DFID's rationale for working in
India
23. Following the publication of the World Banks
report Assessing aid in 1998,[28]
the argument that aid is most effectively utilised where there
are large numbers of poor people and a conducive policy
setting became widely-accepted wisdom amongst donors. DFID also
gives credence to this argument, using 'high poverty' and 'good
governance' criteria to justify their provision of assistance
to India.[29] According
to their rationale, India's relatively sound institutional environment
enhances the case for assistance to the country. While the scale
of poverty in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa is roughly comparable
to that in India - with around half the population of these countries
(320 m. people), living on less than a dollar a day,[30]
India scores better than most sub-Saharan African countries on
governance grounds. Despite significant problems of governance
(which are discussed further in Chapter 3), the country has a
functioning civil service and is well able to handle significant
flows of aid. India also has significant stocks of human capital:
a dense and vibrant civil society; an extensive free press; and
a sophisticated academic community with a substantial capacity
to generate and absorb ideas. Charlotte Seymour-Smith, the Head
of DFID India, told us that as India is not aid-dependent, and
its political and bureaucratic institutions are relatively mature
"there are significant opportunities for donor assistance
to be used to reduce poverty."[31]
24. We are convinced that, at present, India qualifies
easily for DFID's assistance, on both high poverty and good governance
grounds. As several witnesses pointed out, given the number of
poor people living in India, the country could currently be considered
under-aided.[32] Yet
over the last few years the 'high poverty/ good governance' model
of aid effectiveness has been disputed. As we noted in a previous
report on 'Financing for Development', critics of the World Bank's
approach to aid allocation have questioned the relative importance
of the right policy environment in determining the effectiveness
of aid. They have suggested that aid can be effective across a
range of policy environments.[33]
Such arguments underline the importance, for donors, of continuously
re-examining their models of aid and aid effectiveness. In referring
to the existence of such debates over aid effectiveness we do
not mean to challenge DFID's allocation of aid to India as a whole.
As we discuss later in this report however, we do think there
are questions about how DFID has allocated its assistance within
its India programme. In selecting the Indian states in which it
would develop focus state programmes, DFID prioritised the criterion
of good governance. To date, such prioritisation has limited DFID's
engagement with some of India's poorest states (including UP and
Bihar), which are affected by conflict, crisis and lack of good
governance.[34]
25. DFID India staff told the Committee that at its
current rate of economic growth, India was expected to graduate
from being a low-income country (LIC) to being a middle-income
country (MIC) in approximately 2013/15. Although India's shift
to MIC status is "some way off"[35]
we think that DFID should already be considering its likely implications.
The significance of India's projected move between the (otherwise
arbitrary) categories of LIC and MIC derives from one of DFID's
commitments under its 'Value for Money' objective. DFID has undertaken
to provide 90% of its country programme resources to LICs by 2005/6.
This commitment, which excludes humanitarian assistance, has led
to reductions in planned bilateral spending in MICs.[36]
These reductions are based on the assumption that although MICs
are often characterised by high levels of inequality, they ought
to have the capacity to redistribute their resources internally
and thereby alleviate the poverty of their poorest citizens.[37]
India is already typical of an MIC in terms of its high levels
of inequality.[38] The
fact that these inequalities are growing suggests that redistributive
policies implemented by the GoI have not been effective, to date.
26. Under DFID's current policy, India's elevation
to MIC status would necessitate a drastic reduction in the volume
of DFID's bilateral assistance to the country. A significant reduction
in DFID's assistance to India would be problematic if it led to
the curtailment of programmes in India's poorest states. Many
of these states are characterised by levels of poverty and indebtedness
which, if they were independent countries, would qualify them
for Least Developed Country (LDC) and Highly Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC) status.[39] Hilary
Benn acknowledged this when he told us "If UP and Bihar were
countries in their own right, we would be in there."[40]
Given India's geographical size and huge population of poor people,
we believe it could be considered an exception to existing rules
regarding the distribution of DFID assistance between MICs and
LICs. One possibility might be for DFID to continue engaging with
individual states even if it decided to scale back its programme
to India as a whole. From what we heard about the GoI's evolving
attitude to the receipt of development assistance however (see
paragraphs 32-38), it seems unlikely that the GoI would allow
DFID to pursue a policy of engaging only with individual states.
Nonetheless, we think that DFID ought to be developing its work
in India's poorest states. We would be very concerned if the future
success of India in reducing levels of income poverty (and thereby
attaining MIC status), led DFID to significantly reduce its work
with India's remaining hundreds of millions of poor and socially
excluded people.
