



# House of Commons

## International Development Committee

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# Development assistance in Iraq: Interim Report

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## Seventh Report of Session 2004–05

*Report, together with formal minutes, oral  
and written evidence*

*Ordered by The House of Commons  
to be printed 5 April 2005*

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and HC 244-i and ii of Session 2004-05]  
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## The International Development Committee

The International Development Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for International Development and its associated public bodies.

### Current membership

Tony Baldry MP (*Conservative, Banbury*) (Chairman)  
John Barrett MP (*Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West*)  
Mr John Battle MP (*Labour, Leeds West*)  
Hugh Bayley MP (*Labour, City of York*)  
Mr John Bercow MP (*Conservative, Buckingham*)  
Ann Clwyd MP (*Labour, Cynon Valley*)  
Mr Tony Colman MP (*Labour, Putney*)  
Mr Quentin Davies MP (*Conservative, Grantham and Stamford*)  
Mr Piara S Khabra MP (*Labour, Ealing Southall*)  
Chris McCafferty MP (*Labour, Calder Valley*)  
Tony Worthington MP (*Labour, Clydebank and Milngavie*)

### Powers

The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via [www.parliament.uk](http://www.parliament.uk)

### Publications

The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at [www.parliament.uk/indcom](http://www.parliament.uk/indcom)

### Committee staff

The staff of the Committee are Alistair Doherty (Clerk), Hannah Weston (Second Clerk), Alan Hudson and Anna Dickson (Committee Specialists), Katie Phelan (Committee Assistant), Jennifer Steele (Secretary) and Philip Jones (Senior Office Clerk).

### Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the International Development Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 1223; the Committee's email address is [indcom@parliament.uk](mailto:indcom@parliament.uk)

# Development assistance in Iraq: Interim Report

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1. We began taking evidence on this inquiry into Development assistance in Iraq in the autumn of 2004 with terms of reference, designed to address the following areas:

- How DFID has spent its funds and what the spending has achieved;
- The role of the multilateral organisations, as well as DFID's international and local NGO partners;
- Coordination of service provision and policy;
- The security environment and humanitarian space; and UK commitments to the principles of 'Good Humanitarian Donorship'; and,
- The transition from humanitarian relief and basic service provision to reconstruction and development.

2. In the course of the inquiry we held three public evidence sessions: the first with officials from DFID, MOD and the FCO; the second with NGO representatives from Save the Children and Christian Aid, and an academic commentator, Mr Yahia Said; and the third with the Secretary of State for International Development, Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP. We also held a private meeting with Dr. Reinoud Leenders from the International Crisis Group. We received written evidence from DFID and a few NGOs.

3. In February 2005, some of the Committee visited Baghdad, Basra and Al Amarah in Maysan Province; the number of members taking part in the visit to Iraq was limited due to the security situation. During the visit we became aware, at first hand, of the very difficult circumstances under which DFID staff and their employees work. Our visit also enlightened us as to DFID's many different areas of operation and to their necessarily close working arrangements with both the FCO and the UK armed forces.

4. The basic information for our inquiry — lists of DFID's areas of activity and projects which they are funding — has been provided to us. What has been a problem, however, is the lack of availability of analyses and evaluations of the programme. The difficult circumstances under which NGOs work in Iraq, and the consequent absence of many UK and international NGOs from the country, meant that we did not receive as much written evidence as we would normally expect.

5. The imminent Dissolution of Parliament has brought the inquiry to a premature close. We have not therefore been able to produce a report which would do justice to the terms of reference which we set for our inquiry. We have decided to publish the oral and written evidence<sup>1</sup> and hope that, while no Committee can bind its successor, the Committee in the next Parliament will continue the work, perhaps in the context of a broader inquiry into post-conflict reconstruction.

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<sup>1</sup> See also Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2004-05, *Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post-Conflict Operations*, HC 65-II, Ev 86 -101 (DFID)

# Formal minutes

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**Tuesday 5 April 2005**

Members present:

Tony Baldry, in the Chair

John Battle	Mr Quentin Davies
Hugh Bayley	Mr Piara Khabra
Ann Clwyd	Chris McCafferty
Mr Tony Colman	Tony Worthington

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report (Development assistance in Iraq: Interim Report), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

*Ordered*, That the Chairman's draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 5 read and agreed to.

*Resolved*, That the draft Report (Development assistance in Iraq: Interim Report), be the Seventh Report of the Committee to the House.

*Ordered*, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.

*Ordered*, That the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported to the House.

Several papers were ordered to be reported to the House.

[Adjourned to a date and time to be fixed by the Chairman.]

## Witnesses

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**Tuesday 16 November 2004**

*Page*

**Mr Jim Drummond**, Director, Iraq Directorate, Department for International Development (DFID), **Hon Dominic Asquith**, Director, Iraq, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and **Dr Roger Hutton**, Director Joint Commitments Policy, Ministry of Defence (MoD)

Ev 1

**Tuesday 18 January 2005**

**Mr Oliver Burch**, Iraq Programme Manager, Christian Aid, and **Mr Ken Caldwell**, International Overseas Director, Save the Children

Ev 14

**Mr Yahia Said**, Research Fellow, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics

Ev 23

**Thursday 10 March 2005**

**Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP**, Secretary of State for International Development, **Mr Michael Anderson**, Head, Middle East and North Africa Department, and **Mr David Hallam**, Iraq Senior Programme Manager, DFID

Ev 29

## Written evidence

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Department for International Development

Ev 35; Ev 55; Ev 56; Ev 60

Christian Aid

Ev 65; Ev 70

Dr Joost R Hiltermann, International Crisis Group

Ev 71

Jill Knight

Ev 72

Oxfam

Ev 73

Save the Children UK

Ev 73; Ev 81

## List of unprinted papers

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Additional papers have been received from the following and have been reported to the House but to save printing costs they have not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons Library where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Record Office, House of Lords and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to the Record Office, House of Lords, London SW1 (Tel 020 7219 3074). Hours of inspection are from 9:30am to 5:00pm on Mondays to Fridays.

### *DFID:*

Development maps : Iraq Development Indicators 2000-04

Iraq: Interim Country Assistance Plan

The Iraqi Strategic Review Board: National Development Strategy 2005-07: The Ministerial Committee on The National Development Strategy, September 2004

Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations on Interacting with Military and Other Security Actors in Iraq, 20 October 2004

### *Others:*

*Health in Iraq: The current situation, our vision for the future and areas of work*, Ala'din Alwan, MD, FRCP, FFPH, Minister of Health, Ministry of Health, Iraq, Second Edition, December 2004

# Reports from the International Development Committee since 2001

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The Government Responses to International Development Committee reports are listed here in brackets by the HC (or Cm) No. after the report they relate to.

## Session 2004–05

First Report	Commission for Africa and Policy Coherence for Development: First do no harm	HC 123 ( <i>HC 123</i> )
Second Report	Work of the Committee in 2004	HC 326
Third Report	DFID's Bilateral Programme of Assistance to India	HC 124-I and II, <i>HC 506</i>
Fourth Report (First Joint Report)	Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2003, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny	HC 145
Fifth Report	Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect	HC 67-I and II
Sixth Report	Fair trade? The EU's trade agreements with ACP Countries	HC 68

## Session 2003–04

First Report	Trade and Development at the WTO: Learning the lessons of Cancún to revive a genuine development round	HC 92-I and II ( <i>HC 452</i> )
Second Report	Development Assistance and the Occupied Palestinian Territories	HC 230-I and II ( <i>HC 487</i> )
Third Report	International Development Committee: Annual Report 2003	HC 312
Fourth Report	Kenya: DFID's Country Assistance Plan 2004–07 and Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals	HC 494 ( <i>HC 857</i> )
Fifth Report (First Joint Report)	Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny	HC 390 ( <i>Cm 6357</i> )
Sixth Report	Migration and Development: How to make migration work for poverty reduction	HC 79-I and II ( <i>HC 163, Session 2004–05</i> )
Seventh Report	DFID's Agriculture Policy	HC 602 ( <i>HC 1273</i> )
Eighth Report	Department for International Development: Departmental Report 2004	HC 749 ( <i>HC 327, Session 2004–05</i> )

## Session 2002–03

First Report	Afghanistan: the transition from humanitarian relief to reconstruction and development assistance	HC 84 ( <i>HC 621</i> )
Second Report	International Development Committee: Annual Report 2002	HC 331
Third Report	The humanitarian crisis in southern Africa	HC 116-I and -II ( <i>HC 690</i> )

Fourth Report	Preparing for the humanitarian consequences of possible military action against Iraq	HC 444–I and –II ( <i>HC 561</i> )
Fifth Report (First Joint Report)	The Government's proposals for secondary legislation under the Export Control Act	HC 620 ( <i>Cm 5988</i> )
Sixth Report (Second Joint Report)	Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2001, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny	HC 474 ( <i>Cm 5943</i> )
Seventh Report	Trade and Development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún	HC 400–I and II ( <i>HC 1093</i> )
Eighth Report	DFID Departmental Report 2003	HC 825 ( <i>HC 231, Session 2003–04</i> )

#### Session 2001–02

First Report	The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the Surrounding Region	HC 300–I and –II ( <i>HC 633</i> )
Second Report	The Effectiveness of the Reforms of European Development Assistance	HC 417–I and –II ( <i>HC 1027</i> )
Third Report	Global Climate Change and Sustainable Development	HC 519–I and –II ( <i>HC 1270</i> )
Fourth Report (First Joint Report)	Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2000, Licensing Policy and Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny	HC 718 ( <i>CM 5629</i> )
Fifth Report	Financing for Development: Finding the Money to Eliminate World Poverty	HC 785–I and –II ( <i>HC 1269</i> )
Sixth Report	DFID: Departmental Report 2002	HC 964 ( <i>HC 357, Session 2002–03</i> )



# Oral evidence

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## Taken before the International Development Committee

on Tuesday 16 November 2004

Members present:

Tony Baldry, in the Chair

John Barrett  
Mr John Battle  
Mr John Bercow

Mr Tony Colman  
Mr Quentin Davies  
Tony Worthington

*Witnesses:* **Mr Jim Drummond**, Director, Iraq Directorate, Department for International Development (DFID), **Hon Dominic Asquith**, Director, Iraq, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and **Dr Roger Hutton**, Director Joint Commitments Policy, Ministry of Defence (MoD), examined.

**Q1 Chairman:** Thank you all very much for coming to give evidence. As a committee our concerns over Iraq have been largely when do we—and I suspect as a consequence, when do DFID—engage? Our experience in Afghanistan—and many of us have visited Afghanistan—was that it is very difficult to do any development work without security and without stability on the ground. You can do a certain amount such as trying to get the electricity working again and get the sewage working again—they are all important things—but in terms of real development work which actually requires a civil society, NGOs, moving around, some interaction between representatives of state and a civil society actually does require a degree of security and a degree of stability. I think we would welcome your views as to whether or not that point has now arrived? Is there sufficient security on the ground for there to be meaningful development work or are we simply in a kind of sticking plaster mode still and trying to keep society moving as best we can? So it is some kind of huge humanitarian operation, not in refugee camps but a whole society in some sort of humanitarian situation just trying to keep water and food and everything flowing. Could you paint a picture of how you see the development space in Iraq at the moment?

**Mr Drummond:** I think usually in these post-conflict situations one can move from the immediate relief to the reconstruction to the development with some overlap. I think in Iraq what we have at the moment is much more overlap than we would normally expect so that there are some immediate relief questions such as: How do you follow up in Najaf or Fallujah after a military action? There are some immediate reconstruction questions still there. We are dealing with a situation where there has been very little investment in infrastructure for 15 to 20 years so there are very frequent breakdowns of almost everything. I think what has happened in the last year is that the situation has stabilised due to the efforts of donors and partners here and the military. At the same time there is an opportunity to do development work. The Iraqi Government has recently produced a National Development Strategy which is very forward looking. We can make it

available to you if you have not seen it<sup>1</sup>, but it seems to me a pretty good document for a government that has been there for two or three months in terms of setting forward priorities, the political process and security, taking more responsibility for their own security and establishing a liberal market economy. There are also targets for reconstruction which have been set. I think you have these three phases overlaid in a way that perhaps you do not have in quite the same way in Sierra Leone or even in Afghanistan.

**Q2 Chairman:** Is it post-conflict or post-war?

**Mr Drummond:** Clearly in parts of Iraq there is still conflict going on. In other parts of Iraq—in the north of Iraq—it is pretty peaceful. In the south in the last couple of months since Najaf it has been pretty stable. People have been able to get out and around and do things again.

**Q3 Mr Battle:** You mentioned the overlap and I was recently visiting Afghanistan and the case there was: Can we get onto development? It seems we are going to elections but when will development actually start? By that I mean on the ground, in villages, health clinics, education, projects for the agricultural economy. Some of the resources—including DFID resources—were going into basic security, not necessarily military to chase the Al-Qaeda network up and down the Tora Bora, but at least to employ people to have local presences of quasi military police presence. I wondered if, for all the talk of resources—and it is public resource, probably inaccurate—that money in DFID is being taken away from other areas and parts of the world and other programmes to go into the reconstruction and redevelopment of Iraq. I do not get the impression that much re-development is actually going on. Could you disillusion me and others of that and tell me that water, electricity, roads and agricultural development and, indeed, industrial and service development is being sponsored and supported?

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<sup>1</sup> *The Iraqi Strategic Review Board: National Development Strategy 2005–07*, The Ministerial Committee on The National Development Strategy, September 2004. Copy placed in the Library.

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**Mr Drummond:** A lot of work on immediate reconstruction is being done. For example, DFID funded jointly with the Development Fund for Iraq—Iraq's own oil money—an emergency infrastructure programme in the south which has helped to restore power supplies, extend water supplies in Basra; there have been programmes to rehabilitate schools; the UN and World Bank trust funds are starting to operate in these areas. However, I think we are at an early stage of this. There is work going on that we are sponsoring at the centre to provide economic policy.

**Q4 Mr Battle:** Is the electricity supply, for example, more secure now than it was under Saddam Hussein?

**Mr Drummond:** The output is a bit higher than it was before the war.

**Q5 Mr Battle:** The output by the power stations?

**Mr Drummond:** Yes and the reach is better because the grid is now operating so that you can transfer power from stations in the south or the north to the centre, or vice versa. The coverage is better.

**Q6 Mr Battle:** The reason I ask these questions is that in a sense Iraq started, in technical terms according to the World Bank some years ago, as a middle income country that is now desperately facing poverty; it has not got the basic supplies of energy and water. What percentage of rural and urban areas have clean drinking water now?

**Mr Drummond:** We are in a situation where we need to gather more information about what is going on around Iraq so that we can monitor progress more accurately in what we are trying to achieve. There have been a number of studies of households now which provide information. I think the best one that we have seen is by an organisation called Fafo which I think is Norwegian based<sup>2</sup>. It shows that 93% of rural households and 98% of urban households are connected to the electricity network. Those people report that the electricity supplies are unstable but if you look at the latest maps for electricity supplies across Iraq what it shows is that the different governorates are getting between 10 and 16 hours of power per day which is better than it was during the summer when the demand is much higher. There are economic policy issues that need to be addressed in all of this because power is virtually free in Iraq so there is not much incentive to switch it off. There is an issue for the government for the future as to how it unwinds some of these subsidies because about half of its budget is spent on subsidies.

**Q7 Mr Battle:** We only get impressions of the conflict and we only get impressions from films of Baghdad with one or two other city exceptions. If I wanted to compare (I do not have any experience of visiting Iraq but I have of Afghanistan) western Afghanistan where there was no conflict going on

you could see the real potential for DFID (they were there with other agencies) working on rural agricultural integrated development projects, making sure an irrigation water supply where a river had dried up worked. It was a brilliant example where you could say there were security problems in places such as Kabul and Kandahar occupied by the Americans. In western Afghanistan you could see the real potential for good sustainable economic development. Is that true in parts of Iraq now or is the whole place a security camp really?

**Mr Drummond:** I think the main security problems are in the areas around Baghdad. If you go to the Kurdish areas in the north then they are pretty stable and secure and there has been a lot of development there. If you go to southern Iraq at the moment there have been phases where it has been very insecure but for the last couple of months it has been better and people have been able to get out more and do development work. As I say, we have been able to do things in the south; it has been stable enough over the last year to get out and do things.

**Q8 Mr Battle:** I do not decry the use of security officers including police officers; I actually feel and believe they are a function of good integrated development work, but were DFID satisfied that they engaged in the appropriate planning with senior police officers in advance of the invasion and that since then enough support has been provided by the Home Office so that just as in Afghanistan there is support between DFID and the Home Office—and indeed in East Timor—to provide that basic level of ordinary security? Has that happened yet in Iraq?

**Mr Asquith:** Let me try to answer that question. Certainly in terms of looking at it now I would congratulate the Home Office on the support they have given in terms of providing police expertise on the ground in exceptionally difficult circumstances. That is very true down in the area around Basra—which is under British Forces control—but it is also true in Baghdad. That includes both police officers on the ground and retired police who are mentoring the Iraqi police service in slightly more remote areas as well.

**Q9 Mr Battle:** A police officer from my own constituency in Leeds has been in Iraq, but the question I am asking is: has there been enough planning and are there enough?

**Mr Asquith:** Enough planning now, yes. I would say there is enough planning. Are there enough? One can always do with more.

**Q10 Chairman:** Could you just say a little bit about the Global Conflict Prevention Pool? Who is in the lead on that and when does it come into play? How does it come into play? Is it something that sits permanently or does it become activated if there is a particular conflict in the offing? Can you just give us a feel about what the interplay is with the rest of Whitehall?

**Mr Asquith:** It includes the Foreign Office, DFID and the Ministry of Defence. We each have in our ministries officials who follow this every single day

<sup>2</sup> *Iraq Multiple Indicator Rapid Assessment*, Iraqi Central Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology, FAFO and UNDP. To be published late April/early May. See <http://www.fafo.no/>

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and they are forever looking, each day, at projects (both monitoring projects that are existing and projects for the future). In terms of what the objectives are, they were in the initial period (after the end of major hostilities) focusing on security sector reform on governance broadly and at that period on discovering more about Iraq itself. We have now written a development of the strategy for the Global Conflict Prevention Pool which will retain the security sector reform element but will do more on the bridge building between communities and the capacity building of government. We try to work those three into each project so they are mutually re-enforcing. In terms of actual amounts spent, we would expect to spend by the end of this financial year roughly £20 million and will look in the region of £50 million for next year and about £12.5 million for the year after that. It is a rolling programme. Some of its most effective work goes into prison sector reform and on the policing side into supporting capability.

**Q11 Mr Davies:** Can I just ask if that £12 million comes within the £70 million envelope of aid for Iraq or is it in addition?

**Mr Asquith:** This is a separate fund.

**Q12 Mr Davies:** What would be the total amount in this financial year that the British tax payer is contributing to Iraq, apart from the cost of military operations?

**Mr Drummond:** The Global Conflict Prevention Pool contribution is part of the £544 million that was pledged at Madrid for the three years from April 2003 to March 2006. We cannot tell you exactly the amount spent this year as we are only part of the way through it, but I guess it will be £100 million to £150 million of the pledge.

**Q13 Mr Bercow:** Mr Asquith, in response to my colleague Mr Battle you asked whether he meant is sufficient planning being done now. Obviously there is no point in living in the past but we hope we will learn from the past. I wonder if I could ask you, would it be fair to say that whereas there was very substantial military planning in advance of the invasion there was no—or next to no—civil police planning? As part of that, wrapped into that inquiry, am I not right in thinking—as we understand it—that the first approach to the Home Office and to ACPO came only after the fall of Baghdad?<sup>3</sup> Secondly, are there enough police now in and around Baghdad or might it be the case that for whatever understandable reasons a decision has been made to spread relatively thinly the police presence across the country, partly to satisfy demand in different parts of the country, but that the effect of that is that provision is inadequate in Baghdad and finally, therefore, do you accept the view that I know Christian Aid (among others) has observed that there is still an enormous need to recruit, retain, train and protect police because, as

ordinary Iraqis are saying, security is the biggest single thing and without it sustainable development is obviously going to be a mere pipe dream?

**Mr Asquith:** Can I be honest and plead ignorance on precisely when the first request came to the police and try to tackle that first question in a slightly different way? The objective soon after the end of major hostilities was to put on the street as many police as possible to tackle the security conditions that then existed. A large number were recruited and a large number were put in place. The level of training and preparation for the police was not sufficient to withstand a very concerted attack upon them in April of this year. The lessons drawn have been to devote even more time to the training of the police before they are subjected to what are exceptional security threats which I suspect our police force would have great trouble in contending with. A lot of effort was initially put into trying to get them spread as widely across the country as possible but effort has been focused increasingly on increasing the training of those police forces that are recruited. I think that is the best answer I can give you.

**Dr Hutton:** There was an issue after the conflict of the quality of the Iraqi police service. The one thing we found in training the police and all other aspects of the security sector is that you cannot rush these things. There is a tendency to want to rush because of the security situation but you only build in quality by taking time over it and training these people properly. I can give you some statistics if you are interested on police training. The Iraqi Police Service at the moment is currently manned to 87,000 of whom 50% are trained and equipped. We have increased the ceiling which we are aiming for to 135,000, the plan being to have 40% trained and equipped by January next year and 100% by July 2006. Slightly complicating the picture is that because of the poor quality of some of the people originally in the IPS there is a redundancy programme so as the numbers go up some of the numbers also go down at the same time.

**Q14 Tony Worthington:** Can I go back to what the Chairman was raising earlier with you? I think you said that the degree of overlay between your interests—that is DFID's interest—and, if I understood you correctly, the Ministry of Defence interest was much greater in Iraq than it was elsewhere.

**Mr Drummond:** I think that is probably true. What I was trying to say was that what we are facing in Iraq is a lot of different development challenges all at the same time. In other countries we tended to face them more in sequence so that there is some immediate post-conflict relief required for places like Najaf or Fallujah. There is some next stage reconstruction of infrastructure—quick impact projects which the military tend to play a leading role in—required. There is also an opportunity to do some long term development stuff, although it is not an easy environment in which to do it.

<sup>3</sup> Ev 55

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**Q15 Tony Worthington:** Is it not the case that that is the way it was planned? The Pentagon was put in charge of the humanitarian programme; that was the American plan. It is the American plan we are working to; the humanitarian plan was to be set up and we were invited to come to that effort and that that effort answered back this line of command which was still the Pentagon and to the President. It was planned to be overlaid.

**Mr Drummond:** It is certainly the case that the US system planned to do some of the humanitarian phase themselves but it is also the case that there was a lot of planning done by development agencies with the UN system for the humanitarian phase. As it turned out there was a limited requirement for that.

**Q16 Tony Worthington:** The central point I am getting at is this idea of humanitarian space, that following the military around in any case is a very dangerous experience and what agencies have tried to do over the years is to say that the people providing humanitarian assistance—food, shelter and so on—are not the same people as the people who are shooting up Iraq. What was very alarming to the NGOs—and I remember it well—and what they were protesting about was that it was planned without humanitarian space; the humanitarian bit and the defence bit were overlaid.

**Mr Drummond:** I think that may be true to some extent in the way the US system approached that. I think it is not true in the way that we approach that in the sense that we planned with the United Nations system, with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with the NGOs for the humanitarian phase. The humanitarian phase was actually very short. A lot of the humanitarian problems that were anticipated did not actually happen and we therefore moved on into the next immediate reconstruction phase quite quickly.

**Q17 Tony Worthington:** What we have witnessed is this appalling identification of aid workers as legitimate targets—they are not legitimate targets—where they have been kidnapped and where they are seen as now fair game by terrorists. We did not help that by going into a war where, in fact, it was planned by the Americans that there would be this overlap between the humanitarian issues. The humanitarian assistance would follow in subject to the control of the military. That did not help, did it?

**Mr Drummond:** I think what we have tried to do is to keep that as separate as possible. I do not entirely buy the NGO argument that because they have perceived an association between the military and the humanitarian that they have become targets. Elsewhere, in the Middle East for example, they have become targets unfortunately for terrorists just because they are associated with the West.

**Q18 Tony Worthington:** I do not think that we can simply say that in the British sector we are doing it differently because our NGOs—the international NGOs—will be working in the rest of Iraq as well as in the British sector. That is true, is it not?

**Mr Drummond:** Some of them are. There have been relatively few British NGOs very active in Iraq during Saddam's period and relatively few since. In a sense there was a gap there which had to be filled.

**Q19 Tony Worthington:** But is this business—this precious separation of the humanitarian from the military—going to be more difficult in the future to recreate that space post-Iraq than it was before Iraq?

**Mr Drummond:** We have seen the same pattern in Afghanistan of NGOs being targeted; we have seen it in a few other countries now. It is something that the UN is very conscious of. It has just produced new guidelines for humanitarian operations in Iraq which I think are very pragmatic. Again we can show you them if that would be helpful<sup>4</sup>.

**Q20 Tony Worthington:** Can I just ask you to say a little bit about the use of civilian contractors and how that has affected the delivery of services. I think more than anything I can remember before there has been, as it were, the privatisation of provisions for reconstruction and has that brought in another issue in terms of being able to guarantee safe passage and so on?

**Mr Drummond:** Are you talking about people who provide protection for the development workers?

**Q21 Tony Worthington:** That is one issue. We have, as it were, private police forces working there. They are called security but they are doing police work and there will be private contractors as well who have been brought in for the reconstruction effort.

**Mr Drummond:** I think the only way that one can do the reconstruction effort is through private contractors frankly. One normally might get more UN organisations on that, a few more NGOs, but unfortunately they are not there so the other option is to use private contractors to do that. Obviously in the situation in Iraq they would have to make some arrangements for their own protection and there are private companies that are providing security.

**Q22 Tony Worthington:** The point I am trying to get at is that you have a situation of where that humanitarian space—in this case for reconstruction of the country—is not seen as divorced from the military effort and those people are targets as well.

**Mr Drummond:** I think the humanitarian space argument is just about humanitarian agencies that are providing immediate life saving relief. The reconstruction effort is something that happens normally in a different way and with different principles and it is quite common for the military to be involved in quick impact projects. They have been in the Balkans and other parts of the world.

**Q23 Tony Worthington:** Have any representations been made to the Americans about the lack of wisdom of sending in the humanitarian effort behind the tanks?

<sup>4</sup> *Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations on Interacting with Military and Other Security Actors in Iraq*, 20 October 2004. Copy placed in the Library.

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**Mr Drummond:** We have talked to the Americans about the importance of separating.

**Q24 Tony Worthington:** Can you say what response you have had?

**Mr Drummond:** From the development community there is an understanding of that.

**Q25 Tony Worthington:** From the Pentagon?

**Mr Drummond:** I have not personally talked to the Pentagon.

**Dr Hutton:** I have not either.

**Mr Asquith:** Can I just add one thought to the important question of whether or not the humanitarian agencies have been associated with the military and therefore are targets as a result? From my experience on the ground in Baghdad for five months this year it is very clear what the intentions and the objectives of the insurgents or terrorists are. They are fundamentally nihilistic. The people who are targeted—and this is the point I want to make—are not just the humanitarian agencies, the western humanitarian agencies; there are a huge number of Iraqi professionals and NGOs operating who have no contact whatsoever with the multi-national forces and were being subjected to—and still are being subjected to—kidnaps and assassinations. There is one clear intent on the part of those perpetrating them, which is to cause as much chaos as possible.

**Q26 Mr Colman:** I visited southern Iraq and Camp Doha in Kuwait in September as part of the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme. I met a number of senior American officers who were very complimentary about the work of DFID in terms of the way DFID was working with local Iraqi contractors, and the American officers were saying that they wished that the Americans on their side, in delivering humanitarian aid and development aid, were doing the same but they were bringing in contractors from the outside, from the United States. While the DFID projects tended to survive and not be subject to sabotage or be blown up, the American work was sadly harmed in this way and an enormous amount of military people were being required to protect the American contractors who were doing their aid effort in the areas of the country where they were working. Would you believe that is simply perception and has no basis of fact or is there a difference in the reconstruction and development work that we are doing because we are separating out, if you like, the military and the occupying power status from the delivery of humanitarian aid while the Americans are not? Are we having a better survival rate of electricity and works, as one example, in our area because we are using Iraqi contractors than perhaps the Americans are doing because they are using American contractors?

**Mr Drummond:** I had not heard that story before. It is obviously true that we have been fortunate in having slightly more flexible procurement rules and so we have been able more easily in the early stages to use local contractors and contractors from the region. That made it easier to get jobs done. The

American rules are becoming more flexible and they are certainly using more local contractors now. Part of the review that they did as a supplemental three or four months ago resulted in some greater flexibility for them to use local contractors. And that, as the security situation develops, is clearly the best way to go and also the best way to get local labour employed which is one of the objectives.

**Q27 Mr Colman:** Is development work going ahead much faster in the region where we are the occupying power rather than where the Americans are the occupying power?

**Mr Drummond:** The Americans have spent a large amount of money, a much larger amount of money than we have. They have spent something like \$3 billion on immediate relief and reconstruction programmes. They face a bigger security challenge in the areas around Baghdad where they are working. They are also working to some extent in the south so I have seen myself programmes that they are doing with pumping stations along the Shat al Arab. They are achieving things.

**Mr Asquith:** There are many examples that I saw in the Sunni areas around Tikrit where the local American commander was working directly and totally with the local Iraqi business and political representatives in defining what projects to go for and who to do them. They were invariably local companies who were chosen to do them. Unfortunately in that area there was the desire amongst a minority to destroy those projects.

**Q28 Mr Colman:** Would Dr Hutton like to comment, because it was a military person who was saying this to me?

**Dr Hutton:** No, I have not experienced that myself.

**Q29 Chairman:** Before we move on to funding, this phrase “good humanitarian donorship” or GHD, does this ring any bells? It is one of these phrases that comes in development speak. Is this a text somewhere? Is it a book or a booklet? Or is it a process, something like the Geneva Convention?

**Mr Drummond:** It is an agreement amongst donors when they met in Stockholm. It set out some principles.

**Q30 Chairman:** We signed up to it?

**Mr Drummond:** Yes.

**Q31 Chairman:** And DFID is there to see that it is enforced, is that right?

**Mr Drummond:** Yes.

**Q32 Tony Worthington:** Looking at the immediate relief side, I think that what has happened pragmatically on the ground in some places where it has been difficult for the ICRC and others to get to, is that relief supplies have been provided from time to time by the military. What would be useful would be to show what the UN has just come up with on Iraq because it takes the principles of neutrality and the rest and it goes through to how to apply them in Iraq.

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**Mr Drummond:** That would be useful.

**Q33 Mr Colman:** In your memorandum to us<sup>5</sup> in this inquiry you have identified the DFID development goal as an inclusive Iraqi-led reconstruction and you split that into three primary objectives: first of all, economic growth; secondly, accountable governance; thirdly, to promote social and political cohesion and stability. Could you describe how you are progressing against the three goals and how these in fact relate to your primary objective which, of course, is poverty alleviation?

**Mr Drummond:** On the economic side there is some quite positive progress. The Iraqi economy is expected to grow by 60% this year, largely on the back of higher oil prices, but there are signs of pick-up in agriculture, transport and some other areas of the economy too. A lot of the oil revenues flow through into public sector salaries and so get out in terms of extra demand into the economy. I think there are not very accurate measures of unemployment yet to show whether there has been a substantive change, but there is anecdotal evidence of improvement there. I think that is a reasonably positive story.

**Q34 Mr Battle:** Oil prices have risen massively from \$20 a barrel to \$50 a barrel, but I was under the impression that production of oil from Iraq is still well down on what it was before the conflict.

**Mr Drummond:** Production has been fairly consistent at around 2.5 million barrels per day which is more or less on target for where they expect it to be at this stage. There have been blips where pipelines have been blown up but I think over the last few months they have become more skilful at mending things.

**Q35 Mr Colman:** What about in the other two areas, governance and social cohesion?

**Mr Drummond:** On the governance side, we have had various changes in government obviously over the last year. We have moved from an occupation government to the interim government which has only been around for a few months. We have seen a rapid growth in civil society, a rapid growth in the press; we have seen pretty good representation for women in the political process; we have seen the creation of the National Council—which Dominic may want to comment on—which is part of a process for trying to hold the government accountable.

**Q36 Mr Colman:** Could I ask how the DFID objectives fit with the Foreign Office objectives and the Ministry of Defence objectives? How do they come together and—and I suppose I am coming back to the question originally asked by my colleague Mr Worthington—to what extent is DFID really simply an add-on to what is a driven policy coming out of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence?

**Mr Drummond:** I think success in Iraq requires action on three broad fronts. On security we need to move from a position of security through to security sector reform and that is primarily—but not entirely—the Ministry of Defence's responsibility. We need a political process which moves towards democracy and a new constitution and that is primarily—but not entirely—a Foreign Office preserve. We also need reconstruction moving in parallel with economic regeneration and that is primarily DFID's role in this process, but everybody else has an interest in it.

**Q37 Mr Colman:** Dr Hutton, you were part of the triumvirate that sat down and agreed these objectives, were you?

**Dr Hutton:** I think we have become much better at thinking of a concerted effort across Whitehall and, speaking MoD speak for a moment, we tend to think of lines of operation of which the military line is just one. What DFID do, what the Foreign Office do, the economic lines of operation, building stable institutions in Iraq, they complement our line of operation which is providing overall security. As Jim says, part of that is the security sector reform which we have taken the lead on. It is very much a combined—again in MoD speak—campaign planning approach that we take these days.

**Mr Asquith:** The three strands that Jim has spoken of are quite clearly interwoven virtually every day of our working lives. We are always co-ordinating amongst each other to keep those strands together.

**Q38 Mr Colman:** From the point of view of my experience in southern Iraq—again it is a Putney resident who is a consul general in Basra—I was very impressed to see how this was being done in terms of pulling them all together, but do you believe that there is a sufficient poverty focus in ensuring that the FCO and Ministry of Defence objectives are in fact linked in with this, or would you prefer DFID's focus—that is the FCO and the Ministry of Defence—to be on other issues than these three?

**Mr Asquith:** I am very satisfied with the direction of DFID policy. It seems to fit very, very clearly and easily with exactly what we are trying to achieve on our side and I would suspect exactly the same from the Ministry of Defence, but I cannot obviously speak for them.

**Dr Hutton:** We are at the hard end of providing security in Iraq, but what DFID are doing is equally important in providing a stable, secure Iraq. The two lines of operation are absolutely complementary and we wholly support DFID's approach to this.

**Q39 Mr Colman:** We are obviously concerned where the DFID money is coming from for Iraq and I think it would be helpful if you could clarify what proportion of the DFID expenditure is humanitarian assistance, what proportion is reconstruction and where the money comes from? Which budget lines were used and can you assure us that the very poorest countries—which is where DFID should be putting its money—are not going to suffer? Is it all coming out of contingency? Is it

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coming out of the CHAD line (that is the Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department line)? Could you give us a background as to where the money is coming from and for what purposes?

**Mr Drummond:** The money for 2003–04, £75 million, came from the contingency reserve which DFID holds and was allocated to humanitarian assistance and a bit a reconstruction work in 2003–04. In that year DFID had a £90 million reserve of which £75 million went to Iraq and some to Montserrat. The 2004–05 and 2005–06 DFID funding for the reconstruction of Iraq includes £50 million reallocated from the middle income country programmes and DFID contingency funding of £115 million. We have a public service agreement that requires us to spend 90% of our bilateral programme on the poorest countries and we are sticking with that.

**Q40 Mr Colman:** Therefore the split of this money that you have given us between humanitarian and reconstruction, what would that be for the three years?

**Mr Drummond:** About £75 million for humanitarian assistance. We have not in the current year, so far as I am aware, provided humanitarian assistance. There will be some that was allocated to UN agencies in the previous financial year which is still being spent this year but we have not responded to new appeals this year.

