Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1
- 19)
WEDNESDAY 15 DECEMBER 2004
MR ANDY
MCLEAN,
MR OLIVER
SPRAGUE AND
MR ROBERT
PARKER
Q1 Chairman: Good morning, everyone.
Andrew, would you like to introduce yourself and your colleagues.
Mr McLean: I am Andy McLean, the
Deputy Director of Saferworld. This is Rob Parker, the military,
security and police co-ordinator for Amnesty International, and
this is Oliver Sprague.
Mr Sprague: Campaigns and policy
officer.
Mr McLean: From Oxfam.
Q2 Chairman: Thank you. Thank you
also for your written submission, which we have found very, very
helpful indeed, as always. This year we have taken the sensible
step of taking evidence from NGOs and defence manufacturers before
we take evidence from the Foreign Secretary, so that we will be
better equipped to pose hopefully more interesting questions when
we see him in January. There have been a number of things that
have happened since we last met earlier this year, including the
fact that the government now publishes quarterly reports on decisions
in relation to licence applications and we have now had the second
quarter of the year. Could I ask you what your impression is of
the new quarterly reporting system: How much of an improvement
do you think it is over the previous annual reports?
Mr McLean: I think it is an improvement
in the way that it obviously comes out much more quickly and much
closer to the time at which the licensing decisions are made.
I think that is something which the Committee has urged in the
past and we have as well, so I think that is a very welcome development.
I think it probably shows a challenge for us all, as well, though—the
Committee and the NGOs and also the media—in terms of ensuring
that this actually does lead to a greater level of scrutiny and
accountability for export licensing decisions, because there is
a danger that with these things coming out quarterly then in some
ways the impact of an annual report can be dissipated as well
in profile terms. I think there is a challenge there for us to
ensure that it does lead to an increased level of scrutiny. With
regard to the level of transparency within the report, I think
there are three areas to which I would like to draw the Committee's
attention. Firstly, there is still a need for a greater level
of detail in the descriptions of the equipment that is being licensed
for export. As we all know, there is the trend now whereby the
majority of equipment exported is component parts, electronics
equipment, communications equipment. Of course it is much more
difficult therefore to get a clear picture of what the impact
of this equipment is and the potential use to which it could be
put. I think that highlights the need for more detailed descriptions
about these component parts, and, in particular, the type of weapons
systems into which they are therefore going to be incorporated.
I note that in the US annual report, for instance, they do highlight
very often the weapons systems within which components will be
included; say, for example, military engines for F16 jets. There
is also the challenge of the fact that in the UK report there
is very little information on the end users of the equipment that
is exported—and that again I know is something which the
Committee has highlighted in the past—and I think that is
something which still needs to be improved. Also, with the changes
in the new licensing system, I think there are still problems
in the way the new information on incorporation and brokering
is included. On incorporation technologies, it reports the country
to which the equipment is being exported for incorporation but
not the eventual destination, so it is very difficult of course
for us to get a picture as to what the eventual impact of that
equipment will be. On brokering, the licence information is given
according to the source country from which the brokered transfer
will take place rather than the recipient country, so, again,
it is very difficult to trace the eventual impact. Although there
has been some improvement in transparency and with the speed at
which the reports have been released, we still need a lot more
detail.
Q3 Chairman: Thank you very much
for that. In your latest report, you look at each of the criteria
and identify a number of end-use countries that raise concerns
and issues. There are a number of questions and we may come back
to you after this meeting to explore some of those, but, given
the time that we have this morning, I would be interested in hearing
your views about the licences, particularly in the most recent
quarterly report, for example, that cause you the most concern.
Which are the licence decisions that worry you the most?
Mr Parker: If I may say something,
before we go on to specific licences, on the issue of timeliness
of the reporting and how useful it is to us. In theory we will
be able to track the speed with which export policy changes in
relation to events on the ground, with more timely reporting.
One specific example: in the Maldives, where there is an extant
open licence for crowd-control ammunition, tear gas and the like,
the Government expressed concerns over attacks by police on peaceful
protestors in August (so just after the reporting date of the
last quarterly report) and also condemned the imposition of a
state of emergency in the islands. We will be watching with interest
to see whether that has an impact on perhaps potential revocation
of the open licence supplying the kind of equipment that the security
forces are using in the Maldives.