Value for money
27. Total overseas development assistance to India
amounts to less than 0.35% of India's GDP (or 1.3% of the GoI's
discretionary expenditure), and DFID's assistance represents under
0.06% of India's GDP.[41]
In comparison to certain countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where
DFID assistance can make up 10-20% of GDP, DFID's financial contribution
to poverty reduction in India is a drop in the ocean. As one witness
commented to us however "capital clearly is not the point"[42]
of DFID's involvement in India. Our inquiry led us to concur with
Hilary Benn's view, that it is for DFID's "ideas and its
flexibility"[43]
that many in India welcome its presence. It is nonetheless the
case, as the Secretary of State also told us, that DFID's financial
contribution "enhance[s] the conversation"[44]
which the Department is able to have with the GoI.[45]
Many of those we spoke to in India saw the value of DFID's programme
in terms of its technical assistance, good practice and scrutiny
of programme governance, rather than in terms of its absolute
monetary value. We agree with this analysis. Given the extent
of poverty in the country, we do not see the limited scale of
DFID's programme as counting against the case for assistance to
India. As we discuss further in Chapter 5, we think DFID should
build on the existing strengths of its India programme by devoting
a greater proportion of its resources towards research, technical
assistance and the development and dissemination of good practice.
28. Aid conditionality has always been relatively
ineffective at the central level in India.[46]
Mark Robinson considered that this ineffectiveness has largely
been due to the insignificance of donor funds in comparison to
the considerable volume of GoI spending.[47]
To some extent, the ineffectiveness of aid conditionality can
also be attributed to the determined independence of the GoI.
The decision by some donors to impose sanctions on India following
the country's first testing of its nuclear capabilities in 1998[48]
made it even more difficult than it had previously been for donors
to apply conditionalities at the central government level. According
to Dyson and Vira:
The sanctions
made it evident to the government
of India that it could operate quite comfortably without donor
assistance, and that "the donors could keep their sanctions."
Donors eventually lifted their sanctions voluntarily, but the
relative bargaining position of donors vis-à-vis the national
government had weakened.[49]
Given the independence of the GoI, DFID has realised
that it must focus on "policy discussion
based on ideas
changing minds,"[50]
rather than seeking to apply conditionalities. This is in line
with recent shifts in DFID's thinking on aid 'conditionality',[51]
which we welcome. We endorse the assertion of DFID, the FCO and
HM Treasury in their September 2004 consultation paper on aid
conditionality that "developing countries must have room
to determine their own policies for meeting the Millennium Development
Goals" and applaud the UK government's renewed emphasis on
building partnerships for poverty reduction with developing country
governments.[52],[53]
We look forward to seeing how the shift in DFID's thinking set
out in the consultation paper impacts on DFID's work in practice.
29. At state-level, DFID's financial assistance is
of greater significance than at the centre; in Orissa for example,
it is projected that DFID assistance will make up 7.8% of the
State's discretionary expenditure between 2002 and 2005.[54]
The larger significance of DFID's assistance at state-level means
that its influence on policy formation can be potentially greater.[55]
Recent events in AP have illustrated however, that even at state-level,
donor policy influence is limited. In June 2004 the World Bank
suspended its budget support lending to AP after the State's newly
elected government decided to provide free electricity to farmers,
going back on previous pricing agreements they had made with the
Bank (see paragraphs 57-60).
30. Although donors can require their aid to be spent
on a particular sector, they cannot prevent a recipient government
responding by cutting its own resource allocation to that sector,
thereby leaving the total spend the same. This is known as the
'fungibility' of aid. As the World Bank has observed, in most
countries the majority of aid is likely to be highly fungible,
and consequently "the safest assumption for donors is that
they are, more or less, financing whatever the government chooses
to do."[56] In light
of this, DFID's assessment of the policy priorities of the GoI
and individual state governments is crucial to ensuring that its
resources will be spent on poverty reduction. Furthermore, DFID
must assess the success with which pro-poor policies are translated
into pro-poor practices.