**Q41 Mr Colman:** Using all the money from the contingency allowance for Iraq, does that mean that the work in Darfur is under-funded?

**Mr Drummond:** No, I do not think so. The Africa Division has its own contingency provision which has funded the work in Darfur.

**Q42 Mr Colman:** I understand that your budget going forward means that you are reducing the amount going into Iraq over the next three years. Could you clarify which programmes you envisage stopping in the next three years?

**Mr Drummond:** We made a pledge at Madrid of £544 million which will be spent by the end of March 2006. We have not decided on allocations for years after that yet but our expectation is that Iraq should not need large amounts of donor funding after that period because it should be generating enough of its own revenues from increased oil and other parts of the economy.

**Q43 Mr Colman:** What is your bottom line in terms of the programmes you would in fact be funding? For instance, is capacity building—which all of us are concerned about—the area which you are going to concentrate on?

**Mr Drummond:** We would expect, as I say, for Iraq not to need large amounts of donor grants for capital programmes; it should be able, if it gets a debt reduction, to borrow commercially to do things. It should be generating its own revenue in oil. It will continue to require assistance from outside on rebuilding the institutions of the state and we hope that we will be able to contribute to that. Quite what

budget that will require I do not know. It has not been fixed yet but we will be going through a process during the next few months to do that.

**Q44 Chairman:** At the moment we are there—to use the language of the United Nations—as occupiers. I do not mean that in a pejorative sense.

**Mr Asquith:** No, the UN does not use that word.

**Q45 Chairman:** I thought the reason the Americans describe themselves as occupiers was because it had to be in a UN resolution?

**Mr Asquith:** That was up until 28 June.

**Q46 Chairman:** So we have ceased to be occupiers. There will come a time, January hopefully, when there will be elections. Presumably then we will be giving assistance by way of direct budgetary support to the then government, will we?

**Mr Drummond:** What we are trying to do at the moment is . . .

**Q47 Chairman:** No, what is the mechanism, not what we are trying to do now. After January there will be an Iraqi Government.

**Mr Drummond:** There is an Iraqi Government now and what we are trying to do now is to work very much with that Government to build up its capacity and to support its policies, to help it develop its policies. It may be a different Iraqi Government in January and our role will be the same, to try to support them.

**Q48 Chairman:** As Parliamentarians I think we would say there will be some democratic—hopefully democratic—authority after January, so will the mechanism be direct budgetary support as we understand direct budgetary support, or will DFID effectively be saying that these are the programmes that we think are in the best interests for the people of Iraq?

**Mr Drummond:** What we want to do is work with Iraqi policies. We want to be able to debate those policies with the Iraqi government, whether it is the current government or the next one. The National Development Strategy that I mentioned at the beginning is the first sign of Iraqi government policies and setting of priorities. We think it is a pretty good document. It was presented to the donors at the Tokyo Conference in October and it provides a fairly broad framework for us to work within. Whether we will be providing direct budget support is something that we will have to discuss with the new Iraqi government. My guess is that with the oil price where it is that may not be a high priority.

**Mr Asquith:** There will still be a developing political process. The government that is elected in January will be termed the transitional government rather than a full government. I know this is playing with words but it is important in the context of the transitional administrative law which the Iraqis wrote themselves, signed up to themselves in March, and it is also important in the context of Security Council Resolution 1546 which set out the political

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process which ends after these elections and the drafting of a constitution and a referendum on the constitution by the middle of October and the constitutionally based elections at the end of next year. At the end of that process—that is the end of the political process—we will have the fully fledged Iraqi government, but you will still have a transitional government for this coming year which has yet to define for itself its powers.

**Q49 Mr Davies:** While we are on the funding, since you say that Iraq is potentially a wealthy country and thinking of the rise in the oil price, why did we not consider making some of this money available—which was necessary to fund the reconstruction you are describing, the £540 million that you are talking about—by way of a loan which could be repaid when these oil revenues come on-stream? Then maybe you could use this money for some of the middle income countries from whom we have withdrawn programmes in order to pay for Iraq because money would flow back into DFID's coffers, or at least it would flow back to the British tax payer. Why is it all given in the form of an apparently irrevocable grant?

**Mr Drummond:** At this stage we judge that Iraq needs grant aid and Iraq has large amounts of debt. DFID does not, so far as I know, provide loans to developing countries.

**Q50 Mr Davies:** That is just a sort of procedural rule, a bureaucratic obstacle. It does not address my point of substance as to whether or not economically there would be a good basis for a loan because what is a loan? It is advancing cash flow and you say that Iraq does not have a cash flow now but they are going to have it in the future. That, all things being equal, is a good basis for a loan, is it not?

**Mr Drummond:** Where Iraq is at the moment, with \$120 billion of debt which it cannot repay, that is not a sound basis for moving to loans. I think in a few years' time Iraq should be able to borrow commercially but all the donors are agreed that for the moment it justifies grant assistance.

**Q51 Mr Davies:** How much of the £150 million that you are spending of British tax payers' money in Iraq this year—apart from the cost of military operations—is being spent on security and how much on insurance to protect the deliverers of those projects and those programmes, whether those deliverers be employees of DFID, NGOs that we are supporting or contractors we are hiring whether expatriate or Iraqi? How much for security for them? How much for insurance for them?

**Mr Drummond:** Where we are providing bilateral projects where we are putting staff on the ground, the costs of security adds roughly a third to what we are doing.

**Q52 Mr Davies:** So two thirds is the cost of the actual programmes and one third is the cost of security. What about insurance?

**Mr Drummond:** I do not have a figure for insurance I am afraid.

**Q53 Mr Davies:** Why do you not have a figure? Because it is not material?

**Mr Drummond:** It will be part of contract; I am afraid I just do not know the figure.

**Q54 Mr Davies:** Is it material in relation to the total cost of this exercise?

**Mr Drummond:** Insurance will obviously add to the cost of what we are delivering and insurance in Iraq will be a bit higher than elsewhere. We can provide you with an estimate of what it is but I am afraid I do not have it in my briefing.

**Q55 Mr Davies:** I have a note here from our own advisers which estimates that the insurance premia have reached 30% of company pay rolls and the security costs for two travelling foreigners can amount to US \$5,000 per day, for example. If that estimate is correct it adds up to quite a large amount of money, does it not? It does seem to me that decision takers in DFID like yourself should be aware of what that amount of money adds up to.

**Mr Drummond:** What I need to check is whether the security includes insurance or not. What I am being told is that the figure of £5,000 per day is for the very short term contractors and for longer term it is significantly less than that.

**Q56 Mr Davies:** Is that £5,000 or \$5,000? It makes a big difference with the present rate of exchange. I put to you \$5,000.

**Mr Drummond:** It is dollars.

**Q57 Mr Davies:** I am asking the questions, you are supposed to know the answers.

**Mr Drummond:** As I said to you, I do not know the precise costs of insurance; we can find that for you.

**Q58 Mr Davies:** Would you be kind enough to let the Committee have a note on the question I have asked?

**Mr Drummond:** Of course<sup>6</sup>.

**Q59 Mr Bercow:** "Is" does not equal "ought". As my colleague Mr Davies was suggesting, the fact that it has not been policy to provide loans is just a statement of what is; it is not in any way a judgment on what ought to be. It does seem to me to be a perfectly legitimate line of enquiry. Many of us are fully cognisant of the need for an Iraq spend, Mr Drummond, and our questions must not be taken to imply that we do not think it is necessary or a priority, but equally quite a lot of us believe in specificity, value and accountability for the spend. Therefore, I wonder if I could ask you, consistent with what you said about the decreased need for substantial capital programmes over the next couple of years as reflected in the figures, whether at least in broad but reasonably specific terms you can tell me—because I would like to know—what the £86 million in 2005–06 will embrace. I may be wrong, but I am very concerned about what seems to me a lack of specificity about where the money is going and what exactly is being provided. Do we

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know that that is precisely what is needed? Will it all be reliably spent? Who is charged with the responsibility for overseeing its efficacy, *et cetera*, *et cetera*? These are very, very substantial sums of money, albeit decreasing sums, on the Iraq spend over the next couple of years and I would like to be clear that you—whom I am sure are master of all you survey and certainly the person giving evidence to us today—can tell us what the £86 million is delivering. What are we getting? What if my constituents in Buckingham say to me, “Well, you’re on this committee, Mr Bercow, it’s a very important committee and we are all frightfully pleased you are representing us, but what we want you to get out of Mr Drummond is what this £86 million is getting us?”

**Mr Drummond:** Can I answer that in 2004–05 or do you want to focus on the next financial year or both?

**Q60 Mr Bercow:** I am going to be greedy and say both.

**Mr Drummond:** In the current year what you are getting are improvements to infrastructure in southern Iraq. You are getting advice to establish the procedures at the centre of government. In Iraq you are getting advice on economic policy. There is a substantial amount of money provided through the UN and World Bank Trust Funds which will be spent in the current financial year and that will go on a variety of education, health, electricity supply, water supply programmes.

**Q61 Mr Bercow:** When you say “advice”, do you mean consultancy costs?

**Mr Drummond:** Advice is mostly provided by the consultants, yes. We have to go to the market to acquire the expertise. So those are some of the things you would be able to tell your constituents for this year. For next year we have not made decisions yet and we will be reviewing Country Assistance Plans over the next couple of months to decide on priorities for the next financial year.

**Q62 Mr Bercow:** But £86 million is very precise. It is not £85 million, it is not £90 million; it is £86 million. Is it costed? What I am getting at is has it been chopped on the basis of a percentage calculation of what ought to be chopped in order to furnish other parts of the Department with a potential spend? I am sorry if you think I am being very finickity; I am being very finickity about it but I believe rightly. Have you made a judgment that £86 million is what is needed not because you have anything like budget support in mind, but a very specific set of identifiable projects with yardsticks for measuring their achievements?

**Mr Drummond:** The money for next year is the balance of DFID’s contribution to the Madrid pledge. There will also be money through the Global Pool next year which will be on top of the £86 million, so I do not expect for the next financial year that there will be a significant change in the overall UK contribution on the civilian side. In terms of what we spend it on next year, as I say we will review over the next couple of months what we

should be doing with it. I would expect that we would want to make more contributions to health, education, employment generation in the south and we will want to carry on with our capacity building programmes at the centre and see some of these economic reform issues that we are working on now translated into policies which are then implemented. **Mr Bercow:** I trust that will be clearly itemised and explained in the next annual report.

**Q63 Mr Battle:** I am still not that much clearer about the process—immediate relief, reconstruction and development—and I know it is difficult but I am looking for a clear plan in my mind of how Iraq is moving through all the stages. I am under the impression that everyone in Iraq is still receiving food daily from the World Food Programme, including the president. Is that right?

**Mr Drummond:** There is still a food ration. It is not provided by the World Food Programme; it is provided from the Iraqis’ budget.

**Q64 Mr Battle:** So everyone gets a daily food ration.

**Mr Drummond:** I think about 60% of the population are dependent on it.

**Mr Davies:** We heard it was a 100%.

**Q65 Mr Battle:** I was under the impression that it was 100% because I think one of us asked the World Food Programme if even the president gets a ration and we were told yes, because that is the situation. I just want a clearer impression in my mind of when people will come off rations in Iraq, including the president.

**Mr Drummond:** We would like to see the public distribution system wound down and one of the pieces of work we are involved with is how you wind that down sensibly so that you protect poor people but you do not use Iraqi oil revenues, tax money to subsidise the wealthy people in Iraq. In the current political situation with a government that is going to be facing an election in January and a new government thereafter, I do not think we are going to see movement on that in the next few months but this is an opportunity to plan for making that change.

**Q66 Mr Battle:** Is the difficulty the distribution because of security or is it production of food and ability to buy it in?

**Mr Drummond:** As you move away from the current system then you need to have a private sector system which is going to replace it and that takes a bit of building. We also want to send the right price signals to Iraqi farmers. At the moment my understanding is that they do not get the right price incentive.

**Mr Asquith:** Your question is directed at why there is still a food distribution system?

**Q67 Mr Battle:** Yes.

**Mr Asquith:** Because there are large sectors of the population who do depend on it for economic reasons.

**Mr Drummond:** The 60% that I mentioned are people who are judged to depend upon this.

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**Q68 Mr Battle:** So if we go through the stages from immediate relief to reconstruction to development, if we are looking at places like Malawi that faced drought (the Southern African drought), providing the rains did not completely dry up the following year there were seed packages to make sure people could grow, and therefore became self-sufficient in, food. There was at least a timeline and a progress report of when people could come off dependency on hand-outs of food but we have not got to that stage at all yet in Iraq, have we?

**Mr Drummond:** They are working on that at the moment, but they have not got to the stage of a definite plan for doing it and I do not think they would want to announce at the moment, for understandable reasons, a definite plan for doing it.

**Q69 Mr Battle:** How does DFID view the balance between strengthening the Iraqi interim government and strengthening civil society?

**Mr Drummond:** DFID is trying to work on strengthening government systems which will be sustainable after the interim government has moved on and there is a transitional government in the next phase, and thereafter a general election. What you have is a situation where Saddam Hussein used a lot of systems outside the normal government processes and so there was not a system round the prime minister for running the government in the way that we would recognise and so what we are trying to do is to help him generate those systems in a way that will be sustainable through the various elections. That is an important part of what we are doing but we have also set up funds for civil society development and to help poorer people or marginalised people get involved in the political process. Most of those things will be through civil society organisations, so we are doing both.

**Q70 Mr Battle:** Are you helping the reconstruction of those participatory structures, perhaps at the local level, small village and town organisations and that kind of thing?

**Mr Drummond:** The proposals that we are getting from civil society organisations both in Iraq and from international and UK organisations that can still work with Iraqi partners do involve some of that, yes. For example, there are quite a few proposals for voter education coming through at the moment.

**Mr Asquith:** We do a lot of work with civil society organisations from our missions in Iraq. The problem is not so much finding them because there is a surprisingly large number. The problem is determining which are the effective ones and which are the ones who are actually taking you for a ride or see an opportunity for remuneration for work which is not really what we would call NGO work. There is no shortage of people but it does require a high degree of caution and circumspection about whom you are dealing with, which does inevitably take a little bit of time. However, we are working very, very closely with them, and that includes increasing the capacity of the good ones to function.

**Mr Davies:** Before we leave that, Mr Battle's questions have opened up a very major significant contradiction. In a testimony we had only last week from the Deputy Director of the World Food Programme, Monsieur Graisse told us that 100% of the population of Iraq were receiving food distribution. That testimony was so surprising that you will recall I asked him specifically to confirm that and asked if Mr Alawi, for example, was also receiving or entitled to receive that and I was told yes. Mr Drummond, in his testimony just now, said that it was 60%. If it is 60% all sorts of questions arise about how the selection is made. However, it is an extraordinary matter that there should be such a different perception between two agencies so intimately involved and so responsible for the future of Iraq as the World Food Programme and DFID, that I wonder if I can ask Mr Drummond to let us have a letter in due course either confirming the testimony he has given us today or correcting it in the light of Monsieur Graisse's testimony to us?

**Q71 Chairman:** What I think we will do, Quentin, is let Jim have a copy of what WFP said last week and then he can see whether there has been some misunderstanding or it can be clarified because it is an important point.

**Mr Drummond:** I think I can probably clarify it now, Chairman. I think the entitlement is close to 100%, pretty much everybody.

**Q72 Mr Davies:** Pretty much everybody or everybody?

**Mr Drummond:** In terms of the people who need and depend on it—which is what I said—that is around 60% in our judgment.

**Q73 Mr Davies:** If they are entitled they probably claim it even if they do not need it.

**Mr Asquith:** I am pretty confident they do not. At least I am pretty confident that the President and the Prime Minister do not. What does happen is that the food distribution system is based upon a registration process. You have to go and register and it is done by families. There are some people in Iraq at the moment who will not be on the register.

**Chairman:** This is very interesting but I wonder whether from the Foreign Office or DFID we could have a note because I think it is very important to have an authoritative view<sup>7</sup>. I think we are going to have to adjourn for this division and I think the best way is just to have a note on this one.

*The Committee suspended from 3.44 pm until 3.56 pm for a Division in the House*

**Q74 Chairman:** As I understand it, most of DFID's programmes are being managed remotely from Amman, is that right?

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**Mr Drummond:** No. The UN manages quite a lot of its work from Amman because its international staff are not in Iraq, they are in Amman. I think the Japanese government has some people in Amman as does the EEC.

**Q75 Chairman:** Where is the international reconstruction fund facility for Iraq managed from?

**Mr Drummond:** That is managed by the World Bank and the UN and the UN part of that is in Amman. The World Bank has one or two staff in Amman as well but does most of the work from Washington.

**Q76 Chairman:** Where are the DFID team?

**Mr Drummond:** The DFID team are in London, Baghdad and Basra and visit Amman for liaison purposes but we do not have people based there.

**Q77 Mr Battle:** How many staff are in the DFID team in Baghdad?

**Mr Drummond:** DFID core staff, about half a dozen.

**Q78 Mr Battle:** Do you have other staff in other parts of Iraq that are out in the field or are they all necessarily in Baghdad?

**Mr Drummond:** They are in Baghdad and Basra.

**Q79 Chairman:** You are confident that there are sufficient DFID feet on the ground to make sure that the money spent is accountable and it is being spent effectively and all that kind of stuff?

**Mr Drummond:** I am satisfied with that, yes. I would like, for the purposes of broadening the programme, to be able to post more people to Iraq but in the current circumstances we have to be quite careful about our numbers.

**Q80 John Barrett:** I feel that one of the advantages of being on this Committee is that we are able to make sure that we get good value for money, that DFID spend their money wisely, the programmes are efficient and well-co-ordinated and I would like to go on to that. However, can I just grasp what you have said already? You have said there is a stable flow of oil and oil prices have increased so we have an increased source of income; at the same time you talk about grants, not loans. You were talking about free power still existing in the country and you were also talking about the World Food Programme maybe supplying 60% or even more.

**Mr Drummond:** Not the World Food Programme; the Iraqis' own budget. They are using their oil revenues to buy food, which is then provided pretty much free to people.

**Q81 John Barrett:** One issue that has cropped up is, is there a detailed plan or was there a detailed plan in advance of the conflict and what stages are we at so far as co-ordinating what we do for the future now? Bearing in mind that this is a country that potentially has a reasonable source of its own income, but at the same time there are a number of donors—including ourselves—what mechanism is there in place for co-ordination between the donors

at national level and also looking at co-ordinating with the future Iraqi interim government and then longer term the new Iraqi Government as to how best and how most efficiently can funds, development and that long term plan be implemented then unfold in the years ahead?

**Mr Drummond:** Can I just make a point about the income levels because the per capita income level in Iraq last year was estimated at \$400 to \$500, which is pretty low. It is going to rise this year, we think, to around \$700 but this is still actually pretty low. Iraq in two or three years' time ought to be—security and other things permitting—on a path upwards and well back into the middle income category. It is still formally speaking categorised by the OECD as a middle income country because they do the calculation every three years. It is not a rich country and there are a lot of poor people, particularly in southern Iraq. I do not think it is ready yet to be moving onto commercial loans but in a few years' time, sure. On the donor co-ordination question the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation in Baghdad is at the moment in charge of co-ordinating the donors locally. There are relatively few donors with development experts on the ground in Baghdad. We have them; the US has them. We are providing liaison people for the World Bank and the UN. There is quite a tight knit donor community in Baghdad which meets regularly informally as well as formally with the Ministry of Planning. Internationally there is a wider donor community. We talk to each other every month in telephone conferences and we meet every four to six months at a suitable place, usually in the region.

**Q82 John Barrett:** Can we move on from the co-ordination at national or international level to co-ordination at a more local level. What has DFID planned to ensure that this co-ordination down through civil society, through local governments and through what remaining NGOs there are there (because obviously with the security situation a lot have moved out)? For this money—and as we said before they are substantial sums—not just the money we have donated but the international community has given, it is absolutely vital that there is an effective and co-ordinated system at local level to make sure this is also effectively spent. Is there a plan in place to make sure that through to more devolved levels, there are systems in place for efficient use of the resources? Are these being developed and if so, what is DFID's plan for this?

**Mr Drummond:** We are involved in this in the south in Basra. We do not have staff in other parts of Iraq apart from Basra and Baghdad at the moment. In Basra there is a co-ordination mechanism which is run jointly by us and the Americans which includes the UK military and includes Iraqi representatives of course. There are separate regular contacts with NGOs, particularly around the political participation and civil society funds that we mentioned. I think there is good contact locally. I can only speak for Basra, as I say.

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**Q83 John Barrett:** Is there a plan B in place? Plan A is obviously that the security situation improves dramatically in the years ahead but is there a plan B if that is not the case? Are there alternatives where people can say that after the election the security situation would improve and troubles would cease, but if it turns out that this does not quieten down in the year ahead is there an alternative scenario able to be rolled out?

**Mr Drummond:** The alternative scenario is that we have to do more immediate relief or immediate post-conflict reconstruction and that the development process is delayed. What we have tried to do in designing our programme is to be as flexible and as quick on our feet as we can with that. We are adjusting at the moment what we are doing in southern Iraq so that we are helping a bit more on the quicker impact stuff than we thought we would need to do five months ago.

**Q84 Mr Battle:** One of the questions I asked at an earlier session just after the military action in Baghdad was about the policy of de-Ba'athification—it is an ugly phrase but I think we all know what it means—of Iraq, that everyone who had been in the Ba'ath party should be sacked from their job which meant that we cleared out most of the 'civil service'. I was a little bit sceptical of that policy because I thought (a) we would lose the capacity of people who were trained and (b) we would alienate people and they would turn against any plans of reconstruction. I just wondered whether that policy has been reconsidered; whether that was the effect of that policy. Where is the capacity in providing essential services? Where are the personnel and what is the present situation? Or are people who were de-Ba'athified being allowed back in now and encouraged to join in? What is the present situation?

**Mr Asquith:** That whole issue was very much in the forefront at the end of Coalition Provisional Authority days when it was indeed reconsidered and it was left open very specifically in the education field for teachers to come back in; not just teachers but across the whole educational spectrum. The level at which you had to reach in the Ba'ath party in order not to be readmitted into the system was set and it was set quite high. Those below that were allowed back into the employment pool. That remains so in terms of, as it were, lower level Ba'ath party people; they are still employable. The de-Ba'athification became increasingly targeted on those who were senior members of the Ba'ath party. In terms of the effect, speaking from personal experience, I was always surprised how many people there did seem to be still in the civil service but it is a capacity building problem; they were there but, with the greatest respect, they were not the most effective. That was because of the circumstances in which they had been operating for 30 years.

**Q85 Mr Battle:** So there are not thousands of people who were, put loosely, made redundant who are standing around unemployed and disgruntled by the whole project.

**Mr Asquith:** There are, of course, a large number of people who were in the security forces with whom there have been problems in terms of amalgamating them into or allowing them to re-join civil society. That is, as you are all very well aware, the pool in which there are some disgruntled people operating. In terms of employment, one of the predictions, particularly as the American supplemental funding has started to increase, is that the employment pool will begin to shrink quite dramatically.

**Q86 Mr Battle:** In the end if people in other parts of the world collaborated in any way with a regime that has been oppressive and has abused human rights, those people would hopefully either be brought to trial or a line is drawn and they can come back productively to co-operating in the economy of that society at the appropriate level. Is there a plan for that or are these people just locked out and stood on the street corner throwing bricks—if not worse—at the military forces?

**Mr Asquith:** I should be clear that it is an issue since 28 June which the Iraqi Interim Government is responsible for in determining the policy and has been debating amongst themselves quite extensively and is one which will be taken up by the transitional government after January.

**Q87 Mr Bercow:** We are told that unemployment stands at somewhere between 40% and 50% but the figure for women is much higher than that. What is the rate of unemployment among women?

**Mr Drummond:** There are not actually any very good measures of unemployment across Iraq. There is not a system so we are dealing with estimates. The most recent estimate I have seen—which may have come after the submission that we put to you—was that women's participation in the labour force is 13%, so very low. That same study produces unemployment rates of 12% in urban areas, 6.6% in rural areas with some differentiation across the poorer governorates where the unemployment rate is much higher. As I say, there are no accurate figures for this.

**Q88 Mr Bercow:** I think it might be quite useful to know—pursuant in a sense to the sort of line of questioning that my colleague Mr Davies was developing earlier—to what extent that unemployment is the result of a cultural pattern and possibly even a specific choice not to work, and to what extent is the result of lack of skills or training, and to what extent it might be the consequence of displacement or other features of the conflict. What I am getting at here is that I think a lot of people would say that if we could provide development assistance that will bolster the economy and extend opportunities for women, then up to a point that is certainly something that we should be prepared to consider. Nevertheless there is a total pot and it is not infinite for development assistance from this country and indeed multilaterally for that matter. In the context of what is—or should be—again a middle income country with a substantial revenue stream from oil not very far away on the horizon, we

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obviously cannot sign up to some holistic goal which says that all women should be employed or our cultural preferences dictate that they should be. What I am really getting at is, amongst people who are or could relatively inexpensively be trained and who want to work in the category of Iraqi women, what proportion are not able to do so?

**Mr Drummond:** I do not think we have the information to answer that question frankly at the moment. I think a lot more studies are needed to get a good statistical base for Iraq.

**Q89 Mr Bercow:** In that case, could I just say as somebody who is massively sympathetic to these objectives—and of course empowerment of women and general equality is a very important Millennium Development Goal (MDG)—an MDG I support—that we do need precisely that wealth of information. Can I put it to you that there is a concern otherwise that we can find ourselves going along with declarations of good intent that are entirely laudable in themselves but to which potentially there is an unlimited price tag and that is not something that we can credibly do in development policy, given that there are other countries around the world perhaps a great deal poorer.

**Mr Asquith:** Could I just add, although I am not sure whether it is relevant or not, in the case of the elections for the national council we set ourselves a target for a percentage for women which was exceeded. In the case of the transitional assembly for which the vote will be taking place at the end of January this coming year, the target is that 25% of the national assembly will be females.

For that reason in the electoral arrangements every third candidate has to be a woman. In certain areas, certainly on the political side, there are targets set and arrangements put in place that are kept.

**Mr Bercow:** That is helpful.

**Mr Drummond:** On our side quite a lot of the civil society and political party participation funding that we are providing will go towards organisations that are promoting women's engagement.

**Q90 Mr Battle:** In the light of the evidence you have given us today some of us will hopefully be visiting Iraq in the New Year and I was wondering if it were possible to have a map, as in my constituency there are rough maps showing us the areas of high unemployment, areas of economic stress, I am looking really for a development map as opposed to a military strategic map. Could we, as a development committee, have a development map so that we would have a clearer idea of the areas where good work can go on, where work is going on and where the needs are in Iraq? I do not think I have that pattern yet. I accept the points you make about the difficulty in getting the data, but I think if we could get somewhere closer to that it would enable us to say that the focus is on development in the wake of the military and security questions rather than we are trying to second guess where we move the troops all the time.

**Mr Drummond:** The data is incomplete but we can put together what we have for you<sup>8</sup>.

**Chairman:** Thank you very much for helping us with our understanding of these issues.

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<sup>8</sup> Copies of maps placed in the Library.

**Tuesday 18 January 2005**

Members present:

Mr Tony Baldry, in the Chair

John Battle  
Hugh Bayley  
Ann Clwyd

Mr Quentin Davies  
Tony Worthington

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*Witnesses:* **Mr Oliver Burch**, Iraq Programme Manager, Christian Aid, and **Mr Ken Caldwell**, International Overseas Director, Save the Children, examined.

**Q91 Chairman:** Oliver and Ken, thank you very much for coming and talking to us this afternoon. Could I start off with an issue which relates to both Iraq and other areas as well. I think it was quite clear that right at the outset of the invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces that there was a fair amount of tension between DFID and the Ministry of Defence in that I think clearly the Ministry of Defence had a view that they would invade Iraq militarily and that DFID would then after that come along and do all the humanitarian bit in their wake. I think Clare Short when Secretary of State had a rather different opinion. She took the view that the invading forces were occupying forces under the Geneva Convention and therefore it was for the occupying forces under the Geneva Convention to provide water, sanitation and other resources to the civilians that they were occupying. We are increasingly now getting situations whereby for humanitarian reasons we are seeing military intervention. It happens in Iraq and we saw it to a certain extent in Syria and Somalia and so on. The first question is do you as NGOs who are very much involved in this feel that the ground rules are clearly enough set out as to what is the role of the military, what is the role of DFID, and what is the role of the NGOs? We will come on to ask about capacity in a second but in terms of who is meant to be doing what, whose role is what, is it sufficiently clearly laid out? Ken, do you want to start first?

**Mr Caldwell:** The short answer to that in our view is no. There are still major issues for us in relation to humanitarian space. There has been a lot of debate post the Afghanistan and post the Iraq invasions about humanitarian space and some good work put together in the humanitarian community, but from what we see that is not yet percolating through into the military community and therefore we are seeing continuing situations of military activities, including by the British military, straying into humanitarian space, and from our perspective that is not only an issue of inappropriate intervention under international law it also places our staff very directly at risk. Part of the reason why it is very difficult for humanitarian agencies to operate in places like Iraq and Afghanistan now is because of that blurring of the boundary between military and humanitarian space. The crucial issue is to get this message fixed into the military establishment as well as the humanitarian establishment.

**Q92 Chairman:** When you say “straying into humanitarian space”, could you expand on that and translate that into concepts that others will

understand? What do you mean, Oliver, is happening on the ground that is causing you concern?

**Mr Caldwell:** My best example of that will be in Afghanistan but if you prefer to stay in Iraq I can do that.

**Q93 Chairman:** Both?

**Mr Caldwell:** In Afghanistan there are things called provincial reconstruction teams, PRTs, which have been conceived of as a place where military and government and humanitarian actors all work together and present a united front and go out together and do things together, and it has led to a disastrous blurring of the boundaries, with military personnel, sometimes in uniform, sometimes not, doing distributions and contributing to the rebuilding of schools, *et cetera*, all of which are thoroughly worthy things but it does mean that there is now huge confusion in communities’ minds about who is doing what work and one understands why those members of the community who are forming guerrilla forces or dissident military forces if they see anybody involved in this community see them as a military target.

**Mr Burch:** We would absolutely second that. My experience as we went into the Iraq invasion in early 2003 is that NGOs were being invited to take part in a combined military/political operation and they would be an integral component, together with military communications, logistics, civil affairs, humanitarian, psychological operations, all locked together. This completely ignores the mandates of humanitarian organisations to be neutral and impartial. We did want to take part but we were not able in the case of Iraq to define that line and I think humanitarian organisations have paid for it. It is not a new principle. It is something that we have been experiencing since the Balkans, through Afghanistan, but I think Iraq is the most extreme example. If I could just give one case of the kind of thing that we are very, very worried about and that is the recent operation in Fallujah, that we are all familiar with, where we had a situation where the Iraqi Red Crescent tried constantly to send aid into a situation where the town was blockaded but it was prevented from doing so by the military forces carrying out the operation. At the end the Coalition military forces did humanitarian aid of their own, effectively saying if you will not co-operate with us in the humanitarian operations, we can do this component ourselves. We had a situation at the end—and this has been recorded by a respected

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journalist—where families were invited to send one man each to the mosque to collect an aid packet and when they got there they found themselves forensically checked to see if they had fired a weapon or not and those who had were arrested, the use of perfidy in other words. One point is that it is against the Geneva Convention, but think where it puts the humanitarian organisations in that area, so we find it very, very hard to work with this sort of thing going on.

**Q94 Chairman:** Do NGOs have a point of reference at DFID? Explain to the Committee so we can understand and the House can understand what happens? Do you get a telephone call from someone in DFID saying, “Can you help with this particular humanitarian situation?”, or do you see a humanitarian situation developing and get in touch with DFID? What are the mechanics for this?

**Mr Burch:** From our point of view, what I have just described and what Ken has described we are not specifically blaming DFID for this situation, we think this is a military doctrine. As far as Christian Aid is concerned, we have DFID funding currently and we had it in the past.

**Q95 Chairman:** I am sorry, I did not explain myself clearly enough. I am talking in general terms now because I am trying to sort out in our minds this whole question of how NGOs and humanitarian organisations work with the military.

**Mr Caldwell:** There are two situations in the way it would occur on the ground. We would identify a need, either directly or through our local partners, and in seeking to respond to that need we may need the permission of the military forces on the ground, whether they are legitimately recognised by international law or not, and that may lead to a situation where we enter a negotiation with them about what we can do and who can do what. The other situation we may face is as a result of civil/military liaison at governmental level we are then invited to respond to a need, and in that situation if that legitimate request comes from a legitimate civil authority on the ground and we believe that we can respond to that in an impartial and neutral manner then we would do that. If it involves us being mixed up in the military operation where the criteria for distribution will be “hearts and minds” or some other political motive that is where we have to stand back from it.

**Mr Burch:** It is a very difficult matter to manage. We tend to refer to something called the SCHR—the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response—guidelines which go into these matters quite closely and the guidelines form a very good basis for trying to decide what is a neutral action and what might be implied to be a political and military action.

**Q96 Chairman:** In both Afghanistan and Iraq, for humanitarian aid workers to operate there is presumably a need for security, indeed everyone we saw in Kabul from whom we took evidence on the

Afghanistan inquiry said that security is pre-eminent and security usually implies troops being able to deliver security, so how do you see the ideal way for humanitarian officials and humanitarian NGOs to be able to access security without a sense that the military is invading the humanitarian space?

**Mr Burch:** Two things. What we really look for from the military is an umbrella of security for everybody—freedom of movement for the civilian population, *et cetera*—under which we can operate, and that is fine. In other situations where the conflict is worse, NGOs in many parts of the world are able to operate quite successfully without security being supplied by anybody directly to them on the basis of their visibility and their reputation for being neutral and impartial and the value of the programme. That works quite well. Once you become associated with a military force which is regarded as a faction in the conflict—and I think that is the case in Iraq today—then effectively you are tainted and you do not have that freedom of movement and it is the beneficiaries that suffer.

**Q97 Tony Worthington:** I would like you to confirm whether my memory is correct or not about Iraq. My memory of the situation is that what made Iraq unique in this respect was that the Pentagon issued invitations to humanitarian organisations to take part under General Garner in the humanitarian efforts and that the lines of accountability of the whole operation were through the Pentagon and to the President and that that, in my view, to my memory, is unprecedented, that you would have the humanitarian space obliterated at the start. Is that correct?

**Mr Caldwell:** That is accurate. I am not sure it is entirely unique in our experience. It may be more blatant in the Iraq situation than it has been in others but there are other situations, notably relating to Afghanistan, where some elements of that would apply. It is also worth noting that virtually every reputable humanitarian NGO in the world refused to do business on those terms because we felt it was a situation we could not engage in. It does reflect the degree of lack of understanding between the military and the leadership and the humanitarian community about these sorts of principles. There is still a big gulf.

**Mr Burch:** General Powell described the NGOs as the “best force multipliers you could have” in a speech about a year ago. Andrew Natsios at USAID, talking to US NGOs, said “you are either with us or against us”. This is very much the attitude. I recall a telephone call I made in 2003 to the newly operating Humanitarian Operations Centre with the US military in Kuwait. I asked some questions about accessing Iraq and I was immediately told, “Come straight down here, we will get you your papers and get you cashed up with US AID into Iraq very quickly.” They obviously did not know we had funding of our own but that is the kind of attitude and operation that was going on on the ground in Iraq from the beginning.

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**Q98 Hugh Bayley:** To move on to a related but different subject, are there lessons that can be learned about capacity building from the work that your two agencies have done and which DFID have done in Northern Iraq, lessons particularly in relation to the autonomy of local self-government which could be drawn upon in other regions of Iraq, like central Iraq or southern Iraq?