Mr McLean: In terms of licences
of concern: in the last quarter there have been a number, I think.
There are a couple of countries, just to highlight. India and
Pakistan, obviously—which I know the Committee have raised
concerns about under criterion 4 before: still, over the last
18 months, very, very high levels of licensing to both countries
and of potentially offensive equipment. Obviously the situation
in Kashmir and the stand-off between the two countries has improved
somewhat—and we welcome that—but of course I think
there is still great potential for a recourse to a more bellicose
stance there. I think the fact that in the last quarter there
are still open licences going for components to combat aircraft,
combat helicopters to both countries, that sort of equipment which
clearly has a potentially offensive use, is of concern. To Syria,
in the most recent quarter, April to June 2004, there is an open
licence for armoured four-wheel drive vehicles, and that follows
a previous licence for armoured vehicles in January to March 2004
and a licence for small arms ammunition in 2003, which is of concern
to us. Also there is a continued high level of exports to Indonesia
of potentially offensive equipment (again, components for combat
aircraft, helicopters and so on) which, given the ongoing conflict,
particularly in Aceh, causes a number of concerns. Another issue
around licences is on incorporation. I do not know if that is
something you are going to return to. I would like to highlight
there that the second highest recipient of licences for incorporation
is Israel, which has received 61 licences for incorporation in
the last 18 months. That is second only to the US, which received
64. Israel of course has a very aggressive export policy at the
moment: it is the second highest exporter to China, for instance—something
which has caused the US to comment very publicly on its concern
over. The fact that there is no information published about the
eventual destination of the goods into which this equipment will
incorporated is of great concern to us.
Mr Parker: From a purely Amnesty
perspective: we always look out for handcuffs, because basically
when handcuffs appear in this report it means over-sized handcuffs
and we fear there is the potential for them to be used as or turned
into leg cuffs, which would be banned from export. We always note
when they appear in the annual report. This time of concern would
be that there is an export to Egypt and to the Philippines. I
know the Committee has looked into this before and received assurances
from the government that there was no risk that they would be
used in such a way, for torture or something like that, but we
do not have that information here in the annual report, so I would
just like to flag the Egypt and Philippines cuffs' export.
Q4 Chairman: Thank you very much
indeed for that. That is very helpful. Obviously in the latest
quarterly report we have information under the new Export Control
Act; for example, information on brokering by individuals in the
UK or companies in the UK, to which you have referred briefly,
Andrew. What is your impression of the information the Government
is now providing under the Export Control Act and the additional
information that that Act requires? Do you have any general observations
on that, other than the point you made earlier about the importance
of knowing the end use?
Mr Sprague: From an Oxfam point
of view—well, probably from the point of view of all in
the UK Working Group—the information that is provided on
the brokering and trafficking type licences is probably inadequate
for adequate scrutiny. I think of particular concern is the fact
that the licences do not specify the ultimate destination where
the brokered goods were going to end up and I think that is primarily
what we are all concerned about. We want to know whether those
goods are going to countries that prevent a proliferation risk
or would violate the criteria contained in the EU Code of Conduct
and I would like to see that improve in subsequent quarterly reports—as
a matter of some urgency, I would argue.
Q5 Mr O'Neill: If I could have a
look at the prospects for the Export Control Organisation. As
you are aware, the Gershon-driven cost-cutting exercise may well
have staffing implications for this area. Do you have any concerns
about the impact on the efficiency of the ECO, which I think most
people would say has improved? I remember, before this Committee
was established, my colleagues and I in the DTI Select Committee
had terrible trouble trying to get the system moving more quickly.
It took several reports and kicks before things could happen,
but now that it is happening do you have any worries about it
stopping?
Mr McLean: I think these proposed
cuts are bad news and I think there is a real risk that it could
lead to less scrutiny and it could lead to less transparency.
