Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1 - 19)

WEDNESDAY 15 DECEMBER 2004

MR ANDY MCLEAN, MR OLIVER SPRAGUE AND MR ROBERT PARKER

  Q1  Chairman: Good morning, everyone. Andrew, would you like to introduce yourself and your colleagues.

  Mr McLean: I am Andy McLean, the Deputy Director of Saferworld. This is Rob Parker, the military, security and police co-ordinator for Amnesty International, and this is Oliver Sprague.

  Mr Sprague: Campaigns and policy officer.

  Mr McLean: From Oxfam.

  Q2  Chairman: Thank you. Thank you also for your written submission, which we have found very, very helpful indeed, as always. This year we have taken the sensible step of taking evidence from NGOs and defence manufacturers before we take evidence from the Foreign Secretary, so that we will be better equipped to pose hopefully more interesting questions when we see him in January. There have been a number of things that have happened since we last met earlier this year, including the fact that the government now publishes quarterly reports on decisions in relation to licence applications and we have now had the second quarter of the year. Could I ask you what your impression is of the new quarterly reporting system: How much of an improvement do you think it is over the previous annual reports?

  Mr McLean: I think it is an improvement in the way that it obviously comes out much more quickly and much closer to the time at which the licensing decisions are made. I think that is something which the Committee has urged in the past and we have as well, so I think that is a very welcome development. I think it probably shows a challenge for us all, as well, though—the Committee and the NGOs and also the media—in terms of ensuring that this actually does lead to a greater level of scrutiny and accountability for export licensing decisions, because there is a danger that with these things coming out quarterly then in some ways the impact of an annual report can be dissipated as well in profile terms. I think there is a challenge there for us to ensure that it does lead to an increased level of scrutiny. With regard to the level of transparency within the report, I think there are three areas to which I would like to draw the Committee's attention. Firstly, there is still a need for a greater level of detail in the descriptions of the equipment that is being licensed for export. As we all know, there is the trend now whereby the majority of equipment exported is component parts, electronics equipment, communications equipment. Of course it is much more difficult therefore to get a clear picture of what the impact of this equipment is and the potential use to which it could be put. I think that highlights the need for more detailed descriptions about these component parts, and, in particular, the type of weapons systems into which they are therefore going to be incorporated. I note that in the US annual report, for instance, they do highlight very often the weapons systems within which components will be included; say, for example, military engines for F16 jets. There is also the challenge of the fact that in the UK report there is very little information on the end users of the equipment that is exported—and that again I know is something which the Committee has highlighted in the past—and I think that is something which still needs to be improved. Also, with the changes in the new licensing system, I think there are still problems in the way the new information on incorporation and brokering is included. On incorporation technologies, it reports the country to which the equipment is being exported for incorporation but not the eventual destination, so it is very difficult of course for us to get a picture as to what the eventual impact of that equipment will be. On brokering, the licence information is given according to the source country from which the brokered transfer will take place rather than the recipient country, so, again, it is very difficult to trace the eventual impact. Although there has been some improvement in transparency and with the speed at which the reports have been released, we still need a lot more detail.

  Q3  Chairman: Thank you very much for that. In your latest report, you look at each of the criteria and identify a number of end-use countries that raise concerns and issues. There are a number of questions and we may come back to you after this meeting to explore some of those, but, given the time that we have this morning, I would be interested in hearing your views about the licences, particularly in the most recent quarterly report, for example, that cause you the most concern. Which are the licence decisions that worry you the most?

  Mr Parker: If I may say something, before we go on to specific licences, on the issue of timeliness of the reporting and how useful it is to us. In theory we will be able to track the speed with which export policy changes in relation to events on the ground, with more timely reporting. One specific example: in the Maldives, where there is an extant open licence for crowd-control ammunition, tear gas and the like, the Government expressed concerns over attacks by police on peaceful protestors in August (so just after the reporting date of the last quarterly report) and also condemned the imposition of a state of emergency in the islands. We will be watching with interest to see whether that has an impact on perhaps potential revocation of the open licence supplying the kind of equipment that the security forces are using in the Maldives.

