Memorandum submitted by the Department
for International Development
1. INTRODUCTION
1. This Memorandum aims to address the questions
raised by the Committee in announcing this Inquiry on 21 July.
It focuses on the role of DFID and of the wider donor community,
since the end of major hostilities in April 2003. The final section
provides a brief overview of current progress on reconstruction.
2. DFID PROGRAMME
IN IRAQ,
APRIL 2003 TO
OCTOBER 2004
2. DFID's current strategy for Iraq is set
out in the Interim Country Assistance Plan, which was published
in February 2004. Its development goal is an inclusive, Iraqi-led
reconstruction process which brings sustained benefits to all
citizens, particularly the poor and vulnerable. Its three primary
objectives are:
To promote rapid, sustainable and
equitable economic growth.
To encourage effective and accountable
governance.
To promote social and political cohesion
and stability.
3. The principal elements of DFID's programme
in Iraq, as it has evolved since April 2003, have been as follows:
(a) The initial priorities were to ensure
an effective response to humanitarian needs arising from the 2003
conflict, and then to begin supporting the process of reconstruction.
(b) From the end of the 2003 conflict until
the handover to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) on 28 June
2004, DFID contributed advisers to the Office for Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and then to its successor,
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
(c) Beginning in the summer of 2003, DFID
developed a programme to support the regeneration of the southern
four Governorates, amongst the poorest parts of Iraq, and to restore
their links with the centre.
(d) DFID has also developed a "National
Programme" primarily to provide advice to the new IIG on
core central government functions, and also to promote Iraqi civil
society and political participation.
(e) Multilaterally, DFID has worked to strengthen
international support for Iraq's reconstruction, and has contributed
£70 million to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility
for Iraq (IRFFI) to enable the World Bank and United Nations to
assist in a wide range of sectors.
4. These elements are described in more
detail in the following sections. A summary list of the projects
funded is at annex 1.
(a) 2003 humanitarian assistance through
the UN, ICRC and NGOs
5. The primary objectives of DFID's humanitarian
assistance in 2003 were to ensure that the international community
was sufficiently prepared to avert any major humanitarian crisis
arising from the 2003 conflict, and to assist in the restoration
of essential services after the conflict. DFID contributed £85
million towards the humanitarian and reconstruction operations
of UN Agencies in response to appeals launched in March and June
2003. DFID committed £32 million to the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent (IRRC) movement in 2003, £18 million
of which has been disbursed, primarily to the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC). Some of this has subsequently been carried
forward into 2004 due to IRRC's inability to operate within the
deteriorating security situation. This assistance has provided
emergency rehabilitation and repair work at vital health, water
and sanitation facilities serving millions of people throughout
the country. We are considering with the ICRC and the IFRCS to
what extent further support may be needed. £7.2 million was
also provided to NGOs for their post conflict humanitarian work
in Iraq, in sectors including: health, nutrition, water and sanitation,
food, agriculture, security, mines action, media, humanitarian
co-ordination and information, displaced people, power, fuel,
education, and human rights.
6. The UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs were able
to set up effective humanitarian operations quickly after the
end of the major conflict in 2003, using their previous experience
of working in Iraq and established local networks with capacity
to deliver assistance on the ground. The deteriorating security
situation since mid-2003, particularly following the UN and ICRC
bombings, has resulted in a significant reduction in the numbers
of their international (non-Iraqi) staff able to work in Iraq.
This has caused some slowing down of the implementation of assistance
programmes. However, many organisations' Iraqi staff have continued
to operate discreetly, and effectively, and assistance has been
channelled though emerging Iraqi NGOs and private sector companies.
International NGOs have also retained a stronger presence in Kurdish-controlled
areas where they have been able to operate more easily and have
a good track record.
(b) Support for the Coalition Provisional
Authority
7. From mid-2003 until 28 June 2004, DFID
contributed to the provision of qualified personnel to the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) to support its work towards the effective
reconstruction of Iraq. About £28 million was spent on this
programme, and related security costs.
8. In the CPA headquarters in Baghdad, DFID
provided 24 personnel. The posts included the CPA Director of
Operations, and advisers to the Ministries of Finance, Municipalities
and Public Works, Trade, Industry and Minerals, and Planning and
Development Co-operation. DFID advisers to the CPA also worked
on food security, gender and migration issues.
9. In southern Iraq, DFID provided over
40 technical experts to the regional office of the CPA in Basra
between October 2003 and June 2004. Key subject areas included
infrastructure services (power, fuel and water), health, education,
social policy and welfare, agriculture and transport. Advisers
worked closely with senior provincial officials from the four
southern governorates over this period. This work enabled DFID
to develop sound local working relations early on in the reconstruction
process and to deepen its understanding of the problems facing
some of the poorest areas of Iraq.