As you say, I think there is a sense that the operations of the
department are improving. Obviously this is a challenging time,
when, as the Chairman said, the provisions under the new Export
Control Act are being implemented and so the department is now
having to process these new types of licence applications which
they have not had to do before. If there are to be these cuts—and
I think about 25% has been mooted—then I think there is
a great risk that that could lead to a greater proportion of equipment
going on open licences, which will of course lead to less transparency,
because they are quicker to process, and I think it could also
lead to a greater resistance from the Government to increase transparency
in certain areas. I note that in the Government's response to
your last report there was not an "in principle" objection
to providing information on end users; the objection was that
this would put an onerous strain on resources—and, of course,
as resources are being cut, where is that extra capacity going
to come from? I would say that in the current climate, when the
Government is putting so many resources internationally into trying
to increase global stability, prosecute the war on terror and
so on, that really increasing the resources for proliferation
control is the way in which things should be heading rather than
actually seeking to cut them.
Q6 Mr O'Neill: The other side of
the coin is that you might get back to the old situation where
it took far longer for the applications to be processed.
Mr McLean: Yes.
Q7 Mr O'Neill: And I suppose you
could end up with a back-log which, in some ways, from your point
of view, I would imagine, would be almost as much the unintended
consequence of an ill wind.
Mr McLean: I think that is not
really the key issue. These cuts in the Export Control Organisation,
I would have thought, are somewhere where there is a common ground
really between the defence industry and NGOs, because obviously
they are seeking a quicker licensing process and we are seeking
greater scrutiny and transparency.
Mr O'Neill: The other thing of course
is that it might be, if savings have to be found, that they could
be found perhaps by increasing the charges or imposing charges
rather than doing it the other way round. How would you feel about
that? The cost of the licence might be increased; there might
be charges imposed on the applicants. Sometimes the sums are comparatively
small in relation to the whole contract. If there was a pro rata
way of calculating it: for example, there are 10,000 applications,
4,000 ratings, and if you had a two tier system and if you had
percentages for each one, it might provide the kind of income
which the Government could then use to fund the operations, so
that we could have it but it would be slightly more expensive
for the arms control manufacturers.
Chairman: It might be a question more
appropriate to put to our next group of witnesses.
Q8 Mr O'Neill: I am merely asking
for an opinion. It would be wrong to suggest we only had one option:
staff cuts.
Mr McLean: That sounds a sensible
suggestion and we would certainly favour that.
Q9 Mike Gapes: Could I take you on
to what is going to happen next year. The UK has the presidency
of the G8 from January of next year onwards, and then from the
beginning of July the presidency of the European Union. What would
you hope would come out of that?
Mr Sprague: It has been a very
significant year for us for export control issues. I think it
is marvellous news that the UK Government has committed itself
to support the Arms Trade Treaty and obviously, as you have mentioned,
2005 is a big year with the presidencies of the G8 and the European
Union. I think for the G8 we would like to see the UK working
with G8 partners between now and the Summit in trying to ensure
that reference to the ATT, or at least the principles of the Arms
Trade Treaty, are included in the communiqué of the G8,
building on from the decision in 2008, I think, in Japan, where
they issued a statement on small arms and light weapons. In terms
of the EU presidency, I expect we might come on to this but there
has been a year long review of the EU Code of Conduct and one
of the things that has come out of that review has been the need
to provide greater clarity on how you implement the individual
criteria. Certain criteria have been particularly problematic.
There has been some great work done on the simple development
criteria, which we might come on to later, but I would say a useful
priority for the UK presidency would be to build on this initiative
and maybe look at criterion 2. There has been a welcome development:
I do not know if it has gone through yet, but it appears there
has been a change to the wording of criteria 2, the human rights
criteria, with a more specific reference to international humanitarian
law, which of course makes the EU code more consistent with the
Arms Trade Treaty, and I would think it would be extremely helpful
to develop operative guidelines, a sort of instruction kit, if
you will, on how to implement the States' existing responsibilities
under international law. That would be, I think, a major step
forward in the EU harmonising itself towards the principles of
the Arms Trade Treaty and a greater building block towards achieving
that treaty.