  Mr McLean: In terms of licences of concern: in the last quarter there have been a number, I think. There are a couple of countries, just to highlight. India and Pakistan, obviously—which I know the Committee have raised concerns about under criterion 4 before: still, over the last 18 months, very, very high levels of licensing to both countries and of potentially offensive equipment. Obviously the situation in Kashmir and the stand-off between the two countries has improved somewhat—and we welcome that—but of course I think there is still great potential for a recourse to a more bellicose stance there. I think the fact that in the last quarter there are still open licences going for components to combat aircraft, combat helicopters to both countries, that sort of equipment which clearly has a potentially offensive use, is of concern. To Syria, in the most recent quarter, April to June 2004, there is an open licence for armoured four-wheel drive vehicles, and that follows a previous licence for armoured vehicles in January to March 2004 and a licence for small arms ammunition in 2003, which is of concern to us. Also there is a continued high level of exports to Indonesia of potentially offensive equipment (again, components for combat aircraft, helicopters and so on) which, given the ongoing conflict, particularly in Aceh, causes a number of concerns. Another issue around licences is on incorporation. I do not know if that is something you are going to return to. I would like to highlight there that the second highest recipient of licences for incorporation is Israel, which has received 61 licences for incorporation in the last 18 months. That is second only to the US, which received 64. Israel of course has a very aggressive export policy at the moment: it is the second highest exporter to China, for instance—something which has caused the US to comment very publicly on its concern over. The fact that there is no information published about the eventual destination of the goods into which this equipment will incorporated is of great concern to us.

  Mr Parker: From a purely Amnesty perspective: we always look out for handcuffs, because basically when handcuffs appear in this report it means over-sized handcuffs and we fear there is the potential for them to be used as or turned into leg cuffs, which would be banned from export. We always note when they appear in the annual report. This time of concern would be that there is an export to Egypt and to the Philippines. I know the Committee has looked into this before and received assurances from the government that there was no risk that they would be used in such a way, for torture or something like that, but we do not have that information here in the annual report, so I would just like to flag the Egypt and Philippines cuffs' export.

  Q4  Chairman: Thank you very much indeed for that. That is very helpful. Obviously in the latest quarterly report we have information under the new Export Control Act; for example, information on brokering by individuals in the UK or companies in the UK, to which you have referred briefly, Andrew. What is your impression of the information the Government is now providing under the Export Control Act and the additional information that that Act requires? Do you have any general observations on that, other than the point you made earlier about the importance of knowing the end use?

  Mr Sprague: From an Oxfam point of view—well, probably from the point of view of all in the UK Working Group—the information that is provided on the brokering and trafficking type licences is probably inadequate for adequate scrutiny. I think of particular concern is the fact that the licences do not specify the ultimate destination where the brokered goods were going to end up and I think that is primarily what we are all concerned about. We want to know whether those goods are going to countries that prevent a proliferation risk or would violate the criteria contained in the EU Code of Conduct and I would like to see that improve in subsequent quarterly reports—as a matter of some urgency, I would argue.

  Q5  Mr O'Neill: If I could have a look at the prospects for the Export Control Organisation. As you are aware, the Gershon-driven cost-cutting exercise may well have staffing implications for this area. Do you have any concerns about the impact on the efficiency of the ECO, which I think most people would say has improved? I remember, before this Committee was established, my colleagues and I in the DTI Select Committee had terrible trouble trying to get the system moving more quickly. It took several reports and kicks before things could happen, but now that it is happening do you have any worries about it stopping?

