Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-139)

PROFESSOR JOHN FARRINGTON AND DR CAROLINE DYER

15 SEPTEMBER 2004

  Q120 Chairman: This is one view, Professor Farrington. Do you think that DFID has made sufficient impact on issues of land tenancy and extension schemes that would enable poor farmers to get higher returns from their land and labour? Or is your concern that DFID really is not engaged sufficiently in agriculture at all?

  Professor Farrington: I do not think it is sufficiently engaged. I do not think it is sufficiently informed about what the possibilities are in agriculture. That is my basic position. There have been successful examples of agriculture extension within rural livelihood schemes, within those fairly narrow geographical boundaries, but very little of that has been scaled up and taken to government and inserted in the way government does agriculture extension, so that opportunity has been lost. On land, land is a very interesting one because land reform, in the sense of land redistribution, was on the agenda in India very shortly after independence and ran for 20 or 30 years, 40 years in some states, with a very, very mixed record. In some states it was quite successful, in other states large land-holders found all kinds of ways of evading the provisions of the Land Ceilings Acts. I think there are dimensions of land which do not involve redistribution which are potentially very interesting and are more feasible in the current political climate, and one of them has to do with reform of land tenancy and leasing. There are some fairly draconian provisions in the laws of a lot of states which have a kind of `land to the tiller' philosophy behind them. In other words, if you have been a tenant for three years on a piece of land you ought to have the option to buy that land, in fact, it might even be compulsorily purchased and handed over to you. These provisions were set up with the best will in the world at a time when independence took place and they wanted to move away from the exploitative practices of middle-men in the old days. I think there are really important questions about whether their usefulness has now been outlived and whether they are putting a brake on land renting and tenancy, because landlords are afraid that if a tenant stays there for a couple of years then they will not get their land back. I have been told that in Kerala there are something like 80,000 hectares of rice-land standing idle because the landlords cannot cultivate them, for whatever reason, but are afraid to rent them out in case they do not get them back. One needs to look at those kinds of provisions in relation to land. The other factor with land I think is a very interesting one. There is a lot of migration out of agricultural areas into urban areas on a seasonal basis and people have looked at this as a distress phenomenon. It is not necessarily distress, it is a very positive livelihood opportunity for a lot of people who could survive in agriculture but can survive better if they have that extra bit of cash from construction, or whatever, in the towns. In some circumstances they are actually very reluctant to move away from their plot of land, unless they can get a bit of money for it and rent it out in the meantime. They may leave their wife behind who can manage only, say, half their plot; what do they do with the other half, can they rent it out? If they can, they might be much more inclined to diversify into other activities, which is very positive. If they cannot, they might sit at home. I think those kinds of conditions are potentially interesting and important.

  Dr Dyer: Can I make a point about how livelihoods and education might intersect at that particular point in relation to migrant labourers, who are often migrating in very well-known and predictable seasonal cycles, particularly out of tribal areas in Gujarat, which I know best. One can say immediately that the children will be able to attend schools for about three or four weeks at the beginning of the school year, subsequent to that they might go to the sugar cane or building industries, where there is no education provision for them at all. Then they return and it is very difficult for them to get reabsorbed into the school system when they return home the next year. This is a phenomenon that seems not to be getting any kind of attention at all, from DFID or otherwise.

  Q121 John Barrett: DFID in Andhra Pradesh have come in for some stick for their support for the government's Vision 2020, and you mentioned urbanisation and the move away from land on a seasonal basis. How do you assess DFID's support for Vision 2020 and is your assessment that they are looking towards more of an organisation society rather than supporting the agricultural dimension?

  Professor Farrington: I think, with or without Vision 2020, the long-term trend is towards urbanisation. The absolute numbers of rural people in states like Andhra Pradesh is going to peak in about 20 or 30 years' time, the demographics are quite well known, so urbanisation is there. One facet of Vision 2020 was to move towards highly commercialised farming for export on a contract-farming basis and to give corporate access to fairly large pieces of land. This has attracted a huge amount of media attention because some have argued that it implies dispossessing people who already occupy that land and perhaps forcibly it is causing them to move into urban areas, or whatever. I am not sufficiently well informed to form a judgment but one can see that is a danger. As far as I am aware, DFID's support has not been for elements of Vision 2020 of that kind, it has been for rather different things. The Vision 2020, I suspect, is now part of history. I very much doubt whether the new Government of Andhra Pradesh would want even to hear mention of Vision 2020, so I think it is a closed chapter.

  Q122 Mr Battle: I would like to ask about hunger and famine because I think generally it is said, and Amartya Sen suggested, that the one thing India achieved in the 20th century was eliminating famine, and yet is it not the case that in some states there is still hunger? Again, it is just a question of are DFID's strategies working with the livelihoods approach to make sure that agriculture is a sustainable food strategy?