Q10 Mike Gapes: Do you and your colleagues
have any hopes or expectations for next year?
Mr McLean: I think the transfer
controls issue is key. We would be looking to the G8 really to
take a good stance on support for an arms trade treaty. Obviously
in 2006 we have the review conference of the UN Programme of Action
on Small Arms Control, so we are looking to agreements in the
EU and the G8 next year as providing a key stepping stone to a
wider international agreement in 2006. We would also in the EU
code welcome the introduction of a "presumption of denial"
for exports to regions of instability. Obviously one of the key
aims of the new code is to promote a convergence in export policies
and practices of EU Member States, and yet, as we see in the EU
annual report, there is still a wide divergence of the application
of the criteria towards particular countries of concern. So I
think the agreement of a general presumption of denial to particular
countries in regions of instability would be an important point.
Then I think the issue of arms brokering and transportation is
key. Again, we would like to see the G8 build on its work on arms
brokering and support the development of an international and
legally binding instrument on arms brokering, and within the EU
we would like to see the common position on arms brokering expanded
to ensure that extra-territorial controls are mandated across
the European Union and also the neglected issue of transportation
agents addressed. There has been a lot of focus on the brokers
and not much on the people actually moving the weapons, and I
think possibly the idea of a code of conduct for transportation
agents, with agreed international standards which they would sign
up to, would be an important move there.
Q11 Mike Gapes: The EU Code of Conduct
some of my colleagues will deal with later on. There is also the
Arms Trade Treaty and I think that will be dealt with by somebody
else. You talk about regions of conflict. We have seen recently
worrying developments in Congo again. Africa is very high up in
terms of regions of conflict, or parts of Africa. The Africa Commission
is also due to be coming out with a report relatively shortly
which links into this whole G8 process. Do you have any expectations
specifically about Africa or any hopes?
Mr McLean: Yes. I think the Africa
Commission is a very welcome innovation. I think it is very encouraging
that in their draft programme, which they published a month or
so ago, there is a recommendation to establish an international
arms trade treaty and also an international legally binding instrument
on arms brokering. I note that those two recommendations were
also echoed in the recent report of the UN high level panel on
new security threats, so support for this is building. But I think
it is also important, as you say, actually to address the problem
of the proliferation of weapons within Africa. I think there,
providing greater support to sub-regional organisations and to
countries in the development of national and regional action plans,
is a very important way forward to addressing the problem on the
ground as well as the international supply.
Mike Gapes: Thank you very much.
Q12 Mr Colman: Perhaps I could make
a declaration of interest: since the last meeting of this Committee
I have become a patron of Saferworld, and I hope that example
will be followed by our next set of witnesses, all of whom have
said to me individually that they support the way that Saferworld
works, and perhaps we could look to other people coming forward
from the arms' manufacturing industry also to be supporters of
Saferworld. My question really follows on to the Arms Trade Treaty
which Mr Gapes has brought up. Obviously I am interested that
Mr Sprague from Oxfam feels it is a positive situation. Could
you open that out a bit further. Have you been consulted? Has
the coalition putting forward the Arms Trade Treaty been consulted
since the Foreign Secretary made the announcement at the Labour
Party Conference in September saying that he will in fact be taking
this forward in the way you have described?
Mr Sprague: I think it is true
to say the Government are thinking about how they are going to
take it forward, but we have had some very encouraging correspondence,
which restates the commitment, and they say they specifically
want to work on developing countries and building up—which
I assume is through the transfer controls initiative and trying
to establish the ATT principles and trying to bring in the international
humanitarian law aspect—within that process. The Government
are meeting us formally, I think tomorrow, to discuss our ideas
and our plans, and there is a very important meeting that is going
to happen in Tanzania—which has been driven by Finland,
who have emerged as one of the leading champions of the Arms Trade
Treaty—in mid-February. I think for the first time 20 governments
or maybe even 30 governments from around the world who are warm
to the idea of the treaty will meet to discuss and to formalise
how to take it forward, and I am encouraged to note that the UK
Government are having bilateral discussions with the Finish Government
about how the UK can play its full part in that process. From
where we were last year, we have made significant progress, which
is why I am so optimistic, and something like an arms trade treaty
will move from something that was a nice idea maybe two years
ago, to something that in my lifetime working and campaigning
in with Oxfam will actually happen.