**Mr Caldwell:** Absolutely. One of the very striking things that is different about the Kurdish-controlled governorates in Iraq is that civil society is much more developed and much stronger than it is in other parts of Iraq. That reflects the amount of effort in which DFID can claim a recent credit over the last 13 years since 1991 through investing in developing Kurdish civil society. We are now in a situation where it is much easier for us to find strong Iraqi local partners in those areas than it is as yet in other parts of Iraq. One of the crucial roles we believe DFID and the British Government is uniquely well-placed to play in Iraq is the strengthening of civil society. Why are we uniquely well-placed? Because anything associated with the Americans, frankly, in the Iraqi context is seen as tainted and it is quite risky both in political and security terms for Iraqi NGOs to be taking funding or being co-ordinated by the Americans, and while the risks are not entirely absent for British funding it is certainly dramatically better than elsewhere. One of our concerns about the DFID programme in Iraq at the moment is that it is not giving sufficient priority to the strengthening of Iraqi civil society. A relatively small proportion of resources is going in that direction and we would like to see a specific earmarking of the DFID budget for Iraq for the strengthening of Iraqi civil society, maybe 10% or something like that.

**Mr Burch:** We also think it is very important. It is remarkable what our partners tell us when we are trying to work in fields like education or health and trying to relate to the local branches of the ministry who have little contact with Baghdad and have no idea of what their strategy is. It makes it very, very hard in this situation to support them. We do have some support from DFID in this field of developing civil society and developing the capacity of local departments of Iraqi ministries and indeed encouraging communities to be demanding from their service providers. It is a very good concept but they should do more of it, I agree.

**Q99 Ann Clwyd:** On that particular point, it is the Americans in fact who have been doing the building of civic society, the building of good governance, of democracy programmes, and working in building Baghdad City Council for example. It really is the Americans who are mainly associated with that. I have been to Iraq and it is some time since the end of the war and I think there was some regret amongst some of the Iraqis that the British were not more involved. Certainly the Americans must be given credit, I think, for the work they have done on civil society. I think it has been very impressive.

**Mr Caldwell:** I may add, in agreeing with that that, as you will be aware, there is a Ministry of Civil Society Development which has just been created by

the transitional government and the way in which that new department approaches its mandate is fairly critical to whether civil society genuinely develops independent of government and political parties in Iraq in the future, assuming we have some sort of stable government. This would be a very good moment in the coming months for the British Government, either through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's human rights programme or through DFID's own civil society development work, to really invest in helping the civil society department to work out how best to undertake that mandate in a way that curbs the worst excesses of civil society, which inevitably in this situation we are seeing happening but at the same time does not seek to control or politically narrow down the space for civil society to operate.

**Q100 Ann Clwyd:** On health, I did not realise until I went to Amman recently that the World Health Organisation has been extremely active. I met the Director of the World Health Organisation and the head of the health administration in Iraq and they were very proud of the fact that they had managed to vaccinate 95% of the children of Iraq. That included the children of Fallujah. That is something you never ever hear about. I would not have heard about it unless I had gone to Amman and spoken to those people. The WHO has got quite an impressive record.

**Mr Caldwell:** Yes.

**Q101 Tony Worthington:** Can I ask about infrastructure. You read all sorts of stories about what the level of provision of water, electricity and other sanitation was before the war started and what it is like now. Can you give us a picture of your assessment of the basic infrastructure of Iraq and what it is like trying to repair it, what it is like trying to put it to rights?

**Mr Caldwell:** Our observation would be that this is a very widely varying picture across different communities in Iraq. There are some where the infrastructure now is significantly better than it was pre-war. There are others where it is still not functioning.

**Q102 Tony Worthington:** Can you be specific about where it is better?

**Mr Caldwell:** I would not like to be specific because I do not have those to hand and our picture inevitably would be a patchy one rather than a comprehensive one. The UN is better-placed to give you an overview of that situation than the NGOs would be. Our observations from the areas where we are either working directly or working with local NGOs are that in some situations the infrastructure has improved.

**Q103 Tony Worthington:** Where you have worked can you give us an example?

**Mr Caldwell:** Well, there has been quite significant investment in rehabilitating water services and we would observe that as a result of sanctions that many of the bits of infrastructure in Iraq had almost no



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investment between 1991 and 2002 and some of them were in a very decrepit state by the time the war happened. In some cases those problems have been tackled; in some cases they have not and things have got worse. Our particular interest from Save the Children is not so much with the hard infrastructure but the soft infrastructure. For example, in schools we are seeing most schools up and running again now but there are real concerns about drop-out rates. Most children are at least being enrolled in school now, although not all and not as high as it was before, but the drop-out rates particularly of girls are still high and one of our top concerns at the moment is the drop-out rate of girls from education, partly due to reasons of security and safety of girl children going to school.

**Mr Burch:** I have the impression that some progress is being made but the security situation and sabotage has obviously made that very slow. I think one point to make is the situation pre-war was rather politically distorted because the infrastructure was effectively good in areas that were loyal to the Ba'ath Party so, if you like, Baghdad had fairly good electricity before the war because other parts of the country were being starved of it. Now where supply has been spread more evenly Baghdadis are complaining and perhaps that is not totally reasonable. In the south, for example, we are involved in investing in some water supplies to different villages. These have been left disconnected for many years by the previous authorities because they were not politically on board with the Baathist line. So there is some element of correcting political distortion now with a fair approach to infrastructure which is probably making some Iraqis disappointed.

**Q104 Tony Worthington:** Yes, I can understand where the security situation is appalling that the contractors will not work and it is simply impossible to repair the infrastructure, but we are told that it is a very, very patchy situation, and that there are relatively safe parts of the country. For example, in the Kurdish area has there been a major step forward because no reports are coming from there of terrorism?

**Mr Burch:** The information I have is that is fairly good and the information I have about Basra is that it is improving, but if we are talking about the upper centre Sunni triangle areas there are some major problems.

**Q105 Tony Worthington:** But in terms of a judgment on the effects of the war and the invasion of the country, for people to believe that it was worthwhile, then what we are hearing is that what really annoys them is that there is an occupying power but that things have not improved. In areas where it has improved what has been the impact of that? Has that made the occupation seem more justified?

**Mr Caldwell:** As I am sure you will relate to from your own constituencies, in the parts of the country where it has improved people tend to be bit quieter than in the places where it has gotten a bit worse, but our experience would be that even situations where things have improved there is still a sense of

injustice about the country being run from abroad and the desire given where things are now to see things move as fast as possible to a peaceful, Iraqi-run government.

**Q106 Tony Worthington:** But is there delivery of that infrastructure, engineering, and all those other activities in the areas where it could be or is there a failure to deliver?

**Mr Caldwell:** Our observation would be that the investment in infrastructure has prioritised the major economic sectors. For example, if you contrast the amount of information that is available almost on a daily basis about the state of the oil infrastructure and the extent to which that has been rehabilitated and what sort of results it is producing in terms of the power it is producing, what effect that has had today or this week (with the almost total lack of meaningful social indicators today in Iraq) it is a very dramatic difference. There has been very little investment in building up a real picture nationwide of what is really happening in schools, what is really happening in hospitals, what is really happening in health centres, and what is really happening with violence affecting ordinary communities. We would like to see—and this is relevant to DFID's programme as well—DFID giving higher priority to getting in place those mechanisms, both for its own programmes and for others, that will enable effective monitoring about whether all that investment is delivering results on the ground in terms of improved social development.

**Q107 Ann Clwyd:** You talked about 1991 as though that were the date that the improvements in infrastructure stopped. As you know, it went back 35 years, it was not 1991, it was further back than that and they are trying to repair 35 years of neglect, which is much more difficult. I do not know when you were both in Iraq last. Have you been recently?

**Mr Caldwell:** Not recently.

**Mr Burch:** We have not had anybody in for over a year.

**Q108 Ann Clwyd:** In Kurdistan of course they have had a head start on everybody else. It is about five years since I was there last and there have been tremendous changes there. Reconstruction has gone on apace and Turks are even coming across the border and building hotels in Kurdistan but the rest of the country, obviously for the reasons we all know, continues to limp.

**Mr Caldwell:** Indeed.

**Q109 Mr Battle:** I wonder if I could ask about the retention of international interest in Iraq particularly after the elections because already we know on the military front the Czechs are withdrawing and the Polish are withdrawing and others have set a timetable for withdrawing and by mid-summer it will just be British and American troops. Is that being paralleled by the interest of the donors? There has been a great international reconstruction fund facility for Iraq that has been set

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up and we know it has hit the headlines but I am not sure when the money arrives that we have got the commitment. It is really to do with the commitment on the ground to co-ordinating, organising and distributing it. Is it not the case that because of security that many in the UN and indeed other international NGOs are starting to withdraw so we could have less to co-ordinate on the ground? What is your response to that? Are people's irons to the fire both on emergency aid and reconstruction for the long term? Is there a full range of NGOs and is there good donor co-ordination to stick with it or like the military will they just withdraw?

**Mr Burch:** We do have a rather extraordinary situation where most international agencies are working by what we call remote control so in effect it is Amman in Jordan that is doing the job that would normally be done in Baghdad and a lot of things in Iraq are being decided there. I think some quite effective programmes are going on despite the security. We are managing to implement a small amount of programmes through our own partners at roughly the rate we hoped we would be able to. I am relieved to be able to say that. The impression I have on constraints is that the level of capacity of the government authorities and the ministries is so comparatively low that there is a limit to how much can be done at a certain speed. That is what is slowing down reconstruction, the organisation of the Iraqi—

**Q110 Mr Battle:**—Even within the interim government there is not sufficient co-ordination of the donors going on to actually make sure the funds to which DFID have contributed (£17 million, if I remember rightly) are distributed?

**Mr Burch:** I think they only have so much capacity and they realise it. Most of the ministries are present in Amman and they are trying to get as much support as possible from the relevant UN institutions to train their people and build their own capacity, but we have quite a long way to go, so I think in a way that is the main constraint to spending a lot of money quickly and effectively in Iraq today.

**Q111 Mr Battle:** Is that what you would expect or would you expect things to be further on in comparison with other international situations where we need co-ordination? Is it better or worse?

**Mr Burch:** I am not too surprised. I have worked in Afghanistan before and we are moving on slowly there.

**Mr Caldwell:** To take your broader question, I think there is always a situation that in a very high profile crisis, as we have had in Iraq over the last couple of years, a certain amount of the donor interest, a certain amount of the agency interest, relates to the profile that is going on at the time and there will be a more limited number of donors and agencies that are committed to the longer term whole in helping Iraq to build a new sort of society. In the international NGO community there is a smaller number of NGOs that, if security conditions permit, would like to play a part in supporting that development of a new Iraqi society, although I think

the number of donors that are willing to fund that will be partly determined by the level of political profile in the international community and partly by whether the donors feel they can spend their money wisely in that situation. There is still understandable concern amongst many donors about “Can we be confident our money is being well spent in a situation where we are having to monitor it by remote control?”.

**Q112 Mr Battle:** Could I pursue this? I know the situation in Afghanistan slightly better. I have been there since the conflict. It was the poorest country in the world, so you were starting from a long way back to build up the systems from the ground and integrate development, so the template there I find is quite encouraging even now, post-elections in Afghanistan. In Iraq my impression, and it is only an impression, is that we are starting with a country that is not the poorest in the world but is almost middle income. It certainly has capacity economically in terms of oil and the notion was that if we could sort out the politics and the conflicts could the oil money be coupled with a development strategy? I see it as potentially one of the most advanced approaches and that is aside from the “democratisation” programme. Do you see it that way at all?

**Mr Burch:** I think you are right.

**Q113 Mr Battle:** Or is it a mess really? There are fires on the oil lines again so the oil revenues are not there. Is there any time line and are the interim government even talking about the fact that perhaps we could get resources for education, health care, new businesses going again and the economy?

**Mr Burch:** I think it will happen. I do agree with what you said. We regard it as a country or a region which is potentially quite wealthy but which has been desperately neglected for 35 years. That is what you are dealing with and it is the psychological effect of those 35 years of neglect and misrule, if you like. The key issues we think in Iraq are governance and security. If those can be put right almost everything else will follow. It is not a Christian Aid focus country. It is not like Afghanistan or southern Africa.

**Mr Caldwell:** I would be more optimistic about Iraq than I would be about Afghanistan in that if we can sort out those issues that Oliver is describing there is an educated population in Iraq, there is a large amount of oil and it should be the case that within five to ten years there will not be a need for international assistance to Iraq. In Afghanistan they are building from a much lower base. The government is in control of even less of the country than the Iraqi interim government is and they are having to learn from scratch how to run a pluralistic society and that will be a long haul.

**Q114 Mr Battle:** If I can go right back to my first question, how much can donor intervention or encouragement or co-operation be part of the

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process to go along that development road or are the donors waiting around for a lead from the interim government that is not quite there?

**Mr Caldwell:** The solution to Iraq is primarily political and military in our view but the donors have an important role to play in the context of progress and the military issues in helping to build the sort of society in general and civil society in particular that enables there to be the checks and balances within future Iraqi society that stop the same thing happening again as has happened over the last 30 years.

**Q115 Mr Davies:** Mr Caldwell, I know that you criticise and Save the Children has criticised the extent of the funds being given by the government to the UN and their very limited role in Iraq. Seventy million has been allocated under the government's programme to the UN and to the International Construction Fund. No-one is quite clear what the UN themselves are likely to do with it. Can you expand on your concern about that?

**Mr Caldwell:** I hope it does not come across as explicit criticism. It is a concern more than criticism.

**Q116 Mr Davies:** I did use the word "concern", I think.

**Mr Caldwell:** Yes indeed. Our concern is that, given the very tight restrictions placed by UNSECOR, the UN security apparatus, on what UN people can do within Iraq, their ability to monitor and oversee the programmes they have been entrusted with is very limited. There are no other obvious options that resolve that issue, which is why we are putting our main emphasis not so much in the channels. We are just making the point that one should not rely on the UN, just because it is the UN, to be able to do this well. The important thing is to make sure that the work is happening, to track indicators on the ground as to whether it is actually working, and we are worried that the UN and other donors, including DFID, are placing too much reliance on inputs at the moment without the ability to monitor what is resulting.

**Q117 Mr Davies:** I think that is a very good point. You say there are no other options but maybe there are. Maybe some of that money should have gone to Iraqi indigenous organisations. Would that have been a better alternative?

**Mr Caldwell:** I have already made the point that we think a relatively modest share, maybe ten per cent, of donor money could go to building Iraqi civil society and be well invested.

**Q118 Mr Davies:** Not just building Iraqi civil society but helping other Iraqi institutions get off the ground, whether they are political or social; that is a good cause. Maybe some of this money could have gone to Iraqi NGOs who would have helped either with relief effort or with development programmes.

**Mr Caldwell:** Absolutely; I agree with you.

**Q119 Mr Davies:** So I think your criticism is first that half the money, £35 million, has gone to an organisation which has basically pulled out of Iraq and is not in a position to deliver or monitor programmes. It is up to us to check on how this money is being dispersed. Secondly, the issue is whether it could instead have gone to Iraqi NGOs. You are saying it might have done. That would have had the double effect of delivering the money to people who were on the spot and able *prima facie* to do something with it and to account for it, and would have contributed to building up those organisations as institutions in the new Iraq, so an opportunity may have been lost. Is that right?

**Mr Caldwell:** I think that is true to an extent, although I do not think it would be productive to imagine that all those resources could have been usefully channelled through Iraqi civil society. I think a proportion of them could be but part of the channelling will remain finding trustworthy Iraqi government structures, hopefully post election, that are committed to getting resources through and which are committed to a rights based approach which crosses the religious divide.

**Mr Burch:** Absolutely. The problem here is that there is not that much implementing capacity in Iraq on the ground. Christian Aid always works through local partners. All our work is done through Iraqi NGOs. I wish we could identify more, faster, but we can only go at a certain speed. They are starting to spring up now that the political climate has changed but most of these organisations are very inexperienced. They have to learn management and all sorts of skills. We are trying to promote that process but it is taking time.

**Q120 Mr Davies:** So really the key constraint on the aid and development over in Iraq is not that objectively there is not a need; it is not objectively that there are not resources available because the British Government and others have made them available; it is the absence on the ground of reliable competent organisations that are able to deliver and monitor those programmes. Is that what you are saying?

**Mr Burch:** That is fair to say.

**Q121 Chairman:** Oliver, when Christian Aid gave us written evidence in October of last year<sup>1</sup> you lamented the lack of evidence of a co-ordinated strategy for long term development of Iraq. In particular you pointed to the uncertainty of external funding as well as the lack of opportunities for civil society organisations to engage in shaping what you described as local development plans. Perhaps I could roll up a number of questions and ask you to comment on them in totality. Has the situation changed? How does Christian Aid go about co-ordinating with local civil society organisations? Do you think that this newly established Ministry of Civil Society Development is going to assist in the

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co-ordination and regulation process and, if not, why not? We are a little perplexed as to how an NGO organises itself to carry out activities in Iraq whilst based in Amman. Can one operate remote operations, whether by NGOs or by the UN agencies, and, lastly, how in the circumstances of Iraq does one ensure the accountability of these operations?

**Mr Burch:** The situation is improving slowly. New NGOs are appearing quite rapidly. They are not all very competent. They are not all entirely honest. There is certainly a need for a process not just to register NGOs in Iraq but try and regulate their activities. There seems to be a certain amount of competition at the moment between several ministries. We have a Minister of Planning who initially took the job over from the CPA but there is now a new Minister of NGOs and of course we have a ministry responsible for civil society and having asked our partners I do not think any of those are quite clear exactly which of those ministries is going to be responsible for what. Remote control operating from bases overseas or in Amman can work quite effectively. In Amman many of the local NGOs are now becoming represented and opening offices. Iraqi ministries are being more or less permanently represented there. Co-ordination meetings can be held safely there. We are meeting our partners several times a year. It works quite well. Of course, we are very disappointed at the end of a project that we cannot go off on the ground and evaluate in detail with the beneficiaries the true impact of it. Unless we can walk amongst the communities and talk to the beneficiaries there is not much purpose being in the country at all. We are taking a certain amount on trust and I guess any donor who is thinking of investing in Iraqi programmes or the country at all has to take that point on board. Progress is being made but it is slow. Co-ordination with the Iraqi interim government is a little bit irregular in the NGO field. As regards co-ordination with international organisations under NCCI, which is the umbrella organisation in Amman, I would say it is quite good.

**Mr Caldwell:** In relation to accountability issues, all of us who are involved in seeking to provide assistance to Iraq, be they donors or merely NGOs, are facing a greater challenge in accountability. It is much more difficult for us to work in Iraq than almost any other country in the world because of the explicit targeting of humanitarian workers, and therefore we can only continue to operate there if we have a belief that things are going to get better. If we ever saw a situation in Iraq where we saw no real prospect of things improving then we would ask ourselves some tough questions, if we did not think there was going to be a time in the next two or three years where we could get in there and find out whether they were being effective.

**Q122 Mr Davies:** Mr Burch, can I pick up on something you said so that we are absolutely clear on the evidence you are giving us? You said that you cannot in Iraq go and visit projects on the ground and walk about and talk to the community. That is

the case absolutely, is it, everywhere you are, not just in dangerous areas like Falluja, and is it true whether or not you have a police or military escort, whether or not you have a white face or whether you are using Iraqi colleagues who are citizens of Iraq?

**Mr Burch:** Our evaluation, and this has been so for more than a year, is that in most parts of Iraq it is not safe to expose international assets, if you like, in that way, nor would our partners welcome hosting us. For the northern provinces, the Kurdish areas, you could make a case for that but unfortunately we do not think the biggest needs are there, and most of our projects these days are further south below the green line.

**Q123 Mr Davies:** So even in the Shia south you cannot visit?

**Mr Burch:** No, we do not think, having had a number of security assessments, and this is revisited regularly, that it is a practical prospect. It is not much good to us, to be honest, to be in a hotel room in a guarded situation or heavily escorted. You do not see much that way. What we want to do is to talk to beneficiaries and move freely. If we cannot do that we might as well work from outside.

**Q124 Mr Davies:** And even your Iraq colleagues, because both Save the Children and Christian Aid I am sure have Iraqis on your staff as colleagues who have had the same training and background and who you trust as any other colleagues, cannot do this on-the-spot monitoring and evaluation?

**Mr Burch:** Not quite. In our case they are partners. We work through partners that we fund to do projects. Essentially we leave it to them to make the decision as to whether they are safe to go to work that day and where and how the programme can run, and so far they have been able to do so. The key point here is that they are working in a very discreet way, I might even say a clandestine way, so whereas in most parts of the world a humanitarian organisation gets its protection from working very visibly in the conflict with white vehicles and even the high frequency radio masts and the flag, and relying on its reputation for doing good work, in Iraq it is completely turned around; it is the opposite, so our people are not using white vehicles, they are using taxis and they are trying to look like ordinary people going about ordinary business and not internationally funded—this is the key adjective—humanitarian organisations because they are at risk.

**Mr Caldwell:** The situation for Save the Children is slightly different because we have had an established team in northern Iraq over the last 13 years and so our local staff are in certain circumstances able to travel in the sort of way that Oliver has described and see what is happening on the ground. In a public forum I prefer not to go more into the operational modalities of that for reasons of security but I am quite happy to—

**Q125 Mr Davies:** But the results of that are reassuring to you. The money has not been wasted, things are happening, reasonable progress is being

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made and there are competent people delivering the programmes that you are supporting. That is a question. Is that the case?

**Mr Caldwell:** I do not want to convey an impression that they are working as normal. We are able to do a certain amount in these very tightly constrained circumstances but every time they travel they are facing security risks and they travel in a very low profile way in a way that makes it much more difficult. They are almost there asking questions like private citizens rather than representing Save the Children. That means we can get a certain amount of feedback and comfort from those visits but nothing like the standard we would normally expect in a more conventional situation.

**Q126 Ann Clwyd:** I agree with you: it is more difficult than it was immediately after the war. One of the greatest needs as far as indigenous NGOs and the newly emerging NGOs are concerned is the fact that they do not even know how to fill in forms. I have seen that time after time. They need somebody to sit down with them and help them to fill in an application form. That is such a basic necessity. I cannot understand why people have not understood that they have no experience of filling in application forms. There is one organisation that I visit every time I go which I think is well worth supporting but we had to put someone in the last time I was there to sit by the side of the man making the application to help him answer the questions. There are questions about bank accounts. Most of those NGOs do not have bank accounts. The needs are very basic to start with and I think that has to be factored into any consideration of how indigenous NGOs in Iraq should be helped. Secondly, I think it is possible to get people to come in and see you. I saw DFID being a bit slow in doing that, in calling people to see them at various places. If I could do it they could do it as well. The other thing is the ministries. I have got a friend who is a Water Minister in Iraq and he is constantly complaining that his own staff, the people who work in his private office, do not know how to do things like write a letter. As the chief man in the ministry he spends an enormous amount of time just correcting basic letters. Those kinds of skills are needed and they need to be assisted in all of that.

**Mr Caldwell:** I would agree with that. Both of us are regarding it as very high priority in our role in capacity building with local NGOs even on the basic stuff like filling in forms or keeping basic books of account that can be accountable for proper use of resources. Certainly within government ministries, as Oliver referred to earlier, there are different but significant capacity problems and an important part of supporting the new government, if one is successfully formed, will be capacity building work for government departments which is generally something that UNDP is known to take a lead role in more than it being NGO territory.

**Mr Burch:** There are a lot of seminars and courses in the region and certainly one of the things we do is send NGOs to Egypt or the Lebanon, for example,

to go on courses. That is still going on now and the UN is doing similar things for the ministry staff.

**Q127 Ann Clwyd:** We have just held a three-day seminar in Amman for NGOs involved in human rights. Again, what was interesting was that people have never met one another. The Syrians have never met an Azidi, never met a Kurd. To get a grouping of various people to make up Iraq is also important for better understanding between the various factions. That is an ongoing thing. Security, of course, is the all-important factor. As you know, most of the reconstruction has been held up because money has been diverted to security. I imagine you would agree that that is necessary anyway but it must be very frustrating for somebody like the Water Minister, who has got all kinds of projects planned, who is engaged in reflooding marshes where the poorest people of Iraq live, not to be able to continue with that work. Therefore should some of the UN money be diverted into continuing to build the infrastructure rather than quite a lot of it, a point you were making, Quentin, sitting in a bank account somewhere?

**Mr Burch:** I understand that in the United States administration there has been a change of thought in this and that the thinking is that it has not been very productive to try to improve the infrastructure in their case in order to win hearts and minds with the very bad security and that money should be diverted instead to address the problem of unemployment. Therefore, labour creation schemes would be more useful at this stage. I am not quoting that as a recommendation but I understand that is the thinking in the US these days.

**Q128 Ann Clwyd:** The Water Ministry is employing tens of thousands of people in infrastructure projects.

**Mr Burch:** It does, yes.

**Ann Clwyd:** But if they are put on hold what happens to those people who did have employment and have now become unemployed? It is not quite that straightforward.

**Q129 Mr Davies:** It is a false analysis, is it not, because infrastructure development is very labour intensive?

**Mr Caldwell:** You make a very good point about human rights which is in a situation where, if we see an election successfully carried off, we are going to see still big religious and ethnic divides within Iraqi society and a rights based approach in that context, if we are going to see benefits getting through to ordinary people, is very important. While the Iraqi government in international law is signed up to all sorts of human rights conventions there is clearly a huge distance to travel, as you will know from your own experience, in terms of recognition of those. As one little example, we have been promoting the Convention on the Rights of the Child within Iraq but we heard a story the other day of a teacher that had been beating their children for not getting their

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Convention on the Rights of the Child sums right. Those are the sorts of basic things that still have to be dealt with.

**Q130 Ann Clwyd:** Given that the post-war humanitarian crisis was not as bad as was expected in that it was not of the kind that was predicted, was it right that aid agencies should have kept staff on the ground in view of the deteriorating security situation? Should they have withdrawn them sooner?

**Mr Caldwell:** It is one of the toughest calls that we face as international NGOs in a situation of the greatest humanitarian need. As we see in Darfur at the moment, very often there are situations where the security risks are at their greatest and every week we have to make tough judgment calls about what degree of risk we are prepared to carry in high risk situations, as Iraq obviously is, people will take those judgments in different places. When to make that call to pull out is a very hard call to make.

**Q131 Mr Battle:** What about the differences in the guidelines, because there were guidelines? They are called the Good Humanitarian Donorship guidelines, and they are for the organisations interacting with the interim government and with the military as well, the security services. In Save the Children's evidence you said there were shortcomings in that; it was not quite working right. Would you like to say a little bit more about that and those guidelines and how they need to be sharpened up?

**Mr Caldwell:** Let me be clear. The Good Humanitarian Donorship guidelines are primarily about co-ordination between donors and with the government of the country. The guidelines for civil and military relations are those relating to the Steering Committee in Humanitarian Response.

**Q132 Mr Battle:** They are a separate set of guidelines?

**Mr Caldwell:** They are a separate set of guidelines drawn up in different structures. I am happy to talk about either of those.

**Q133 Mr Battle:** In a sense it is the interaction with the security services and the military. How is that working?

**Mr Caldwell:** As we discussed at the beginning of this evidence session, we see some really big holes in that. To date those guidelines have been primarily agreed within the humanitarian community and we do not see any evidence of them being signed up to and implemented by the military establishment of the key countries.

**Q134 Mr Battle:** I think it is what is on the paper. I am referring perhaps to my experience in Afghanistan. I am keen to see clarity rather than ambivalence and ambiguity in who does what because there is a danger that NGOs get tied in to military and security strategy. That is why they cannot use white vans and cars with a red cross on

to move around if they are compromised because they are part of the security operation. Is it in that area where you need further clarity and guidance?

**Mr Burch:** From our point of view I think we do put our faith in the SCHR guidelines which say very clearly that humanitarian operations are a matter for independent and neutral humanitarian organisations and the military should do it only when there is no other alternative in a time-bound situation, ideally with some humanitarian civilian advice, so it should be an extraordinary rather than an ordinary situation. I still think that those guidelines are pretty good and I think you can apply them to Iraq but it gets very complex in some of these emergencies where a number of organisations are in the field together in some quite tense situations. I know that the UN, when they re-inserted into the country after the military operation of 2003, were very nervous about how they would be perceived by the local population and what their relationship with the military should be and I know that they wrote some very detailed instructions to all their staff about things like, "Should military officers be allowed to come to co-ordination meetings by invitation or regularly?" "Under what circumstances should we appear with a military officer in uniform?" "Should there be any guards near UN installations?". Despite all this care it seems to be clear that they did not make that separation and indeed they were attacked in the summer of that year. They knew what the risks were before that disaster, that is clear. Everybody is trying to get this right but unless the military side is prepared to co-operate and, as you say, sign up to these ideals, it is not much help.

**Mr Caldwell:** We would like to see the British Government promoting inter-governmental and military initiatives to come to terms with these issues so it is not a debate in the humanitarian community; it is a debate in the military community we are engaging with. Possibly through NATO might be the best vehicle for doing it but we would like to see a military-led initiative to work out where the military should stop.

**Q135 Mr Battle:** And there is precedent for that. I am just calling to mind the conflict in the Balkans, in Kosovo, for example, where after the worst conflict and then the ceasefire was declared I visited and the Royal Engineers were doing work rebuilding water pumps and power stations but everyone knew what the guidelines were. They were moving into that reconstruction but it was accepted as the refugees were returning to Pristina that they knew what the rules of the game were and they could then work with the NGOs, but I get the impression there is not that kind of clarity in the guidelines. Am I right?

**Mr Caldwell:** I would hazard a guess that if you spoke to the top 30 people in the Pentagon and asked them if they followed the SCHR guidelines I know what the answer would be.

**Mr Burch:** I think possibly some wrong lessons were drawn from the Balkans experience. There were

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some examples in the Balkans, in Bosnia-Herzegovina where I have also worked in the past, where there has been some very fruitful co-operation in specific circumstances. If you have a situation where the local population does not regard the military as factional, in other words it regards it as neutral and an overall umbrella of security and its

acceptance is quite good, they can do some quite good work and they have, of course, logistic capacity etc, but that is unusual.

**Chairman:** Thank you very much. You have been extremely helpful in the answers you have given and the clarity you have brought to some of the issues we are looking at.

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*Witness:* **Mr Yahia Said**, Research Fellow, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, examined.

**Q136 Chairman:** Mr Said, thank you very much for coming and giving evidence. Can you in two sentences tell us what is the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the LSE?

**Mr Said:** It is the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the LSE; it is a research centre attached to the London School of Economics. It looks at global issues and tries to explore global solutions for them. The programme I work for within that centre is the Global Civil Society Programme which looks at transnational networks of NGOs in civil society organisations working together to address certain issues, grievances and problems, whether it is human rights or cross-border construction or issues of free trade.

**Q137 Hugh Bayley:** I understand you have recently returned from Baghdad. We heard a lot in the previous session about the security problems in Iraq. I wondered if you could comment on DFID's suggestion recently that it is still possible to successfully engage in reconstruction activities outside the central zone. What is your view about that? Is it possible and, if so, how should one set about reconstruction in difficult areas?

**Mr Said:** I think the security situation and the prospects for reconstruction in various parts of Iraq are quite patchy. There are not such set rules that you can do reconstruction in the north as you can do it in the south or the centre. In Baghdad recently Sadr City, where two million out of five million Baghdadis live, has been the scene of quite successful reconstruction effort ongoing after the ceasefire was signed. Other parts of Baghdad of course are off limits for reconstruction effort, whether they are driven by DFID or whether they are driven by Iraqi ministries. The same could be said of other areas in Iraq. Areas in the south like Samawa are pretty safe for reconstruction efforts but they still carry the legacy of the fact that they were unsafe for some time last year and that somehow people have been slow to react to the improvements in the security situation in these areas. Generally the biggest security challenge in Iraq today are the roads. What you have is that millions or sometimes billions of dollars are spent, for example, fixing Baghdad Airport but the road to Baghdad Airport is unpassable and quite dangerous, which means that that investment lies almost dormant. It is the same with the billions being spent on the port facilities in the south. There is a very big capacity in the ports to import and export goods but the roads are quite unsafe. These are some of the

challenges. There is the power, the electricity. Over the last month there have been about three or four hours of electricity in Baghdad, which is atrocious, although the generating capacity has been improved significantly and Iraq today has more generating capacity than it had before the war. The sabotage, both in terms of the power lines but also in terms of the fuel supplies to the power stations, has meant that this generating capacity is lying dormant.

**Q138 Hugh Bayley:** When you identify problem areas, and you have talked about roads and about a lack of security on the roads as being the problem, there is a chicken and egg situation, is there not? Where reconstruction makes a real difference to the quality of people's lives one would expect a greater sense of respect for the civil authorities, whoever they might be, but you need security to create conditions where that can happen. You seem to be suggesting that the priority is security and the free movement of people, and that that is the precondition without which reconstruction cannot take place. Am I right to draw that inference?

**Mr Said:** I think the priority area is security but within the security problem the priority area is politics, so as a matter of fact it goes even further than that. I think you need a political solution to address the security problem which will open the way for reconstruction. That said, I am not saying we have to wait for the reconstruction effort until then but maybe the direction of reconstruction investment has been misguided, for example, going into large projects. The bulk of the billion dollar, big tag investments, have gone into, for example, oil production and oil export. Iraq produces two to two and a half million barrels a day that it cannot move within the country, let alone outside the country. Creative approaches, that will shorten the supply routes, for example, of power, of oil, of food resources and so on so that they are less susceptible to insurgent activity, could have brought faster relief than large investments in big price tag projects. At the end of the day they are done and signed up for but they are not bringing Iraqis the benefits that could have come from smaller projects. Some of the most successful reconstruction work that has been done in Iraq over the last two years has been very small scale, direct, on-the-spot, sometimes financed directly by military commanders on the ground, such as fixing the local school, fixing the local clinic, just getting some through the military process, and in this I am contradicting my predecessors. Some of

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the military commanders on the ground have been very successful in directly addressing the needs of communities, whereas projects that have been designed far away, in Madrid or in Tokyo, with large investments and so on, have been very slow to trickle down through the process to the average Iraqi on the ground.

**Q139 Hugh Bayley:** Both the previous witnesses made the point powerfully that their safety and that of those who operate in Iraq has been compromised because of military activity invading humanitarian space. Where you have an international NGO that has worked on contract to the coalition provisional authority, for instance, one can see exactly why they are seen as collaborators with the occupation, but few of the internationally known NGOs have worked on that sort of basis. Do you think the security problems and risks they face have come as a result of the military invading humanitarian space or simply because they are soft targets, and if the insurgents' objective is to make Iraq as ungovernable as possible and to frighten foreigners away because they do not want the West to be seen as contributing to the solutions in the region, would it not be the case that international NGOs would have been targets even if the military had behaved more clearly to restrain themselves from invading humanitarian space?