  Professor Farrington: There are something like 240  million undernourished people in India, about 20% of the population. It is very high. It is concentrated in particular geographical areas, mainly in the semi-arid rain-fed areas of central India, and it is concentrated socially among the scheduled tribes and the lower castes. I think that is part of where the difficulty lies, the way in which the caste system is structured is hugely problematic I think in terms of trying to improve the conditions of lower-caste people. They face all kinds of structural problems in accessing resources, productive resources, in accessing opportunity and accessing markets. It has been like that for a very long time and DFID within five years is not going to change that.

  Q123 Mr Battle: Is it going to make much impact on it at all?

  Professor Farrington: It might do. If you look at these rural livelihood schemes and projects, the ones in Orissa, for example, they have a very high tribal and scheduled caste concentration within those areas, and certainly within that geographical frame something can be done.

  Q124 Mr Battle: DFID are targeting those areas, are they?

  Professor Farrington: Within rural livelihood projects, they are targeting those, yes, which is very positive, because that is a tiny fraction of the total tribal population and scheduled castes population of the whole country.

  Q125 Chairman: Can I go on to education? I think in 2003-04 DFID spent nearly £42 million on education in India, and in 2004-05, quite a drop, is spending £12½ million. Drawing on your experience in the education sector, how do you evaluate the contribution of DFID programming to India's progress on education?

  Dr Dyer: It is really quite difficult to distinguish the DFID contribution from that of the other donors, because it has been such an exemplary example really of how donor co-operation worked in the biggest programme under the DPEP. I am finding it quite difficult to respond to that global kind of question.

  Q126 Chairman: Let me put the question another way. Whatever the figure is, it is a substantial amount of money. Question: can it actually make any impact? Does it make any impact in its own terms, is that worthwhile, does it have any leverage? Is that the best way for DFID to be spending its money?

  Dr Dyer: It does have impact because it augments very, very slim educational budgets and it is important to do that, but there is still a long way to go on the quality of education. The quality of policy dialogue that DFID can have also makes a difference. DFID can introduce new ideas, promote sharing of ideas, where this is happening, so I think it does have an impact. I am not sure that DFID is able to get down and see enough of the real grass roots of the educational institutions and what they really do and what the capacities are to come up with ways forward which really, really make a difference. I am thinking in particular of teacher education processes, of recruiting the teacher educators, who they are, what they do, what capacities are really required of them to make a difference. I think we do not have enough information, not only DFID but perhaps the Government of India also, about the actual educational processes to allow DFID to be more proactive in really addressing some of the key issues in the quality of education.

  Q127 Chairman: Who is responsible for promulgating best practice in education in India?

  Dr Dyer: There is a very serious problem in Indian education in relation to research and the research that is done. A huge project like the DPEP, for example, has thrown up very, very little in the way of good quality evaluative studies of processes and lessons learned. It is very difficult to access information about what has been good practice and therefore to share it. There was an almost anti-research response from the Government of India during quite a lot of the DPEP so the Government of India did not take that responsibility perhaps as seriously as one might have hoped and expected. A lot of reports are not in the public domain and they are very difficult for people to access. In terms of responsibilities, I think the Government of India did not take that up particularly. I am not sure that the donors took that up as much as they might have done and as a result we have had one of the largest educational programmes and we do not know enough about it, we do not even know really what the final achievements of the children in the DPEP Phase One states were.

  Q128 Chairman: Why do you think that is? Do you think that is because the Government of India is concerned that any objective independent assessment will demonstrate it has not been as successful as politically they would like to suggest, or they just do not have the machinery to do it?

  Dr Dyer: I think there are political issues about whether it is successful because the quality of public education is well known to be a very major issue. The quality of the machinery to do it, certainly there was a lot of slippage in the initial surveys and mid-term surveys by the national organisation that was charged with doing it, so that the assessment figures we do have, unfortunately, do not have very much credibility. There is an issue of technical capacity nationally also to do that. Partly that might be about the Government of India's political relationships with the national-level organisations and that perhaps it has not felt able to commission other and perhaps more able institutions to undertake those national-level surveys.

  Q129 John Barrett: It sounds as if it is a very difficult problem to get a grasp of—is DFID's money being well spent? Is it effective in one area?—and the sums are quite big. DFID's intention is to spend £210 million through the universal basic education scheme and it sounds as though we have not really got a grasp of what work has to be done. You mentioned poor research but are we doing the right thing? Do you think DFID's contribution to the universal elementary education programme is focusing on the right problem?