(c) DFID programme in southern Iraq
10. In addition to the deployment of DFID
staff and consultants to the CPA in southern Iraq, DFID's main
priority in the south prior to the handover of power to the IIG
was the restoration of essential infrastructure. This work included
an Emergency Infrastructure Programme focusing on the reinstatement
of infrastructure for power, fuel, and water supplies, as well
as sewerage systems; and other projects focused on the refurbishment
of public sector buildings. The majority of this work has now
been completed. It cost US$100 million, of which US$ 66 million
was met from the Development Fund for Iraq and US$34 million by
DFID. The programme was managed in close collaboration with the
Iraqis and UK forces. It helped to stabilise infrastructure in
the south and make some improvements before the arrival of larger
investments from the US Supplemental and, in the longer term,
Iraq's own budget and the private sector.
11. The longer-term challenges to reducing
the high levels of poverty in the south are to promote economic
recovery and to build political and other links between the south
and the centre. A priority will be to strengthen Iraqi capacity
to ensure that the flows of financial resources coming into the
region over the next two years are used well and are targeted
at sustainable and inclusive economic growth. DFID has agreed
a new capacity building programme for the four governorates in
southern Iraq, worth £20.5 million over two years. The programme
will help the southern governorates to plan and manage reconstruction
funding. The implementation of this programme in the Governorates
of Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan is currently being hindered
by the poor security situation. The programme is continuing in
these areas through management from Basra and day visits to the
other three governorates. DFID is also financing (over a six month
period from July 2004) a £16.5 million programme to assist
employment generation and to provide a facility to deal with potential
critical failures in essential services.
12. Other DFID support in the south includes
the development an effective media through a £6.7 million
project being undertaken by the BBC World Service Trust; and a
one-year project to support de-mining. Some of DFID's national
programme work will also benefit the south, including the funds
for political participation and civil society capacity building.
(d) The "National Programme"
13. DFID is working at the national level
in Iraq to support the development of public policies and reforms
which benefit the poor and strengthen public administration, based
on the three Country Assistance Plan objectives:
(i) Promote rapid, sustainable and equitable
economic growth
14. DFID has a £3 million programme
to assist the IIG in the design and implementation of essential
economic reform programmes, which will also help Iraq in its negotiations
for a debt-reduction package. DFID has also provided over £3
million towards an IMF technical assistance package for Iraq.
This support has provided training for Iraqi officials in a wide
range of public financial management areas. These programmes have
helped to facilitate agreement to an IMF Emergency Post Conflict
programme, which is an important precursor to debt reduction negotiations
in the Paris Club. DFID has also provided around £8.5 million
towards an International Finance Corporation (IFC) finance facility
for small and medium enterprises in Iraq. This facility aims to
strengthen the capacity of Iraqi financial institutions and provide
much needed finance to the Iraqi private sector.
(ii) Encourage effective and accountable governance
15. DFID's £3 million Emergency Public
Administration Programme is providing technical support to the
Iraqi Prime Minister's Office, other government institutions and
three ministries which are key for reconstruction: Finance, Municipalities
and Public Works, and Planning and Development Co-operation. The
project aims to build the foundations for a modern professional
and accountable civil service. DFID is also exploring how we can
help strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs. In the justice sector, a £2 million project is providing
training to the judiciary, prosecution and bar association; and
a £1 million project with the Institute of War and Peace
Reporting is providing training for journalists to help develop
independent and effective news media.
(iii) Promote social and political cohesion
and stability
16. DFID has established a Political Participation
Fund (PPF) which aims to increase opportunities for participation
by Iraqi citizens in the political process; and a Civil Society
Support Fund (CSSF) which focuses on strengthening the capacity
of Iraqi civil society organisations. Each fund, worth £5
million includes elements to promote gender equity.
(e) Multilateral Assistance: IRFFI
17. The International Reconstruction Fund
Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), was set up in December 2003 by the
United Nations and World Bank. It provides bilateral donors with
a means of channelling their contributions towards Iraq's reconstruction
priorities in a co-ordinated manner, and reduces the transaction
costs to the Iraqi Government of dealing with many different donors
with their own individual priorities and procedures.