  Mr McLean: I think these proposed cuts are bad news and I think there is a real risk that it could lead to less scrutiny and it could lead to less transparency. As you say, I think there is a sense that the operations of the department are improving. Obviously this is a challenging time, when, as the Chairman said, the provisions under the new Export Control Act are being implemented and so the department is now having to process these new types of licence applications which they have not had to do before. If there are to be these cuts—and I think about 25% has been mooted—then I think there is a great risk that that could lead to a greater proportion of equipment going on open licences, which will of course lead to less transparency, because they are quicker to process, and I think it could also lead to a greater resistance from the Government to increase transparency in certain areas. I note that in the Government's response to your last report there was not an "in principle" objection to providing information on end users; the objection was that this would put an onerous strain on resources—and, of course, as resources are being cut, where is that extra capacity going to come from? I would say that in the current climate, when the Government is putting so many resources internationally into trying to increase global stability, prosecute the war on terror and so on, that really increasing the resources for proliferation control is the way in which things should be heading rather than actually seeking to cut them.

  Q6  Mr O'Neill: The other side of the coin is that you might get back to the old situation where it took far longer for the applications to be processed.

  Mr McLean: Yes.

  Q7  Mr O'Neill: And I suppose you could end up with a back-log which, in some ways, from your point of view, I would imagine, would be almost as much the unintended consequence of an ill wind.

  Mr McLean: I think that is not really the key issue. These cuts in the Export Control Organisation, I would have thought, are somewhere where there is a common ground really between the defence industry and NGOs, because obviously they are seeking a quicker licensing process and we are seeking greater scrutiny and transparency.

  Mr O'Neill: The other thing of course is that it might be, if savings have to be found, that they could be found perhaps by increasing the charges or imposing charges rather than doing it the other way round. How would you feel about that? The cost of the licence might be increased; there might be charges imposed on the applicants. Sometimes the sums are comparatively small in relation to the whole contract. If there was a pro rata way of calculating it: for example, there are 10,000 applications, 4,000 ratings, and if you had a two tier system and if you had percentages for each one, it might provide the kind of income which the Government could then use to fund the operations, so that we could have it but it would be slightly more expensive for the arms control manufacturers.

  Chairman: It might be a question more appropriate to put to our next group of witnesses.

  Q8  Mr O'Neill: I am merely asking for an opinion. It would be wrong to suggest we only had one option: staff cuts.

  Mr McLean: That sounds a sensible suggestion and we would certainly favour that.

  Q9  Mike Gapes: Could I take you on to what is going to happen next year. The UK has the presidency of the G8 from January of next year onwards, and then from the beginning of July the presidency of the European Union. What would you hope would come out of that?

  Mr Sprague: It has been a very significant year for us for export control issues. I think it is marvellous news that the UK Government has committed itself to support the Arms Trade Treaty and obviously, as you have mentioned, 2005 is a big year with the presidencies of the G8 and the European Union. I think for the G8 we would like to see the UK working with G8 partners between now and the Summit in trying to ensure that reference to the ATT, or at least the principles of the Arms Trade Treaty, are included in the communiqué of the G8, building on from the decision in 2008, I think, in Japan, where they issued a statement on small arms and light weapons. In terms of the EU presidency, I expect we might come on to this but there has been a year long review of the EU Code of Conduct and one of the things that has come out of that review has been the need to provide greater clarity on how you implement the individual criteria. Certain criteria have been particularly problematic. There has been some great work done on the simple development criteria, which we might come on to later, but I would say a useful priority for the UK presidency would be to build on this initiative and maybe look at criterion 2. There has been a welcome development: I do not know if it has gone through yet, but it appears there has been a change to the wording of criteria 2, the human rights criteria, with a more specific reference to international humanitarian law, which of course makes the EU code more consistent with the Arms Trade Treaty, and I would think it would be extremely helpful to develop operative guidelines, a sort of instruction kit, if you will, on how to implement the States' existing responsibilities under international law. That would be, I think, a major step forward in the EU harmonising itself towards the principles of the Arms Trade Treaty and a greater building block towards achieving that treaty.