Q13 Mr Colman: We have a list of
seven countries that up to the end of September have expressed
support for the treaty, one of which obviously was Finland. Perhaps
you could let the clerk separately have a list afterwards of where
we are on the 30, because that sounds significantly more promising.[1]
At the meeting tomorrow, are you expecting to meet with the Secretary
of State from DfID, as well as from FCO, given the emphasis that
you have just made that it should be a developing country sign-up
as well as, if you like, EU/North America and Japan.
Mr Parker: The Government is basically
going to face the same obstacles that the NGOs identified when
trying to put forward this idea of an arms trade treaty; namely
that it is not going to work unless you get the support of the
major exporting nations. Also, there is a danger that if it is
seen as an initiative by industrialised developed nations to limit
other people's access to weapons, then it will also fail. There
is a lot of work to be done on those issues. From an international
campaigning perspective we are very encouraged, I would agree
with my friend from Oxfam, in that a year ago these governments
were not talking about an arms trade treaty and now, thanks to
the public campaigning by NGOs all over the world, not only has
the UK come forward as the first major exporter in support of
this, but so have other countries, representing five different
world regions. So we are starting to tackle the idea that this
really has to be a call from all over the world, both affected
regions and supply regions.
Q14 Mr Colman: A small arms survey
last year showed that, I think, 18 African countries were manufacturing
small arms, and that was 90% of the small arms circulating in
Africa. Colleagues will be talking about small arms subsequently
in questions on that, but I again come back to ask: Is DfID in
fact going to be represented at the meeting tomorrow?
Mr McLean: The meeting tomorrow
is with the Foreign Office but we would certainly welcome a meeting
with the Secretary of State for International Development, because,
as you say, this is something which has to be pushed across government
and the dialogue with developing countries obviously can be critical
in that.
Q15 Mr Colman: Is Mr Parker concerned
that there would need to be an unacceptable watering down of the
details of the Arms Trade Treaty in order to pull in the manufacturers
from the north.
Mr Parker: That is certainly a
concern. We would not want to see the criteria watered down in
any way but part of the debate is: Will the eventual instrument
be politically binding or legally binding or will it cover all
arms or small arms only? These are all up for debate and we will
be taking forward with the UK Government as to its intentions
on this tomorrow.
Q16 Mr Colman: Please keep us informed
and perhaps have a talk with the clerks about your meeting with
the Foreign Secretary so that we are up to speed on what is going
on.
Mr McLean: We will do. I think
your point about the need to engage the major players which you
have just mentioned shows the importance of the G8, because within
the G8 you do have the major weapons' exporters. That really is
a critical opportunity next year to begin dialogue on this issue.
Q17 Mr George: The arms embargo imposed
by the EU on Libya has been terminated, as you know. Do you have
any comment on that? Should it have been terminated? After all
the "Great Leader" was rewarded for his actions. Are
you prepared to accept the terminating of the arms embargo or
do you have any reservations?
Mr McLean: I think we do have
reservations. Obviously the steps which Libya has taken to announce
its weapons of mass destruction are very welcome and we do not
underestimate the significance of that. But we would question
whether lifting the arms embargo was really the right carrot for
that. It was obviously one of the first things that flowed from
there and the major concern about that is Libya's past role as
a proliferator of arms on the African continent. There is well
documented evidence about the supply of weapons to Charles Taylor
at the time when Liberia was under an arms embargo, so I think
real questions have to be raised about the potential risk of diversion
of any weapons that will actually be sent to Libya. I think it
probably sends the wrong signal at this time when we have not
had the chance to see whether the reforms that are under way in
Libya are actually going to bed in and when we are not yet really
convinced of the arms export control systems and records which
the Libyans have in place.
