Some of these gangsters are illegal immigrants. Is it not surprising that there is not much more action taken, insofar as some of these people are undoubtedly illegal immigrants, to get them out of the country?

  Sir Keith Povey: I have not seen the research that would actually convince me that the proportion of gun crime is committed by illegal immigrants.

  Q217  David Winnick: I did not quite say that.

  Sir Keith Povey: I think anecdotally there is a major problem in some of the Jamaican gangs in relation to carrying guns. You have only got to look at the operations in West Midlands and Greater Manchester and the Metropolitan Police with Operation Trident, which is about black on black killings, that are making substantial inroads into that culture. The success rate of Operation Trident is substantial. Forces are aware of the issues and are desperately trying to involve communities in some resolution of that, but there is some way to go. As I said earlier, although in statistical terms it is a small problem, in perception and public fear and public outreach terms it is a big problem.

  David Winnick: What we saw in Nottingham last week.

  Q218  Mr Clappison: Just on this point about the extent of the problem, it does look very much to be the case that although you have talked about the scale of the problem, in particular forces and in particular localities the problem seems to be concentrated, it seems to be localised in certain areas. The question that I would like to put to both of you is that given what Mr Evans has said about what needs to be done at a community level and enforcement level and the transferability of the experience from some parts of the United States, how can we get this process started in the areas where it needs to start before it spreads elsewhere?

  Sir Keith Povey: I think substantial work is already being done in those areas. In 2001-02 the number of people killed in this country by firearms was 93, in 2002-03 it was 81, so a fairly substantial reduction. Who is to say how that came about? It is very difficult to measure intervention by police, involvement by the community and the outcome. Certainly the forces that I have mentioned, the four in particular, are well aware of that issue, well aware of the areas in which this takes place, but it is very, very difficult to overcome the random shootings, such as took place in the last couple of days in Nottingham. If it is going to be sustainable, if it is going to be long-term, then the only way forward is   to get into those communities so that the communities are accepting that this is not appropriate behaviour.

  Q219  Mr Clappison: How do we get into those? Who is going to start this off? Where is the impetus going to come from?

  Sir Keith Povey: The impetus has got to come from the Police Service initially because it is going to be seen as a police problem, but it is a case of involving the Drug Action Teams, the Crime Reduction Partnerships, the local clergy, the local stakeholders, and it is only by that sort of partnership approach that we will get the results we want. I think what Paul was saying reflects what is happening, in actual fact, in the Metropolitan, West Midlands and Greater Manchester areas.

  Mr Evans: I have sat through presentations of the Met's gun project, if you will, and many of the things that I touched upon as ways to success are things that they are implementing and have implemented: the idea of a close working relationship with the community, community engagement, also the education piece of trying to make sure that young people know that that type of life is a dead end and the whole intelligence piece of focusing on that small number of people who may be involved in drug trade or who your intelligence tell you have to be monitored very closely. I think that the reduction in gun crime and gun homicides in the Met will point to some of the successes they have had in recent years.


 
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