Select Committee on International Development First Joint Report

2  THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEES

Relations between the Committees and the Government

7. We and our predecessor Committees have looked at high-level policy issues but also taken the lower-level scrutiny function seriously, and examined the detail of the licences issued (and denied) by Government. We believe that this is an essential component of the task that we have been set. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary commented that "there is no more assiduous select committee"[3] and the Modernisation Committee of the House of Commons referred to our predecessor Committees' work on export controls in Session 2000-01 as one of four "notable contributions to parliamentary and public debates" since the departmental select committee system was established in 1979.[4]

8. There is no doubt, however, that this approach generates extra work not just for our staff and advisers, but also for the Government, and the Foreign Secretary spoke stridently on the matter when he appeared before us. He said:

this is an administrative operation and it is quite a complicated one. It aims to be very efficient and it aims to deal with the scores and scores of very, very detailed questions which we have received from your Committee as efficiently and as effectively as possible which, I have to say, does add to the burden, but it is maybe a necessary part of all this. [5]

He added later:

The necessary duties of this Committee do themselves add significantly to the overall cost of running the operation. In those countries where they do not have parliamentary scrutiny, the system is very much more straightforward. It is self-evident that there would be much less systematic record-keeping, much less concern about consistency and so on. I happen to believe in this system, but there has to be a limit and there is a balance to be struck. [6]

9. We do not accept the implication by the Foreign Secretary that we have overburdened the Government with an unnecessary volume of detailed questions. The Committees have made these inquiries to elucidate points of policy and test complex and controversial licensing decisions. Furthermore, these written questions have been an alternative to holding oral evidence sessions more frequently, which would have created even more work for his officials.

10. We have a unique scrutiny function. Our work includes looking at high-level policies and the issues arising from them. But the end product of the system is thousands of individual licensing decisions, each of which is crucially important. We test only a very small fraction of those decisions, and digging into this detail is an essential part of our job; if we did not do this, we would be unable to test how the Government is carrying out its policies in practice. We appreciate that our work adds to that of the Government, but effective scrutiny cannot be cost-neutral. We conclude that this dual-track approach to scrutiny of strategic export licensing should continue.

11. There is another factor that should be considered: it is in the interests of Government that its policy is scrutinised as that gives it extra assurance that its own objectives are being met. Our interests and those of the Government therefore coincide in ensuring that the scrutiny that takes place is efficient—maximises the use of available resources—and effective—holds this part of Government to account.

12. A key issue will be the design of future software, which could enable the information we require to be generated automatically. A renewal project is currently underway, which we discuss in more detail later in this Report.[7] We recommend that those devising new Government information systems for strategic export controls should be given an objective of ensuring that data can be supplied much more simply and quickly to the Committees on, for example, end use, open licences (OIELs) involving incorporation, refusals and appeals.

The future of the Committees: key issues

EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT

Written evidence

13. Responsibility for licensing decisions in the area of strategic export control spans four government departments, hence the need for our unique working arrangements. This presents the Government with logistical challenges in terms of agreeing positions and finalising documents. While this, in turn, means that our work is sometimes delayed and frustrated, on the whole we accept it as a necessary complication. However, the Government's performance over recent months has been particularly poor:

• The response to a request of 24 March 2004 to declassify parts of the Government's evidence to the Committees: Staff made clear the deadline for inclusion of the material in the Report, but this was nonetheless missed by the Government, and a response was not received until 12 May 2004.
• The Government's response to the Committees' 2004 Report: Government departments had agreed to make replies within two months of publication of a report. In this case, a longer delay was agreed, on the basis that four government departments were involved. A reply was promised during the September sitting of Parliament. In the event, a reply was not received until October, too late to be analysed for the Committees' meeting.

14. The Chairman wrote to the Foreign Secretary about these problems. He replied that "agreeing a response to any enquiry directed to four departments is considerably more time-consuming than, for example, replying to the Foreign Affairs Committee alone,"[8] accepting that the first delay was "unfortunate" and that the second was a matter of "regret". We hoped that lessons would be learned for the future. Sadly, they have not. The supplementary information from the Foreign Office necessary for this Report (including follow-ups from the evidence session on 12 January) did not arrive to the agreed deadline (the end of February). There was no indication that there would be a delay until the day of the deadline. This is particularly unfortunate, as the Committees' staff had stressed to FCO officials that they were working to a particularly tight timetable and had reduced the number of questions accordingly.

15. We are disappointed that, yet again, the Government has missed an agreed deadline for the provision of information to the Committees. The fact that these questions are directed to multiple departments is no excuse for agreeing to provide information by a certain date and then failing to do so. This second-class service has been obstructive to effective scrutiny of Government policy.