**Mr Said:** I agree with where you are going with that question. The problem in Iraq is not the fact that the military invaded humanitarian space but the fact that the military is viewed as an invader. The problem is the fact that there is a significant portion of the Iraqi population, if not all Iraqis, who fear that their country is under occupation and that is where a lot of the violence is coming from. It has nothing to do with the fact that the military has been invading humanitarian space. As some of you suggested, in Yugoslavia where the military has not been viewed as an occupying force or as an invader, that issue did not arise, of them intermeshing with each other, and indeed in Iraq the attacks on the UN, the attacks on humanitarian organisations, have taken place and would have taken place, as I believe, regardless of their relationship with the United States military or with the British military. As you rightly suggested, the sorts of terrorists—and this is not necessarily representative of the entire insurgency in Iraq—who will attack the UN or attack the Red Cross or who kidnapped Margaret Hassan, are people who would not have been deterred. Margaret Hassan was the furthest from the coalition and from the military and from the invasion of humanitarian space as you can get and yet she was probably specifically targeted for that. The two Italian humanitarian workers were against the sanctions, against the invasion, and were quite strong in their positions in terms of their views about the occupation and the presence of foreign troops and yet they were kidnapped. The problem with the security in Iraq is with the whole perception of the occupation, with the social tensions that exist in the country with political backgrounds, with ethnic

backgrounds, rather than the relationship between NGOs and the military. Of course, that relationship has to be redefined and there is a huge debate about that. Lots of people in the humanitarian community believe in that separation but there are other positions in that, both in academia and in the military, who say that that era is over. Now when you talk about human security you provide security solutions. The military or an invasion or an intervention have to provide a full human security solution that is not only about shooting and protecting but is also about feeding and giving jobs and providing humanitarian assistance. The development of the military side is about broadening the scope of their work when they are providing security solutions rather than limiting it and saying, "Okay, the military does the shooting and Christian Aid does the feeding". There is a move away from that. To go back to Iraq, I think you are right. I think the kinds of terrorists, that part of the insurgency that has been targeting humanitarian organisations, would have done so regardless of the issue of the blurring of the border between humanitarian and military space.

**Q140 Chairman:** There has been quite a lot of debate in the UK in the business pages about how much business UK companies are getting out of reconstruction as compared to how much business US companies are getting out of reconstruction. I suppose one of the issues we should be considering is to what extent is this an Iraqi-led reconstruction process. Do you get the impression that DFID is facilitating an Iraqi-led reconstruction process or is it simply that the coalition as occupiers are undertaking such reconstruction as they feel as occupiers is needing to be done?

**Mr Said:** There are several questions here that need to be addressed. First of all, it is not so much a real reconstruction effort that is going on. There is a patchwork of investment projects or activities that are taking place—an airport here, a sewer station there, a couple of electricity power stations over there. In all these areas there are certain works that cannot be done by Iraqis. Building a deepwater seaport is nothing that any construction company in Iraq can carry out and it is definitely where a lot of revenue will be acquired by foreign companies. Fixing up a school or resurfacing the road is something that Iraqi companies can do and are doing. The money for a lot of reconstruction effort, where it has been possible, has been primarily going to Iraqi companies simply because the foreign companies cannot bring people to Iraq to do that work. It is quite dangerous for them and it is more cost effective for Iraqi companies to do that. There is no impression in Iraq that there is a co-ordinated, coherent reconstruction programme that is taking place and many people argue in Iraq that it is not correct to have that because these are long term decisions that affect the long term future of Iraq and these decisions should be left to a government that is elected and seen as fully legitimate.



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**Q141 Chairman:** Is there sufficient money for the reconstruction that needs to be done and, if there is sufficient money, is the difficulty just with dispersing it?

**Mr Said:** There is probably too much money going into reconstruction in Iraq. The problem is the following. The ministries spend the bulk of their money paying salaries and what has been happening with the Iraqi ministries is that they have, especially since June, re-hired all the people that had been fired during the Saddam years. At the same time they are keeping their own staff but sometimes they have been returning Ba'athists to office that they have fired over the last two years. What you have is that each ministry is re-hiring 2,000 or 3,000 people on top of the bureaucratic bloat that they already had during the Saddam years. Therefore, a significant portion of Iraqi budgetary resources have been tied up with paying salaries. As a short term measure in a way it is good; it is keeping the peace, it is keeping lots of Iraqi families funded and supplied, although it is not necessarily a good thing in terms of institution building. On the other side of that you have the billions that have been earmarked by the international community for reconstruction and I do not think there is enough capacity within Iraq to absorb these billions, especially considering the security situation. In a way the solution at this moment is not by committing more resources, especially not committing more resources for large investment projects, but rather improving the absorption capacity in Iraq for these resources. That is not necessarily in terms of the capacity of ministries but is especially in terms of the institutional framework, the political framework and the security programme.

**Q142 Ann Clwyd:** Where were you in Iraq? Did you travel through Iraq?

**Mr Said:** I have been travelling to Iraq every three months since the war and during my first trip I went to the south, to Amara. Recently I have been only travelling to Baghdad, obviously, because of security and because the roads are the most dangerous part of Iraq.

**Q143 Ann Clwyd:** You gave a partial assessment of the security situation and you talked about Sadr City and other parts of Baghdad and other areas. Can you give us a global assessment of the security situation?

**Mr Said:** As you hear on the news, there is widespread violence in Iraq and it is for various reasons. There are many aspects to the violence. A big part of the violence is criminal. There are lots of highway robberies, murders, kidnapping for ransom, extortion. Then there are the terrorists that you hear about, the Al-Qaeda types. Over the last months we have seen a coming together of people associated with Al-Qaeda and some of the remnants of the regime. Part of the insurgency that is quite significant is nationalist Islamic, people who were against Saddam but who are very unhappy not only with the presence of foreign troops but also with the direction in which the new Iraqi government and the

new Iraqi political system seem to be heading, people who are motivated by, for example, religious reasons because they feel that the new Iraqi government is too westernised, people who feel that exiles are playing too big a role in the country. There are people with personal reasons, people who have had someone killed by the Americans or who were mistreated at a checkpoint or who just feel unhappy about the Americans running around. There is a large number of grievances that are not finding political expression and are creating space where violence is thriving. These feed into each other so, for example, a lot of the criminal violence is piggy-backing on the insurgency. When I was in Baghdad a taxi driver had his car car-jacked by two persons who were pretending to be suicide bombers. They started to pray as if they were about to blow themselves up, so he jumped out of the car and they stole the car. What you have is different kinds of violence bolting on to the core of the insurgency and I believe at the end of the day that the core of the insurgency has a legitimate point to it which is the fact that they are people who are unhappy about the fact that Iraq is occupied.

**Q144 Ann Clwyd:** What effect is that going to have on the elections and the legitimacy of the elections?

**Mr Said:** I am moderately optimistic about the elections. Many people in Baghdad, including people who are pro-insurgency, who think that a violent resistance to the occupation is justified, nonetheless intend to vote, to participate in the election. They think that the elections will be flawed, will be far short of what they view as the ideal, but nonetheless they think that the elections will be a step towards full independence, towards the return of self-determination to Iraqis. Literally there was a person who told me, "Maybe I will get one or two people who I believe in into parliament rather than a large faction but maybe in the next round we will get more people in". There is sufficient hope among Iraqis that despite all the problems with the elections they will be a step away from the current chaos. Also, although I have been describing a picture of the insurgency as quite widespread and strong, on the worst day you have in Iraq about 150 or 200 attacks. There are 6,000 or 7,000 polling stations, so even with all the efforts of the insurgents, they will not be able to attack a significant number of polling stations, enough to disrupt the elections in a serious way. That said, I am not listing all the other issues that are very well covered, like Sunni participation in elections. These are all issues that will still be there. I am just trying to describe the elements that make me a little optimistic. Despite the rhetoric people do believe that the Electoral Commission, which was entirely set up by the UN, enjoys a certain legitimacy, definitely more legitimacy than the interim government itself, and the fact that it is in control of the election process gives comfort to at least some of the sceptical among Iraqis about the elections, that at least that part of it will be legitimate. There are other concerns. I am sure you have heard the reports about Alawi's party giving \$100 bills to journalists to give them positive

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coverage, that there are militias in the south that are trying to convince people to participate in the elections and so on. There will be all kinds of violations so it will be very far from an ideal process but many people in Iraq, including those who are opposed to the occupation and to the current government, believe they should participate just to get that step closer to the end goals.

**Q145 Mr Battle:** It is encouraging to hear what you say despite the fact that many candidates cannot reveal their names and that the positions of some polling stations are being kept secret because they might be bombed beforehand. What hope do you hold out after the elections that those Sunnis who refuse to participate will say, "We have had a vote. That is democracy. We will now join in"? Do you see any signs of that at all? Will the elections be a healing or a dividing process?

**Mr Said:** I have been speaking to the Council of Muslim Clerics which is the most influential Sunni institution. It is not a political organisation. It is essentially just formed of the majority of the Sunni clerics in Iraq; it is almost like a trade union. Rhetorically they are quite vehemently opposed to the election; they describe them in the most negative terms, but I know that they quietly have been looking for ways to get back into the political process. I think they will stay out of the elections. I do not think they are campaigning energetically enough for their members not to vote, which is quite a positive sign. In a way it is almost like Hamas and the Palestinian Territories, which does not participate but does not call for a boycott. I think that although they explicitly did not say that, in practice on the ground this is what we are seeing. I think they will not vote. They do not want to be associated with the election, they think it will taint their patriotic Islamic credentials, but at the same time they are looking for ways back. Unfortunately, on the other side we do not see enough movement to meet them halfway. There are people who are currently involved in the political process who feel threatened by these forces that are outside and would rather have them stay outside. They would rather push them further and describe them as terrorists, as bitter-enders and so on for their own political benefit and this is definitely irresponsible. To go back to what will happen after the election, it will depend a lot on what the people in power, who are elected to the parliament, do to reach out to those who have been outside the political process. There is definitely a space for dialogue. There is lots of rhetoric about national dialogue but unfortunately many of the mainstream political parties have been going in the opposite direction, have been going for sectarian and identity politics that are not helpful for resuming dialogue.

**Q146 Tony Worthington:** One of the consequences in the long lead-up to the elections is reports of criminality and corruption increasing. Is that your assessment, and that senior people in the government are rumoured to be involved in corruption as well?

**Mr Said:** I do not have any hard evidence of corruption on a significant scale in the government but if you speak to any Iraqi they are 100 per cent convinced that there is widespread corruption that goes to the highest places. The perception, if not the reality, is of widespread, endemic corruption. Many people that I spoke to in Iraq believe that corruption goes on not only in the government but also in the coalition, in the US and British governments, and with people who are involved in the distribution of funds. I have not seen any evidence of that but everybody I spoke to across the political spectrum strongly believe that there is such corruption. I have seen anecdotal evidence of corruption, such as a minister whose chief of staff is his cousin. The Minister of the Interior has hired about 200 of his relatives to high positions in the government. When he was questioned about it in parliament he said, "Because I trust them". There is anecdotal evidence that points in the direction of corruption. Baghdad and most of Iraq currently are currently suffering from a severe fuel shortage. There is no gas at the gas stations and there is no kerosene for heating. The Baghdad City Council have been accusing the Ministry of Oil that it is corruption at the Ministry of Oil that is causing the shortage, not a real shortage of oil supplies because Baghdad oil products come from a refinery within the city so there is no such thing as saying that there is sabotage on the roads to prevent these products from coming to the gas stations. I have not seen any evidence of that. One suspects that there is scope for corruption because gas in Baghdad filling stations is sold at half a cent a litre and given the lack of gas—Iraq imports a lot of it from Kuwait at what I suspect to be one dollar a litre—obviously there is a space for arbitrage and if there are any commercially-minded people within the Ministry of Oil or anywhere in Iraq, I am sure they will be trying to bridge that gap between the price at the gas station and the money Iraq has paid to buy gas. There are conditions for corruption and again billions of dollars are being spent. My colleagues before spoke about there not being sufficient funds for civil society. I think there is too much money being spent on Iraqi civil society. There is no way that Iraqi civil society can absorb the £10 million that the British Government, for example, has set aside for its development, let alone the \$50 million that the US Government is spending. There are not enough NGOs in Iraq or people capable to work in NGOs that can absorb so much money. I do not know how much NGOs in Britain spend.

**Q147 Tony Worthington:** Let us be quite clear about this strange expression, that there is no way people can absorb so much money. I do not think people have any problem absorbing the money. What you are saying basically is that it is not going to the purpose it was intended for?

**Mr Said:** Yes. Civil society specifically is almost smoke and mirrors. It is about voluntarism, it is about a feeling of participation, it is about debate, it is about dialogue, it is about consensus. It is all these ephemeral things. If you speak about civil society in

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terms of distributing food and blankets, of course you can spend a lot more money on that, but if you talk about civil society in terms of Iraq's engagement in shaping the future, it is something where you can spend £20 or £50 on water bottles and we have a debate and you achieve a lot more than when you spend, for example, and I am guilty of that, £20,000 or £30,000 getting ten Iraqis to Amman, putting them in a five-star hotel and giving them a lecture about fund-raising. There are ways and ways to spend money on developing civil society.

**Q148 Tony Worthington:** There is a sort of irony, when you mentioned the Iraq before, that the major centre of talk in terms of corruption was the oil-for-food programme but there is now no talk about corruption there. Is that just because everybody is being fed by it? How is it being done now? There is this extraordinary operation of the whole country being fed. Is it because everybody is being fed?

**Mr Said:** No. In the oil-for-food programme Iraq was exporting as much oil as it could but could only import food or there was a restricted list of where it could spend the money. What is now happening I think is that most of the Iraqi oil revenues are spent on salaries so there is no space for corruption there. There are monies coming in. Iraqi policemen used to earn two dollars a month. They now earn \$200 a month and there is a lot more of them, so there is no space for that money to be diverted.

**Q149 Tony Worthington:** There is always space for something to be diverted.

**Mr Said:** I am sure there is some diversion but it is on a much smaller scale. In the oil-for-food programme the whole idea was that Saddam was trying to milk it for his own benefit. What I found out is that that very corruption that was inside Saddam's efforts to utilise the oil-for-food programme was destroying the regime because it turned the regime into gangs that were competing for these diverted funds and although Saddam thought that some of these funds were going towards his chemical and biological weapons programme, in reality they were all going into various pockets of his cronies who were fighting real wars with each other.

**Q150 Tony Worthington:** When you get a disruption and you cut people out of the food chain, you know, you have got gangs who are dependent on the income, where have they gone now because they have no longer got their income? Where are they getting their income from?

**Mr Said:** A lot of the people at the top of the food chain have left the country. A lot of the people who were involved in the billions of dollars that were being diverted are people sitting in Damascus and in Amman and there is a real-estate boom in those countries because of that. As for the minions, the henchmen, the people involved in that, as I have described, there are wide criminal networks involved in smuggling, in sabotage, in kidnapping people, in

highway robberies and such activities, but the real big thieves, the big robber barons, are sitting in Damascus and Amman.

**Q151 Tony Worthington:** Let us go on to something different. In all these conflicts where there has been terrible oppression and massive abuse of human rights in a previous regime, it is always thought that there has somehow got to be closure at the end of it, there has to be some kind of reconciliation or a sense of justice. How do you assess the way in which the crimes of the former regime are going to be dealt with?

**Mr Said:** There is a semi-official process, which is the Memorial Foundation that is run by Kanaan Makiya, which I think has received significant funds from the US administration and has also received access to almost all the documents that are being collected around the country and have been collected around the country about the regime. Unfortunately, this process, viewed from Baghdad, lacks transparency; it is not public enough and therefore is not serving its purpose. In a way, somebody sitting in New York and London collecting all these documents and analysing them, and I am sure they are making an admirable effort in that, is not giving Iraqis a sense of closure. This is one of the missed opportunities, I think, of the last two years, in other words, trying to develop a system for truth and reconciliation, a system of somehow holding the henchmen of the regime accountable without creating a whole group of Iraqis who feel targeted, without turning it into a witch-hunt. Now, unfortunately, because of the way the US has been using all the regime's crimes in its rhetoric, even that process has been discredited. Because it has been left, because every time you speak of grievances about what is going on today, the US Embassy answers you with quite correct stuff about mass graves and crimes against humanity committed by Saddam, somehow that noble memory is being tainted by the occupation. Somewhere down the road we will go back to these documents that are being collected now and this evidence and get it out into a transparent public process.

**Q152 Tony Worthington:** But you are not optimistic that that can be done now?

**Mr Said:** It is definitely not happening now. Unfortunately, the court for Saddam Hussein's henchmen has been quite disorganised and definitely lacks transparency, definitely lacks the legitimacy that one hopes for from such a court. I think it was a mistake not to set up an international court because Iraq definitely does not have the capacity to prosecute the crime of aggression, for example, as in the case of Kuwait, let alone other crimes that Saddam's henchmen are being prosecuted for. Unfortunately this is a missed opportunity and it will be doubly difficult to do it again correctly some time down the road than had it been done correctly from the beginning. This is a very important question because one of the main mistakes that everyone agrees has been committed by the Bremer government was, for example, the dissolution of the

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army, or the de-Ba'athification. These are both measures that have been taken because nobody had the patience to set up a truth and reconciliation process which would have been a lot better transitional justice process at weeding the criminals, the Ba'athists, out of the system than a blanket dismissal of the entire army or of the three top echelons of the Ba'ath party.

**Q153 Ann Clwyd:** It would have been better had the UN set up an international war crimes tribunal. I think that is the major mistake. The UN did not grasp that opportunity.

**Mr Said:** Unfortunately, I know that the UN was quite keen to do that and it was the US and some other countries that were in coalition with the US that were opposed to it. I made a mistake there.

**Chairman:** Thank you very much. My impression also was that the UN wanted to do it but was not allowed to by the US. Thank you very much for some really helpful insights, all the more helpful because you have recent experience of being in Iraq.

**Thursday 10 March 2005**

Members present:

Tony Baldry, in the Chair

John Barrett  
Mr John Battle  
Mr Tony Colman

Mr Quentin Davies  
Tony Worthington

*Witnesses:* **Rt Hon Hilary Benn**, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for International Development, **Mr Michael Anderson**, Head, Middle East and North Africa Department, and **Mr David Hallam**, Iraq Senior Programme Manager, Department for International Development, examined.

**Q154 Chairman:** On Iraq we will produce a report for the end of this Parliament but it is unfinished business and who knows what will happen in the next Parliament, but I think the thinking of those in this Parliament is that the sort of work the Committee should do in the next Parliament is looking generically at post-conflict reconstruction which will then enable us not just to look at Iraq, although that is important work, but also to revisit in policy terms, not necessarily physically, places like Afghanistan, Syria, Rwanda and so forth. On Iraq it seems that DFID is doing two tasks. In the south, in Basra, you are doing reconstruction work and poverty reduction and in Baghdad you are doing political participation, good governance, and capacity building—slightly different things. You have now got Lindy Cameron who is trying to hold all that together. Do you see these almost as different programmes? How do you see the future? Is DFID's longer term role in Iraq going to be good governance and Afghanistan or is it going to be reconstruction or is it going to be a bit of both indefinitely?

**Hilary Benn:** I would not say I see these as separate bits because what we are seeking to do in Iraq is about addressing particular needs that the country has got. It is a very complex situation for reasons everybody understands. We are certainly working towards a time when Iraq can do it for itself. That is what working on fixing the infrastructure is about. We are working in the south because there is a big issue of poverty there, and this is a country, of course, as we know, which has been impoverished as well as brutalised and traumatised by what has happened to it over the last 35 years, but it is also a country with an enormous amount of capacity, natural wealth and so on but has suffered grievously, and if the politics get fixed then Iraq should be able to get on with it relatively quickly. That is a big "if" because of all the factors that we are acutely conscious of. I think both of those are contributing to Iraq being a country that can do it for itself, but in the meantime dealing with the real consequences there have been in terms of increased poverty, increased infant mortality and, of course, in the south this is the part of the country that has suffered a lot and where poverty has been greatest.

**Q155 Mr Davies:** Perhaps I can start off, Secretary of State, by saying that I had a fascinating trip there together with two colleagues. I was extremely favourably struck by two things and came back very

encouraged by those two things. There are two other observations I am going to put to you which perhaps are more problematic. The first thing I was encouraged about was the progress being made in reconstruction and in helping the nascent Iraqi administration build up its own capability. I think those things are very encouraging from the point of view of achieving successful stability and democracy in Iraq in a reasonable timescale. The second thing that struck me, quite surprisingly but very favourably, was the very good co-operation on the ground between DFID personnel and the military. Both come from what you might expect to be rather different cultures and I was very favourably struck by that. In fact, one general told me that he would like to have someone from DFID on his staff at the beginning of the planning stage of such an operation in the future, which I think you should take as a compliment. The two things that I thought were a bit problematic were that both you and the MoD have budgets in the general area of reconstruction. The MoD spend theirs on what they call quick impact projects and they often have a force protection aspect, that is to say, to make people happy so you have got so many people lobbing bombs at our troops, but I suppose any successful reconstruction, development or even relief programme might lead to that so these distinctions are not absolute. Of course, DFID have their own programmes for consultancy, relief and reconstruction, as the Chairman has just said. In practice, because of the good working co-operation on the ground, there is quite a lot of flexibility I noticed, and at least on one occasion DFID was prepared to take over the funding of one of the programmes conceived and run by the military when that came to an end and that was splendid. I nevertheless thought that in principle this was a distinction which could lead to bad decisions, could lead to some muddle, and it meant that the British taxpayers' money which was being spent on Iraq was not being spent in a seamless way but was being artificially divided up into two different budgets. Finally, and this is also a problematic phenomenon which I will put to you, it is quite clear to me that a lot of the money being spent by DFID is quite inconsistent with the principles in the 1998 Act of Parliament which governs your existence, which says that you can only spend money on poverty reduction because a lot of the money is being spent, and I think very sensibly spent, on capacity building, that is to say, advice, consultancy to the

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Iraqi administration. The Adam Smith Institute, for example, has a contract from DFID to help restructure some of the Iraqi ministries, in fact physically restructure them, even suggesting how the minister's office should be laid out, I discovered, but, most importantly, of course, what kind of tasks, what kind of functions, what kind of capabilities were required and giving advice on decision-making procedures and so forth, but it is not poverty reduction except by an extraordinary leap of the imagination. Equally, there is a park being built in Basra. It is very nice. It is a heritage kind of project in the sense that hopefully years hence this particular facility will be associated with the British presence there. It was not exactly poverty reduction. I am extremely glad in practice that you are not being hidebound by the Act which supposedly governs you but as a parliamentarian I have to point out to you the anomaly between the theory and the practice.

**Hilary Benn:** First of all, I would not accept that we were doing anything, indeed I would be very alarmed as Secretary of State if it were suggested that it was the case, that was inconsistent with the International Development Act and, secondly, with respect, I would not agree with the suggestion that capacity building has got nothing to do with poverty reduction. Indeed, if one looks at DFID's programmes, not just in Iraq but in lots of other places, we do a huge amount of capacity building. Why? Because having states that work, states that function, governments that can do their job, is absolutely fundamental to improving services and the lives of poor people. One of the consequences of 35 years of trauma and brutalisation in Iraq is the very limited capacity of government to do that. We see very clearly the impact on poverty in terms of some of the social indicators I was talking about, the fact that 60% of Iraqis are dependent on the food ration system. That tells you a lot about how the country has suffered. The other very strong argument for doing the capacity building work is, as this money is available, not just from the UK but from other international donors, the thing that has not yet been got right is for there to be a system within Iraq that enables the political system to divide that money up and to use it for the purposes that people want in different places. In other words, the connections are not yet there between, say, the governor of a province, who wants to be able to get access to the international money to help with reconstruction. I hope that following the elections on 30 January there will be a clear understanding of the need to build that but I make no apology at all for doing capacity building work because I think it is fundamental to tackling the basic problem, particularly in the south, which is that of poverty, and I am grateful for what you say about the other observations to do with what you think is working well, particularly the relations with the military, which I would concur on.

**Q156 Mr Davies:** We totally agree, Secretary of State, that the capacity building job is a very necessary one and a very useful one and it contributes to stability and, of course, the extent to

which it contributes to better government there may be some impact on poverty. My point is this, that the 2002 Act was supposed to represent a change, indeed a sea change. It was supposed to be very limiting in terms of the things that DFID and previously the ODA could spend money on. In actual fact, any international aid agency would wish to be involved to some extent in relief work, in development work, in capacity building work, and that was the case with the ODA beforehand. It continues to be the case that pragmatically you do a very wide range of things. I do not think the 2002 Act in fact has changed anything at all. It has not restricted, thank heaven, and I am very glad, your capacity to do things which only indirectly or at one or two removes can be regarded as being relevant to the relief of poverty. That is the point I am making, so if you like you should take it as a compliment that you have not been constrained by this Act in the way that the propaganda at the time the Act was passed would have indicated you might have been.

**Hilary Benn:** I do not think it was a question of propaganda at the time. It was about focusing our effort and in particular what the Act has closed off, of course, is taking decisions to give aid in the interests of Britain where, as we know in one particular very famous case which went to court, you end up being hopelessly confused as to why you have taken decisions. Was it because that was what the country needed based on an objective assessment, or was it because that was what was in Britain's interests to do at the time? Of course, the other big change there has been the untying of our aid which we did in April 2001. I think we would have a different interpretation of what the Act was about and I think capacity building is very important.

**Mr Colman:** Can I say that I was one of the three members that went to Iraq. Mr Davies, of course, you have heard from, and the others were Ann Clwyd and myself. I would like to thank everybody in DFID in Iraq and in the MoD in Iraq who did so much to facilitate our movement around Iraq and what we could see. Can I say to you, Chair, that Lindy Cameron was doing considerably more than trying to hold together, if you like, I think those were your words, the situation between Baghdad and Basra and there was in fact very strong co-ordination and very strong leadership from her. She is on a well-deserved holiday at the moment but we were extremely impressed by her and her staff. The argument, Secretary of State, that has been put forward, perhaps gently, by Mr Davies we explored fully when we were there and Miss Cameron made it very clear that she was operating within the International Development Act of 2002 and those of us who were there other than Mr Davies concurred with that. I perhaps saw it from the other end of the telescope which was to see, extraordinarily, that the work of the MoD was very much pro-poor development. The example that was given by Mr Davies of DFID was of taking over a particular operation in Al-Amara, which was in fact the appointment of street sweepers, the very poorest of the poor, where it was important to have a bridge between the MoD financing of the street sweepers

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and the local elected authority taking over responsibility for those street sweepers, was a very good example of the MoD operating on a pro-poor policy and we continue in a pro-poor policy. Mr Davies is smiling, I think in concurrence of that, and clearly the park in Basra was very much for the poor of Basra. It was certainly not for the wealthy.

**Chairman:** We have established that. The accounting officer is not going to have any objection about where this money has been spent so far.

**Q157 Mr Colman:** I have a question for the Secretary of State which is that perhaps one of the things which we found very interesting there was the way that the MoD had in fact worked on a pro-poor development programme over the recent years and months in a way that amazed all three of us, to see the excellent work they were doing, and clearly they were highly influenced by the work of DFID and is this in fact one of the very good outcomes coming out of Iraq?

**Hilary Benn:** I think it is. Let us be absolutely straight about the situation that we found ourselves in. DFID has come into Iraq and done things that traditionally we would not do. Let us be honest. Why? Because that was what was required in the circumstances. We had to dust down some skills and the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit is one of the lessons from this: can we be more effective in future? That is the first thing. We genuinely value the working relationship with the MoD. I think we have learned things from each other. You are reflecting some of the DFID experience rubbing off on the MoD. One of the things that I have learned about the MoD very forcefully is that they have got this fantastic capacity to get on and do things. It is an intensely practical, extremely able organisation. We need each other; that is the third lesson. This is a difficult and dangerous place to work. One of the things we have had to spend a lot of money on, of course, has been security for our staff. Immediately after the UN bombing the first thing I did was to take decisions about buying more armoured vehicles and armed guards—absolutely right and proper—and some of the things we have not been able to do have been because of the security situation. Therefore, we have had to reflect and find other ways to spend the money, other things to get on with. It is a quite unusual set of circumstances but I do think that we have a lot to learn from each other and I think that that kind of close working relationship with the MoD is to everybody's benefit because you work out in the end that whatever stereotypical views one had of the other and *vice versa* is not the case and if we understand what each of us is trying to do we are going to have a better outcome than would have been the case if we did not.

**Q158 Mr Davies:** Secretary of State, it may be a little bit early to ask this question but I am sure you are already thinking about how we are going to measure the impact of our activities in Iraq and see what value for money we have been able to generate. As you say, security has been very expensive. I think about a third of the budget has been spent on security, which obviously reduces the amount which

can be spent on purchasing direct outputs for the benefit of Iraqis. I just wondered what sort of criteria you were going to use to see how we were achieving good value there and also what you felt about sustainability. Do you feel that we have now made sufficient progress with the programme which we announced in Madrid? Do you think that at the end of that programme we will still need to be in Iraq? Do you think that some of the consultancy or development work will require more than two or three years to come to fruition or do you think that we shall be able to hand over entirely to the indigenous Iraqi administration, and hopefully within that timescale the military will then no longer need to be present in Iraq? Indeed, if I can make this final observation, it seemed to me to be extremely useful when discussing matters with Iraqi politicians to say as British politicians that one of our concerns was to get back our troops as soon as possible, because that changes the argument altogether. Once you say that they tend to say, "Do not go too soon, please. We need you", but if they assume that we are going to be there for ever of course the pace is relaxed and they do not necessarily take the difficult decisions that need to be taken to get their own operation up to speed.

**Hilary Benn:** We can assess different things in different ways, obviously. There are the very tangible, practical outcomes of improving the water supply system or restoring electricity or the emergency infrastructure project, which we started in the autumn of 2003, because other things that had been promised from other sources did not materialise and we thought we had better get on with this and we put that together very quickly in those circumstances, and you can see the results. You have got additional generating capacity, power lines have been restored and so on, although there is a propensity on the part of some people to try and blow them up again. That is part of the difficult circumstances in which people are working. That is tangible. Also tangible are the days of work we are in the process of creating, job creation schemes, to try and deal with the very high level of unemployment. You can count those days, those we have already contracted that have happened and those that we are in the process of contracting. We are just about to start a further infrastructure project worth £40 million in the south to try and get better fuel distribution, more reliable electricity supply, practical things like that, so there is a pretty hard way of assessing those. With capacity building it is more a qualitative judgment. How do we do that? People go and visit and review. You will write, in the jargon, an Output to Purpose Review which will look at what you were trying to achieve and what has happened. We have been funding, for example, the training courses for judges and lawyers. We have had media training. There is a lot of civil society organisations that we have given capacity building support to through our two participation funds, so you can assess those. I think the most difficult question to answer is how is the government itself performing in being able to do the job that anybody looks to government to achieve. I have to say there

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that up until now there have been problems in making good connections between the international money that is available for reconstruction and people in different parts of Iraq understanding how they can get access to it. You have the Minister of Planning, who has been the focal point, the point of contact, between the Iraqi administration and the international donors, but I have found a lot of Iraqis that I have met will come and say, "We are not seeing that money. Can you come and do things with us bilaterally?". The case for capacity building is that in the end we do not want the system to work like that. We do not want people to come and have parallel conversations with lots of ministers from different countries. We want them to construct a system so they can have their own political arguments about how they are going to divide up the cash, like any country. That is not yet working effectively. One hopes that with the elections that took place, the emergence of politics, the formation of the new government, we are going to see that happen in time. As I said in answer to an earlier question, if that works and the violence subsides and so on, then there is no doubt that Iraq is a country that has the capacity to get on and do it for itself without the international community having to be there in the same way that we have had to be there up until now.

**Q159 Mr Davies:** That is very convincing and very sensible. Meantime I think you are right to deal with local administrations. We saw it in Basra and Al-Amara where, incidentally, we met the governor, and you are dealing with him and not trying to go through the intermediation of Baghdad. Can I ask you whether, because of the difficult security situation, and you have told us about the measures you had to take, which inevitably means you have not been able to disburse money as rapidly as you might otherwise have been able to do and perhaps you have not been able to disburse it as effectively or do all the things you could otherwise have done, was it was sensible in retrospect to front-load the money that we allocated at Madrid quite to that extent and whether it would not have been better perhaps to have spent a little bit less or planned to spend a little bit less in the beginning and then increase the sums available subsequently?

**Hilary Benn:** Obviously there was an understandable desire at the time to get support and help in quickly. Compared with that moment when the Madrid Conference took place, the security situation got worse subsequently, but we were not to know that was the case. With the money we are spending bilaterally I think we have been pretty creative in finding ways of using it to good effect, working through Iraqi companies and organisations. The security threat is not just for the international staff because there are also threats made against Iraqi partner organisations.

**Mr Davies:** Very much so.

**Hilary Benn:** And you will be very, very acutely conscious of that. Indeed, having mentioned the Planning Minister, of course there was the assassination attempt which has just been reported this morning. There are a lot of very, very brave

people: Iraqis and, of course, our staff who are all volunteers and do a quite magnificent job, I have to say. I think there is one area where there has been particular difficulty and that has been the trust funds. We put a significant amount of money, as did others, into the UN and the World Bank trust funds but both have had difficulty getting going because of the security situation. The UN, scarred by the bombing, is understandably reluctant. We have seen in recent times the UN money beginning to move after a long period. The World Bank money, in my view, is not moving with sufficient speed and currently we are engaged in quite vigorous discussions with the World Bank about what we are going to do in those circumstances because there is no point having money stuck, committed to projects that are planned but which you cannot deliver on the ground. I think it is perfectly legitimate in those circumstances to say, "Things have changed, you have got a difficulty. If you cannot spend it this way, can we find another way of doing it?"

**Mr Davies:** I think that makes a lot of sense, Secretary of State. Perhaps I could be a bit less diplomatic than you need to be as a member of Government. I thought that the UN's attitude was extremely disappointing. I understand they were traumatised by the murder of Sergio Vieira de Mello and so forth but it seems to me that if, as you rightly say, there are a lot of brave people in Iraq—Iraqis, Americans and British doing a job, and we ourselves were in the Green Zone for a while, there are a very large number of British DFID employees and contractors working there—and if they are able to do that in those circumstances then for the life of me I really cannot see why the UN and agencies cannot be there. Frankly, I think if they do not go back there very soon they will be open to being accused of being excessively pusillanimous and really letting down the world by being excessively cautious and worried about the security situation when others have been setting a much better example, including us.

**Chairman:** That leads in to a question from Mr Battle.

**Q160 Mr Battle:** I welcome the comments you made about the trust funds because it may be the case of making other suggestions. If the UN cannot use the money perhaps you could get it back from them and spend it yourselves. If I could come to one other area of budgeting, DFID, as well as giving a substantial amount to the UN, also gives money to the British Council and has given them the task of administering the Civil Society Fund and the Political Participation Fund. Are you confident that is—how shall I put it—reaching the parts that it ought to reach and that some of the poorest groups which are trying to build up capacity are getting the benefit of that money? Are you confident in the distribution system of the British Council, if you like, to make sure that funding is spent well?

**Hilary Benn:** If you look at the list of projects that have been supported<sup>1</sup>, I think that money is being used to very good effect. There have been some

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difficulties in getting it going and running right, to be very honest with you, which I think we are in the process of overcoming. That was partly to do with having the right people in the right place in order to make sure that happened for some of the same reasons I have alluded to that created difficulties for other organisations. It was not perfect to start with but I think it is getting better. If you look at the list of organisations which are getting supported, I think that is very good use of the money in helping organisations on the ground. In this thriving civil society, which there is now in Iraq, and we tend to focus, understandably so, on all of the bad things that came out when the lid came off, there is a lot of fantastic good stuff coming out as people adjust to a new society in which there are things they are worried about but they do not have to be terrified about what traumatised them for 35 years.

**Q161 John Barrett:** You mentioned in relation to the tsunami that one of the key things DFID had to do was to make its commitment based on an assessment of needs. Obviously there are different issues in relation to Iraq but one area that there has been a lot of controversy over is the counting of Iraqi casualties. There was a report in *The Lancet* which the Government dismissed because the Government said “We get our information from the Iraqi Ministry of Health”, but is it not the case that there has been no great effort put into assessing the number of Iraqi casualties which is something DFID should have done in order to calculate just what impact DFID needed to have on the ground? Without that information DFID are not able to assess what would be their priorities.