31. India is capable of funding the development of
thermonuclear devices, and is in the process of expanding its
own overseas aid programme (see paragraphs 32 to 38). We were
therefore concerned, over the course of our inquiry, to establish
that the resources which DFID allocates to India really provide
additional development assistance. As Dr. Michael Lipton put it,
"The key question is whether extra aid will actually mean
extra resources going to the poor
or whether it will simply
displace government money which would otherwise have gone to those
ends."[57] He went
on to say:
If you ask me whether objectively I think [India's
defence spending] is probably too high, given the alternative
priorities and development and poverty priorities in front of
India, I would agree with that and so would many Indians. If you
ask me whether India is by any means an extreme case of that among
our aid recipients, or if you ask me whether I think withdrawing
aid would make the Government of India spend less on defence,
the answer to both those questions is no. So there is no operational
implication for Britain's aid.[58]
Most of those who we spoke to during the course of
our inquiry concurred with Dr. Lipton's point of view. [59]
We were convinced by their arguments that DFID's assistance does
provide additional benefit. As we discuss later in this report
however, questions remain over how this assistance is being distributed
and deployed.
India's attitude to aid
32. In recent years, India seems to have become increasingly
tired of being cast in the role of aid recipient.[60]
In June 2003 the then Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani asserted
that "By 2020 we should become a developed country"[61]
and the NDA government announced a series of changes to India's
aid policy. The main changes were:
- GoI would no longer accept
any tied aid;
- GoI would accept bilateral
aid from only six sources (Japan, Germany, Russia, the UK, the
USA and the European Union). The other 22 bilateral donors operating
in India were requested to channel assistance through civil society
or multilateral organisations;
- GoI would pre-pay all outstanding
debt owed to bilateral donors (except Japan, Germany, France and
the US), having already pre-paid $2.8 bn. of debt to the World
Bank and ADB earlier in 2003; and,
- GoI would cancel debt to seven
Highly Indebted Poor Countries and provide grant or project assistance
to developing countries in Africa, South Asia and elsewhere through
the 'India Development Initiative'.[62]
33. These changes in aid policy can be seen as a
reflection of India's changing self-image. They seem to have been
primarily intended to bolster Indian economic and political interests.
Some commentators have suggested that the changes in aid policy
were motivated by the GoI's concern about donors' attempts to
use their aid packages as instruments of foreign policy, to force
changes in Indian domestic policy. A further explanation offered
for the move was that India felt its global ambitions, not least
its desire to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council,
were being hindered by its position as a recipient of aid from
countries with less strategic ambitions. The GoI itself justified
its policy changes on efficiency grounds, as lowering the transactions
costs involved in dealing with multiple donors. Whatever their
motivation, the changes demonstrate how GoI decisions regarding
development assistance may pre-empt any future plans which DFID
makes in respect of its India programme. As DFID acknowledged
in its submissions to the Committee, those seeking to provide
development assistance to India must take account of this reality.[63]
The policy shifts reflect India's vibrant democratic system, but
also highlight the rapidly changing nature of its aid environment.
In India, in contrast to the majority of DFID's country programmes,
the parameters of the aid relationship are heavily shaped by the
partner, rather than the donor. Hilary Benn acknowledged this
when he told us "We have to adapt to the framework that the
Government of India, as its policy evolves and changes, sets,
and respond accordingly, but continue to bring what we can."[64]
We were encouraged to hear that DFID has undertaken analysis of
the risks to development assistance in India in the course of
creating its new CAP for the country, and encourage the Department
to repeat such analysis on an ongoing basis.
34. Since the Lok Sabha election in May 2004, there
has been uncertainty over whether the new Congress-led UPA government
would adopt, adapt or discard the NDA's modifications to India's
aid policy.[65] There
has been some indication that the UPA will reverse the policy,
accepting aid from all G8 countries and from non-G8 EU members
provided they contribute at least $25m. a year.[66]
Representatives of withdrawing bilateral donors told us that in
practice this modification would affect only the Netherlands,
who have given no indication of reversing their plans to withdraw.
Some commentators have suggested that the UPA may demonstrate
a greater commitment to social issues than the NDA did, basing
their arguments on the Congress party's manifesto commitments
to generating employment for poor rural households. As in most
countries, however, it is common for Indian governments to fail
to implement their electoral promises, so Congress's manifesto
commitments are no guarantee of UPA policy.[67]
The lack of effective grassroots pressure for the fulfilment of
electoral commitments in India seems bound to limit the pro-poor
outcomes of government policy-making, and the GoI has yet to engage
with this issue.