Oral evidence

16. We had understood that during oral evidence sessions witnesses appearing from the Government would be in a position to answer questions on the range of policy involved, rather than matters pertaining solely to 'their' department. We were therefore disappointed that when the Foreign Secretary and his officials appeared before us on 12 January they were unable to give details of proposed efficiency savings at the Export Control Organisation (part of the Department of Trade and Industry), despite having been given advanced notice of our interest. The Foreign Secretary explained to us that "responsibility for this is split" and suggested that we should approach the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry for further information.[9]

17. This important issue was one of the key matters we wished to explore during the evidence session. We hold hearings infrequently, and it is important to ensure that when we do we get the necessary points on record. We note that the latest draft Guidance on Departmental Evidence and Response to Select Committees submitted to the Liaison Committee by the Leader of the House states that "Government Departments should, wherever possible, co-operate fully with inquiries on joined-up policies".[10]

18. The inability of the Foreign Secretary and his officials to answer our questions about the Export Control Organisation is a disappointing sign of the limitations of 'joined-up government'. We are surprised that the Foreign Secretary was not accompanied by government officials able to respond to our lines of inquiry on a key topic. It would be a poor use of time—both ours and the Government's—if the Committees in future were to have to hold multiple evidence sessions with government representatives on a single policy area because the subjects under discussion fell under the responsibility of different Departments.

FUTURE FREQUENCY OF EVIDENCE SESSIONS

19. The Committees will also need to respond to the welcome development of Government quarterly reporting on arms exports, as noted by the UK Working Group on Arms and which we discuss in further detail later in this Report.[11] While any decision on working patterns will be a matter for our successor Committees in the next Parliament, we would suggest that in future the Committees hold oral evidence sessions at least every six months, as well as submitting written questions to the Government on a quarterly basis.

AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE COMMITTEES

20. Our unique composition has meant that the Committees' profile on Parliament's website[12] has been very low, with our reports and press notices only being available through the sites of our constituent committees. We know of at least one instance when this has meant that potential witnesses have not seen relevant press notices. We will ensure that a website dedicated to our joint work on strategic export controls goes live on the Parliament site as soon as possible, with an entry for the Committee in the main alphabetical Committee List. The site will include the text of our previous reports, press notices, future programme and transcripts of oral evidence sessions, as well as those of our predecessor Committees in the last Parliament.

PRIOR SCRUTINY

21. We have commented on a number of occasions (most recently in our First Report of Session 2003-04[13]) that there should be a system of prior parliamentary scrutiny for the most sensitive export licence applications. The Government has repeatedly rejected this recommendation, and stated in a letter to the Chairman on 27 June 2004 that:[14]

Having, as we committed to do, considered this issue very carefully, the Government remains of the firm view that prior scrutiny of export licence applications raises unacceptable constitutional, legal and practical difficulties and does not intend to take this issue further.

We queried the finality of this response with the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, who replied:[15]

In summary the Government considers it would be unacceptable to blur the line between scrutiny by Parliament of the Government's actions on the one hand, and participation by the Committee in the decision-making process itself on the other; and furthermore, any meaningful involvement by the Committee in the decision-making process would inevitably give rise to delay and call for additional resources.

22. The Government's argument for separation between us and the decision-making process is not consistent with the modern realities of scrutiny. Committees do not simply engage in historical studies of Government policy: there is increasingly a real-time engagement with decision-making. However, the confidential nature of arms export licensing, and the fact that it is justiciable do make this situation unusual. Other countries have overcome these difficulties, though, with Sweden, the Netherlands and the USA having some form of advance information provision for, and consultation of, Parliament.[16]

23. We believe that a prior scrutiny model for certain sensitive arms export decisions could be developed, which would allay the Government's fears of delay and the need for additional resources. We are disappointed with the Government's resolute opposition to any form of prior parliamentary scrutiny, and believe that the reasoning for its position is flawed. We intend to press vigorously for this change to be made in the next Parliament.

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3   Q 100 Back

4   Modernisation Committee, First Report of Session 2001-02, Select Committees, HC 224, para 3 Back

5   Q 88 Back

6   Q 96 Back

7   Q 102 (Dr Landsman, FCO). See also paras 36-37 and 43. Back

8   Ev 43 Back

9   Q 89 Back

10   Memorandum by the Leader of the House of Commons to the Liaison Committee, para 61, published with the oral evidence given by the Leader of the House to the Liaison Committee on 19 October 2004, HC 1180-i. Back

11   Q 2. See also Q 97 and paras 26 and 27. Back

12   www.parliament.uk Back

13   Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees, First Joint Report of Session 2003-04, Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, HC 390, paras 49-52 (henceforth "Committees' 2004 Report"). Back

14   Ev 33 Back

15   Ev 44 Back

16   See Ev 71,74 and 78. Back

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Prepared 24 March 2005