  Q10  Mike Gapes: Do you and your colleagues have any hopes or expectations for next year?

  Mr McLean: I think the transfer controls issue is key. We would be looking to the G8 really to take a good stance on support for an arms trade treaty. Obviously in 2006 we have the review conference of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms Control, so we are looking to agreements in the EU and the G8 next year as providing a key stepping stone to a wider international agreement in 2006. We would also in the EU code welcome the introduction of a "presumption of denial" for exports to regions of instability. Obviously one of the key aims of the new code is to promote a convergence in export policies and practices of EU Member States, and yet, as we see in the EU annual report, there is still a wide divergence of the application of the criteria towards particular countries of concern. So I think the agreement of a general presumption of denial to particular countries in regions of instability would be an important point. Then I think the issue of arms brokering and transportation is key. Again, we would like to see the G8 build on its work on arms brokering and support the development of an international and legally binding instrument on arms brokering, and within the EU we would like to see the common position on arms brokering expanded to ensure that extra-territorial controls are mandated across the European Union and also the neglected issue of transportation agents addressed. There has been a lot of focus on the brokers and not much on the people actually moving the weapons, and I think possibly the idea of a code of conduct for transportation agents, with agreed international standards which they would sign up to, would be an important move there.

  Q11  Mike Gapes: The EU Code of Conduct some of my colleagues will deal with later on. There is also the Arms Trade Treaty and I think that will be dealt with by somebody else. You talk about regions of conflict. We have seen recently worrying developments in Congo again. Africa is very high up in terms of regions of conflict, or parts of Africa. The Africa Commission is also due to be coming out with a report relatively shortly which links into this whole G8 process. Do you have any expectations specifically about Africa or any hopes?

  Mr McLean: Yes. I think the Africa Commission is a very welcome innovation. I think it is very encouraging that in their draft programme, which they published a month or so ago, there is a recommendation to establish an international arms trade treaty and also an international legally binding instrument on arms brokering. I note that those two recommendations were also echoed in the recent report of the UN high level panel on new security threats, so support for this is building. But I think it is also important, as you say, actually to address the problem of the proliferation of weapons within Africa. I think there, providing greater support to sub-regional organisations and to countries in the development of national and regional action plans, is a very important way forward to addressing the problem on the ground as well as the international supply.

  Mike Gapes: Thank you very much.

  Q12  Mr Colman: Perhaps I could make a declaration of interest: since the last meeting of this Committee I have become a patron of Saferworld, and I hope that example will be followed by our next set of witnesses, all of whom have said to me individually that they support the way that Saferworld works, and perhaps we could look to other people coming forward from the arms' manufacturing industry also to be supporters of Saferworld. My question really follows on to the Arms Trade Treaty which Mr Gapes has brought up. Obviously I am interested that Mr Sprague from Oxfam feels it is a positive situation. Could you open that out a bit further. Have you been consulted? Has the coalition putting forward the Arms Trade Treaty been consulted since the Foreign Secretary made the announcement at the Labour Party Conference in September saying that he will in fact be taking this forward in the way you have described?

  Mr Sprague: I think it is true to say the Government are thinking about how they are going to take it forward, but we have had some very encouraging correspondence, which restates the commitment, and they say they specifically want to work on developing countries and building up—which I assume is through the transfer controls initiative and trying to establish the ATT principles and trying to bring in the international humanitarian law aspect—within that process. The Government are meeting us formally, I think tomorrow, to discuss our ideas and our plans, and there is a very important meeting that is going to happen in Tanzania—which has been driven by Finland, who have emerged as one of the leading champions of the Arms Trade Treaty—in mid-February. I think for the first time 20 governments or maybe even 30 governments from around the world who are warm to the idea of the treaty will meet to discuss and to formalise how to take it forward, and I am encouraged to note that the UK Government are having bilateral discussions with the Finish Government about how the UK can play its full part in that process. From where we were last year, we have made significant progress, which is why I am so optimistic, and something like an arms trade treaty will move from something that was a nice idea maybe two years ago, to something that in my lifetime working and campaigning in with Oxfam will actually happen.