35. Both the New Delhi Declaration, signed in January
2002,[68] and the Prime
Ministers' Initiative, signed by Tony Blair and Manmohan Singh
in September 2004, demonstrate the value which the UK and Indian
governments accord to their countries' ongoing relationship. Other
bilateral donors told us that their relationships with India have
evolved in recent years. Mr. Wolfhard Behrens, the Head of Economic
Co-operation and Development at the German Embassy in Delhi, told
us that the GoI now prefers to discuss economic co-operation,
because discussions of development assistance are an unwelcome
reminder of India's poverty and problems. The EU's programme in
India also focuses on economic cooperation rather than development
assistance.[69] Naturally,
we attach great importance to the continued maintenance of the
UK's cordial and productive relationship with India. We believe
that DFID's relationship with the GoI should be seen as a relationship
between two partners rather than in terms of a donor and recipient.
36. One important aspect of this changing relationship
is DFID's engagement with India's own international aid programme.
Perhaps surprisingly, India has been a long-standing provider
of aid to other countries, primarily through the provision of
training and manpower assets. India has also provided significant
amounts of assistance to its neighbours, during the 1980s to Bangladesh
and Vietnam, and more recently to Afghanistan, Nepal and Bhutan.
According to the Ministry of External Affairs, Indian assistance
since 1964 has totalled around $2bn.[70]
The policy changes introduced by the NDA in 2003 expanded India's
existing aid programme through the creation of a new 'India Development
Initiative'. We support DFID's stated intention to support India's
emerging role as a donor, and to expose India to global best practice
and harmonisation. In light of this we were pleased to hear, for
example, that DFID has encouraged its partner agency UNICEF India
to facilitate lesson-learning between India and Nigeria around
social mobilisation & communication for polio eradication.
37. Following the tsunami earthquake disaster which
hit South Asia on 26 December 2004, the GoI announced assistance
totalling $22.5m. to Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Indonesia and Thailand.[71]
India itself is thought to have suffered over 10,000 fatalities
and widespread destruction, with the states of Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry,
AP, and the Andaman and Nicobar islands, worst affected. The GoI
has received both criticism and praise from domestic and international
sources for its decision to refuse overseas aid for relief from
the disaster. Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières
have expressed concern that this may have delayed the delivery
of essential food and medicine to those affected.[72]
An editorial in the Times of India described the GoI as "churlish"
for refusing to accept well-meant offers from around the world.[73]
Others have accepted that the GoI may have valid reasons for
its decision: pledges of assistance may not represent new money;
aid may consist of inappropriate offers 'in kind'; disaster assistance
is often supplied for political reasons; and, as a regional power,
India has a responsibility to respond to such crises.
38. As a commentary in the International Herald Tribune
observed "by rejecting foreign assistance, the Indian government
has willingly invited greater scrutiny on its relief efforts.
One can, therefore, expect a better-than-usual response from the
bureaucracy." [74]
We hope this is the case. The tsunami earthquake disaster occurred
after we had concluded taking evidence for our inquiry and we
have no wish to rush to ill-considered judgements about the nature
of the relief effort so soon after the event. We think the disaster
has raised two more general points, however. First, the tsunami's
widespread impact has highlighted the need for DFID to retain
the capacity and adaptability to respond quickly and appropriately
to disasters occurring in the countries where it works. Lower
income countries have limited financial, human, technological,
institutional and natural resources, and therefore suffer disproportionately
when disasters occur; between 1992 and 2001, poor countries accounted
for one fifth of the total number of disasters but over half of
all the disaster fatalities which occurred.[75]
Second, the tsunami has reinforced the relevance of many of the
recommendations we made in our 2002 report 'Global climate change
and sustainable development.'[76]
The tsunami was a geo-physical event, and not caused by climate
change. Experts agree however, that the frequency and impacts
of natural disasters are likely to be increasingly exacerbated
by climate change. We therefore wish to reiterate some of the
recommendations of our previous report, including: the importance
of disaster mitigation efforts, including international standards
for early warning, response and recovery; the need for DFID to
sponsor vulnerability assessments to enable adaption work to be
targeted at the most vulnerable communities; and, the need for
urgent action to build the capacity of developing countries to
understand and respond to climate change. We were alarmed by a
recent World Economic Forum report which found that progress towards
the environmental MDGs had been the slowest towards any of the
Goals (rating it at just 3/10).[77]
HMG needs to re-assess its progress on environmental MDGS.
9 Q 4 [Dr Michael Lipton CMG, Research Professor of
Economics, Poverty Research Unit, University of Sussex]; Official
data suggest that the proportion of Indians living below the poverty
line fell from 40% in 1987-8 to 26% in 1999-2000 [Panagariya,
A., "Commentary; vote against reforms?" Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol. 39 (21), May 22 2004, pp.2079-2081],
although the validity of these figures are disputed by some scholars
(see paragraph 40). Back
10
The GoI's Official Poverty Line, or Headcount Ratio, defines those
whose income is too low for adequate nutrition; approximately
260 m. people at present. Back
11
In some cases anti-poverty schemes do seem to have succeeded in
reducing levels of vulnerability - another measure of poverty.