18. In March 2004, DFID made a £70
million contribution to IRFFI: £30 million to the trust fund
managed by the United Nations, and £40 million to the World
Bank's. For the UN, we stipulated that our contribution should
go towards DFID priority sectors, including primary and secondary
education, health, water and sanitation, electricity supply, refugees
and governance. In September 2004, in response to an urgent request,
we allocated US$10 million of our £30 million contribution
specifically to meet security costs for the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq. Our contribution to the World Bank's fund
is not earmarked to specific sectors or projects. A decision on
any further contributions will be based on an assessment of progress
made, requirements for 2005 and resources available in DFID's
Iraq programme.
19. Overall, donors have committed just
over US$1 billion to IRFFI: US$400 million to the World Bank's
trust fund and US$600 million to the UN's. The biggest contributors
are Japan (US$490 million), European Commission (US$192 million),
UK (US$120 million) and Canada (US$75 million). A full list of
donors and their contributions is attached at annex 2.
20. The UN has approved projects worth a
total of US$377 million, covering all regions of Iraq in sectors
including health, education, water and sanitation, and infrastructure.
Implementation has begun on several of them. The UN's pipeline
of projects under preparation will absorb all the finance currently
available. In addition to IRFFI-funded projects, the UN is continuing
to implement projects for which finance was provided during 2003
under the emergency appeals for Iraq. Over US$100 million was
disbursed in the first half of 2004, including emergency support
for people affected by the fighting in cities such as Fallujah
and Najaf.
21. Two World Bank projects are currently
underway: over 600 Iraqi officials have received training; and
approximately 40,000 textbooks have been delivered. Projects are
under preparation in education, urban infrastructure, water and
sanitation, health and private sector development.
22. The lack of an international presence
in Iraq of either the UN (until very recently) or the World Bank
has inevitably slowed project identification, approval and implementation,
and has inhibited the development of normal contacts with the
Iraqi government. The UN and World Bank have made considerable
efforts to overcome these difficulties through remote-working
links with their Iraqi national staff, focusing on work that can
be implemented by Iraqis and the private sector, using teleconferencing,
and hosting coordination and planning meetings in Amman. Pending
the return of international staff, DFID has contracted liaison
officers to represent the UN and the World Bank in Baghdad.
23. DFID plays an active role in the IRFFI
Donor Committee which provides strategic supervision of the funds.
Its next meeting is in Tokyo on 13-14 October where discussion
will focus on the progress of project implementation, and co-ordination
with Iraqi Ministries. The meeting will also provide an opportunity
for outreach to other potential donors to Iraq, and for the presentation
of Iraq's development priorities through its new National Development
Strategy.
3. OTHER DONORS
24. At the Madrid Donors Conference for
Iraq in October 2003, more than US$32 billion was pledged in grants
and concessional loans, as well as trade credits and assistance
in kind. The largest pledges were from the USA (US$18.4 billion
in grants), Japan (US$1.5 billion in grants and $3.5 billion in
loans), the World Bank (US$3 to 5 billion), IMF (US$2.5 billion)
and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia ($500 million each). A full list of
pledges is attached at annex 3.
25. The principal US instrument for
assistance to Iraq is its US$18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund (IRRF), which was approved as an Emergency Supplemental Appropriation
in November 2003. This funding is being managed mainly through
the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) in the US Embassy in
Baghdad. The main sectors for expenditure are security and law
enforcement, justice, electricity, oil production, and water and
sanitation. A recent reprioritisation exercise is expected to
shift some expenditure away from some longer term electricity
and water projects towards more immediate needs of security, oil
production and employment generation.
26. Japanese grant assistance is
split between multilateral contributions of US$500 million (US$490
million to IRFFI and US$10 million to the International Finance
Corporation small business facility) and bilateral funding. US$517
million of the latter has so far been programmed for the power
sector, hospital rehabilitation, water treatment plant, and vehicles
for the police, fire service and sanitation services. Japan is
also channelling US$35 million through NGOs. Work is beginning
on programming the US$3.5 billion which will be available in concessional
loans from next year.
27. The European Commission, Canada
and a number of smaller donors are channelling most or all
of their funding through IRFFI.
4. CO -ORDINATION
ISSUES
(a) Whitehall Co-ordination
28. Progress in Iraq requires parallel progress
on security, the political process and reconstruction of the economy
and state institutions. DFID works closely with other Government
departments to ensure coherent UK policy and approach. The Secretary
of State for International Development attends regular Ministerial
Iraq co-ordination meetings. DFID officials participate in weekly
Whitehall meetings on strategy, security and day-to-day practical
issues, and daily contacts take place with other government departments
at working level. An example is the regular co-ordination which
takes place between DFID, FCO and HM Treasury economics specialists
on economic reform and debt reduction issues. In Iraq the DFID
offices are an integral part of the Embassy in Baghdad and the
British Embassy Office Basra. DFID staff in Iraq work closely
with their FCO, MOD and military counterparts.