**Hilary Benn:** Of course there has been a great debate about that but I would not say that DFID needed to try to do that. It is a very difficult task for reasons that others much better qualified than I have explained. I do not think I would agree that this was a necessity in order to enable DFID to make a proper assessment of how we were going to spend our money. Regardless of the number of casualties there have been, and there have been a large number but nobody knows for sure, the need to get the water and power supplies back up and running, to provide employment, although there is good economic growth in Iraq and that is one of the other things one should note, putting money in to help schools and hospitals get back up and running, build capacity, all of those things are required regardless of whether there is an accurate count or not.

**John Barrett:** Without an accurate count, apart from the Iraqi Ministry of Health, there is no indication of the scale of that particular problem. Whether it is DFID pressure from the UK Government or the UK in conjunction with the US government, there seems to have been a lack of drive to pursue that particular issue.

**Chairman:** I think the Secretary of State has answered that question.

**Q162 Mr Colman:** Before I ask my substantive question, can I briefly return to John Battle’s point. Ann Clwyd is not able to be here this afternoon, but

she is immensely experienced in terms of Iraq and she has expressed to us again and again her concern that perhaps the British Council either were not the appropriate mechanism for disbursing aid, or that they could adopt new practices, particularly to ensure that Iraqi based NGOs were able to apply for help for their organisations. Secretary of State, could I perhaps ask for a paper to review this mechanism and you might want to come back to us before we publish our report because this was something which we pursued and were concerned that lessons should be learnt on<sup>2</sup>. My question is about donor co-ordination. After the United Nations withdrew from Iraq, what mechanisms did DFID develop to ensure co-ordination between itself and other donors in Iraq? What lessons have been learnt about donor co-ordination from DFID’s experiences in Iraq? The example that we had when we were there was that DFID particularly did not work in a major way within the justice and human rights sector because previously they had been told that the Americans were going to put \$20 million into this sector and subsequently they did not. Do you believe there are lessons that could be learnt in terms of how donor co-ordination should go forward?

**Hilary Benn:** There are always lessons in those circumstances. There is the International Donor Committee, those are the meetings set up under the trust fund, and we are part of that. There is the core group of donors, those who pledged \$150 million or more at the Madrid pledging meeting. There are the co-ordination mechanisms in the south, in particular the Southern Iraq Reconstruction Steering Group, and then there are the Iraqi mechanisms that have been put in place. They have worked reasonably well. Of course there have been some difficulties and I have referred to the problems within the Iraqi system of making sure that all parts of Iraq understand how the international donor assistance works and where you need to go to try and get hold of some of that money, and that is about internal politics. We have done quite a lot on human rights.

**Q163 Mr Colman:** Justice and human rights, the training of judges, the training of magistrates.

**Hilary Benn:** Yes, we have done quite a lot. I did not quite understand the premise that somehow we had steered away from there because we thought somebody else was doing it.

**Q164 Mr Colman:** This has come up in our discussions.

**Hilary Benn:** We have gone along and done quite a lot. I am sure you have a list of what we have done.

**Q165 Chairman:** I know there are some Iraqi judges in the UK this week, are there not?

**Hilary Benn:** And they are being trained.

**Q166 Mr Colman:** Secretary of State, previously we were informed that \$20 million was committed from the US but they withdrew that funding for that

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sector and that was the reason I brought it up. Perhaps you could ask your officials to look into this because clearly if we were wrongly informed then that is something we need to correct in our report.

**Mr Anderson:** I can give you an answer now. The US has done quite a lot of reprioritising driven largely by security concerns and the inability to get people on the ground, so they have made an attempt to move money from programmes that are more difficult to implement to programmes which they can implement and this was part of that process. \$20 million is quite a substantial sum when compared with the DFID framework. In our view, the amount of money we are putting into the justice sector and human rights at the moment is appropriate in the larger strategy we are pursuing. The decision by the United States to change their strategy did not invalidate the strategy that we were already pursuing.

**Q167 Mr Colman:** I have to ask, were you consulted in terms of this change in the US strategy to be able to consider whether you wished to change our strategy as a result of that?

**Mr Anderson:** We were in the core group, and there are telephone conversations every month among all of the larger core donors, and we were informed of the US changes in prioritisation. We did not go into detail in all of them because there were quite a large number but we knew that the decrease in funding for the justice sector would be one of them. We chose not to change our thinking because we did not feel that we had the extra funding to fill that gap.

**Q168 Chairman:** Secretary of State, this is clearly unfinished business for us all. We have not really asked any questions about the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit which I understand is not yet operational, so to speak, we would hope that the Committee in the next Parliament can focus on this. I think there are some issues we have not explored this afternoon, like what is DFID's role in Geneva Convention type stuff and after occupation and all those kinds of things but those are issues we can discuss later in the year, hopefully, depending on where we all are.

**Hilary Benn:** Okay.

**Q169 Chairman:** Secretary of State, thank you very much for having been here this afternoon.

**Hilary Benn:** Thank you very much.

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# Written evidence

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## Memorandum submitted by the Department for International Development

### 1. INTRODUCTION

1. This Memorandum aims to address the questions raised by the Committee in announcing this Inquiry on 21 July. It focuses on the role of DFID and of the wider donor community, since the end of major hostilities in April 2003. The final section provides a brief overview of current progress on reconstruction.

### 2. DFID PROGRAMME IN IRAQ, APRIL 2003 TO OCTOBER 2004

2. DFID's current strategy for Iraq is set out in the Interim Country Assistance Plan, which was published in February 2004. Its development goal is an inclusive, Iraqi-led reconstruction process which brings sustained benefits to all citizens, particularly the poor and vulnerable. Its three primary objectives are:

- To promote rapid, sustainable and equitable economic growth.
- To encourage effective and accountable governance.
- To promote social and political cohesion and stability.

3. The principal elements of DFID's programme in Iraq, as it has evolved since April 2003, have been as follows:

- (a) The initial priorities were to ensure an effective response to humanitarian needs arising from the 2003 conflict, and then to begin supporting the process of reconstruction.
- (b) From the end of the 2003 conflict until the handover to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) on 28 June 2004, DFID contributed advisers to the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and then to its successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
- (c) Beginning in the summer of 2003, DFID developed a programme to support the regeneration of the southern four Governorates, amongst the poorest parts of Iraq, and to restore their links with the centre.
- (d) DFID has also developed a "National Programme" primarily to provide advice to the new IIG on core central government functions, and also to promote Iraqi civil society and political participation.
- (e) Multilaterally, DFID has worked to strengthen international support for Iraq's reconstruction, and has contributed £70 million to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) to enable the World Bank and United Nations to assist in a wide range of sectors.

4. These elements are described in more detail in the following sections. A summary list of the projects funded is at annex 1.

#### (a) 2003 humanitarian assistance through the UN, ICRC and NGOs

5. The primary objectives of DFID's humanitarian assistance in 2003 were to ensure that the international community was sufficiently prepared to avert any major humanitarian crisis arising from the 2003 conflict, and to assist in the restoration of essential services after the conflict. DFID contributed £85 million towards the humanitarian and reconstruction operations of UN Agencies in response to appeals launched in March and June 2003. DFID committed £32 million to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (IRRC) movement in 2003, £18 million of which has been disbursed, primarily to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Some of this has subsequently been carried forward into 2004 due to IRRC's inability to operate within the deteriorating security situation. This assistance has provided emergency rehabilitation and repair work at vital health, water and sanitation facilities serving millions of people throughout the country. We are considering with the ICRC and the IFRCs to what extent further support may be needed. £7.2 million was also provided to NGOs for their post conflict humanitarian work in Iraq, in sectors including: health, nutrition, water and sanitation, food, agriculture, security, mines action, media, humanitarian co-ordination and information, displaced people, power, fuel, education, and human rights.

6. The UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs were able to set up effective humanitarian operations quickly after the end of the major conflict in 2003, using their previous experience of working in Iraq and established local networks with capacity to deliver assistance on the ground. The deteriorating security situation since mid-2003, particularly following the UN and ICRC bombings, has resulted in a significant reduction in the numbers of their international (non-Iraqi) staff able to work in Iraq. This has caused some slowing down of the implementation of assistance programmes. However, many organisations' Iraqi staff have continued to operate discreetly, and effectively, and assistance has been channelled through emerging Iraqi NGOs and private sector companies. International NGOs have also retained a stronger presence in Kurdish-controlled areas where they have been able to operate more easily and have a good track record.

**(b) Support for the Coalition Provisional Authority**

7. From mid-2003 until 28 June 2004, DFID contributed to the provision of qualified personnel to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to support its work towards the effective reconstruction of Iraq. About £28 million was spent on this programme, and related security costs.

8. In the CPA headquarters in Baghdad, DFID provided 24 personnel. The posts included the CPA Director of Operations, and advisers to the Ministries of Finance, Municipalities and Public Works, Trade, Industry and Minerals, and Planning and Development Co-operation. DFID advisers to the CPA also worked on food security, gender and migration issues.

9. In southern Iraq, DFID provided over 40 technical experts to the regional office of the CPA in Basra between October 2003 and June 2004. Key subject areas included infrastructure services (power, fuel and water), health, education, social policy and welfare, agriculture and transport. Advisers worked closely with senior provincial officials from the four southern governorates over this period. This work enabled DFID to develop sound local working relations early on in the reconstruction process and to deepen its understanding of the problems facing some of the poorest areas of Iraq.

**(c) DFID programme in southern Iraq**

10. In addition to the deployment of DFID staff and consultants to the CPA in southern Iraq, DFID's main priority in the south prior to the handover of power to the IIG was the restoration of essential infrastructure. This work included an Emergency Infrastructure Programme focusing on the reinstatement of infrastructure for power, fuel, and water supplies, as well as sewerage systems; and other projects focused on the refurbishment of public sector buildings. The majority of this work has now been completed. It cost US\$100 million, of which US\$ 66 million was met from the Development Fund for Iraq and US\$34 million by DFID. The programme was managed in close collaboration with the Iraqis and UK forces. It helped to stabilise infrastructure in the south and make some improvements before the arrival of larger investments from the US Supplemental and, in the longer term, Iraq's own budget and the private sector.

11. The longer-term challenges to reducing the high levels of poverty in the south are to promote economic recovery and to build political and other links between the south and the centre. A priority will be to strengthen Iraqi capacity to ensure that the flows of financial resources coming into the region over the next two years are used well and are targeted at sustainable and inclusive economic growth. DFID has agreed a new capacity building programme for the four governorates in southern Iraq, worth £20.5 million over two years. The programme will help the southern governorates to plan and manage reconstruction funding. The implementation of this programme in the Governorates of Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan is currently being hindered by the poor security situation. The programme is continuing in these areas through management from Basra and day visits to the other three governorates. DFID is also financing (over a six month period from July 2004) a £16.5 million programme to assist employment generation and to provide a facility to deal with potential critical failures in essential services.

12. Other DFID support in the south includes the development an effective media through a £6.7 million project being undertaken by the BBC World Service Trust; and a one-year project to support de-mining. Some of DFID's national programme work will also benefit the south, including the funds for political participation and civil society capacity building.

**(d) The "National Programme"**

13. DFID is working at the national level in Iraq to support the development of public policies and reforms which benefit the poor and strengthen public administration, based on the three Country Assistance Plan objectives:

*(i) Promote rapid, sustainable and equitable economic growth*

14. DFID has a £3 million programme to assist the IIG in the design and implementation of essential economic reform programmes, which will also help Iraq in its negotiations for a debt-reduction package. DFID has also provided over £3 million towards an IMF technical assistance package for Iraq. This support has provided training for Iraqi officials in a wide range of public financial management areas. These programmes have helped to facilitate agreement to an IMF Emergency Post Conflict programme, which is an important precursor to debt reduction negotiations in the Paris Club. DFID has also provided around £8.5 million towards an International Finance Corporation (IFC) finance facility for small and medium enterprises in Iraq. This facility aims to strengthen the capacity of Iraqi financial institutions and provide much needed finance to the Iraqi private sector.

*(ii) Encourage effective and accountable governance*

15. DFID's £3 million Emergency Public Administration Programme is providing technical support to the Iraqi Prime Minister's Office, other government institutions and three ministries which are key for reconstruction: Finance, Municipalities and Public Works, and Planning and Development Co-operation. The project aims to build the foundations for a modern professional and accountable civil service. DFID is also exploring how we can help strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In the justice sector, a £2 million project is providing training to the judiciary, prosecution and bar association; and a £1 million project with the Institute of War and Peace Reporting is providing training for journalists to help develop independent and effective news media.

*(iii) Promote social and political cohesion and stability*

16. DFID has established a Political Participation Fund (PPF) which aims to increase opportunities for participation by Iraqi citizens in the political process; and a Civil Society Support Fund (CSSF) which focuses on strengthening the capacity of Iraqi civil society organisations. Each fund, worth £5 million includes elements to promote gender equity.

**(e) Multilateral Assistance: IRFFI**

17. The International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), was set up in December 2003 by the United Nations and World Bank. It provides bilateral donors with a means of channelling their contributions towards Iraq's reconstruction priorities in a co-ordinated manner, and reduces the transaction costs to the Iraqi Government of dealing with many different donors with their own individual priorities and procedures.

18. In March 2004, DFID made a £70 million contribution to IRFFI: £30 million to the trust fund managed by the United Nations, and £40 million to the World Bank's. For the UN, we stipulated that our contribution should go towards DFID priority sectors, including primary and secondary education, health, water and sanitation, electricity supply, refugees and governance. In September 2004, in response to an urgent request, we allocated US\$10 million of our £30 million contribution specifically to meet security costs for the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq. Our contribution to the World Bank's fund is not earmarked to specific sectors or projects. A decision on any further contributions will be based on an assessment of progress made, requirements for 2005 and resources available in DFID's Iraq programme.

19. Overall, donors have committed just over US\$1 billion to IRFFI: US\$400 million to the World Bank's trust fund and US\$600 million to the UN's. The biggest contributors are Japan (US\$490 million), European Commission (US\$192 million), UK (US\$120 million) and Canada (US\$75 million). A full list of donors and their contributions is attached at annex 2.

20. The UN has approved projects worth a total of US\$377 million, covering all regions of Iraq in sectors including health, education, water and sanitation, and infrastructure. Implementation has begun on several of them. The UN's pipeline of projects under preparation will absorb all the finance currently available. In addition to IRFFI-funded projects, the UN is continuing to implement projects for which finance was provided during 2003 under the emergency appeals for Iraq. Over US\$100 million was disbursed in the first half of 2004, including emergency support for people affected by the fighting in cities such as Fallujah and Najaf.

21. Two World Bank projects are currently underway: over 600 Iraqi officials have received training; and approximately 40,000 textbooks have been delivered. Projects are under preparation in education, urban infrastructure, water and sanitation, health and private sector development.

22. The lack of an international presence in Iraq of either the UN (until very recently) or the World Bank has inevitably slowed project identification, approval and implementation, and has inhibited the development of normal contacts with the Iraqi government. The UN and World Bank have made considerable efforts to overcome these difficulties through remote-working links with their Iraqi national staff, focusing on work that can be implemented by Iraqis and the private sector, using teleconferencing, and hosting coordination and planning meetings in Amman. Pending the return of international staff, DFID has contracted liaison officers to represent the UN and the World Bank in Baghdad.

23. DFID plays an active role in the IRFFI Donor Committee which provides strategic supervision of the funds. Its next meeting is in Tokyo on 13–14 October where discussion will focus on the progress of project implementation, and co-ordination with Iraqi Ministries. The meeting will also provide an opportunity for outreach to other potential donors to Iraq, and for the presentation of Iraq's development priorities through its new National Development Strategy.

### 3. OTHER DONORS

24. At the Madrid Donors Conference for Iraq in October 2003, more than US\$32 billion was pledged in grants and concessional loans, as well as trade credits and assistance in kind. The largest pledges were from the USA (US\$18.4 billion in grants), Japan (US\$1.5 billion in grants and \$3.5 billion in loans), the World Bank (US\$3 to 5 billion), IMF (US\$2.5 billion) and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (\$500 million each). A full list of pledges is attached at annex 3.

25. The principal US instrument for assistance to Iraq is its US\$18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), which was approved as an Emergency Supplemental Appropriation in November 2003. This funding is being managed mainly through the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) in the US Embassy in Baghdad. The main sectors for expenditure are security and law enforcement, justice, electricity, oil production, and water and sanitation. A recent reprioritisation exercise is expected to shift some expenditure away from some longer term electricity and water projects towards more immediate needs of security, oil production and employment generation.

26. Japanese grant assistance is split between multilateral contributions of US\$500 million (US\$490 million to IRFFI and US\$10 million to the International Finance Corporation small business facility) and bilateral funding. US\$517 million of the latter has so far been programmed for the power sector, hospital rehabilitation, water treatment plant, and vehicles for the police, fire service and sanitation services. Japan is also channelling US\$35 million through NGOs. Work is beginning on programming the US\$3.5 billion which will be available in concessional loans from next year.

27. The *European Commission*, *Canada* and a number of smaller donors are channelling most or all of their funding through IRFFI.

### 4. CO-ORDINATION ISSUES

#### (a) Whitehall Co-ordination

28. Progress in Iraq requires parallel progress on security, the political process and reconstruction of the economy and state institutions. DFID works closely with other Government departments to ensure coherent UK policy and approach. The Secretary of State for International Development attends regular Ministerial Iraq co-ordination meetings. DFID officials participate in weekly Whitehall meetings on strategy, security and day-to-day practical issues, and daily contacts take place with other government departments at working level. An example is the regular co-ordination which takes place between DFID, FCO and HM Treasury economics specialists on economic reform and debt reduction issues. In Iraq the DFID offices are an integral part of the Embassy in Baghdad and the British Embassy Office Basra. DFID staff in Iraq work closely with their FCO, MOD and military counterparts.

29. The MOD's Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) has also played an important role in reconstruction in southern Iraq. MND(SE)'s ability to operate quickly and effectively on the ground has contributed to stabilising security in the region.

#### (b) Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP)

29. The FCO, MOD and DFID have pooled human and financial resources, to develop and implement a Conflict Prevention strategy in Iraq. The Iraq GCPP programme, with a budget of £19 million in 2004–05, is managed by FCO and focuses on three key objectives:

- Building the capacity of the Iraqi government and civil society to carry out conflict prevention and resolution initiatives;
- Preventing further polarisation and reducing underlying tensions between different elements of Iraqi society; and
- Building the capacity of the security sector, with special emphasis on the police and prisons.

30. Security sector reform has been the emphasis of much of GCPP's work, focusing on police and prison service training, mentoring and monitoring. Other activities include technical support to the Human Rights and Foreign Affairs Ministries, interfaith activities, media, civic education, and training on a variety of conflict resolution priorities. A devolved fund has also been provided to the British Embassy in Baghdad to undertake small-scale, quick impact conflict resolution projects. A summary of GCPP activity in Iraq is at annex 4.

### (c) Co-ordination with the Iraqi Government

31. The nature of DFID's work, much of which is aimed at strengthening Iraqi capacity to manage the reconstruction effort, means that good and close working relations with the Iraqi Government are essential. The present Secretary of State for International Development has visited Iraq three times for consultations with Iraqi ministers and senior officials, as well as, before 28 June 2004, with senior CPA officials.

32. DFID has built its working relations with Iraqi ministers and officials since the handover of power in June 2004, through DFID's offices in Baghdad and Basra and through regular visits by UK-based staff.

### (d) Donor Co-ordination

33. DFID plays an active role in promoting donor co-ordination on the ground in Baghdad and in the south. Priorities are to ensure strong Iraqi leadership of the reconstruction effort, and to encourage donors to work together coherently with the Iraqi authorities. DFID is providing advisory support to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) to develop the capacity to take a strategic approach towards donor support to Iraq.

34. Two co-ordination mechanisms have been set up to maintain a strategic overview of international support:

- The *Iraqi Strategic Review Board* (ISRB) provides overall policy guidance for donor assistance and has final approval authority for reconstruction activities. Its membership comprises representatives of the Ministry of Finance, MoPDC, and the Central Bank of Iraq. Donor representatives also attend as observers.
- The *Council for International Co-ordination* (CIC), chaired by the Minister for Planning and Development Cooperation, comprises 23 countries which are supporting the reconstruction effort and are represented in Baghdad. It is the main official forum in Iraq for dialogue amongst donors and between donors and the Iraqi authorities. However, its effectiveness is currently constrained by the absence of development professionals in many foreign missions in Baghdad.

35. In addition to Iraqi co-ordination mechanisms, and the IRFFI Donor Committee, a "Core Group" of donors pledging \$150 million or more at Madrid holds monthly telephone conferences with the MoPDC to discuss reconstruction issues. DFID also maintains bilateral contacts with a range of other donors.

## 5. SECURITY ISSUES

### (a) Effects of insecurity

36. The security situation in Iraq has been difficult since the end of major hostilities in April 2003. Managing reconstruction programmes is a continuing challenge. The inability of international donors and construction companies to move around and operate freely in the country is a particular constraint. Costs are inevitably likely to be higher than in normal situations, and the risks of delay greater. In some cases, infrastructure rehabilitation has been set back by sabotage or theft. These problems have affected all international donors in Iraq. As noted above, the UN has only a small international staff presence in Iraq, and the World Bank currently has none. Many bilateral donors are also absent or have minimal representation.

### (b) DFID/HMG response and staff protection

37. Staff security is the top priority for DFID and it takes very seriously its duty of care to its employees working in Iraq. Every effort is taken to ensure their health and safety, and to provide a secure environment in which to work. DFID works very closely with FCO to ensure all HMG staff are provided the same level of protection. Resources are shared to avoid duplication of effort and reduce costs. The extensive measures that are taken include the provision of pre-posting hostile environment training and briefing, body armour, armoured transport, communications equipment and armed protection. Staff are informed of security procedures upon arrival in Iraq and subsequently of any changes. Security procedures are under constant review.

38. DFID and FCO work together to provide armed protection to HMG staff working in Iraq. This is essential if DFID employees are to carry out their work with ministries and on projects. A private security firm, Control Risks Group (CRG) which also provides intelligence and security advice, provides this service. A defensive "armed response" is the very last resort.

39. All DFID employees visiting or working in Iraq are volunteers and are free to leave at any time. Counselling is available for DFID employees and their families at any time. We encourage our contractors to follow the same security procedures as our own staff and offer help in meeting their duty of care responsibilities, such as providing armoured transport, armed protection and access to telephone counselling. The extent of assistance needed by contractors depends on the capacity of the organisation, so for solo consultants we provide essentially the same level of support as we do for our own staff. DFID has offered NGOs which we are supporting additional finance for increased security provisions if needed.

**(c) “Humanitarian Space” issues in Iraq**

40. DFID shares the concern expressed by many NGOs over the increasing incidence of humanitarian agencies being targeted by violence in Iraq. Attacks on humanitarian staff have risen to levels that even agencies used to managing serious risks find difficult. For humanitarian staff, security normally derives from the acceptance by all parts of the local community that they are acting impartially and independently of governments and combatant forces. In Iraq, humanitarian agencies, including UN agencies and the ICRC, have struggled to gain that acceptance in the face of forces determined to create instability and disrupt reconstruction.

41. DFID generally discourages military involvement in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance other than under exceptional circumstances, and any association between military forces and humanitarian organisations needs to be handled sensitively in order to avoid a blurring of identities, which may render humanitarian workers more vulnerable to attack. In Iraq, the UK military has been provided with resources to undertake quick impact projects (QIPs) to address real and immediate needs and contribute to providing a stable environment in which political, social and economic development can take root. QIPs have played an important role in the military’s presence in southern Iraq: in order to maintain “humanitarian space” it is important that the military remains in uniform when implementing them.

42. DFID contributed to the consultation process prior to the publication of “Guidance for the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Complex Emergencies” (also known as “The Oslo Guidelines for Complex Emergencies”). DFID is also involved in a wide range of military training, academic courses and exercises in addition to consultation on military doctrine for crisis response operations. We use these opportunities to highlight appropriate roles for the military in emergencies.

**6. PROGRESS IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 2003**

43. The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) assumed authority of the country ahead of schedule on 28 June 2004. Of the 31 ministers, 6 are women and 5 are Kurds. The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), signed by the Iraqi Governing Council on 8 March, provides a temporary legal framework for the governance of Iraq until the agreement of a new constitution in 2005. The TAL confirms the equality of all Iraqis and safeguards fundamental human rights. It sets out the processes for elections by January 2005, the adoption of a new constitution, and further elections under that constitution. A 100-member Interim National Council was selected in August; its role is to hold the IIG to account until elections take place. The IIG remains committed to the agreed timetable for elections to be held in January 2005.

44. Since May 2003, the foundations of a market economy have been laid. The new Iraqi Dinar has been introduced and its value against other currencies has remained stable. The Central Bank of Iraq is independent of Government and has kept inflation under control—only 5.6% in the first 6 months of 2004. The tax system has been simplified: income tax at 15 per cent, and a 5% reconstruction levy on most imports. Iraq’s economy is expected to grow by over 50% in 2004, mainly due to higher oil production and prices, and may rise by a further 17% in 2005. An IMF programme has been agreed and work is underway towards a debt reduction deal.

45. Unemployment is still high but steps are being taken to create new jobs. The Iraqi National Employment Programme and US reconstruction programmes have created almost 500,000 jobs. In southern Iraq, DFID has set up a project which will generate up to 1.75 million days of employment, and has contributed £1million towards a US\$30 million job creation programme managed by UNDP.

46. Oil production has been below target, but still remains at more than 2 million barrels per day (bpd). Production is on track for reaching 3 million bpd by early 2005, security permitting.

47. Water and sanitation have been improved through extensive programmes to rehabilitate a system suffering from years of under-investment and neglect. Estimates suggest that immediately after the conflict, 60 per cent of urban and 30 per cent of rural populations had access to safe water. Considerable work has taken place across Iraq to improve the quantity, quality and reliability of water supplies, which are now better than before the conflict. In the south, the former CPA estimated that coverage increased by 10-15 per cent from May 2003 to July 2004. There are still shortages however, particularly in the south, and the UN continues to operate water tankers and provide drinking water to vulnerable groups and inhabitants of rural areas.

48. Prior to the conflict none of the sewage treatment plants in Iraq were operational and raw sewage was being discharged into the rivers and waterways. Since then investment has brought existing pumping stations back into service and repairs have been made to broken equipment. A major wastewater treatment plant in Baghdad began operating on May 19, 2004: the first major plant in the country to operate in over 12 years. Major investment is planned to extend and improve water and sanitation for the large parts of the population still lacking these basic services.

49. The health service suffered badly from neglect and mismanagement under Saddam Hussein. Since the conflict, the Iraqi Ministry of Health (MoH) has been reformed and, with international assistance, is increasingly able to deliver essential health care. MoH has identified priority areas such as primary health care, disease surveillance, pharmaceutical policy and professional training. Iraq’s 240 hospitals and 1,200



primary health centres are functioning. Routine vaccination for children and mothers restarted in mid-2003: so far 30 million doses have been delivered. National polio and measles vaccination programmes were completed in September 2004. However, much work remains to be done on maintaining reliable drugs supplies, coordinating funding, and implementing the MoH's plans. Security problems continue to restrict access to health facilities for both the general population and health workers.

50. The education system is functioning. Iraq has 6 million pupils and 300,000 teachers in over 20,000 schools. In Higher Education institutions there are 350,000 students and 50,000 employees. USAID, UN agencies and NGOs are undertaking programmes in teacher training and school refurbishment. 70 million new textbooks have already been distributed. The World Bank plans to spend \$100 million for emergency education projects: a \$40 million textbooks project is underway, and a \$60 million school rehabilitation project is expected to begin soon. The UN is also undertaking school rehabilitation programmes.

51. Long-term rehabilitation of the energy sector continues, although security problems have slowed progress. Power generation is now averaging 4,750 MW, compared with the pre-conflict level of 4,400 MW. Most of Iraq is receiving between 9 and 15 hours of electricity daily, which should improve as demand reduces in the cooler months. The Interim Iraqi Government has set a target of 6,000 MW by the end of 2004. A newly completed rehabilitation of the power grid is ensuring more equitable distribution across Iraq.

52. The creation of a free and independent media is an essential part of Iraq's transition to an open and democratic society. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, new newspapers have flourished. DFID is spending about £7 million to support media development, primarily through the BBC World Service Trust and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting.

53. After the 2003 conflict an independent High Judicial Council was established, judges and prosecutors were vetted, and criminal defendants were guaranteed certain rights. The Iraqi Special Tribunal, which will try members of the former regime suspected of crimes against humanity, has been established. The Human Rights Ministry now has 130 staff, and two lawyers have been appointed as onsite monitors at the Abu Ghraib prison. DFID is providing £2 million support to the sector, focusing on training for the judiciary, prosecution service and the bar.

54. Key bridges have been reconstructed, new rail tracks have been laid, and ports are being rehabilitated and opened to commercial traffic. Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) is now processing an average of 45 non-military arrivals and departures a day. Iraqi Airways has recommenced commercial flights after being grounded for 14 years. Telecommunications have improved significantly with a 49 per cent increase in telephone subscribers since the conflict. Internet access has become more widespread, the number of subscribers increasing from around 11,000 pre-conflict, to almost 80,000 in August this year.

55. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) there were about 400,000 Iraqi refugees around the world in early 2002. UNHCR is providing assistance for voluntary returns, and so far 14,000 have returned to Iraq under this programme. Many more Iraqis have returned to their country without assistance. The number of spontaneous returns is not yet clear; estimates range from 15,000 to 50,000. We are pressing the UNHCR for a more accurate figure.

*October 2004*

## IRAQ: DFID CONTRIBUTIONS TO RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

SEPTEMBER 2004

## UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES IN RESPONSE TO 2003 EMERGENCY APPEAL

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Support for agricultural production in conflict affected areas of Southern Iraq, focusing on vulnerable groups.	Needs assessment and identification of project beneficiaries, distribution of seeds and tools, marketing, training for Ministry of Agriculture, support to veterinary services.  <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£1.5 million</b>
<b>UN Development Programme: UNDP</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Restoration of electricity supply system	Repaired 18 collapsed 132 kV and 400 kV transmission lines. Purchased 135 diesel generators of which 50 were installed in key humanitarian services.  <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£12.1million</b>
<b>UNDP Iraq Reconstruction and Employment Programme (IREP)</b> <b>2004</b>	Provide rapid employment and income earning opportunities for unemployed workers in southern Iraq.	2003: Focus on poor neighbourhoods in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Almost 500,000 working days created. 2004: up to 500 communities to be assisted through IREP and up to 250,000 people in employment for a full month.  <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£938,894</b>
<b>UNDP Umm Qasr Fleet Management</b> <b>2004</b>	Dredging of Umm Qasr port to improve safety	International specialists and Iraqi engineers and administrators managing effective dredging at Umm Qasr port.  <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£2.48 million</b>
<b>UNDP Wreck Survey</b> <b>2004</b>	Detailed survey of 20 wrecks in Iraqi waterways.	Part of a series of projects opening the access channels through dredging, and salvage and removal of shipwrecks.  <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£646,097</b>
<b>UNEP</b> <b>2004</b>	Assist IIG to address immediate and long-term environmental threats to sustainable development.	Identify and begin the remediation of the most severely contaminated sites ie areas chronically contaminated by pollution and toxic materials, sites bombed during the conflict, areas where looting and burning of industrial facilities has released hazardous materials, and areas contaminated by illegal dumping of hazardous wastes and sewage; provide technical assistance to support the restoration of Marshlands and sustainable use of natural resources. Revitalise international environmental co-operation.  <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£938,894</b>

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>UN High Commissioner for Refugees: UNHCR</b> <b>2003</b>	Preparedness for possible refugee flows out of Iraq as a result of conflict.	Relief items stockpiled, transport and communications equipment installed; camps and reception centres prepared; emergency response teams mobilised; borders monitored. Currently providing assistance to 2,500 refugees, displaced in recent conflict, in Syria and Jordan.  <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£1.75 million</b>
<b>UN Children's Fund: UNICEF</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Preparedness	Nutritional supplies distributed; assistance in reactivating primary health centres and Child Community Care Units. 3,622 tonnes of HPB and 165 tonnes of milk distributed.	<b>£9 million</b>
	Re-establishment of immunisation services	Six months' supply of vaccines purchased, regular immunisation resumed.	
	Mine risk education	750,000 leaflets printed and distributed to schools, awareness posters put up.  <b>Project finished</b>	
<b>United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)</b> <b>2004 to 2005</b>	Develop and implement a strategy for promoting women's rights in post conflict Iraq.	Supporting women's organisations to prepare a national conference and providing training workshops.  <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£500,000</b>
<b>UN Mines Action Service: UNMAS</b> <b>2003</b>	Mine Action Rapid Response Plan	Co-ordination and disposal teams deployed to Baghdad and Basra; destroying unexploded ordnance in Basra; assessment undertaken for further support.  <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£4 million</b>
<b>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: OCHA</b> <b>2003</b>	Establishment of Humanitarian Information Centres (HICs).	Website for Humanitarian Information Centre for Iraq established in Baghdad, Basra, Erbil and Mosul to provide a central source on information for the humanitarian community.  <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£550,000</b>
<b>UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: OHCHR</b> <b>2003</b>	Support to UN Human Rights work in Iraq, post-conflict.	Appointment of six human rights officers to UN offices in Iraq. Integration, promotion and protection of human rights into the humanitarian effort and strengthening national capacity to promote and protect human rights.  <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£400,000</b>
<b>UN Security Co-ordinator: UNSECOORD</b> <b>2003</b>	Preparedness and assessment of UN security in Iraq	Field Security Co-ordination Officers deployed in neighbouring countries pre-conflict. Security procedures developed for UN re-entry to Iraq.  <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£600,000</b>
<b>UNSECOORD</b> <b>2004 to 2005</b>	Set up an improved security co-ordination and management system	DFID have made a contribution of £3 million for UN security costs in Iraq.  <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£3 million</b>

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
	for Iraq.		
<b>World Food Programme: WFP</b>	Preparedness	Food pre-positioned pre-conflict.	<b>£33 million</b>
<b>2003</b>	Provision of general food basket to the Iraqi population. Upgrading logistics and communications capacity.	Reinstated Iraqi Public Distribution System (PDS) during June with distribution taking place in all 18 Governorates by the end of the month. <b>Project ongoing</b>	
<b>World Health Organization: WHO</b>	Preparedness and Emergency support for the health sector.	Pre-positioning of emergency health kits (enough for 1 million people for three months); emergency assessment of health infrastructure to help prioritise rehabilitation; rehabilitation of national drug distribution system, rehabilitation and re-equipping of health units in Baghdad and Basra. <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£6 million</b> <i>Plus:</i> secondment of public health officer to help co-ordinate WHO activities in Baghdad.
<b>2003 to 2004</b>			
<b>RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT</b>			
<i>Agency</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</b>	Preparedness. Provision of medical and water supplies. Protection for prisoners of war and detainees.	Preparations to treat 7,000 war-wounded, provide safe water for 3.1 million people and provide hospital feeding to 5,000 patients for one month. Visited and registered more than 4,000 Iraqi prisoners of war. Currently providing water and medical supplies to health facilities. ICRC continues to carry out a wide range of relief and protection activities in all parts of the country.	<b>£16.5 million</b>
<b>2003 to 2004</b>			
<b>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)</b>	Pre-positioning of relief supplies to meet needs of possible refugees leaving Iraq.	Supplies pre-positioned for up to 300,000 potential refugees in the region. Because refugee flows were much smaller than anticipated, the IFRC contingency plans, on which their appeal was based, did not need to be implemented and they therefore did not need to draw down funds beyond £1.5 million. DFID are considering with the British Red Cross Society and the IFRC to what extent further support may be needed.	<b>£15.5 million allocated</b> <b>Only £1.5 million drawn down</b>
<b>2003</b>			