Back
12
Q 12 [Dr Michael Lipton CMG, University of Sussex]; The Indian
Planning Commission acknowledged in 2001 that external sources
of development assistance had not been tapped as extensively as
they might [Government of India, Approach paper to the Tenth
Five Year Plan (2002-2007), Planning Commission, (New Delhi,
2001), available on-line at http://planningcommission.nic.in]. Back
13
Q 36 [Mr David Loyn, BBC] and Ev 55 [DFID memo]. Back
14
Q 10 [Dr Michael Lipton CMG, University of Sussex]. Back
15
The Reproductive and Child Health programme, the second phase
of which DFID has been involved in designing, is an exception.
Back
16
DFID visit briefing papers, not printed, placed in the Library. Back
17
Informal committee discussion with Mr Edward Luce, South Asia
Bureau Chief, Financial Times. Back
18
Ev 97 [Dalit Solidarity Network (UK) memo]; Ev 101 [Voice of Dalit
International (VODI) memo]. Back
19
Q9 [Dr Michael Lipton CMG, University of Sussex]; Q122 [Professor
John Farrington, Overseas Development Institute]. See also David
Haslam, Caste Out: The liberation struggle of the Dalits in
India, London: CTBI (1999). Back
20
Ev 103 [VSO memo]. Back
21
Kate Bird and Nicola Pratt, Fracture points in social policies
for chronic poverty reduction, London: ODI (2004). Back
22
Ev 103 [VSO memo]. Back
23
World Health Organisation, Disability and rehabilitation,
Geneva: WHO (2003). Back
24
See footnote 21. Back
25
Ev 105 [Y Care International memo]. Back
26
According to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation, see http://www.fao.org/sd/WPdirect/WPre0108.htm. Back
27
See http://www.actionaidindia.org/People_we_work_for.shtml. Back
28
World Bank, Assessing aid: what works, what doesn't and why,
Washington DC: Oxford University Press for the World Bank (1998). Back
29
Paul Collier and David Dollar, "Development effectiveness:
what have we learnt?" Economic Journal, Vol.
114 (2004), pp.244-271. Back
30
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report
2004 (2004) p.129. Back
31
Q 39 [Dr Charlotte Seymour-Smith, DFID India]. Back
32
Ibid ; Q 10 [Dr Michael Lipton CMG, University of Sussex];
The Case for Increased Aid to India, annex to DFID memo
(Ev 55), not printed, placed in the Library. Back
33
International Development Committee (IDC), Fifth Report of Session
2001-02, Financing for Development: Finding the money to eliminate
world poverty, HC 785-I; See also OECD/DAC, Development
Cooperation Report, (1999) pp.130-131; Jonathan Beynon, Policy
implications for aid allocations of recent research on aid effectiveness
and selectivity: A summary, DFID (2001). Back
34
IDC, Eighth Report of Session 2002-03, DFID: Departmental Report
2003, HC 825 p.15. Back
35
Q 148 [Rt Hon. Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International
Development]. Back
36
DFID, Departmental Report 2004, CM 6214 (April 2004), p.155. Back
37
Edward Anderson, Sven Grimm and Carlos Montes, Poverty Focus
in EU support to Middle-Income Countries, London: ODI with
Development Strategies (October 2004). Back
38
"The state of the states", India Today, 16 August
2004. Back
39
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative was established
in 1996 as a mechanism to co-ordinate debt cancellation among
multilateral and bilateral creditors. The programme, administered
by the World Bank and IMF, is intended to reduce to poor countries'
debt burdens to a sustainable level. Forty-nine countries that
have been identified by the UN and recognised by the WTO as 'least
developed' in terms of their low GDP per capita, their weak human
assets and their high degree of economic vulnerability. Back
40
Q 156 [Rt Hon. Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International
Development]. Back
41
DFID, India Country Plan, (February 2004). Available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/capindia.pdf. Back
42
Q 36 [Mr Christopher Lockwood, The Economist]. Back
43
Q 145 [Rt Hon. Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International
Development]. Back
44
Q 180 [Rt Hon. Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International
Development]. Back
45
DFID's financial assistance is also less of a "drop in the
ocean" at state and project-level. This raises the question
of why DFID is moving away from project-based work and towards
support to central government schemes. Back
46
Q 180 [Rt Hon. Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International
Development]. Back
47
Q 81 [Dr Mark Robinson, Institute of Development Studies (IDS),
University of Sussex]. Back
48
Several donors withdrew or cut back their aid packages to India