29. The MOD's Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)
has also played an important role in reconstruction in southern
Iraq. MND(SE)'s ability to operate quickly and effectively on
the ground has contributed to stabilising security in the region.
(b) Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP)
29. The FCO, MOD and DFID have pooled human
and financial resources, to develop and implement a Conflict Prevention
strategy in Iraq. The Iraq GCPP programme, with a budget of £19
million in 2004-05, is managed by FCO and focuses on three key
objectives:
Building the capacity of the Iraqi
government and civil society to carry out conflict prevention
and resolution initiatives;
Preventing further polarisation and
reducing underlying tensions between different elements of Iraqi
society; and
Building the capacity of the security
sector, with special emphasis on the police and prisons.
30. Security sector reform has been the
emphasis of much of GCPP's work, focusing on police and prison
service training, mentoring and monitoring. Other activities include
technical support to the Human Rights and Foreign Affairs Ministries,
interfaith activities, media, civic education, and training on
a variety of conflict resolution priorities. A devolved fund has
also been provided to the British Embassy in Baghdad to undertake
small-scale, quick impact conflict resolution projects. A summary
of GCPP activity in Iraq is at annex 4.
(c) Co-ordination with the Iraqi Government
31. The nature of DFID's work, much of which
is aimed at strengthening Iraqi capacity to manage the reconstruction
effort, means that good and close working relations with the Iraqi
Government are essential. The present Secretary of State for International
Development has visited Iraq three times for consultations with
Iraqi ministers and senior officials, as well as, before 28 June
2004, with senior CPA officials.
32. DFID has built its working relations
with Iraqi ministers and officials since the handover of power
in June 2004, through DFID's offices in Baghdad and Basra and
through regular visits by UK-based staff.
(d) Donor Co-ordination
33. DFID plays an active role in promoting
donor co-ordination on the ground in Baghdad and in the south.
Priorities are to ensure strong Iraqi leadership of the reconstruction
effort, and to encourage donors to work together coherently with
the Iraqi authorities. DFID is providing advisory support to the
Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC)
to develop the capacity to take a strategic approach towards donor
support to Iraq.
34. Two co-ordination mechanisms have been
set up to maintain a strategic overview of international support:
The Iraqi Strategic Review Board
(ISRB) provides overall policy guidance for donor assistance
and has final approval authority for reconstruction activities.
Its membership comprises representatives of the Ministry of Finance,
MoPDC, and the Central Bank of Iraq. Donor representatives also
attend as observers.
The Council for International
Co-ordination (CIC), chaired by the Minister for Planning
and Development Cooperation, comprises 23 countries which are
supporting the reconstruction effort and are represented in Baghdad.
It is the main official forum in Iraq for dialogue amongst donors
and between donors and the Iraqi authorities. However, its effectiveness
is currently constrained by the absence of development professionals
in many foreign missions in Baghdad.
35. In addition to Iraqi co-ordination mechanisms,
and the IRFFI Donor Committee, a "Core Group" of donors
pledging $150 million or more at Madrid holds monthly telephone
conferences with the MoPDC to discuss reconstruction issues. DFID
also maintains bilateral contacts with a range of other donors.
5. SECURITY ISSUES
(a) Effects of insecurity
36. The security situation in Iraq has been
difficult since the end of major hostilities in April 2003. Managing
reconstruction programmes is a continuing challenge. The inability
of international donors and construction companies to move around
and operate freely in the country is a particular constraint.
Costs are inevitably likely to be higher than in normal situations,
and the risks of delay greater. In some cases, infrastructure
rehabilitation has been set back by sabotage or theft. These problems
have affected all international donors in Iraq. As noted above,
the UN has only a small international staff presence in Iraq,
and the World Bank currently has none. Many bilateral donors are
also absent or have minimal representation.
(b) DFID/HMG response and staff protection
37. Staff security is the top priority for
DFID and it takes very seriously its duty of care to its employees
working in Iraq. Every effort is taken to ensure their health
and safety, and to provide a secure environment in which to work.
DFID works very closely with FCO to ensure all HMG staff are provided
the same level of protection. Resources are shared to avoid duplication
of effort and reduce costs. The extensive measures that are taken
include the provision of pre-posting hostile environment training
and briefing, body armour, armoured transport, communications
equipment and armed protection. Staff are informed of security
procedures upon arrival in Iraq and subsequently of any changes.
Security procedures are under constant review.
38. DFID and FCO work together to provide
armed protection to HMG staff working in Iraq. This is essential
if DFID employees are to carry out their work with ministries
and on projects. A private security firm, Control Risks Group
(CRG) which also provides intelligence and security advice, provides
this service. A defensive "armed response" is the very
last resort.