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**DFID: RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTHERN IRAQ**


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<i>Project</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>Recovery Infrastructure Group (RIG)</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Design and implement recovery and infrastructure projects to assist the CPA in its programme of post conflict recovery.	Refurbishment of public buildings in the South enabling public service workers to return to work. 48 buildings refurbished, including hospitals, universities and governorate directorate offices.	<b>£7.735 million</b>
<b>Emergency Infrastructure Programme (EIP)</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Infrastructure rehabilitation enabling service delivery of power, fuel and water for short to medium term in southern Iraq.	Overall CPA programme cost of US\$100 million of which the UK Government provides US\$34 million. Of UK funding, Southern electricity transmission and distribution networks repaired and reinforced, improved efficiency of water treatment plants and pumping stations and improved fuel availability.	<b>£20 million</b>
<b>BBC World Service Trust</b> <b>2003 to 2005</b>	Re-establishment of radio and television broadcasting capacity in the four southern governorates.	Iraqi trainees undertaking six weeks of media training (radio, television and post production). Project design phase completed and equipment on order, but implementation delayed due to recent security problems in the south. Over 120 radio programmes broadcast.	<b>£7.1 million</b>
<b>Governorate Teams South</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Establishment of Governorate Offices in Maysan, Muthanna and Dhi Qar.	Refurbishment completed.	<b>£4.023 million</b>
<b>Southern Iraq Employment and Services Programme (SIESP)</b> <b>2004 to 2005</b>	Emergency infrastructure support and employment generation.	Support to senior officials in four southern governorates (Basra, Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar and Maysan) to address rising unemployment and critical failures in essential services. A full-time Programme Co-ordinator appointed by DFID to develop and oversee the IESP.	<b>£16.5 million</b>
<b>Capacity Building in Southern Iraq Governorates</b> <b>2004 to 2006</b>	Capacity building in the southern Governorates and the provision of a Governorates Development Fund for small projects.	Focus on strengthening public administration capacity within the governorates, particularly through better planning, budgeting and financial management.	<b>£20.5 million</b>

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## ADVISORY SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENT, JUSTICE, MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY

<i>Project</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>Emergency Public Administration Programme</b> <b>2004</b>	Provide short-term technical support to key institutions within Iraq's system of public administration.	Assistance in building the capacity of cabinet committees within the Council of Ministers to analyse policy, developing procedures, and establishing basic systems within the Prime Minister's Office. Basic IT and English language training provided.	<b>£3 million</b>
<b>Support to Justice Sector</b> <b>2004 to 2006</b>	International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) programme to provide training in international human rights law to Iraqi judges, lawyers and prosecutors and support judicial institution building.	Training provided to judges on international humanitarian law and the independence of the judiciary. ILAC preparing to deploy Adviser to Baghdad. The UK has provided £1.3 million, from the <b>Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP)</b> , for building the capacity of IST personnel.	<b>£2.07 million</b>
<b>Iraqi Political Participation Fund (IPPF)</b> <b>2004 to 2006</b>	Support the development of legitimate and inclusive political institutions in Iraq, to promote political and social cohesion.	Initiatives across Iraq to improve processes of policy-making or advocacy, the provision of public information and promotion of dialogue, voter or civic education. Funds will be provided to both international and local organisations.  The IPPF is now fully operational. So far 71 proposals for support have been received from Iraqi organisations and are being considered by the IPPF Steering Committee.	<b>£5 million</b>
<b>Iraqi Civil Society Support Fund (ICSSF)</b> <b>2004 to 2006</b>	Strengthen capacity of Iraqi Civil Society Organisations to better address the needs of the most vulnerable groups.	A quick and flexible funding mechanism to support small and medium civil society organisations (CSOs) across Iraq.  80% of funds will be provided in the form of block grants to international Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs) to enable them to foster long-term partnerships with Iraqi NGOs and build local capacity. The other 20% will go direct to Iraqi CSOs.	<b>£5 million</b>
<b>Support for Macro-economic reform</b> <b>2004 to 2005</b>	Assist Iraqis in the design and implementation of IMF and World Bank economic reform programmes.	Initial phase of work to focus on working with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance to start-up a macro-fiscal unit, which will provide the basic fiscal analysis and monitoring required for an IMF agreement and, in the longer term, develop and modernise their capacity to manage the budget.	<b>£3 million</b>
<b>Media Project Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR)</b> <b>2003 to 2005</b>	Increased quality, accuracy and independence of reporting by Iraqi media, particularly on humanitarian issues.	A review demonstrated that the project had largely achieved its purpose, measured against indicators established at start—including number of journalists trained, number of media outlets engaged, internal Iraqi syndication of articles etc. Project now extended to 2005.	<b>£1 million</b>

<i>Project</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>Support to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC)</b> <b>2004 to 2005</b>	Programme liaison and coordination between the Ministry and the UN/World Bank and other bilateral donors.	A three-person team currently working in the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) on donor coordination and liaison. To be reviewed later in the year.	<b>£300,000</b>

**DFID SECONDMENTS AND CONSULTANTS FOR THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA)**

<i>Project</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>Armed Protection Teams</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Improve the safety and security of personnel seconded to the CPA in Iraq.	Complete.	<b>£7.7 million</b>
<b>Managing Agent Service CPA South</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Provision of sectoral advisers to the Coalition Provisional Authority—South's Department of Economic Planning and Development.	Advisers employed under the contract finished work after the hand over of sovereignty in June 2004.	<b>£5.5 million</b>
<b>Consultancy Contracts</b> <b>2004</b>	Provision of advisers to support the work of the Coalition Provisional Authority in various offices in various sectors.	All contracts have now ended.	<b>£3 million</b>
<b>Secondments to CPA</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	DFID core seconded to the CPA.	DFID civil servants filled the following roles in Iraq:  Senior Engineering Adviser, Press and Public Affairs Officer, Economic Adviser, Environment Adviser, Programme Manager, Gender Adviser, Donor Coordination Specialist and Support Officer to the CPA Director of Operations.	<b>£940,000</b>

## INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUND FACILITY FOR IRAQ (IRFFI)

<i>Project</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>United Nations</b> <b>2004 to 2006</b>	Support to United Nations Trust Fund	The United Nations has already approved 35 IRFFI projects worth \$371 million. Most of this amount will be committed or disbursed before the end of the year.  Approved projects include: \$37 million Supporting Primary Healthcare system; \$11 million Support to Electoral Process; \$17.5 million Rehabilitation of School Buildings and \$21 million Rehabilitation of Water and Sanitation Systems in Southern Iraq.	<b>£30 million</b>
<b>World Bank</b> <b>2004 to 2006</b>	Support to World Bank Trust Fund	Seventeen donors have committed US\$413 million to the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund. All of the \$360 million deposited so far has been allocated to following projects such as Capacity Building Programme: \$3.6 million—over 600 Iraqi officials trained to date through 21 seminars/activities (completed) and Emergency Textbooks Provision: \$40 million. Over 40,000 textbooks have been delivered already and shipments are arriving each week.	<b>£40 million</b>

## OTHER MULTILATERAL CONTRIBUTIONS

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>IMF Economic Management (IMF)</b> <b>2003 to 2006</b>	Provide capacity and support to the fledging government of post conflict Iraq on key issues of economic governance and financial management.	Since the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, all travel to Iraq has been suspended.  Policy discussions between Iraqi officials and IMF staff have been regularly taking place.	<b>£3.15 million</b>
<b>International Financial Corporation (IFC)</b> <b>2004 to 2006</b>	To support the development of small and medium sized enterprises.	This support seeks to encourage private sector economic growth in Iraq by providing training to financial institutions on the processes for lending to the private sector, and through providing the finance to allow financial institutions to make loans. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private financing wing of the World Bank, will manage this project	<b>£8.5 million</b>



## NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>ACTED Rehabilitation of Water Units 2003</b>	Rehabilitation of water supply units in Al-Muthanna and Al-Najaf Governorates	ACTED has repaired over 50 water treatment units in rural areas of southern Iraq which has provided safe drinking water to approximately 124,000 people in 30 villages. ACTED has also organised health education campaigns. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£276,500</b>
<b>AMAR 2003 to 2004</b>	Provide medical and sanitary support to refugees in Iran.	AMAR are providing basic medical care, water and sanitation and education to Iraqis living in refugee camps in Iran. <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£792,135</b>
<b>CARE 2003 to 2004</b>	Rehabilitation of water, sanitation and health facilities in central-southern Iraq	Rehabilitated the Water Treatment Plant in Menarthara town, Najaf Governorate and also rebuilt and equipped their Primary Health Care Centre (PHC). <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£454,844</b>
<b>4RS 2003</b>	Support to vulnerable women in northern Iraq.	300 tents and 300 heaters distributed to recently displaced women in Sulaymaniyah; building sanitation units, advocacy and advisory support through Women's Centres. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£105,673</b>
<b>GOAL 2003</b>	Support to primary health care, water and sanitation in Thiqr and Al-Muthana governorates.	Advisory support and coordination provided, drugs distributed, assessments undertaken of health facilities; a reactivated Targeted Nutrition Programme in conjunction with UNICEF and others (nutrition survey abandoned because of adverse security conditions). <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£305,834</b>
<b>Help Age International 2003</b>	To prepare for the potential humanitarian impact of a conflict.	Basic equipment supplied to 4,000 older families; and to residential homes in Mosul and Sulaymaniyah; chronic drugs supplied for 16,000 patients in Mosul, Kirkuk and Dohuk. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£150,000</b>
<b>International Medical Corps 2003</b>	Emergency preparedness for a humanitarian crisis in Iraq	Medical equipment and medicines distributed to health facilities and mobile clinics throughout Iraq. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£220,000</b>
<b>International Medical Corps 2003</b>	Humanitarian risk reduction support to Iraqi vulnerable population.	Focused on three interventions to reduce the risk of a humanitarian crisis; 1) reactivated UNICEF's Targeted Nutrition Programme for children under five, 2) rehabilitated water treatment units and repaired and replaced water and sanitation generators among Marsh arab communities, 3) rehabilitated Central Public Health Laboratory for infectious disease monitoring. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£522,031</b>

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>MEDAIR</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Assistance to internally displaced people in northern Iraq.	1,500 hygiene kits, 500 household kits, 200 food parcels; plus drugs for chronic diseases and kerosene distributed; activities coordinated with WHO. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£281,260</b>
<b>MERLIN</b> <b>2003</b>	Medical emergency preparedness in Baghdad.	Medical supplies were pre-positioned in Baghdad for 30,000 people for three months; assessments carried out of 22 primary and child care centres, and basic drugs and equipment provided for 30,000 patients for two months. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£265,000</b>
<b>MERLIN</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Enhance existing Iraqi Ministry of Health preparedness and response capacity to prevent diarrhoeal disease in Baghdad city and Al-Anbar governorate.	Approximately 31,000 hygiene kits were distributed to over 25,000 families throughout the project period. 500 hygiene kits were distributed in October in the Thawra district of Baghdad in response to a suspected cholera outbreak. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£75,393</b>
<b>Mines Advisory Group (MAG)</b> <b>2003</b>	Mine demarcation and mine awareness in northern and southern Iraq.	MAG demarcated 1.9 million square metres of mine affected land and conducted 1,317 mine awareness activities. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£80,833</b>
<b>Mines Advisory Group (MAG) Northern Iraq Demining Teams</b> <b>2003</b>	Support three mine action teams to cover de-mining in the Mosul area.	The programme currently operates with 21 Mine Action Teams (MATs) who have a range of skills including mine clearance, EOD, survey and demarcation. During 2003, these teams cleared a total of 649 mines, 1,756 cluster bomb units and 65,447 other items of unexploded ordnance. Over five million square metres of land were made safe following MAG's operations. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£612,297</b>
<b>Mines Advisory Group (MAG)</b> <b>2004 to 2005</b>	To support three mine action teams to cover de-mining in central and southern Iraq.	The poor security situation has meant that MAG has been unable to start their demining work in southern Iraq. <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£1.2 million</b>
<b>Muslim Hands International</b> <b>2003</b>	Rehabilitation of four schools in Al-Falluja.	Emergency rehabilitation work in four schools in Al-Falluja which were looted in the aftermath of the conflict. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£100,897</b>
<b>People In Need Foundation</b> <b>2003 to 2004</b>	Emergency Rehabilitation of five Primary Health Centres (PHC).	PINF has undertaken rehabilitation of five Primary Health Centres (PHC) in Missan, Iraq. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£28,991</b>
<b>Save the Children (UK): SCF-UK</b> <b>2003</b>	Emergency operations in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul.	Essential medical supplies provided in Mosul and Kirkuk; basic relief items given to 10,000 temporarily displaced people in northern Iraq. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£499,641</b>

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
<b>SCF Emergency Health Sector</b> <b>2003</b>	Emergency health support to seriously sick children affected by the conflict and post-war insecurity	The SCF has provided essential cytotoxic drugs to hospitals in Baghdad and a central warehouse in Mosul. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£232,631</b>
<b>Solidarite Sanitation Programme</b> <b>2004</b>	Sanitation programme to restore and maintain the sewage capacity in Babil governorate.	Solidarities are working to build 16 new water distribution networks in Qadisiyah Governorate. Ten are almost complete and the remaining six should be shortly finished. <b>Project ongoing</b>	<b>£215,000</b>
<b>War Child</b> <b>2003</b>	Establishment of an emergency field bakery.	War Child produced 32,000 loaves each day and distributed among hospitals, orphanages, education institutions and kindergartens as well as to vulnerable groups in Thi-qar province. <b>Project finished</b>	<b>£613,133</b>

## Annex 2

INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUND FACILITY FOR IRAQ DONOR  
CONTRIBUTIONS UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT GROUP (UNDG) AND WORLD  
BANK TRUST FUND ALLOCATIONS

Currency US\$ Millions

<i>Donor</i>	<i>2004 Total Pledge</i>	<i>2004 Commitments World Bank</i>	<i>2004 Commitments UNDG</i>	<i>2004 Deposits World Bank</i>	<i>2004 Deposits UNDG</i>	<i>2005–07 Commitments WB and UNDG</i>	<i>Total Expected</i>
Australia	17.9	10.2	7.7	10.2	7.7		17.9
Canada	67.2	22.3	22.5	22.3	22.5	7.5	74.7
European Commission	209.8	103.6	106.2	103.6	64.2		209.8
Finland	6.2	3.1	3.1				6.2
Greece	3.6		3.6			3.6	7.2
Iceland	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.0			1.0
India	10.0	5.0	5.0	2.5	2.5		10.0
Ireland	1.2		1.2		1.2		1.2
Italy	12.2		12.2				12.2
Japan	490.0	130.0	360.0	90.0	261.8		490.0
Korea	10.0						10.0
Kuwait	10.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0		10.0
Netherlands	6.0	6.0					6.0
New Zealand	0.9		0.9		0.9		0.9
Norway	4.3	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	5.7	10.0
Qatar	10.0	5.0	5.0		2.5		10.0
Spain	20.0	20.0					20.0
Sweden	10.0	5.0	5.0				10.0
Turkey	1.2	1.0	0.2				1.2
United Kingdom	127.4	71.4	56.0	71.4	56.0		127.4
United States	10.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0		10.0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,028.9</b>	<b>395.7</b>	<b>601.2</b>	<b>313.1</b>	<b>431.5</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>1,045.7</b>

INTERNATIONAL DONORS' CONFERENCE FOR IRAQ  
(Madrid, 23–24 October 2003)

SUMMARY TABLE BY DONOR

<i>Donor</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005-2007</i>	<i>Unspecified by year</i>	<i>Total (in USD millions)</i>
Countries	569.59	758.62	25,118.50	26,446.71
Australia	45.59	0.00	0.00	45.59
Austria	1.94	3.53	0.00	5.48
Belgium	5.89	0.00	0.00	5.89
Bulgaria	0.64	0.00	0.00	0.64
Canada	0.00	0.00	187.47	187.47
China	0.00	0.00	25.00	25.00
Cyprus	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.12
Czech Republic	7.33	7.33	0.00	14.66
Denmark	26.95	0.00	0.00	26.95
Estonia	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.08
Finland	5.89	0.00	0.00	5.89
Greece	0.00	0.00	3.53	3.53
Hungary	1.24	0.00	0.00	1.24
Iceland	1.50	1.00	0.00	2.50
India	10.00	0.00	0.00	10.00
Iran	5.00	0.00	0.00	5.00
Ireland	3.53	0.00	0.00	3.53
Italy	0.00	0.00	235.62	235.62
Japan	0.00	0.00	4,914.00	4,914.00
Korea	0.00	0.00	200.00	200.00
Kuwait	0.00	0.00	500.00	500.00
Luxemburg	1.18	1.18	0.00	2.36
Malta	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.27
Netherlands	9.42	0.00	0.00	9.42
New Zealand	3.35	0.00	0.00	3.35
Norway	4.29	8.58	0.00	12.87
Oman	0.00	0.00	3.00	3.00
Pakistan	0.00	0.00	2.50	2.50
Qatar	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00
Saudi Arabia	120.00	380.00	0.00	500.00
Slovenia	0.27	0.15	0.00	0.42
Spain	80.00	140.00	0.00	220.00
Sri Lanka	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sweden	0.00	0.00	33.00	33.00
Turkey	0.00	0.00	50.00	50.00
UAE	0.00	0.00	215.00	215.00
UK	235.48	216.85	0.00	452.33
United States	0.00	0.00	18,649.00	18,649.00
European Community	235.62	0.00	0.00	235.62
EC + EU Member States + Acceding Countries	614.83	369.04	272.54	1,256.41

This table summarizes pledges made at the International Donors' Conference for Iraq in Madrid, Spain, on 23–24 October 2003.

A pledge is an indication of intent to mobilize funds for which an approximate sum of contribution is specified.

Source for all exchange rates: IMF exchange rates in SDR terms for 24 October 2003

Amounts do not include identified humanitarian assistance (total of 115.17 M USD).

Amounts do not include export credits and guarantees: Austria 11.78 M USD, Saudi Arabia 500 M USD, and Denmark 154.54 M USD

The World Bank and the IMF announced a range of assistance.

Most donors were not able to specify the type of grant assistance at the time of the Donors' Conference.

Amounts unspecified between grants and loans are: Italy (235.62 M USD) and Qatar (100 M USD)

Many donors were not able to provide a breakdown of their pledge by year.

In addition to the amount in the table above, Norway pledged up to 30 M NOK from NORAD's global facilities for promoting private enterprises.

In addition to the amount in the table above, Iran pledged an economic package, with an estimated value of 1,495 M USD, which includes credit facilities, restoration of religious sites, tourism and pilgrimage, technical and advisory services, trade, investment, market access, and humanitarian assistance. Japan's assistance of 4,914 M USD consists of (i) grant assistance of 1,414 M USD for the immediate reconstruction needs of Iraq within the Japan's commitment, chiefly corresponding to the reconstruction needs anticipated through 2004; and (ii) assistance of up to 3,500 M USD, basically utilizing concessional yen loans, chiefly corresponding to the medium-term reconstruction needs for a period extending approximately through the year 2007, taking into account the situation of Iraq including security and the advancement of political process, the progress of the reconstruction projects, developments toward the solution of debt issue, and discussion of the international community etc.

The following countries offered in-kind assistance: Bahrain, Chile, Egypt, Germany, Jordan, Latvia, Mexico, Poland, Philippines, Portugal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia,

#### Annex 4

### IRAQ: GLOBAL CONFLICT PREVENTION POOL

#### OBJECTIVE 1: BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY TO CARRY OUT CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION INITIATIVES

<i>Implementing Agency/ Benefiting Organisation</i>	<i>Project Title</i>	<i>Duration/ Completion date</i>	<i>Approved GCPP Contribution</i>
Ministry of Human Rights	Provision of a Human Rights Conflict Resolution Adviser	April—Nov 2004	Objective 1: £3,674,300
Iraqi Electoral Commission (IECI)	Civic Education Project		
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Provision of an Adviser		

#### OBJECTIVE 2: PREVENTING FURTHER POLARISATION AND REDUCING UNDERLYING TENSIONS

<i>Implementing Agency/ Benefiting Organisation</i>	<i>Project Title</i>	<i>Duration/ Completion date</i>	<i>Approved GCPP Contribution</i>
FCO Consultants/Iraqi National Media Commission	International consultancy team to support Iraqi National Media Commission	March 2005	Objective 2: £5,502,509
Reuters Foundation/Iraq Media Sector	Independent News Agency	Completed	
FCO/Chiltern Broadcast Management/Iraq Media Network (IMN)	Iraqi Media Network	March 2005	
BBC World Service Trust/Iraq National Media Commission	Media Research and Evaluation	March 2005	
International Centre for Reconciliation (ICR)	Iraq Conference, Scoping Study and Forensic Training and assistance for the excavation of Mass Graves	May 2004, July—August 2004	
Foreign Policy Centre and Civility	Conference on Rule of Law and Institutional Reform	October 2004	
International Property Claims Commission (IPCC)	Mediation project in Kirkuk	To be advised	
International Centre for Reconciliation (ICR), Coventry Cathedral	Interfaith Dialogue and Support to the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST)		

**OBJECTIVE 3: BUILDING CAPACITY OF THE SECURITY SECTOR, WITH SPECIAL  
EMPHASIS ON THE POLICE AND PRISONS**

<i>Implementing Agency/ Benefiting Organisation</i>	<i>Project Title and Purpose</i>	<i>Duration/ Completion date</i>	<i>Approved GCPP Contribution</i>
National Security Agency	MOD Vetting Agency	September 2004	Objective 3: £7,635,941
Ministry of Interior/Iraqi Police Service	Police Monitoring/Mentoring	August 2004— January 2005	
ICDC	Equipping the 5th ICDC Battalion	Completed	
H M Customs and Excise	Training for Iraq Customs Senior Managers	Postponed	
Iraqi Prison Service	Prisons—Mentoring and ICDF Training		

**Annex 5**

**IRAQ: THE DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR IRAQ (DFI) AND THE INTERNATIONAL  
ADVISORY AND MONITORING BOARD (IAMB)**

**A. THE DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR IRAQ**

The Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) was sanctioned by United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1483 (21 May 2003). It holds the proceeds of oil export sales from Iraq, as well as remaining balances from the UN Oil-for-Food Programme and other frozen Iraqi funds. Spending from the Development Fund may only be used to: meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people; help economic reconstruction and infrastructure repair; allow for continued disarmament; meet the costs of Iraqi civilian administration; and promote other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq.

Until the handover of power to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), the Fund was directed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), in consultation with the Iraqi Governing Council, the Iraqi Minister of Finance, and the Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq. Since 28 June 2004, resources in the DFI have been managed and disbursed by the IIG.

**B. THE INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY AND MONITORING BOARD**

The International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) was established to ensure the transparency of spending from the DFI, as required by UNSCR 1483. The IAMB comprises representatives of the United Nations, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The principal role of the IAMB is to help ensure that: the DFI is used in a transparent manner for the benefit of the people of Iraq; and that export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas from Iraq are made consistent with prevailing international market best practices.

The IAMB acts as an audit oversight body for the DFI. It oversees audits conducted by international accounting firms of (i) oil export sales, (ii) the accounting for the proceeds from oil export sales, (iii) the DFI financial statements, and (iv) the disbursement procedures for DFI resources.

In March 2004 the IAMB approved the Coalition Provisional Authority's appointment of KPMG to conduct audits in two stages: first for DFI activities up to the end of December 2003, which reported on 15 July; and second for the six months to 28 June 2004, which KPMG expects to report before the end of 2004. The KPMG audit reports are published on the IAMB website (<http://www.iamb.info>).

Oil export sales and DFI operations after June 28 2004 will be examined by external auditors to be appointed by the Iraqi Government. The IAMB will work with the Iraqi Government to ensure the appointment of appropriately qualified external auditors.

**C. SOLE-SOURCED CONTRACTS FUNDED BY THE DFI**

The IAMB has requested a special audit to determine the extent of sole-sourced contracts funded by the DFI. This audit has still to be commissioned, and the IAMB is frustrated by the US Government's delay in handing over its audit reports of sole-sourced contracts. The US Government has stated that, for legal reasons, it cannot release this information without the permission of the companies involved. We understand the US Government is working to resolve the issue.

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### Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Department for International Development

#### PERCENTAGE OF IRAQIS WITH ACCESS TO CLEAN DRINKING WATER

The “Iraq Multiple Indicator Rapid Assessment” conducted by the Iraqi Central Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology, FAFO and UNDP in Spring 2004 found that around 66% of households in urban areas and 43% of households in rural areas have access to stable, safe drinking water. This can be compared to CPA assessments immediately after the conflict in 2003 which indicated that an estimated 60% of urban households and 30% of rural households had access to stable, safe drinking water.

#### THE PERCENTAGE OF IRAQIS CLAIMING FOOD RATIONS

It is estimated that over 95% of Iraqis receive food rations, with little variance across the governorates. The number of Iraqis dependent on the food rations for economic reasons is estimated at 60% by the Iraqi Strategic Review Board, in its National Development Strategy (September 2004).

#### HOW MUCH IS BEING SPENT ON SECURITY AND ON INSURANCE

To date DFID has disbursed £249 million on humanitarian and reconstruction work in Iraq: £186 million through multilateral agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross; and £63 million bilaterally. Of this bilateral disbursement, £17 million has been spent on security (armed protection, armoured vehicles, hostile environment and first aid training, and the posting of security managers in Iraq and the UK). For some bilateral projects, security has been provided by the UK military. The £17 million therefore provides direct security cover for projects worth £32 million (without the security element).

However, as well as providing security for projects in Iraq, the £17 million also covers security for DFID’s own staff and offices in Baghdad and Basra which enable us to keep in touch with developments on the ground in Iraq, maintain contact with the Iraqi Government and other donors, and monitor the funds we provide multilaterally.

Total insurance costs to date are estimated at around £1 million. This includes the insurance costs of relevant consultants, projects, contractors, some NGOs, and vehicles. This spending has supported project disbursement of around £46 million. Insurance costs are therefore approximately 2% of project spending.

#### WHEN DID THE REQUEST TO THE POLICE TAKE PLACE?

The Home Secretary wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 16 April 2003, confirming his commitment to the provision of UK policing assistance as soon as practicable, to support the reconstruction process. He confirmed that Paul Kernaghan, Chief Constable of Hampshire, and the Association of Chief Police Officers’ International Affairs portfolio holder, had agreed to lead for the police service.

From April 2003 onwards, FCO and HO officials worked closely with ACPO, the Ministry of Defence Police and other interested parties in identifying civilian policing requirements in Iraq, and how they might best be met. In this connection, Paul Kernaghan visited Iraq from 13 to 20 May 2003 as part of a small UK police scoping study.

In July 2003, two ACPO—ranked UK police officers were deployed to Baghdad and Basra in the capacity of senior police advisers. Also in July 2003, the Home Secretary agreed to a request from the Foreign Secretary to ask ACPO to seek volunteers to create a pool of UK police officers for potential deployment to Iraq. Subsequently, over 100 UK police officers were deployed to undertake training, mentoring and advisory roles in Baghdad, in the south of Iraq and in Jordan as part of the effort to reform the Iraqi Police Service.

*December 2004*

## Further supplementary memorandum submitted by the Department for International Development

## IRAQ: GLOBAL CONFLICT PREVENTION POOL

February 2005

## OBJECTIVE 1: CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION THROUGH COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND INSTITUTION BUILDING

<i>Implementing Agency/ Benefiting Organisation</i>	<i>Project Title, and Purpose</i>	<i>Duration/ Completion date</i>	<i>GCPP Contribution this FY</i>
Consultant for Ministry of Human Rights	Provision of a Human Rights Conflict Resolution Adviser <i>To provide advice to the Minister of HR issues.</i>	Apr -Dec 2004	£69,058
Bell-Pottinger for Iraqi Electoral Commission (IECI)	Civic Education Project <i>TV, radio and newspaper advertisements on the democratic process in Iraq. A strategic campaign to promote bigger concepts such as the return of sovereignty, reconstruction, support for the army and police, minority rights and public probity.</i>	Aug—Nov 2004	£3,016,000 (completed)
Consultant for Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Provision of an Adviser <i>To help increase MFA capacity, establish an effective diplomatic network and internal reform issues.</i>	Aug—Nov 2004	£80,000
Nottingham University for:  - Ministry of Human Rights - Iraq government - TBC	Human Rights programme  a. Human Rights Training Programme <i>Basic human rights training for Iraqi officials and certain NGOs.</i> b. Training for trainers <i>Individuals selected from basic training courses</i> c. human rights lobbying / ToT Iraqi NGOs <i>As above for civil society</i>	September '04— November '05   February '05  TBC	£609,300 (this FY)
TBC / government—civil society	Human Rights road show	September '04— March '05	£100,000 (this FY)
Crown Agents for: Ministry of Interior	Medium term capacity building (£3.35m) <i>Support to the MoI to improve capacity for policy development and implementation, contributing to the effective civilian oversight of the Iraqi Police Service</i>	Mar '05— June '06	£150,000 (this FY)
International Centre for Reconciliation	Capacity-building <i>Training and central administrative support</i>	October '04— March '05	£231,879



**OBJECTIVE 2: SUPPORTING A BETTER RAPPORT BETWEEN THE VARIOUS INTERNAL ACTORS AND SECTORS OF SOCIETY AS WELL AS BETWEEN IRAQ AND ITS NEIGHBOURS AND DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS**

<i>Implementing Agency/ Benefiting Organisation</i>	<i>Project Title, and Purpose</i>	<i>Duration/ Completion date</i>	<i>GCPP Contribution this FY</i>
Consultants for Iraqi National Media Commission	Media Project <i>Establishment and maintenance of team in Baghdad to advise on media development.</i>	December '03— March '05	£880,000
Reuters Foundation for Iraq Media Sector	Independent News Agency <i>Reuters Scoping Study to establish an independent Iraqi News Agency based in Baghdad.</i>	April '04	£55,000 (completed)
FCO/Chiltern Broadcast Management for Iraq Media Network (IMN)	Iraqi Media Network <i>Provision of Outside Newsgathering Broadcast Trucks for IMN.</i>	January '04— March '05	£1,370,000
BBC World Service Trust for Iraq National Media Commission	Media Research and Evaluation <i>Establishment of Iraqi media research team to identify popular programme demand and requirements for an independent media service.</i>	January '04— March '05	£292,100
International Centre for Reconciliation	Interfaith Foundation Iraq Conference <i>'Religion in the New Iraq' with religious leaders (Iraqi and International) and secular figures with an interest in Iraq.</i>	May '04	£52,871 (completed)
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) for Ministry of Human Rights (Project currently on hold due to UN involvement in the same area)	Forensic Training and assistance for the excavation of Mass Graves <i>Building a comprehensive database of confirmed mass gravesites and building Iraqi capacity to undertake future excavations.</i>	September '04— March '05	£534,303
Foreign Policy Centre and Civility	The Iraq Retreat <i>Facilitation of dialogue between western policy makers and Iraqi civil society on justice / rule of law.</i>	April—Nov '04	£87,200
Columbia University for International Property Claims Commission (IPCC)	Mediation training in Kirkuk <i>Training programme on dispute mediation skills for IPCC staff.</i>	July '04	£56,053 (completed)
International Centre for Reconciliation (ICR)	Interfaith Dialogue <i>Funding of the Interfaith Centre while a wider scoping study on interfaith dialogue is conducted.</i>	July—Aug '04	£45,214 (completed)
Consultant	Scoping Study <i>Interfaith Opportunities in Iraq</i>	July—Sept '04	£21,113 (completed)

<i>Implementing Agency/ Benefiting Organisation</i>	<i>Project Title, and Purpose</i>	<i>Duration/ Completion date</i>	<i>GCPP Contribution this FY</i>
Iraqi Special Tribunal (by- Inforce - International bar Association - Consultant	Support to the Iraqi Special Tribunal <i>a. Forensic training and internships</i> <i>b. Judicial training—mock tribunal</i> <i>c. Investigators training</i>	Sept—Mar 2005	£1,300,000

OBJECTIVE 3: BUILDING CAPACITY OF THE SECURITY SECTOR, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE POLICE AND PRISONS

<i>Implementing Agency/ Benefiting Organisation</i>	<i>Project Title, and Purpose</i>	<i>Duration/ Completion date</i>	<i>GCPP Contribution</i>
National Security Agency	MOD Vetting Agency <i>Establishment of a security vetting agency.</i>	September '04	£94,283 (completed)
ArmorGroup for Ministry of Interior/ Iraqi Police Service	Police Monitoring/Mentoring <i>Provision of international police advisers (IPAs) to MND SE to follow up on basic training within individual police stations.</i>	Jun—Dec '04	£5,300,000
Iraqi Police Service	Provision of Riot Control/Public Order kits for the Iraqi Police Service in MND South East	Mar—Aug '04	£322,961 (completed)
ICDC	Equipping the 5th ICDC Battalion <i>Provision of vehicles, radios and uniforms.</i>	Jan—May '04	£132,149 (completed)
Iraqi MOD	Training <i>Training at Sandhurst of two junior Iraqi Army Officers.</i>	June '04— May '05	£79,000 (paid in advance this FY)
Iraqi MOD	Training <i>MOD Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC), Shrivenham, for an Iraqi Major.</i>	June '04— May '05	£73,500 (paid in advance this FY)
Iraqi Prison Service	Prisons—Mentoring <i>Support development of an effective prison service that meets international minimum standards for treatment of prisoners, codes of conduct are followed and Iraqi capacity increased.</i>	July—Feb '05	£1,430,000
Iraqi Coastal Defence Forces (ICDF)	Training <i>Training of the Commander of the ICDF at Maritime Warfare Centre (UK).</i>	Aug—Oct 2004	£1,930 (completed)
Iraqi Security Forces	Equipping the ISF <i>Provision of security equipment to the Iraqi Police and National Guard (ISF) in Southern Iraq.</i>	Oct—Dec '04	£2,500,000

<i>Implementing Agency/ Benefiting Organisation</i>	<i>Project Title, and Purpose</i>	<i>Duration/ Completion date</i>	<i>GCPP Contribution</i>
Jordan International Police Training Centre (JIPTC)	Equipping the JIPTC <i>Provision of educational and recreational facilities to the Centre.</i>	Mar—Nov 2004	£80,000
ArmorGroup Police training and mentoring phase II	Continued mentoring and training by IPAs of Iraqi police across MNDSE <i>Expansion to Maysan and inclusion of a forensic training capability</i>	Mar- Aug '05	£809,547. (this FY) £4,857,284 (total)
Prisons—Mentoring phase II	Prisons—mentoring continuation <i>Increase in mentor numbers to manage expanded regions.</i>	Mar—Aug '05	£318,610 (this FY) £ 1,836,076 (Total)

## CROSS-OBJECTIVE PROJECTS

<i>Implementing Agency/ Benefiting Organisation</i>	<i>Project Title, and Purpose</i>	<i>Duration/ Completion date</i>	<i>GCPP Contribution</i>
CPA Basra/War Child	Local project <i>Establishment of ten Youth Centres in Basra.</i>	November 2003—June 2004	£49,079
BOB (left over from last FY)/ Birmingham University	Devolved Fund <i>Good Governance Projects Eg Training of Iraqi Diplomats.</i>	Nov '03—June '04	£78,852
CPA (Dhi Qar) (now managed by BOB)	Devolved Fund <i>Good Governance Projects Eg Youth Centres, Media Centre etc.</i>	Dec '03—March '05	£139,000
British Embassy, Baghdad	Devolved Fund <i>Fund to support small projects direct by the Embassy on conflict prevention priorities.</i>	April '04—March '05	£250,000
Consultant	Conflict Adviser <i>To develop the strategy and advise on best practice</i>	March '04—Feb '05	£74,200
DFID/GCPP	Strategic Conflict Assessment <i>Map conflict causes and provide a baseline assessment to enable a review of GCPP strategy (and DFID's country assistance plan).</i>	Oct '04—February '05	£50,000
GCPP management	GCPP support costs	April '04—Mar '05	£3,000

**Further supplementary memorandum submitted by the Department for International Development, following the IDC visit to Iraq, February 2005**

**1. US AID STRUCTURES FOR IRAQ**

*Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)*

The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) comprises \$2.48 billion for humanitarian and reconstruction work approved in April 2003, plus the Supplemental Appropriation of \$18.4 billion approved in November 2003. The latter was allocated primarily to: electricity (\$5.6 billion), water resources and sanitation (\$4.3 billion), security and law enforcement (\$3.2 billion), justice and civil society (\$1.5 billion), oil infrastructure \$1.7 billion), health and education (\$1.1 billion) and other infrastructure (\$0.8 billion). In September 2004, primarily in response to the security situation, about \$3 billion was reallocated from longer term investments, mainly in power and water, to more immediate impact projects in the security and employment sectors. The US Department of State reports quarterly to Congress on IRRF progress.

*Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO)*

The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) is part of the US Embassy in Baghdad. It leads on policy and priority setting for the reconstruction effort, and provides support and policy guidance to the Iraqi Government through US advisers attached to Iraqi ministries.

*Iraq Project and Contracting Office (PCO)*

The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) is the main implementation body for IRRF, providing for the oversight, management and execution of infrastructure reconstruction projects. Most day-to-day programme management is undertaken by contractors.

*USAID*

USAID implements a number of IRRF financed projects, including in infrastructure (\$2.4 billion), local governance (\$237 million), economic governance (US\$183 million), community action (\$166 million) and education (\$108 million). USAID has also committed \$950 million in emergency relief by way of food aid and support to UN agencies and NGOs, and provided the US contribution of \$10 million to the United Nations and World Bank trust funds.

*US Army Corps of Engineers*

The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) manages reconstruction contracts from IRRF in a number of sectors, including oil and gas.

*Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP)*

CERP provides finance for the US military to undertake the equivalent of the UK military's Quick Impact Projects: small scale local activities such as renovating health clinics, digging wells and painting schools. By October 2004, 34,512 projects had been completed and \$578 million disbursed. Funds are drawn from the Iraqi budget and US Department for Defense. Some CERP money has been made available to UK forces. In October 2004 an additional fund, Commanders Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Projects (CHHRP) was established to focus on small scale projects in areas of high instability such as Samarra, Ramadi and North Babil. \$86 million was allocated from US funds, which is being matched by the Iraqi government.

**2. FREE PRISONERS ASSOCIATION (FPA) GRANT APPLICATION**

There are several reasons why the managers of the Political Participation Fund decided not to grant funding to FPA following the FPA's recent project proposal:

- The project cost of over half a million US dollars would have been by far the largest single grant disbursed by the PPF. There was concern that the FPA did not have the capacity to manage such a large project effectively.
- It was apparent from the FPA proposal that a large proportion of the grant would go to FPA infrastructure and equipment rather than capacity building or networking.
- There are several reports—unsubstantiated, but impossible to ignore—which raised questions over the reputation of the FPA in terms of financial management of funds previously given by other donors.

The British Council's suggested course of action now, with which DFID concurs, is for the FPA to submit a new proposal for between \$20–\$80,000 with more achievable aims to the Civil Society Fund. The team will also keep Ms Clwyd's office informed of any further developments.

### 3. UPDATE ON CIVIL SOCIETY FUND AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION FUND

#### *Civil Society Fund and Political Participation Fund*

NB It has become clear that linkages between Iraqi organisations and DFID or the UK Government could inhibit the work of Iraqi NGOs and potentially threaten their security. Names of Iraqi NGOs and locations have therefore not been provided in the tables below.

#### CIVIL SOCIETY FUND

Civil Society Fund (CSF)	AIM: Strengthen capacity of Iraqi Civil Society Organisations to better address the needs of the most vulnerable groups.	Mechanism to support the development of small and medium civil society organisations (CSOs) across Iraq. 80% of funds provided in the form of block grants to international NGOs to enable them to foster long-term partnerships with Iraqi NGOs and build local capacity. The other 20% will go direct to Iraqi CSOs.	£5 million  As at 24/2/05 £4.1 million committed
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#### APPROVED PROJECTS

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Title of Project Funds Requested</i>	<i>Description</i>
Christian Aid in partnership with a Kurdish NGO	Civil Society Development Programme  £813,670	Proposal to develop CSOs in Northern governorates.
International Centre for Trade Union Rights in partnership with Iraqi trade union groups	Trade Union work  £94,390	Training, and providing services to Iraqi unions and to influence labour law and policy.
UNISON in partnership with Iraqi trade union unions	Training for Iraqi trade union leaders  £228,600	Build the capacity of democratic Iraqi Trade Unions by training a new generation of union leaders.
Women for Women	Building Women's Leadership Capacity  £515,000	The project has 3 components: — rights awareness and leadership training for women; — building the capacity of women-focused NGOs by building a cadre of local trainers; and — educating and engaging political, community, and religious leaders on needs of women.
Salvation Army	Inter-agency training in delivery of humanitarian relief activities  £240,000	Proposal to train NGOs and ministry officials in delivery of emergency humanitarian relief activities. This project will work with local NGOs to build capacity to manage humanitarian work.
Women's National Commission	WNC Internship Programme  £350,000	The WNC proposes to provide 4 placements for interns to learn about the experience of the WNC in UK, and to build their capacity to engage with national policy-making processes on gender-related issues in Iraq.
Mines Action Group	De-mining and mine safety education  £1.25 million	Mine clearance and education. Project will develop the capacity of civil society to reduce the impact of mines and unexploded ordnance.

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Title of Project Funds Requested</i>	<i>Description</i>
Save the Children UK	Partnerships for Development: Child Rights-based capacity building for Civil Society Organisations in Iraq	Two year country strategy plan, with three priorities: — child rights based capacity building of CSOs; — primary education for out of school 6–12 year olds; and — livelihoods against poverty and exclusion.
	£559,722	

## PROPOSALS UNDER DEVELOPMENT

War Child	Civil Society Capacity Building £661,178	Establishment of four local NGOs (one in each of the four southern governorates) to empower marginalised groups through the development of an association of NGOs, serving the needs of the most vulnerable.
Prince's Trust	Capacity building NGOs for Youth Development	Building on previous DFID funded work (South Iraq Employment and Services Programme), with AMAR as a local partner to provide local linkages with 4 Iraqi organisations across the south.
HelpAge	£700,000	Support to community outreach services in health and social welfare and refresher training for health and social workers possibly in collaboration with British academic institutions.
TUC	Grassroots Iraq: building a grassroots leadership £355,320 (may be expanded)	Work on a non-sectarian unemployed, women and disabled people's political involvement programme, teaching skills such as organising, negotiations, public speaking, web and radio based communication strategies, conflict resolution.
Norwegian Church Aid & Iraqi NGOs		
International Legal Assistance Consortium		Plans to develop the capacity of the Iraqi Bar Association.
Serene Communications	ICT training and capacity building for women in Iraq	Development of ICT skills to improve employment opportunities for women, using Community Development methods.
AMAR	None as yet	
Iraqi NGO protecting women victims of violence	Protect Women Victims of violence £63,720 (or possibly £33,000)	The project aims to care for women victims of violence, and to influence public and political opinion concerning the rights of women.

## POLITICAL PARTICIPATION FUND

Political Participation Fund (PPF)	AIM: to support the development of legitimate and inclusive political institutions in Iraq, to promote political and social cohesion	Initiatives across Iraq to improve processes of policy-making or advocacy, the provision of public information and promotion of dialogue, voter or civic education. Funds will be provided to both international and local organisations.	£5 million  As at 24/2/05 £1.24 million committed
2004 to 2006			

## APPROVED PROJECTS

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Description of project</i>	<i>Agreed funding</i>
Arab Gulf Studies Centre	Political Awareness Research Project 1 year	\$59,000
Iraqi centre for civic education	Rapid Voter Education and Domestic Election Monitoring 1 month	\$100,000
Institute for War and Peace Reporting	Election Coverage Training for Iraqi Journalists 1 month	\$147,200
Iraqi elections group	Domestic Election Monitoring and Co-ordination. 1 year	\$100,000
Iraqi NGO	Rapid Voter Education 1 month	\$35,000
Iraqi confederation	Iraqi Women's Voter Education 1 month	\$45,000.00
Iraqi Centre	Elections Project in Maysan 8 months	\$59,100
Iraqi democracy centre	Political Participation for Rural and Urban Dispossessed 3 months	\$41,500
Iraqi group promoting civil society	Voter Education through Media 1 month	\$25,000
Iraqi NGO	Political Awareness and Information Campaign. 1 year	\$50,000
Iraqi Foundation	Voter Education "Give your voice, get your rights." 1 month	\$23,200
Iraqi NGO	Women's Political Participation project 2 month project	\$28,000
Iraqi women's NGO	Voter Education 1 month	\$12,820
Iraqi women's NGO	Cultural Symposium on Democracy 1 month	\$3,850
Iraqi NGO promoting advancement of women	Women's Electoral Participation Workshop 1 month	\$22,000
Iraqi women's union	Voter Education 1 month	\$20,800
AMAR	Marsh Arab Political Participation Project	\$330,000
Iraqi Centre	"Women Have a Right to Vote" Electoral Education Seminars 1 month	\$31,000
Iraqi organisation supporting refugees	Civic Education, Election Training & Civil Society Network project To March 2006	\$300,000
Iraqi Radio station	"Voices for Elections" radio programming 1 month	\$52,000
Iraqi student coalition	The student coalition continues to distribute voter education posters and brochures.	
NGO supporting Marsh Arabs in the political process	Approved provided the length of the project matches the timeline of the PPF (up to March 2006).	\$580,000
Ministry of Human Rights	Human Rights festival—completed. The British Council has disbursed all committed funds to the Ministry.	\$67,200
Social Development Direct	Completed. 23 participants from 15 Iraqi Women's Organisations attended two five-day workshops on campaigning on women's rights and the political process presented by Social Development Direct in Amman, from 21 November to 2 December 2004.	\$260,000

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Description of project</i>	<i>Agreed funding</i>
Human Rights NGO Conference	Representatives from 25 Iraqi Human Rights Organisations and a further 15 regional and international representatives attended a four day Human Rights conference in Amman from 10 to 14 December 2004.	\$265,000
Iraqi women's NGO	The group has completed its media campaign encouraging Iraqi voters, particularly women, to ensure that they were correctly registered to vote by the 15 December deadline.	\$150,000

#### *Proposals being developed*

- Iraqi NGO promoting democracy: Political Participation for the Rural and Urban Dispossessed (1 month \$41,000 with a subsequent \$31,000 proposal for post election activity to be submitted).
- Iraqi Human Rights NGO: Southern Citizen's Empowerment Project (4 months \$92,500).
- Danish Institute for Human Rights: Civil Society Electoral Participation Project (1 month \$174,000).
- Basra Women's Political Participation Project (£55,000 x 4 months).
- Iraqi NGO: female voter education.
- Iraqi NGO: female voter education.
- Kurdish NGO: voter education.
- Iraqi NGO: Street Children Conference.

#### 4. WHY THE BRITISH COUNCIL IS MANAGING CSF/PPF

DFID contracted the British Council to manage the funds under the Governance Framework Agreement. This Agreement allows DFID to set up a project quickly without having to go through a tender process. The contract was awarded to the British Council based on the quality of the consortium the Council put forward, and because of the Council's proven experience of running similar trust funds. The British Council has also been contracted to manage a number of DFID-funded Small Grants Scheme country programmes, for example in the Maldives.

The DFID Iraq team did initially consider CARE for the management of PPF and CSF. However, with the worsening security situation CARE decided that it did not have the capacity to manage a programme in Iraq with national coverage. No other NGOs came forward to be considered under the Framework Agreement.

#### 5. DFID SUPPORT TO AMAR

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Action to date and in progress</i>	<i>DFID Contribution</i>
AMAR 2003 to 2004	Provide medical and sanitary support to refugees in Iran.	AMAR are providing basic medical care, water and sanitation and education to Iraqis living in refugee camps in Iran.	£792,135
		<b>Project completed</b>	
AMAR November 2004 –March 2006	Marsh Arab Political Participation Programme, Southern Iraq	Funding provided under the Political Participation Fund  <b>Project ongoing</b>	£315,217

AMAR has also expressed an interest in securing funding from the Civil Society Fund (CSF), which will require a change in focus from basic service delivery role to the new area of building capacity. No formal project proposal has been submitted to the CSF by AMAR as yet.



## 6. BREAKDOWN OF £544 MILLION UK MADRID PLEDGE

The £544 million pledged by the UK for humanitarian and reconstruction work in Iraq 2003–2006 comprises:

- DFID (including our contribution of £38 million to EC spending, 2003 and 2004): **£422.5 million.**
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (mostly for CPA secondments): **£61.5 million.**
- Ministry of Defence (Quick Impact Projects): **£30 million.**
- Global Conflict Prevention Pool: **£30 million.**

## 7. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ASIL AND ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE

The Adam Smith Institute is a free market think-tank which is concerned with trying to influence UK domestic policy. Adam Smith International Ltd is not part of the institute but an independent development consultancy which advises governments around the world on various aspects of government and economic reform. It has contracts with development agencies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and bilateral donors such as DFID, DANIDA and SIDA, as well as governments in the developing world.

### *Why DFID is employing ASIL in Iraq*

DFID ran an open and fair competition, in line with EU procurement regulations, inviting companies to tender for work to be carried out in Iraq; Adam Smith International subsequently won this competition.

## 8. UNEMPLOYMENT

The Iraq Multiple Indicator Rapid Assessment survey carried out in Spring 2004 by Iraq's Central Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) in collaboration with Norwegian research institute Fafo reports the overall unemployment level in Iraq as **10.5%**. This survey was national in coverage and used the ILO's international standard measure of employment as "having worked a minimum of 1 hour" in the previous week.

An alternative definition of employment used by COSIT in other surveys is: "having worked a minimum of 15 hours" in the previous week. If this definition is used to interpret the Fafo/COSIT data, the figure is **22.5%**.

These two estimates can be interpreted as: while "unemployment" by a strict definition may be 10.5%, "unemployment and underemployment" is 22.5%.

These calculations do not take into consideration the low labour force participation rate in Iraq. Whilst "unemployment" may be only 10.5%, Iraq's labour force comprises only 41% of Iraq's working age population. This may reflect cultural norms, for example, women's participation in the labour force is only 13%. It may also reflect large numbers of long-term unemployed who no longer consider themselves to be part of the labour force. Since there are no unemployment benefits, long-term unemployed have little reason to define themselves as members of the labour force (unlike in OECD countries).

*March 2005*

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## Memorandum submitted by Christian Aid

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Security remains the primary concern of Christian Aid's partners, who are effectively obliged to conceal their identity as humanitarian organizations in order to continue working.
- Many Iraqis now regard the multinational force as a force of occupation, and there is considerable public support in many parts of the country for insurgency against the interim administration and its security forces, as well as the multinational force.
- The presentation by Coalition nations of the US-led military mission to Iraq as a partly "humanitarian" intervention has led to a failure to establish neutral humanitarian space in which NGOs, Red Cross and UN agencies can safely access those in need. There is an urgent need for a new policy with clear separation of military and humanitarian actors.
- Inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tensions have greatly increased in Iraq over the last year and the potential for future violence over such issues as the control of land and resources, the central or devolved nature of the state, secular versus religious law, regional autonomy or secession, is now considerable.
- There is an urgent need to select, recruit, protect and train Iraqi police and security forces, in such a way that they will have the confidence of the communities they will serve.

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- As displaced Iraqis seek to return to their original homes, there is a need for increased support for the newly established Iraqi Property Claims Commission and for the establishment of a compensation fund for those who find themselves displaced in turn, without a housing solution. Unless the problem of disputed property and secondary displacement is addressed, it is likely to become a direct cause of further conflict.
  - Concerns remain about the transparency of accounting for Iraqi oil revenues, both during the CPA period and under the present Iraqi interim administration.
  - Local accountability has not been a familiar concept in Iraqi society to date. There is a need to support central and local government structures in the fields of strategic planning, communication, co-ordination, transparency and local accountability.

## INTRODUCTION

Christian Aid believes that the deterioration of working conditions for both international and local humanitarian organisations, as well as ICRC, UN and bilateral government agencies such as DFID, represents the greatest impediment to establishing the basis for Iraq's long-term development. Addressing the sources of insecurity in ways that facilitate the long-term objectives of Iraqis themselves to reconstruct their state and society should be a priority for all those committed to providing humanitarian assistance to Iraq.

This submission is based both on Christian Aid's own observations and responses to questions asked of six Iraqi partner organisations during the course of August and September 2004. These NGOs' views represent a snapshot of the conditions in which they have been working since the transfer of authority to the Iraqi interim government on 28 June 2004. However, we are concerned about the difficulties we and our partners are experiencing in gaining accurate information about conditions for development across the whole of Iraq. There are large swathes of the country about which little is currently known, above all to Iraqis themselves.

Since security remains the primary concern of the organisations Christian Aid supports, we have relayed their responses anonymously. We regret that partners have to disguise the fact that they are humanitarian and development NGOs by such measures as removing external signs from their premises and travelling in unmarked cars and taxis. In rural communities, far from insurgents and armed forces, their security is assured by the communities they serve. But in urban areas they are forced to be discreet about their sources of funding and their activities.

Before the war Christian Aid's programme in Iraq was confined to the formerly autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Since 1992, Christian Aid has supported local NGOs in a range of rehabilitation and development activities, and continues to do so. A substantial water, sanitation and community development programme has been co-funded by DFID. Since May 2003, Christian Aid has extended its operations to provide humanitarian support in the central and southern parts of the country, including emergency relief, landmine clearance, water and sanitation supply, seed banks and nurseries, education, medical and community needs assessment. As well as keeping in close touch with our Iraqi partners, Christian Aid staff visited Iraq in June 2003, providing technical assistance to partners and spending time principally in Baghdad, Kerbala, Basra, Kirkuk and the formerly autonomous Kurdish governorates.

Since the August 2003 bombing of the UN in Baghdad, the security situation has deteriorated to the point where Christian Aid staff are no longer free to travel to Iraq. We are therefore unable to make first hand assessments, meet local organisations or the beneficiaries of their programmes on the ground, or monitor projects in the field. Alternative methods of liaising with Iraqi partners and local organisations have been pursued, mainly by meeting in Amman: two such meetings have been held so far (the most recent in April 2004) and the next is planned for October 2004. Amman has proved an effective location for partner capacity building workshops and liaison between CA, other NGOs and UN organisations. Christian Aid is nevertheless concerned that the continuing inability of staff to travel to Iraq itself will, over time, damage our ability to extend our assistance beyond the partnerships we have already established.

Of the many aspects required for the successful delivery of development assistance in Iraq, the most urgent is restoration of a secure environment. The military strategy adopted by the Coalition nations over the last 18 months has been to present the multinational force as a partly humanitarian intervention. As a result, the understanding which might have developed among the Iraqi population for neutral humanitarian work has never been established. A clear separation between humanitarian and security work is now urgently required.

We also believe that actions can be taken now to restore the trust of Iraqis and pre-empt further outbreaks of violence. This submission focuses on what we perceive to be the most urgent courses of action that the British Government should take.

## KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

- That the British government use its influence and example to ensure that the security mission of the multinational forces in Iraq prioritise the needs of ordinary Iraqis, safeguard their lives and livelihoods, and move as swiftly as possible towards handing over control of their own security arrangements to Iraqis themselves as a prerequisite for development (*paras 1.1 to 1.7*). A new policy of a clear separation between military and humanitarian actors is now required. This will begin to establish neutral humanitarian space within which the UN agencies, ICRC, international and national NGOs can begin to play a full role in meeting the needs of ordinary Iraqis and reconstruction.
- That the British government, through DFID, take note of rising insecurity fuelled by interethnic tensions in the northern provinces of Iraq and resource and accelerate the work of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) in reviewing and adjudicating property claims in the city of Kirkuk and surrounding areas, where property disputes are leading to inter-communal violence. The British government should also promote and financially contribute to a Compensation Fund to provide relocation resources to those whose claim to the land and properties they currently occupy is disallowed by the IPCC, or who remain homeless or internally displaced (*paras 2.1–2.3*)
- That the British government fulfil its moral obligation to provide full and transparent accounts for the funds accruing to and disbursed from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) over which it shared joint responsibility with US authorities as a member of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) until 28 June 2004. The British government should also assist the official auditors (KPMG) and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) in their continuing work, and use its influence and expertise to ensure the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) and its successors set up systems to monitor the extraction and export of Iraqi oil, safeguarding the expenditure of oil revenues for the benefit of Iraqis in the most transparent fashion possible (*paras 3.1–3.3*)
- That in addition to strengthening central government institutions the British government reinforce and resource the capacity of local authorities to coordinate and promote programmes for the long-term development of Iraq. Local elections are likely to be delayed by the requirements of preparing national elections by early 2005. In the interim, the British government should focus its assistance on ensuring that both Iraqi local authorities and ministries of the IIG involve local communities in identifying, designing and implementing development projects and in holding their local authorities to account for local expenditure and the granting of contracts for both reconstruction and development (*paras 4.1–4.5*).

1. *Security for Development*

1.1 Of immediate concern to Christian Aid are the humanitarian consequences of continued military action in Iraq for a population that remains, despite Iraq's potential wealth, dependent on external assistance and on a crumbling infrastructure neglected over many years. Iraqi people certainly require more security than most currently enjoy. We are especially concerned at the rise in terrorist and insurgency-related civilian deaths, as well as the use of military force to combat insurgencies, where this force results in civilian deaths. The Iraqi Ministry of Health has recorded 3,186 civilian deaths through terrorist and security force attacks in the period 5 April to 12 September 2004, a figure that has increased by at least 100 in subsequent weeks. The death of civilians is not only unacceptable, but undermines efforts to create a climate conducive to the sustained and long-term development of Iraq.

1.2 Christian Aid's Iraqi partners share the concerns expressed in a recent survey by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, which show that many in Iraq now believe the multinational force to be a force of occupation, regardless of its intent or future actions.<sup>1</sup> In this respect, we support calls for a more appropriate use of military force, which recognises that civilian deaths directly undermine the core objective of the mission: to return Iraq to democratic Iraqi control.

1.3 To this end, we welcome recent moves to accelerate the recruitment, training and retention of an Iraqi police force to provide local security, but stress that new recruits and applicants need increased protection from the multinational forces in Iraq. To gain popular respect, this force needs to be legitimate in the eyes of the local community and sensitive to local objections to the re-instatement of former Ba'athist officers and officials. Our partners have expressed dismay at the training of security forces overseas, at what is considered to be disproportionate cost and in ways (and places, such as Jordan and Egypt) reminiscent of practices of the old regime. Expenses paid overseas are deemed to encourage further corruption within the security forces and discourage the kind of patriotism needed for the new circumstances of Iraq.

1.4 Iraqi civil society organisations also emphasise the need to "de-militarise" security operations as soon as possible, so that the Iraqi National Guard are trained as border guards only, and that the multinational forces support, rather than lead, the swift return to an Iraqi led civilian security operation. The need to replace the external military mission with a locally rooted civilian police force as soon as possible arises from the increasing concern of Christian Aid partners with new and increasing sources of criminality. Among the

<sup>1</sup> CSIS *Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction* (September 2004, Washington DC, pp.x-xi [http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0409\\_progressperil.pdf](http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0409_progressperil.pdf)).

most worrying are the growth in kidnappings for profit, not just of foreigners, but of Iraqi citizens, and the targeted assassinations of local officials, politicians and contractors deemed to be “working for the Americans.” The daily lives of Iraqis with whom our partners work are more often affected by this kind of ambient criminality than they are by insurgencies, unless they live in or near combat zones. To tackle the diverse sources of crime, local police forces need to receive human rights training and be supported by a functioning justice system. In the absence of due process and local accountability, some police have “reverted to their previous practice of torturing prisoners and death threats to gain information/confessions from them”, according to more than one of our partners.

1.5 In addition to the continuing death toll, Christian Aid remains extremely concerned at the damage inflicted to the neutrality of the humanitarian community, both local and international, by the presentation of the US-led military mission to Iraq as “humanitarian”. This association has, in our view, endangered the personal security of the staff of those international humanitarian agencies to have remained in Iraq after the UN relocated its HQ to Jordan last autumn, and has led in recent weeks to their forced withdrawal. As well as the dangers faced by foreign nationals, we are concerned for the Iraqis who continue to engage in reconstruction and long-term development of their country. Many of them are threatened by association with the activities of multinational force military personnel.

1.6 There is still a tendency, particularly in the US, to assume that the multinational forces and Baghdad government continue to face an organised and united insurgency, focused around Sunni Arab Ba’athist loyalists with some assistance from Al-Qaida linked foreign terrorists. The reality is much more messy and dangerous, in that the US-UK Coalition over the past year has managed to alienate large sections of the population, including Shi’ia Arabs in the south and centre, who had welcomed the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime and might have been expected to support a US-led reconstruction operation in Iraq. Only among the Kurds of the north is the public approval level of the multinational forces still reasonably high, and this approval is likely to disappear rapidly if Kurdish aspirations for autonomy or independence are blocked.

## *2. Property disputes, displaced people and security*

2.1 We believe that the unresolved and long-standing issues of land and property rights require urgent attention if further inter-communal strife and violence are to be avoided. This eventuality, we believe, could be prevented if the British Government were to lend its full support to the work of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission. It should help set up and contribute to a Compensation Fund to relocate families already displaced, to assist those who are willing to move but lack the means, and to compensate those who will need an incentive to move if the adjudication process goes against them.

2.2 There has been a reluctance among multinational force nations, as well as many Iraqis, to accept that most of the violence involves Iraqis killing Iraqis. Iraqi security forces are now taking most of the heat and incurring most of the casualties produced by the insurgency. This violence and its legacy of bitterness have contributed to existing tensions and mistrust between different ethnicities and religious confessions, which have increased enormously over the past year. We have already seen violence between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen over contested property in the upper centre area of Iraq. The potential for future violence between Shi’ia and Sunni Arabs, between Kurds and Arabs, or between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, over such issues as the control of territory and resources, secular versus religious law, the unitary or devolved nature of the Iraqi state, Kurdish autonomy or secession, is now very great.

2.3 Given Christian Aid’s strong links with organisations in the northern region of Iraq, we would like to draw the Committee’s attention to rising instability within communities which, with the exception of the northern city of Tal Afar, are often perceived to be outside the core regions of recent instability, such as the Sunni Triangle. One of our partners in Kirkuk commented on the rise in atrocities over the past six months “perpetrated in order to escalate tensions between national groups”. These include at least 13 assassinations of local officials and politicians, attacks on main roads outside the city and bomb attacks on individual quarters within Kirkuk. Our partner reports that in the lead-up to the national elections, the two main Kurdish parties, the PUK and KDP, have proposed returning all internally displaced Kurds to Kirkuk and “putting a timetable [on] sending back all the people who came to Kirkuk from the centre of Iraq to their own cities without giving compensation to them”.<sup>2</sup> There are also plans to reorganise the administrative map of Kirkuk to include towns excluded from the province in 1968, in order to secure a Kurdish majority on electoral rolls prior to the national elections.

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<sup>2</sup> For details on the background to these issues, see Human Rights Watch *Claims in Conflict—Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq* (HRW, Vol 16, No 4(E), August 2004. <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804>).

### 3. *Accounting for Iraq's oil revenues*

3.1 Following Christian Aid's reports of October 2003 and June 2004 (*Iraq: the Missing Billions* and *Fuelling Suspicion: the Coalition and Iraq's oil billions*<sup>3</sup>), we continue to be extremely concerned by the absence of full and transparent accounts for Iraqi oil revenues and disbursements from the Development Fund for Iraq during the period these were entrusted to the management of the CPA. The CPA ceased its mission on 28 June 2004 with no accounts at all for its activities over the previous year. Only on 14 July 2004, the independent auditors, KPMG, presented the first audits for the period 22 May 2003 to 31 December 2003 to the IAMB, who expressed their concerns over a number of issues: the absence of oil metering during this period; the use of unrecorded barter transactions for certain oil sales in exchange for electricity; the use of non-competitive bidding procedures for a number of contracts funded from the DFI; and the absence of a draft report commissioned by the CPA reviewing controls over the State Oil Marketing Organisation (SOMO).<sup>4</sup>

3.2 In a press release on 8 September 2004, the IAMB voiced its concern that it has still "not received reports of audits undertaken by various US agencies on sole-sourced contracts, despite repeated requests" and noted that the designated auditors, KPMG, will be delivering their next report in early October 2004, covering the period 20 January to 28 June 2004.<sup>5</sup>

3.3 Christian Aid would like to bring the Committee's attention to this report, and to reiterate our belief that the British government has a moral obligation to account for Iraqi funds accrued and disbursed in the period that HMG formed part of the CPA. We believe that this moral obligation extends to ensuring that the IIG and successor governments establish systems to monitor the extraction and export of Iraqi oil, above all through installing metering equipment in accordance with standard oil industry practice. The British government should also assist the IIG and its successors in setting up competitive bidding procedures for the future award of contracts, so that the IIG and its successors can clearly demonstrate that publicly owned funds are being spent in the most efficient and transparent way possible for the benefit of Iraqis, rather than to increase the profits of third party contractors.

### 4. *Local accountability and coordination of development assistance*

4.1 Christian Aid is concerned that at provincial and local government level, there is insufficient evidence of a coordinated strategy for the long-term development of Iraq, either on the part of international humanitarian agencies, or the IIG itself. Only one of the organisations we support is aware of DFID's activities in their locality in Iraq, and the majority of partners who have heard of DFID do not associate DFID with the British government or distinguish it from other international or bilateral donor agencies. With the withdrawal of UN agencies and foreign employees of international NGOs, local Iraqi NGOs are concerned about the commitment of external agencies both to remaining in Iraq and to the coordination of externally funded humanitarian and development activities beyond Baghdad. Within Iraqi domestic structures, there is a dearth of information on how central and local authorities interact for the purposes of coordinating and devolving funds for development, and few opportunities for civil society organisations to engage in shaping local development plans.

4.2 We believe that strengthening local government capacity to respond to local needs is central to maintaining the goodwill and confidence of Iraqis committed to working for the long-term reconstruction and development of their country. To this end, the British government should devote resources to enhance the capacity of local authorities to coordinate and promote programmes for long-term development, to increase their consultation with NGOs and communities most in need, and to prioritise employment creation. Much current reconstruction work appears to take place on an ad hoc basis and is focused on the physical reconstruction of Iraq, without addressing the human aspect of development. For our partners, human-based development means that Iraqi NGOs assist community based organisations to draw up priorities for poverty alleviation and sustainable local employment on the basis of local experience and expertise. Without the technical and financial assistance of local authorities to support this process or a clear policy framework for the future of local development, this activity risks being isolated and unsupported.

4.3 The proliferation of unregulated Iraqi NGOs is a cause of concern for the credibility and legitimacy of development activities. There are now around 3,000 officially registered national NGOs in contrast to only 250 in May 2003. In Kirkuk, where there were 7 local NGOs a year ago, there are now 37. Not all of these are considered to be legitimate NGOs, since many represent narrow family interests, are linked to political parties, are contractors posing as NGOs, or are clearly not humanitarian in mission. Local authorities currently lack the capacity to enforce legislation introduced by the CPA to regulate NGOs, and we would urge that the British government address this issue by advising local governments on how to

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/310iraqoil/index.htm> and <http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/406iraqoilupdate/index.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> See <http://www.iamb.info/auditrep/pr071504.pdf> *Statement by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board on Iraq—Release of the KPMG Audit Reports on the development Fund for Iraq*, 15 July 2004.

<sup>5</sup> See <http://www.iamb.info/pr/pr090804.htm> *Statement by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board on Iraq*, 8 September 2004.

strengthen their regulatory capacity. As NGOs are a new type of agency in the Iraqi context, it is critical to the success of civil society organizations working to improve the lives of ordinary Iraqis that their role be clearly distinguished from commercial enterprises or politically motivated groups.

4.4 Lack of financial transparency for the purposes of development also remains a key concern. Christian Aid's partners are aware of the different ways in which funding arises (through oil revenue, customs and income taxes as well via international donors), but not of how it is allocated or spent. Accountability from central ministry level to local government level exists in principle but could be significantly improved. In some cases, when reconstruction works have been abruptly halted for security reasons (usually when international contractors have left), local authorities have not been forthcoming about plans for completing the works or how they intend to allocate residual funds.

4.5 Corruption has been endemic in Iraq for years, but optimism for future change is tempered by fears of continuing nepotism at ministerial level and the appointment of people according to party or ethnic/religious loyalties, rather than on the basis of qualifications or competence. In Baqubah and Kirkuk, partners cite increased competition between central ministries to allocate budgets and resources ahead of the general elections. We are concerned that the allocation of aid and development assistance according to political criteria, rather than on the basis of need, may increase as the election period approaches. We would encourage the British government to help the Iraqi authorities ensure that financial accounting systems established for centrally managed funds also apply at provincial and local levels, and that greater efforts are made to devolve central state funding to provincial and local authorities once these systems are in place.

*October 2004*

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#### **Supplementary memorandum submitted by Christian Aid**

(This should be read as an addendum to Christian Aid's submission of October 2004)

Three months after Christian Aid's original submission to the Committee, we note that the security situation continues to deteriorate. While we are anxious to see democratic elections take place, we believe that to be successful, elections must be both inclusive and held under conditions that allow all voters to participate securely. Under the present circumstances, in which election rallies and normal campaigning are rendered virtually impossible by security constraints, it is difficult to see how this can be achieved. In addition, the conflict between resistance, coalition and interim-government forces in central and western Iraq seems to be leading to the further alienation of the Iraqi population, and the likely abstention from the electoral process of a large section of the Sunni population.

Of particular concern to Christian Aid and Iraqi partners today, is a situation in which international law intended to protect civilians in conflict, exemplified by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additional Protocols of 1977, appears to be routinely and increasingly flouted by all parties involved in the struggle, including the resistance, the multi-national coalition and the interim Iraqi government.

The resistance tactics of hostage-taking and execution, and detonating bombs that target the general civilian population, as well as humanitarian workers, journalists, police and military personnel, are already well documented by the media, and in many cases have been publicised by websites run by the resistance groups themselves.

The International Committee of the Red Cross report of February 2004 on prisoners held by the coalition has already described: "... excessive and disproportionate use of force against persons deprived of their liberty resulting in death or injury during their period of internment." The report details numerous incidents involving degrading treatment or torture.

During the recent assault on Fallujah, a film taken by a journalist embedded with (US) coalition forces appears to show the murder by shooting of a wounded and unarmed Iraqi, who the previous day had already surrendered to, and been treated by, another coalition unit.

This is one incident which is under investigation. However, the Fallujah assault, and other coalition/interim-government operations now ongoing in the Sunni triangle, demonstrate the coalition commanders' routine disregard for international law on the protection of civilians and for the neutrality of humanitarian work and humanitarian organisations. The operation in Fallujah began with the coalition forces' occupation of the main hospital, thus denying it to the resistance. Civilian women and children were permitted to leave, but unarmed men of military age, whether involved with the resistance or not, were forced to remain in the city to face the consequences of the assault. A blockade was imposed and water and power cut off to whole neighbourhoods. Aerial bombardment of populated urban districts and the use of heavy artillery resulted in widespread death and injury to non-combatants, as well as the destruction of civilian infrastructure. Access to the civilian population by humanitarian agencies, and in particular by the Iraqi Red Crescent, which tried repeatedly to send assistance, was blocked for a long period by coalition forces. Coalition forces themselves undertook to make humanitarian relief distribution towards the end of the operation. However, this included at least one reported misuse of humanitarian assistance, in which families were called on to send one male to the central mosque to collect a relief packet. Once in line, the

men found themselves separated into groups and forensically checked for powder marks. Those who were found to have fired a weapon were arrested, according to photographer Marco Dilauro, embedded with US Marines in Fallujah, 17 November 2004.