  Q13  Mr Colman: We have a list of seven countries that up to the end of September have expressed support for the treaty, one of which obviously was Finland. Perhaps you could let the clerk separately have a list afterwards of where we are on the 30, because that sounds significantly more promising.[1] At the meeting tomorrow, are you expecting to meet with the Secretary of State from DfID, as well as from FCO, given the emphasis that you have just made that it should be a developing country sign-up as well as, if you like, EU/North America and Japan.

  Mr Parker: The Government is basically going to face the same obstacles that the NGOs identified when trying to put forward this idea of an arms trade treaty; namely that it is not going to work unless you get the support of the major exporting nations. Also, there is a danger that if it is seen as an initiative by industrialised developed nations to limit other people's access to weapons, then it will also fail. There is a lot of work to be done on those issues. From an international campaigning perspective we are very encouraged, I would agree with my friend from Oxfam, in that a year ago these governments were not talking about an arms trade treaty and now, thanks to the public campaigning by NGOs all over the world, not only has the UK come forward as the first major exporter in support of this, but so have other countries, representing five different world regions. So we are starting to tackle the idea that this really has to be a call from all over the world, both affected regions and supply regions.

  Q14  Mr Colman: A small arms survey last year showed that, I think, 18 African countries were manufacturing small arms, and that was 90% of the small arms circulating in Africa. Colleagues will be talking about small arms subsequently in questions on that, but I again come back to ask: Is DfID in fact going to be represented at the meeting tomorrow?

  Mr McLean: The meeting tomorrow is with the Foreign Office but we would certainly welcome a meeting with the Secretary of State for International Development, because, as you say, this is something which has to be pushed across government and the dialogue with developing countries obviously can be critical in that.

  Q15  Mr Colman: Is Mr Parker concerned that there would need to be an unacceptable watering down of the details of the Arms Trade Treaty in order to pull in the manufacturers from the north.

  Mr Parker: That is certainly a concern. We would not want to see the criteria watered down in any way but part of the debate is: Will the eventual instrument be politically binding or legally binding or will it cover all arms or small arms only? These are all up for debate and we will be taking forward with the UK Government as to its intentions on this tomorrow.

  Q16  Mr Colman: Please keep us informed and perhaps have a talk with the clerks about your meeting with the Foreign Secretary so that we are up to speed on what is going on.

  Mr McLean: We will do. I think your point about the need to engage the major players which you have just mentioned shows the importance of the G8, because within the G8 you do have the major weapons' exporters. That really is a critical opportunity next year to begin dialogue on this issue.

  Q17  Mr George: The arms embargo imposed by the EU on Libya has been terminated, as you know. Do you have any comment on that? Should it have been terminated? After all the "Great Leader" was rewarded for his actions. Are you prepared to accept the terminating of the arms embargo or do you have any reservations?

  Mr McLean: I think we do have reservations. Obviously the steps which Libya has taken to announce its weapons of mass destruction are very welcome and we do not underestimate the significance of that. But we would question whether lifting the arms embargo was really the right carrot for that. It was obviously one of the first things that flowed from there and the major concern about that is Libya's past role as a proliferator of arms on the African continent. There is well documented evidence about the supply of weapons to Charles Taylor at the time when Liberia was under an arms embargo, so I think real questions have to be raised about the potential risk of diversion of any weapons that will actually be sent to Libya. I think it probably sends the wrong signal at this time when we have not had the chance to see whether the reforms that are under way in Libya are actually going to bed in and when we are not yet really convinced of the arms export control systems and records which the Libyans have in place.