  Dr Dyer: I do not think there can be any doubt about that at all. I know we might not have enough evidence but we do know that there are major issues of quality and it is absolutely right, it is a constitutional commitment and there are many, many children who are not getting into schools still, despite the improvements. There are large numbers of children who are not being retained through the first primary cycles: 50% of children are dropping out of school within the first five years, and 50% of those drop out after only one year. I do not think that really there can be any doubt that DFID does need to get involved and should get involved. I am not entirely clear from the documentation that has been provided as to the nature of DFID's contribution to the centrally-sponsored scheme of Sarva Shiksa Abhiyan, whether that funding is an additionality, whether DFID's money will be going into the central pot, whether it is just going into the pot or it is going to be allocated to specific elements. It would be useful to have more detail on that in order that one could monitor and assess the impact of DFID's spend under Sarva Shiksa Abhiyan. I am not clear from the documentation.

  Q130 Mr Davies: Given that, as Professor Farrington was just saying, the problem of poverty in India is concentrated among the scheduled castes and tribes, which used to be known as untouchables, and so forth, has DFID focused sufficiently on those scheduled castes and tribes, has it given sufficient priority to that in its programmes?

  Professor Farrington: It is certainly aware of the issues, and certainly in the rural development projects, the ones we have been discussing, they are there. There are two kinds of difficulty here. One is that, if one works through government schemes and programmes, nominally a lot of what government does, whether it is at central government level or state government level, is geared towards poverty reduction among these particular groups, and a lot of their legislation and their provisions have very, very affirmative action in terms of these groups. The difficulty is that there is a huge gap between the rhetoric of these and the reality on the ground, the practice on the ground. It is very, very hard to get some of this implemented and I am fearful that by working through government mechanisms one simply is not going to meet it. That is one problem. The other problem I think is that the Government of India does not have a good record of dealing with tribal people, in terms of trying to understand what their livelihood objectives are. It tends to assume that they want the same kind of western consumerist things as everybody else might want and uses that assumption as a basis for simply trying to amalgamate them into the mainstream of development, and I think that has caused a lot of concern. I would like to be reassured that DFID takes a more nuanced view of what tribal peoples' livelihood objectives are than the Government of India has done so far. Of course, the other side of the coin is that if DFID goes in with the Government of India in dealing with tribal people then there is a danger that it might pick up the same set of assumptions. It would need, I think, to challenge the assumptions.

  Q131 Mr Davies: This is again a criticism, a very reasonable one it sounds to me, of DFID's approach to reducing poverty in India through budgetary support. Basically what they are doing is piggy-backing here on government programmes which you say are ill-conceived, inadequate, badly targeted, so far as the scheduled tribes and castes are concerned, and so those inefficiencies inevitably affect the DFID programme as well. Is there a governance issue here? Would one solution be to try to draw the beneficiaries more into the management and governance of the programmes, which maybe the Government of India or the local state governments would not want to do but maybe if DFID was running its own independent projects it could do more easily?

  Professor Farrington: Yes. Let me just clarify one thing, for a moment. I think the problem of design has to do more with tribal issues. I think the quality of the design of a lot of schemes that deal with poverty, including the CSS (Centrally Sponsored Schemes) is actually very good. The problem is with the quality of implementation of those designs. The Indian Administrative Service is second to none, in terms of its capacity to design schemes, they are super.

  Q132 Mr Davies: If they are piggy-backing on the delivery there must be something wrong with that line of delivery, if there are shortcomings there then naturally they affect the delivery of the DFID programme too. Can I come back to this governance issue, because the picture you describe is one of a top-down attempt at policy alleviation and you say that is not always very effective, it is not always well delivered? If you were to introduce a greater degree of bottom-up, or at least involve the bottom in the design and delivery of the programmes, would that be a way forward? It is not something perhaps that the Indian Administrative Service would appreciate but if DFID were running some of their programmes rather more independently might it be possible for them to do that, do you think?

  Professor Farrington: I think it is a way forward and I think the Government of India and some of the state governments have captured it, in the context of the strengthening of local government that was mentioned a short time ago, the decentralisation programme under the Constitutional Amendments. There is reservation of seats within local government for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and women, and so on, there are set proportions of representation there of seats that have to be filled by those categories, so they do have some prospect, I think, of influencing the local adaptation of some of these schemes and the local implementation of some of them.

  Q133 Mr Davies: Your message is, it might be a useful day's work to put some money aside for supporting schemes, the planning and delivery of which would be done in conjunction with these local entities which, by definition, as you say, have a large degree of representation of scheduled tribes and scheduled castes in them. This will give ownership of the programmes rather more to the actual beneficiaries?

  Professor Farrington: That is absolutely right. The problem is that the extent to which scheduled castes and tribes are able to articulate their views and get them pushed through varies enormously from one context to another. In certain contexts where there are reasonably harmonious relations it may well work. In other contexts there is a capture by local elites of almost all aspects of the development agenda, and tribals, they are not able to assert themselves, they are not able to assert their views, even through constitutionally-determined bodies, against those elites.