Mr Sprague: I think it is also
bringing the inter-related point of transportation into this because
Libya is a major hub for global air transport—a combination
of economics and geography: the fuel is cheap there and also it
is in the right place for aircraft to come and refuel—but
from my research and work on the arms trafficking and the embargo-breaking
sort of gun-running activities, so many of the aircraft pass through
either Benghazi or Tripoli on their way down to the conflict spots.
So I think we need to think very carefully about how we can control
that, and, hopefully, one of the things we can do is to start
putting some money and resources and training into customs officials
at the airports in Libya to look through paperwork on flights
and to check that they are legitimate and they are not going to
be going to undesirable end-users, because for me it is a clear
problem.
Mr Parker: One other slightly
tangential aspect of the Libya issue is that there has been talk
of setting up asylum processing camps in Libya and elsewhere in
North Africa to process asylum seekers coming to the EU. We would
have concerns primarily because of previous treatment of asylum
seekers and detainees by the Libyan authorities but also whether
that would possibly lead to exports as incentives for countries,
perhaps Libya, to set up such camps. There are already proposals
for the Italians to send down speedboats, thermal imaging equipment
and that kind of equipment, specifically for these kinds of processing
camps. So it is one to watch for the future.
Q18 Mr Evans: The China-EU arms embargo
has been in place since 1989. The French and the Germans have
been pushing hard to get that lifted. There was a summit at the
Hague on December 8 and a press release came out from the Chinese
afterwards saying that they were very content that the EU now
were working towards lifting that embargo. Whilst Britain is not
leading the campaign, it seems to suggest that they will go along
with whatever is decided. What do you think the consequences will
be of lifting the arms embargo on China?
Mr Parker: Fifteen years on and
there is still no redress for the victims of the Tiananmen Square
crackdown. There are still activists imprisoned for their peaceful
activities related to getting an investigation into what happened
at Tiananmen Square. Amnesty has seen no substantial improvement
in the human rights situation in China and we would really pose
the questions to the EU: What signal does this send to human rights
defenders who are imprisoned for their activities in China? What
leverage does the EU then maintain, if any, over China if it gives
up the arms embargo in terms of human rights? What measures will
the EU take to ensure that China does not interpret this as the
EU saying, "Well, we do not really care about all the activists
who are still in prison from the Tiananmen Square crackdown"?
We could also then look at the role of China as a proliferator
and the role of regional stability, but I think from Amnesty's
point of view we were concerned about what message this would
send to human rights defenders still in prison in China.
Mr McLean: One of the arguments
put forward for lifting the embargo is that the consolidated criteria
could do the job very well instead. I think that is an erroneous
argument because, as you see from our audit, we do have concerns
about the implementation of the consolidated criteria to a number
of countries around the world and I think the EU embargo is having
an impact. Out of the 22 Member States who reported licences in
2003, 17 licensed nothing to China. So I think the arms embargo
is having an impact there over and above what the consolidated
criteria would have on their own.
Mr Sprague: It is probably more
a point for our colleagues to follow these discussions, but, in
terms of the industrial cooperation with the US, my analysis of
the situation would be that the US would have severe concerns
with the re-export of US technology to China because their position
is even more robust than the EU's. Maybe there is a consistency
of policy point here because one of the main strong reasons for
the incorporation guideline changes of a couple of years ago was
the fact that we need to maintain very strong strategic and industrial
relations with the US. I have my concerns about the changes to
those guidelines, but it seems like this may well undermine that
very statement.
Q19 Mr Evans: It does appear that
the United States, Japan, Taiwan have huge reservations about
it but we will be talking with our Foreign Secretary shortly and
this is going to come out no doubt. If he says, "We would
be quite happy and content for the embargo to be lifted because
we have the EU Code of Conduct Criteria to ensure there is not
proliferation," what would your view be to that?
Mr McLean: It would be the point
I made to you previously, that the embargo is having an effect
over and above the EU Code of Conduct, and I think the fact that
17 out of 22 States did not licence anything in 2003 is an indication
of that. Obviously, of course, China is potentially a huge market
and so if the embargo is lifted there will be substantial economic
and industrial pressure within the EU Member States to launch
an export drive into China, so I think it is quite clear to me
that if we do relax the embargo that will lead to a liberalisation
of export policy.
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