  Mr Sprague: I think it is also bringing the inter-related point of transportation into this because Libya is a major hub for global air transport—a combination of economics and geography: the fuel is cheap there and also it is in the right place for aircraft to come and refuel—but from my research and work on the arms trafficking and the embargo-breaking sort of gun-running activities, so many of the aircraft pass through either Benghazi or Tripoli on their way down to the conflict spots. So I think we need to think very carefully about how we can control that, and, hopefully, one of the things we can do is to start putting some money and resources and training into customs officials at the airports in Libya to look through paperwork on flights and to check that they are legitimate and they are not going to be going to undesirable end-users, because for me it is a clear problem.

  Mr Parker: One other slightly tangential aspect of the Libya issue is that there has been talk of setting up asylum processing camps in Libya and elsewhere in North Africa to process asylum seekers coming to the EU. We would have concerns primarily because of previous treatment of asylum seekers and detainees by the Libyan authorities but also whether that would possibly lead to exports as incentives for countries, perhaps Libya, to set up such camps. There are already proposals for the Italians to send down speedboats, thermal imaging equipment and that kind of equipment, specifically for these kinds of processing camps. So it is one to watch for the future.

  Q18  Mr Evans: The China-EU arms embargo has been in place since 1989. The French and the Germans have been pushing hard to get that lifted. There was a summit at the Hague on December 8 and a press release came out from the Chinese afterwards saying that they were very content that the EU now were working towards lifting that embargo. Whilst Britain is not leading the campaign, it seems to suggest that they will go along with whatever is decided. What do you think the consequences will be of lifting the arms embargo on China?

  Mr Parker: Fifteen years on and there is still no redress for the victims of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. There are still activists imprisoned for their peaceful activities related to getting an investigation into what happened at Tiananmen Square. Amnesty has seen no substantial improvement in the human rights situation in China and we would really pose the questions to the EU: What signal does this send to human rights defenders who are imprisoned for their activities in China? What leverage does the EU then maintain, if any, over China if it gives up the arms embargo in terms of human rights? What measures will the EU take to ensure that China does not interpret this as the EU saying, "Well, we do not really care about all the activists who are still in prison from the Tiananmen Square crackdown"? We could also then look at the role of China as a proliferator and the role of regional stability, but I think from Amnesty's point of view we were concerned about what message this would send to human rights defenders still in prison in China.

  Mr McLean: One of the arguments put forward for lifting the embargo is that the consolidated criteria could do the job very well instead. I think that is an erroneous argument because, as you see from our audit, we do have concerns about the implementation of the consolidated criteria to a number of countries around the world and I think the EU embargo is having an impact. Out of the 22 Member States who reported licences in 2003, 17 licensed nothing to China. So I think the arms embargo is having an impact there over and above what the consolidated criteria would have on their own.

  Mr Sprague: It is probably more a point for our colleagues to follow these discussions, but, in terms of the industrial cooperation with the US, my analysis of the situation would be that the US would have severe concerns with the re-export of US technology to China because their position is even more robust than the EU's. Maybe there is a consistency of policy point here because one of the main strong reasons for the incorporation guideline changes of a couple of years ago was the fact that we need to maintain very strong strategic and industrial relations with the US. I have my concerns about the changes to those guidelines, but it seems like this may well undermine that very statement.

  Q19  Mr Evans: It does appear that the United States, Japan, Taiwan have huge reservations about it but we will be talking with our Foreign Secretary shortly and this is going to come out no doubt. If he says, "We would be quite happy and content for the embargo to be lifted because we have the EU Code of Conduct Criteria to ensure there is not proliferation," what would your view be to that?

  Mr McLean: It would be the point I made to you previously, that the embargo is having an effect over and above the EU Code of Conduct, and I think the fact that 17 out of 22 States did not licence anything in 2003 is an indication of that. Obviously, of course, China is potentially a huge market and so if the embargo is lifted there will be substantial economic and industrial pressure within the EU Member States to launch an export drive into China, so I think it is quite clear to me that if we do relax the embargo that will lead to a liberalisation of export policy.


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