following the country's first tests of its nuclear capabilities
in May 1998, with little discernible impact on GoI policy. A similar
strategy following the communal violence in Gujarat in 2002 served
only to increase GoI suspicion of international donors [Gareth
Price, India's aid dynamics: from recipient to donor? Asia
Programme Working Paper, Chatham House (2004)]. Back
49
Jane Dyson and Bhaskar Vira, Donor Dilemmas: Perceptions, Relationships
and Strategies in the Rural Natural Resources Sector. Presented
at "The Commons in an Age of Globalisation,"
the Ninth Conference of the International Association for the
Study of Common Property, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, June 17-21,
2002 p.14. Available at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00000816/. Back
50
Q 81 [Dr Rathin Roy, Development Economist]. Back
51
As represented in their draft policy paper "Partnerships
for aid reduction: changing aid "conditionality" "
published for consultation in September 2004. Available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conditionalitychange.pdf. Back
52
Ibid p.1. Back
53
We recognise however, the continued value of "process conditionalities",
which seek to encourage political and institutional changes in
order to improve the quality and effectiveness of aid (see discussion
in paragraph 97). Back
54
Government of Orissa, Medium Term Fiscal Plan 2002-03 to 2007-08. Back
55
Q 13 [Professor James Manor, IDS, University of Sussex]. Back
56
World Bank, Assessing aid: what works, what doesn't and why,
Washington DC: Oxford University Press for the World Bank (1998)
p.74. Back
57
Q 10 [Dr Michael Lipton CMG, University of Sussex]. Back
58
Q 4 [Dr Michael Lipton CMG, University of Sussex]. Back
59
See for example Q 41 [Dr Charlotte Seymour-Smith, DFID India];
Q30 [Mr David Loyn, BBC]; and, Q181 [Dr Mark Robinson, IDS, University
of Sussex]. Back
60
Q 39 [Dr Charlotte Seymour-Smith, DFID India]. Back
61
Sheela Bhatt, The Rediff Interview: Deputy Prime Minister L.K.
Advani, (June 11 2003). Available at http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/11inter.htm. Back
62
Gareth Price, India's aid dynamics: from recipient to donor?
Asia Programme Working Paper, Chatham House (2004). Back
63
Ev 56 [DFID memo]. Back
64
Q 151 [Rt Hon. Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International
Development]. Back
65
The GoI's refusal to accept any overseas relief following the
tsunami on 26 December 2005, reflects continuity in the government's
desire to not be seen as an aid recipient. Andy Mukherjee "Commentary:
As an aid donor, India displays larger ambitions", International
Herald Tribune, 7 January 2005. Available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/01/06/bloomberg/sxmuk.html. Back
66
This was announced in a press release during 2004 but no further
details have been forthcoming. Back
67
For example, criticising the government's recent employment guarantee
draft legislation, the Times of India wrote "The UPA
government needs to show the political will to stop subsidising
the rich and start implementing the promises it made to those
who voted this government to power." (Editorial, 10 December
2004). Back
68
Among other things , the New Delhi Declaration (2002) committed
the UK to providing £300m of financial support to India annually
in the medium term. Back
69
India's preference for partnerships has also been reflected in
their position on GATS Mode 4 negotiations, where along with some
other developing countries they have pushed for greater liberalisation
of cross-border labour migration. Back
70
See footnote 62. Back
71
See footnote 65. Back
72
Khozem Merchant, "India's policy 'holding back urgent relief'",
Financial Times, 8 January 2005; see also Edward Luce,
"India aims to be part of the solution as it defends refusal
to accept foreign help", Financial Times, 6 January
2005. Back
73
"View: India ambivalent about disaster aid", Times
Of India, 30 December 2004. Available at http://www1.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/975001.cms. Back
74
See footnote 65. Back
75
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
World Disasters Report 2001. Available at http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2001/. Back
76
IDC, Third Report of Session 2002-03, Global Climate Change
and Sustainable Development, HC 519-1. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmintdev/519/519.pdf. Back
77
Global Governance Initiative Annual Report 2005, World
Economic Forum, London (2005). Available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/ggi2005_low.pdf.
Back