While Christian Aid and partners are extremely concerned about the failure to protect civilians or to respect international law on armed conflict, we also call attention again to the failure of coalition leaders to respect the neutrality and mandate of humanitarian organisations, including the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, UN agencies and NGOs, as they try to work in the field. Since the spring 2003 intervention, coalition leaders have consistently tried to present the political/military mission as a humanitarian one, giving humanitarian tasks to coalition military units, and giving coalition military officers the job of co-ordinating humanitarian work. As a result, any distinction between the neutral role of humanitarian organisations and the role of the coalition military is now quite unclear to most members of the Iraqi public, many of whom now resent all international organisations, or even internationally funded organisations, as “occupiers.” Humanitarian space, as aid agencies describe the ability to reach those in need, has been severely compromised as a result and may not be recovered for many years.

Sir Nick Young of the British Red Cross said of a visit to Baghdad last year: “I had a very strong feeling that we were regarded as the occupying powers . . . and this was something I hadn’t felt before.” He regarded the coalition’s denial of access to Fallujah as: “. . . hugely significant . . . it sets a dangerous precedent. The Red Crescent had a mandate to meet the needs of the local population facing a huge crisis, and, given their neutrality, they should have been allowed in to meet those needs.” (*Guardian*, 15 December 2004) Dawood Pasha, the Director-General of Iraq’s new government agency for NGOs, who admits that his government cannot provide security for aid workers, stated recently: “In general, the view of every aid agency in Iraq is that it must be working with Mossad or the CIA. When I say these groups are here to help the Iraqi people, many people think it’s a lie. The fundamentalist religious groups say this. And no-one has seen foreigners for many years, so they are suspicious.” (UN interview, December 2004)

Christian Aid, with its local partners, will continue to work to alleviate the population’s situation in a number of provinces in Iraq, as far as circumstances permit. However, we call upon all parties, including the coalition nations, and particularly the UK and US governments, to respect well-established international laws on conflict. The UK’s coalition membership implies equal responsibility for the breaches that have occurred and are occurring. We also call on all parties to respect the neutrality of humanitarian organisations. In the case of the UK Ministry of Defence and the US Pentagon, this will require a radical change in policy and principle toward both humanitarian organisations and humanitarian activities.

January 2005

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**Follow up response submitted by Dr Joost R. Hiltermann, Middle East Project Director, International Crisis Group, to questions raised on *standing up credible security forces in Iraq* during a meeting with Dr Reinoud Leenders, Middle East Analyst, Tuesday 25 January**

The creation of credible security forces in Iraq requires time, resources and—last but not least—a legitimate government that broadly represents all sectors of the Iraqi population. What we have seen so far in the rebuilding from scratch of both a national army and police force is that the process was rushed to the extreme, with out-of-country training that was dangerously abbreviated and inadequate follow-up once the trainees returned to Iraq for deployment. Recruits were commonly drawn from the poorest, most desperate sectors of society. Deprived of proper training, many fled or switched sides at the merest hint of combat. Moreover, due to the deteriorating security situation, Iraqi units were sent into battle that, while capable fighting forces, were of such a composition (all Kurds, for example) as to raise sectarian tensions in such volatile localities as Falluja and Mosul. The problem was that these were the only units available at the time, the Kurds in particular being fighters hardened in battle.

Army and police recruits need to receive proper and sustained training, including inside Iraq, by qualified trainers able to impart skills and instill discipline and loyalty. This will require major resources over a period of 3–5 years, and many Western trainers will need to be made available to respond to the demand and cover all aspects of the curriculum. Proper follow-up should be conducted following deployment in Iraq to ascertain the functioning of command structures, make adjustments, and weed out weak elements. Every effort should be made to draw recruits from all sectors of Iraqi society, and not to privilege one group over another.

However, no conveyance of technical skills will suffice if there is not a single authority in place that is accepted by a cross section of Iraqis. Only a legitimate political process, culminating in the establishment of a legitimate government that is broadly representative will ensure the degree of loyalty that will turn well-trained security forces into effective arms of the state rather than vehicles for sectarian rivalry and civil war. (The recent elections, while partly successful, were marred by the near-total absence of Sunni Arabs from the polls, itself a reflection of their growing alienation from reconstruction. If this process is not reversed, it may become impossible to build security forces that will not, in the end, be involved in repression.)

February 2005

**Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from Jill Knight, member of Amnesty International**

**RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ**

I write as a member of Amnesty International, having been involved as a volunteer coordinator on Iraq for over 10 years. I am familiar with the strategy that Amnesty is working towards and this includes the promotion of any means which will help to establish respect for human rights as a basis for civil society.

To this end may I suggest the Committee especially concerns itself with:

*1. Assistance to the many Iraqi NGOs trying to establish the whereabouts of the many "lost" persons in Iraq*

Recently the Iraqi Minister for Human Rights spoke in Amman that this need was of paramount importance. NGOs lack forensic back-up for example in tissue matching or DNA processes. They lack in some instances appropriate means to record findings and need IT equipment and help in information retrieval.

This is an enormous task and so many Iraqis need help in establishing what happened to their relatives. Finding reliable evidence and proper identification allows for respectful burial. It allows the people to move on by providing certification of death so that other civil matters can follow, eg remarriage or ownership of property. More importantly still, identification recognises the importance of each human life, in recent years so little respected in Iraq.

Whilst Amnesty would encourage every effort to these ends and is aware the process may take a very long time, it is not equipped with the expertise to do this work directly, nor has it the resources to begin to do so.

*2. Establishment of proper legal process*

If human rights are to be at the forefront of the new Iraqi government's priorities and the Draft Constitution is to be endorsed there is a huge amount of work to be done to support the judicial system. Training of lawyers and Court officials in the conduct of a fair trial, recording systems and protection of witnesses being amongst the important issues in establishing good practice in a country where no one has experienced a fair trial process in living memory.

*3. Police Stations*

The police system is under unbelievable pressure as I write. However unless proper practice can be learned so that the police gather evidence in a proper manner, it will be impossible to set up fair trials. Evidence can easily be contaminated by threats, bribery, and bullying. In the past police stations and other security and intelligence detention places have been involved in violations of human rights using methods of torture and intimidation. Amnesty has always known that it is in the first instance of how an arrested person is treated that must be properly conducted as a protection against abuse. The judicial system will need a proper disciplinary process for the police with due punishment for abuse. There has been a culture of impunity for a long time in Iraq but accountability must be established.

*4. Women in Iraqi society*

Amnesty is deeply concerned about the level of domestic abuse and of crimes committed against women in Iraq. Traditionally rape and abuse have been treated as a domestic responsibility with little opportunity to cope with this officially. In this context, Iraqi legislation is in need of urgent review and amendment to ensure compliance with international human rights standards and to provide full protection for women. Since the war women have suffered from crimes committed against them with no redress. Further the insecurity of recent months have inhibited women from participating in ordinary day to day activities for fear of attack. This has kept many Iraqi girls from school for example. It is very important that women be enabled to take part in the judicial and political process in safety, and there is a need not only for women police officers but for facilities whereby women can act as witnesses without fear of reprisal, with an accountable chaperone mechanism reliably in place.

Amnesty as an organisation does not receive moneys from governments, nor has it resources to develop civil society directly. It can and does have plans to provide training in human rights to individuals and groups but inevitably it is in a small way. At present Amnesty researchers cannot travel freely in Iraq but the organisation has links with NGOs inside Iraq and with individuals.

Iraq could have a great future if only stability can be achieved. If the committee can see its way to providing assistance our impression is that there are many Iraqis willing to work towards the goal of stability and protection of human rights.

I hope the committee may be able to give consideration to these observations.

January 2005



### Letter from Oxfam to the Chairman of the International Development Committee

The scope for impartial, independent, humanitarian action is critical if Non-Governmental Organisations such as Oxfam are to ensure that people's needs are met during times of conflict. This scope has been under intense pressure in Iraq because of insecurity including the direct attack on international humanitarian representatives.

Oxfam International resumed work in Iraq in May 2003, after leaving in 1996, with the intention of providing water and sanitation assistance to people in Nassiriyah, working closely with local water authorities. Security considerations, both for local communities and for our own staff, were a major concern from the start. In August 2003, we withdrew our international staff following the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, after a series of other attacks on humanitarian workers. Though there had been no direct threats to Oxfam, it was clear that international humanitarian workers had become to be considered fair and soft targets in the eyes of militant extremist groups.

Our national staff remained operational but they, too, were obliged to cease programme activities in April 2004 because the deteriorating security situation made it impossible for them to work effectively.

Others, clearly, will have things to say about the various causes of insecurity in Iraq that have adversely affected us. It appears to us, however, that one cause for the deliberate targeting of UN and other international humanitarian workers has been the impression created by the coalition that those workers have been one part of the total international effort.

Because of the poor security situation, and the withdrawal of most humanitarian agencies, the true extent of humanitarian need inside Iraq remains largely unknown. It has been impossible even to gather sufficient, appropriate information required to make a satisfactory assessment. However, we now have clear evidence that indicates that the health of Iraqi people has been seriously compromised since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 as a result of the destruction of health, water and sanitation infrastructure in certain parts of the country. We will be producing a report on this, with Medact, in November, which I shall of course send to you immediately. (See <http://www.medact.org/>)

In short, we are concerned that the ongoing unrest in Iraq means that those in need are suffering because humanitarian organisations such as Oxfam are not able to reach them. Sadly, the brevity of my letter underscores the regrettable position in which we have been placed in not being able to supply sustained, effective humanitarian action or even to make basic assessments to identify the need for appropriate assistance. However, if Oxfam can provide further information to the International Development Select Committee about our work before and during the current Iraq crisis, we would be pleased to do so.

We reiterate our call on the UK Government to play its vital role in establishing law and order across Iraq and establishing an environment within which Non-Government Organisations can operate safely and independently.

*Adam Leach*

*Regional Director*

*Middle East, Eastern Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States*

*October 2004*

### Memorandum submitted by Save the Children UK

#### 1. SUMMARY OF MAIN OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This memorandum presents observations and recommendations pertaining to humanitarian and development assistance in Iraq, and the future role of DFID in meeting critical humanitarian and development needs. The main points are summarised here across five key areas:

##### I. *The Role of DFID in Humanitarian and Development Assistance in Iraq*

- To better meet its target objectives, DFID should revise assumptions underlying its Interim Country Assistance Plan (CAP) for Iraq on a regular basis, identify how best to “sequence” its programmes, and identify commonly-used indicators (eg UN Common Country Assessment indicators) to monitor progress;
- DFID should incorporate and prioritise child-focused initiatives in its programme activities, especially in the Health and Education sectors;

##### II. *The Role of DFID's Partners*

- In light of the current minimal operating presence of the United Nations in Iraq, DFID should assess the cost effectiveness of funding certain sectoral interventions through the UN;
- DFID should ensure that implementing partners guarantee a majority role for Iraqi stakeholders in managing and implementing DFID-funded projects;

### III. *Co-ordination of Service Provision and Policy*

- To what extent has DFID established close working relationships and liaison arrangements with other UK Government entities (including FCO, UK-MoD etc)?
- DFID should work with members of the Donor Core Group to ensure that there is a single, well-resourced assistance and reconstruction coordination centre within the interim administration;

### IV. *The Security Environment and Humanitarian Space*

- DFID is uniquely well placed to play a pivotal role in ensuring that the delivery of humanitarian assistance according to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence is not compromised by inappropriate engagement of military forces in “humanitarian”-like activities. To date, DFID has not been proactive in executing this role;
- As part of its enhanced working relationship with the UK MoD (on Iraq) DFID should adopt a proactive stance in ensuring that UK military missions/activities protect and expand the operational space necessary for humanitarian assistance in Iraq;
- DFID should launch an initiative to engage humanitarian and military actors for the purposes of updating guidelines on humanitarian-military relations to better reflect the current operating environment and threats faced by humanitarian workers;

### V. *The Transition from Humanitarian Relief to Reconstruction and Development*

- To better monitor progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for Iraq, DFID should use the UN Common Country Assessment indicators to (i) establish a development “Baseline”; and (ii) to track changes in conditions associated with the MDGs.

## I. SAVE THE CHILDREN UK’S WORK IN IRAQ

1. Save the Children UK’s mission is to fight for children’s rights and to deliver immediate and lasting improvement to children’s lives worldwide. SC UK’s work for children is guided by the following strategic goals: basic services enjoyed by all children; children safeguarded in emergencies; children protected and respected as citizens; and child-focused economic policies.

2. Except for a short period bracketing the conflict in March/April 2003, SC UK has sustained an operational presence in Iraq since 1991. Following initial deployment to the region to provide emergency relief to displaced persons following the failed Kurdish uprising, SC UK established a relief programme inside Iraq for returning refugees in August 1991. This programme focused on repair of shelters and food distribution.

3. SC UK decided to work exclusively in Iraqi Kurdistan after the Government of Iraq made clear its intention to restrict access and activities of humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the South/Central regions. From 1992 to 1997 SC UK’s programme activities focused on rehabilitation of villages, roads and schools, and assistance to agriculture.

4. Towards the end of 1999 SC UK revised its programme in Iraq to focus on long-term development, including social development, community mobilisation and capacity building for local authorities. SC UK moved away from direct program implementation to working through local communities and local institutions in the areas of social services, alternatives to institutionalisation and juvenile justice.

5. SC UK currently has 20 (predominantly Iraqi) staff working in the country, with offices in Erbil and Baghdad. SC UK activities include emergency education, institutional capacity building for local NGOs, and enhancing child protection at the community level. In addition to its programme activities, SC UK has engaged in policy-directed research on aspects of the humanitarian situation in Iraq since 1998, including research on food security and livelihoods in Northern Iraq.<sup>i</sup>

6. Based on Save the Children UK’s operational experience and institutional research, this memorandum serves to provide constructive input and recommendations to the International Development Committee on the issue of “*Development Assistance in Iraq*”, across five key subject areas: (i) the role of DFID in humanitarian and development assistance in Iraq; (ii) the role of DFID’s partners; (iii) coordination of service provision and policy; (iv) the security environment and humanitarian space; and (v) the transition from humanitarian relief to reconstruction and development.

## II. CONTEXT: FRAMING ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN IRAQ

7. There are several important operational and policy-related factors that define the context for development assistance in Iraq. These factors provide a “lens” through which to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian and development assistance in the country. These bounding parameters include: the security situation in Iraq; legal principles underlying international intervention; agreed donor principles for humanitarian assistance; and operating policies, guidelines that relate to humanitarian assistance.

### *The Security Situation in Iraq*

8. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq constitutes the dominant constraint on humanitarian and development assistance in the country. The security situation is characterised by: (I) armed engagements between Iraqi security forces and Multinational Force (MNF) troops on the one hand, and insurgent groups on the other; (II) attacks by individuals and groups against persons believed or perceived to be supporting the political transition process; (III) deliberate targeting of humanitarian- and development workers; (IV) the raised general level of lawlessness; and (V) increased level of “retribution”-type attacks between various elements of the population.

9. Any assessment of humanitarian and development assistance in Iraq must therefore take into account the level of operational presence and activity that is feasible in such a volatile security environment.

### *Applicable Legal Principles and Regimes*

10. The legal framework and context within which humanitarian and development assistance activities have been undertaken in Iraq has changed in response to the factual situation “on the ground”: From the onset of hostilities in March 2003 to 28 June 2004, the provisions of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (especially the Geneva Conventions of 1949) as they relate to conduct of hostilities, protection of civilians, and situations of occupation were clearly applicable, and were recognised as being so by the UN Security Council. This was the case notwithstanding the debates that were ongoing on the legal basis for the conflict itself.

11. With the assumption of power by the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004 the legal regime became less clear-cut. Although international humanitarian law is still held to be applicable in Iraq, the extent to which the law of belligerent occupation remains applicable will depend on the factual situation on the ground (including the extent to which foreign forces exert control over specific areas).<sup>ii</sup>

### *Donor- and Humanitarian Agency Principles and Policies*

12. The Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship agreed by major donors in Stockholm in June 2003 also frame the assessment of humanitarian and development assistance in Iraq. Participants in that international meeting endorsed a common definition of humanitarian action, and agreed principles relating to, among other issues: allocating humanitarian funding in proportion to needs; participation of beneficiaries; promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness; and support for implementation of guidelines on humanitarian-military relations.<sup>iii</sup>

13. Other relevant framing principles and guidelines include the guidelines for humanitarian-military relations in delivery of humanitarian assistance. Of particular relevance in this regard are the policy papers and guidelines produced by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).<sup>iv</sup>

## III. THE ROLE OF DFID IN HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN IRAQ

14. DFID published its Interim Country Assistance Plan (CAP) for Iraq in February 2004. The CAP identifies the following development goal for Iraq: “an inclusive, Iraqi-led reconstruction process that brings sustained benefits to all citizens, particularly the poor and vulnerable.”<sup>v</sup>

15. The interim CAP sets out the following strategic objectives to fulfill the primary development goal: (i) to promote rapid, sustainable and equitable economic growth; (ii) to encourage effective and accountable governance; (iii) to promote social and political cohesion and stability. The CAP provides a frank and objective assessment of the challenges and opportunities that DFID has encountered in implementing its programme in Iraq. DFID has compiled a matrix of objectives, activities and indicators to assess progress in implementing its programme out to March 2006. The first annual assessment of progress is due to be completed in March 2005.

16. Between 1991 and October 2002 the UK Government provided approximately £100 million for humanitarian assistance, predominantly for Northern Iraq, focusing primarily on making the UN Oil-for-Food Programme more effective and strengthening local capacity to provide support for vulnerable persons.<sup>vi</sup> Save the Children UK believes that this capacity building support, provided through international NGOs, significantly enhanced the ability of local institutions in the three Northern Governorates to respond to the needs to the population and to enhance fulfillment of human rights. This capacity building activity has provided the Kurdish Region with a distinct advantage over the South/Centre of Iraq in addressing current and future challenges.


17. From the onset of the conflict in March 2003 to the end of May 2003, DFID provided £115 million through the United Nations, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs to meet humanitarian needs in Iraq. As of 30 July 2004 DFID had committed £331 million to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, allocated as follows: UN pre-conflict preparedness—£13 million; UN consolidated appeal 2003—£71.8 million; International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)—£70 million; Red Cross—£32 million; NGOs—£7.4 million; DFID secondments and security—£28.1 million; and “Other Reconstruction Work”—£109 million.

18. An approximate sectoral breakdown of the “destination” of DFID funds disbursed under the UN Appeal, NGO- and “Other Reconstruction Work” categories is provided in Figure 1.<sup>vii</sup> The 11 groupings in Figure 1 combine the seven clusters identified in the UN-World Bank Joint Needs Assessment of October 2003 and four other sectors where DFID has committed funds.<sup>viii</sup>

19. A new Ministry of Civil Society Development has recently been established in Iraq. The exact role and functions of this entity are not yet clear. However, the Ministry appears to be in the early stages of formation, with limited “personnel”/administrative capacity.

20. Observations and Recommendations:

- In light of the dynamic security situation, DFID should revise assumptions underlying the CAP on a more regular basis (every three months), and revise programme activities accordingly.
- DFID should consider identifying more frequent intervals (than annual reviews) for monitoring progress in implementing its programmes in Iraq, and should identify indicators for this purpose that can also be used to measure progress towards meeting the needs identified in the joint UN/World Bank Needs Assessment. For example, indicators used for the UN’s Common Country Assessment Process may provide a basis for measuring progress.
- Given that an estimated 50% of Iraq’s population is under 15 years of age, DFID should incorporate and prioritise child-focused initiatives in its programme activities, particularly in the Health and Education sectors.
- Under its strategic objective of “*promoting social and political cohesion and stability*”, DFID should consider its role in supporting aspects of the constitutional drafting process in Iraq as they relate to the incorporation of children’s rights into the draft Constitution (to be drafted by the National Assembly following elections).
- Of the funds DFID has provided to UN 2003 Appeal, NGOs and “Other Reconstruction Work” categories, only 0.92% has been targeted to the “Human Rights, Gender and Environment” cluster. Although funds may have been provided to these sectors through multilateral partners (eg International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq), DFID may wish to consider programme interventions that will support additional activities in these sectors, particularly in promotion of human rights and advancement of women’s and children’s issues.
- DFID has recognised the needs for the development of a vibrant civil society and an independent media. DFID should take steps to ensure that civil society organisations are supported by the Iraqi Interim Government, but that they are not constrained in any way in their legitimate activities by the interim administration. The role of DFID in this regard may be to advise and support the Iraqi Interim Government in establishing registration processes, resource centres, networking initiatives and technical assistance (especially IT-related) to provide an environment conducive to the emergence of civil society organisations.
- DFID should seek to clarify the role and objectives of the new Ministry of Civil Society Development, and should take steps to ensure that civil society can develop independently of state institutions—the essence of “civil” society. In this regard, DFID should consider provision of additional support to *international* civil society organisations (CSOs) to enter into capacity-building partnerships with emerging Iraqi CSOs.
- DFID has acknowledged the need to better “sequence” programme implementation. DFID should assign priorities to key sectors such as support to government institutions, rule of law and civil society development initiatives that will have a knock-on effect on other sectors, and that can deliver results within the constraints of the existing security environment.



**Figure 1—DFID Funding to UN Appeal, NGOs and “Other Reconstruction Work” categories, by Sector, as of 30 July 2004**


#### IV. THE ROLE OF DFID’S PARTNERS

21. The total amount of £331 million committed to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq by 30 July 2004 was allocated to DFID’s partners as follows: United Nations (preparedness and UN Appeal 2003)—25.6%; International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)—21.1%; Red Cross Movement—9.7%; NGOs—2.2%. Funding was provided to a variety of entities under DFID’s “Other Reconstruction Work” category (33%), and DFID secondments and security accounted for 8.5% of the total amount committed. (See Figure 2)

22. DFID has stated that it will need to implement some programmes bilaterally in the short term (in light of the operational constraints on UN/International Financial Institutions’ activities).

#### 23. Observations and Recommendations:

- In light of the current minimal operational presence of the United Nations in Iraq, and purely as an interim measure, DFID should consider assessing the cost effectiveness of funding certain activities through the United Nations, especially in areas where the organisation has limited access to implement the programmes. In some circumstances the funding may be more effectively delivered directly to the implementing partners in Iraq (local, national institutions and NGOs).
- DFID’s funding of “Other Reconstruction Work” accounts for almost 33% of all DFID funds committed to date. DFID should ensure that implementing partners in this category identify qualitative or/and quantitative indicators that will enable DFID (and UK Government) to assess the effectiveness of these contributions.
- In pursuit of its goal of an “*inclusive, Iraqi-led reconstruction process*” in Iraq, DFID should ensure that implementing partners (if not entities within the Iraqi Interim Government) guarantee a majority role for Iraqi stakeholders in managing and implementing DFID-funded projects.



**Figure 2—DFID Funding in Iraq to 30 July 2004 by Awardee/Partner**

## V. CO-ORDINATION OF SERVICE PROVISION AND POLICY

24. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) supports the coordination of humanitarian activities in Iraq through the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Displacement and Migration in Baghdad.<sup>ix</sup> In its Interim CAP of February 2004, DFID identified that the (then-) Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had established an aid coordination process, working primarily through the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. It is unclear whether these two coordination mechanisms are working in parallel, or whether they have been merged into a single coordinating entity.

### 25. Observations and Recommendations:

- In its Interim CAP, DFID asserted that *“we must be joined up with other UK government departments”*. To what extent has DFID established close working relationships and liaison arrangements with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) vis-à-vis fulfilling DFID’s development goal in Iraq?
- DFID should play a lead role in moving from a “high-level” liaison relationship among members of the Donor Core Group (apparent situation as of September 2004) to a more technical approach to coordinating programme activities and reducing overlap/redundancy within the Group.
- DFID should work with members of the Donor Core Group to ensure that there is a single, well-resourced assistance coordination mechanism within the Iraqi Interim Government.

## VI. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND HUMANITARIAN SPACE

26. Save the Children UK has undertaken significant policy-directed research on the subject of humanitarian-military relations in recent years.<sup>x</sup> This work has provided practical recommendations to cross-agency efforts to develop guidelines for humanitarian-military relations in complex emergencies.

27. Save the Children UK maintains that the increased involvement of military forces in relief operations (as part of militaries’ Peace Support Operations), the increased justification of military interventions on purported “humanitarian” grounds, and the multi-dimensional nature of recent peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions have conspired to blur the conceptual, policy-related and operational boundaries between humanitarian and military activities.

28. Save the Children UK further maintains that this erosion of the conceptual and operational space necessary for effective delivery of humane, impartial, and independent assistance has contributed to the deterioration in humanitarian security, a term used to encapsulate the various aspects of physical and psychological safety of both assistance providers and recipients associated with, and necessary for, humanitarian operations. In Afghanistan and Iraq, aid workers have been targeted in part because of their perceived association with foreign forces and because they present a “soft” target for would-be attackers.

29. A defining feature of the interface between humanitarian and military actors is the differing perspectives each party holds on what exactly constitutes “humanitarian” assistance. While there is general agreement on the substance of what constitutes humanitarian assistance (what is delivered), the processes and motivations driving the delivery of assistance differ. Humanitarians provide assistance based on principles of humanity, impartiality and independence and based solely on need. Military forces (with the exception of some UN-mandated peacekeeping forces) act in pursuit of political- and military objectives and frequently undertake relief operations to win the “hearts and minds” of local populations.

30. SC UK has identified three important shortcomings of existing guidelines for humanitarian-military interactions: (a) the guidelines are based on the faulty premise that the fundamental principles of humanity, independence and impartiality will be acknowledged and respected by all military actors; (b) the guidelines are not sufficiently explicit concerning situations where civil[en rule]military teams engage in a complex or ambiguous range of missions; and (c) the guidelines do not sufficiently address scenarios where the needs are less humanitarian than in full crises, yet a situation is bad enough to warrant a military intervention.

31. Existing guidelines do provide for direct military implementation of relief operations, but only in limited, “exceptional circumstances”. In such instances, the use of military or civil-defence resources should satisfy the following criteria: the military resources represent means of last resort; a significant level of need is identified by civilian agencies; interventions remain under civilian control and are time bound.

32. In the case of Iraq, the use of private security contractors has further compromised the distinction between military and civilian personnel. In many cases, these security contractors wear civilian clothes, fall outside the military chain of command, travel in unmarked vehicles similar to those previously or currently used by humanitarian workers from international organisations, and provide security for persons working on projects that may be similar to those undertaken by humanitarian agencies.

## 33. Observations and Recommendations:

- As the UK Government department responsible for reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development, and for leading the reconstruction effort in Iraq, DFID is uniquely well placed to play a pivotal role in ensuring that the delivery of humanitarian assistance according to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence is not compromised by inappropriate engagement of military forces in “humanitarian”-like activities. To date, DFID has not been proactive in executing this role.
- As part of its enhanced working relationship with the UK MoD (on Iraq) DFID should adopt a proactive stance in ensuring that UK military operations protect and expand the operational space necessary for humanitarian assistance in Iraq.
- DFID should facilitate a dialogue between non-governmental humanitarian agencies (NGHAs) and the Multinational Force in Iraq on practical approaches to ensure the protection of humanitarian space in Iraq. The output from such an initiative could be a set of agreed “Working Principles” for undertaking assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq.
- The “Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship” agreed at the June 2003 International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship (Stockholm) highlighted that *“humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.”* DFID should play a lead role within the Donor Core Group, and among other key donors, to ensure that the principles agreed in Stockholm are operationalised in Iraq.
- DFID should launch an initiative to engage humanitarian and military actors for the purposes of updating guidelines on humanitarian-military relations to better reflect the current operating environment and threats faced by assistance providers.
- In situations where UK military forces engage in relief operations in “exceptional circumstances” as provided for under the SCHR Guidelines for humanitarian-military interactions, DFID should ensure that such activities are undertaken according to the criteria outlined in those Guidelines (see para. 31 above).

## VII. THE TRANSITION FROM HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

34. In contrast to situations of rapid-onset humanitarian crisis, the situation in Iraq is characterised by structural factors that affect humanitarian conditions. These factors include the dilapidated state of essential infrastructure (especially Water and Sanitation); the dependency of the population on the public (ration) distribution system since the mid-1980s (and especially since 1990); the legacy of a state-controlled economy which was overly dependent on the oil sector; and the prevailing insecurity which limits the ability to meet humanitarian needs.

35. Iraq represents a case of development regression, whereby the “de-development” of the society has advanced to such a point that it is impacting humanitarian conditions.

## 36. Observations and Recommendations:

- To better monitor progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for Iraq, DFID should use the UN Common Country Assessment Indicator Framework to (i) establish a development “Baseline”; and (ii) to track changes conditions associated with the MDGs.
- DFID and other key donors should identify and implement targeted initiatives in the four key sectors of Health; Food & Nutrition; Water & Sanitation and Education, to move from direct provision of palliative assistance towards longer-term development activities. Such interventions could include, for example, efforts to improve food security by reducing dependency on the public ration system; direct support to revitalise/expand the network of Community Child Care Units etc. Strategies for humanitarian-development transitions should be considered by DFID when it focuses on better “sequencing” of its activities (see para 20).

## VIII. CONCLUSION

37. Save the Children UK maintains that notwithstanding the operational challenges in Iraq, DFID can play a critical role in supporting Iraqi leadership of development and humanitarian assistance in the country. This enhanced role will require a more proactive approach on the part of DFID in several areas, including (i) working with Iraqi authorities to coordinating programme interventions among key international donors; (ii) ensuring that the objective of an Iraqi-led reconstruction process becomes a reality; and (iii) working with other donors, UN, military forces and NGOs to take practical steps to preserve the operational- and conceptual space for humanitarian action.

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Reference

- i For example: Alastair Kirk and Gary Sawdon, *Understanding Kurdish Livelihoods in Northern Iraq: Final Report* (London: Save the Children (UK), January 2002); Save the Children (UK), *Winning the Peace in Iraq: Defining a Role for the United Nations* (London: Save the Children (UK), May 2003).
  - ii The preamble to UN Security Council resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004 states: “*Noting the commitment of all forces promoting the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with international law, including obligations under international humanitarian law . . .*”
  - iii Government of Sweden, *International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship: Meeting Conclusions* (Stockholm: June 2003).
  - iv UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Guidelines on The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* (New York: UN-OCHA, March 2003); Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), *SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance* (2002, revised 2004); Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), *Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies. An IASC Reference Paper* (Geneva: IASC, 28 June 2004).
  - v UK Department for International Development (DFID), *Iraq: Interim Country Assistance Plan* (London: DFID, February 2004). This development goal has been identified in the context of the broader UK Government goal to: “*support and encourage a stable, united and law abiding state that provides effective and representative government, sustainable economic growth and rising living standards for all Iraqi citizens.*”
  - vi UK Department for International Development (DFID), *UK Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq* (London: DFID, 14 October 2002) Available at <http://www.reliefweb.int> (accessed 26 September 2004).
  - vii It is important to note that this is an APPROXIMATE sectoral breakdown. Data were compiled by Save the Children UK based on DFID “Iraq Update” documents. Blocks of funding provided to some recipient organisations covered more than one sector, and in such cases only the primary sectoral allocation of funds was considered.
  - viii United Nations, *United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment* (New York: United Nations, October 2003). The seven clusters are: (A) Education, Health and Employment Creation; (B) Infrastructure; (C) Agriculture, Water Resources and Food Security; (D) Finance and Private Sector Development; (E) Mine Action; (F) Government Institutions, Rule of Law, Civil Society, Media; and (G) Human Rights, Gender and Environment.
  - ix See: United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546* (2004), UN Document ref. S/2004/710 (New York: United Nations, 3 September 2004) : paragraph 47.
  - x See: Gerard P. Mc Hugh and Lola Gostelow, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan* (London: Save the Children (UK), September 2004); Jane Barry with Anna Jefferys, *A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response*, Network Paper No 37 of the Humanitarian Practice Network (London: Overseas Development Institute, January 2002).
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**Supplementary memorandum submitted by Save the Children, in response to written questions from the International Development Committee**

*1. How successful has this project been?<sup>6</sup> When would you expect Iraqi agricultural output to pick up to pre-war levels? What steps are being taken to ensure that food produced will be affordable given the high level of dependence on the public distribution system (PDS)?*

Child malnutrition has gone up considerably, post war, with one in four children under five years chronically malnourished, with the largest number of malnourished children being in and around conflict areas such as Fallujah and Baghdad. Whilst the PDS system has deflated market independence, the community dependence it has engendered means that the PDS system is currently vital for child health. PDS could arguably be better targeted, with increased nutritional value and joined with public health campaigns to maximise its impact. It could also be monetized although this makes it vulnerable to inflation changes and more difficult to target.

Once it is possible to establish strategic agricultural policy, then PDS needs to be phased out while the market is stimulated although this needs to be done with consideration to issues such as land reform, repairing irrigation channels, installing new water pumps, building and repairing seed factories. The status of these activities is unclear and predicting a time frame for their development is difficult.

*2. Should the advancement of women and children be given a greater priority in post-conflict Iraq? What steps can be taken now to ensure that women are given sufficient opportunities to participate in the rebuilding of post-conflict Iraq?*

Save the Children UK, SC UK, believes that the advancement of women and children should be given a greater priority in Iraq, with funding and opportunities for engagement. SC UK and their Iraqi Non-Governmental and Government partners are building technical support centres throughout Iraq and have held workshops to plan these centres. During these workshops, our Iraqi partners have recommended that:

- The UN should coordinate a country-wide baseline assessment of children's human rights, using the reporting guidelines for the UNCRC as a framework and involving all key stakeholders, including seeking children's perspectives. This could provide the basis for mobilising appropriate action to catch up on commitments, and provide a baseline against which progress towards fulfilling children's rights can be monitored.
- The UN humanitarian and human rights agencies and other non-governmental humanitarian agencies should coordinate their activities, working with the Ministry of Human Rights in Iraq, to support the emergence and training of Iraqi NGOs focusing on child rights.
- A sub-commission on the rights of children should be established to provide substantive inputs (through the proposed independent human rights commission) to the constitutional drafting process once the new National Assembly is elected.
- The Government of Iraq, the UN and non-governmental human rights agencies should convene meetings of children in regional centres around Iraq (security permitting) to ensure that children have an opportunity to participate in ongoing/planned initiatives to fulfil their rights. This initiative could contribute to raising general public awareness of children's rights.
- A dedicated UN protection force—drawn from the UN-mandated Multinational force—should be established and adequately resourced to provide security for an enhance UN presence in Iraq, which would enable the organisation to fulfil its mandate under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The previously extant UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) could provide a model for this dedicated protection force.
- Training of Iraqi armed forces and police recruits should include human rights training, focusing specifically on the rights of children in Iraq.
- The UN and non-governmental humanitarian/human rights agencies should support the Ministry of Justice in developing and implementing a strategy for juvenile justice and protection that will be consistent with the Beijing Rules and Riyadh Guidelines.

<sup>6</sup> FID has funded the Food and Agricultural Organisation with £1.5 million, for needs assessment, distribution of seeds and tools, marketing and training for the Ministry of Agriculture. Another project mentioned in the evidence from Christian Aid, is supporting seed banks and nurseries.