  Q134 Mr Davies: The DFID approach, of course, is actually to accept that their programmes are captured from day one, because by definition they are captured, they are simply giving the money to state governments, so they are captured, by definition, by the existing political elite, who are the people who are running the local state government. What we are talking about now is something which would bypass that and would involve setting up structures, maybe ad hoc, in some cases, involving the beneficiaries. This is an approach which would be very revolutionary, in terms of what DFID are doing in India currently, would it not?

  Professor Farrington: Yes. The proposed West Bengal programme has a very large component of strengthening local administrations, strengthening local government, to deliver development benefits, and I think that is all positive.

  Dr Dyer: One of the big problems for the education system is that it is most successful at alienating people because it does not respond to their aspirations, it has issues with the curriculum, which does not deliver for them, and it would be very interesting to see some real grass roots work on working with people to see what their aspirations for education actually are.

  Q135 Mr Davies: Can you characterise just briefly what are typically the aspirations of untouchables, or scheduled castes or tribes, in the educational field, on the one side, and the values which are targeted by the state government educational programmes, on the other, because you say they are not the same?

  Dr Dyer: It would be very difficult to do that very effectively, I think. If you look at the illustrations and textbooks, they are very urban, they are about cleanliness and health and hygiene. It is not that scheduled castes and scheduled tribes do not have ways of doing this or that they do not have their own norms, it is just that they are not reflected in the textbooks. It is a different way of going about the representation of things.

  Q136 Mr Davies: What do you do about that?

  Dr Dyer: Interesting experiments have been done in Gujarat, for example, in devolving textbook design to incorporate consultations with people about what they want to have in their textbooks. Parents have views. It can be done, it is difficult to do but it can be done; maybe making time to go and ask people and to get a voice from the people.

  Q137 Mr Battle: In my experience, most if not all governments tend to be top-down, and tapping in to build a base-up approach is very, very difficult but needs to be done. Usually it does not come from government initiatives, either locally or centrally, but comes from the groups themselves, who start to resist the top-down and build up ideas and new ways of doing things and then ask perhaps for support as pilot or demonstrator models and schemes. I wonder whether there are any examples that you can think of—and the Professor gave us earlier some sharp examples of insurance—for example, good examples of alternative bits of resistance to the top-down system that DFID ought to be getting behind? They can do it, because, for example, in Ethiopia, they have been very, very imaginative in supporting the initiative of the pastoralists there. I do not know India well but it is a group that is really looked down on by everybody and cut out of the whole economic system and it would be inappropriate to apply urban norms, urban redevelopment norms, to pastoralists, for example. There is some scope for them to move into that area. Is there in India?

  Dr Dyer: I am sure there is, in India. In terms of the pastoralists, one of the problems is that a lot of them actually are not recognised, they are not recognised constitutionally as scheduled castes or scheduled tribes, so they do not have any rights to things. Although they might be making their demands—it depends from pastoralist group to pastoralist group—on the state, the state then is able to say, "Well, you're not special. You might be poor but you're not entitled to reservations, although palpably you might need them, because you don't belong in one of our boxes."

  Q138 Mr Battle: Usually NGOs can break through with a bit of imagination, both locally and nationally, and come up with some ideas. Have you any experience there of good examples of good practice that could be built on to turn the system upside-down?

  Dr Dyer: Just while we are on the subject of pastoralists and migration, I think India really has not got a policy response, so in terms of good practice then practically nothing comes to mind to point to, unfortunately. It is very difficult for poor and disenfranchised people, particularly people who have dropped out of schools, who have poor educational experiences themselves and are not literate, and are perhaps a scheduled caste as well, to get the authorities to listen when they go and complain, if they dare to go and complain, that a teacher simply has not turned up to the school for ten days. It is very, very difficult to know what to do and where to go and do that and make it happen. It is a very forbidding and not very accessible, bureaucratic system.

  Q139 Chairman: Dr Dyer, you have expressed some concerns that maybe the DFID country office in India is maybe not always as tuned-in as it might be to research commissioned by DFID in London when it is developing policy. I wonder if you can give us some particulars of that kind of slight dysfunction?

  Dr Dyer: It may well be that this is being addressed by the reorganisation of the DFID Research Division, but there has been a sense in the past that research commissioned out of London has not had perhaps the buy-in from DFID in India, and particularly if that has been longer-term research, that there is a turnover of advisers in DFID India who perhaps do not live necessarily with the duration of the project. I think there are issues about DFID's current extreme focus, in my view, on policy-orientated research. There is also still a very strong need for research that does not come up with policy pointers but looks really at processes and implementation of things.


 
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