39. All DFID employees visiting or working
in Iraq are volunteers and are free to leave at any time. Counselling
is available for DFID employees and their families at any time.
We encourage our contractors to follow the same security procedures
as our own staff and offer help in meeting their duty of care
responsibilities, such as providing armoured transport, armed
protection and access to telephone counselling. The extent of
assistance needed by contractors depends on the capacity of the
organisation, so for solo consultants we provide essentially the
same level of support as we do for our own staff. DFID has offered
NGOs which we are supporting additional finance for increased
security provisions if needed.
(c) "Humanitarian Space" issues
in Iraq
40. DFID shares the concern expressed by
many NGOs over the increasing incidence of humanitarian agencies
being targeted by violence in Iraq. Attacks on humanitarian staff
have risen to levels that even agencies used to managing serious
risks find difficult. For humanitarian staff, security normally
derives from the acceptance by all parts of the local community
that they are acting impartially and independently of governments
and combatant forces. In Iraq, humanitarian agencies, including
UN agencies and the ICRC, have struggled to gain that acceptance
in the face of forces determined to create instability and disrupt
reconstruction.
41. DFID generally discourages military
involvement in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance
other than under exceptional circumstances, and any association
between military forces and humanitarian organisations needs to
be handled sensitively in order to avoid a blurring of identities,
which may render humanitarian workers more vulnerable to attack.
In Iraq, the UK military has been provided with resources to undertake
quick impact projects (QIPs) to address real and immediate needs
and contribute to providing a stable environment in which political,
social and economic development can take root. QIPs have played
an important role in the military's presence in southern Iraq:
in order to maintain "humanitarian space" it is important
that the military remains in uniform when implementing them.
42. DFID contributed to the consultation
process prior to the publication of "Guidance for the use
of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Complex Emergencies"
(also known as "The Oslo Guidelines for Complex Emergencies").
DFID is also involved in a wide range of military training, academic
courses and exercises in addition to consultation on military
doctrine for crisis response operations. We use these opportunities
to highlight appropriate roles for the military in emergencies.
6. PROGRESS IN
IRAQ SINCE
MAY 2003
43. The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) assumed
authority of the country ahead of schedule on 28 June 2004. Of
the 31 ministers, 6 are women and 5 are Kurds. The Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL), signed by the Iraqi Governing Council
on 8 March, provides a temporary legal framework for the governance
of Iraq until the agreement of a new constitution in 2005. The
TAL confirms the equality of all Iraqis and safeguards fundamental
human rights. It sets out the processes for elections by January
2005, the adoption of a new constitution, and further elections
under that constitution. A 100-member Interim National Council
was selected in August; its role is to hold the IIG to account
until elections take place. The IIG remains committed to the agreed
timetable for elections to be held in January 2005.
44. Since May 2003, the foundations of a
market economy have been laid. The new Iraqi Dinar has been introduced
and its value against other currencies has remained stable. The
Central Bank of Iraq is independent of Government and has kept
inflation under controlonly 5.6% in the first 6 months
of 2004. The tax system has been simplified: income tax at 15
per cent, and a 5% reconstruction levy on most imports. Iraq's
economy is expected to grow by over 50% in 2004, mainly due to
higher oil production and prices, and may rise by a further 17%
in 2005. An IMF programme has been agreed and work is underway
towards a debt reduction deal.
45. Unemployment is still high but steps
are being taken to create new jobs. The Iraqi National Employment
Programme and US reconstruction programmes have created almost
500,000 jobs. In southern Iraq, DFID has set up a project which
will generate up to 1.75 million days of employment, and has contributed
£1million towards a US$30 million job creation programme
managed by UNDP.
46. Oil production has been below target,
but still remains at more than 2 million barrels per day (bpd).
Production is on track for reaching 3 million bpd by early 2005,
security permitting.
47. Water and sanitation have been improved
through extensive programmes to rehabilitate a system suffering
from years of under-investment and neglect. Estimates suggest
that immediately after the conflict, 60 per cent of urban and
30 per cent of rural populations had access to safe water. Considerable
work has taken place across Iraq to improve the quantity, quality
and reliability of water supplies, which are now better than before
the conflict. In the south, the former CPA estimated that coverage
increased by 10-15 per cent from May 2003 to July 2004. There
are still shortages however, particularly in the south, and the
UN continues to operate water tankers and provide drinking water
to vulnerable groups and inhabitants of rural areas.
48. Prior to the conflict none of the sewage
treatment plants in Iraq were operational and raw sewage was being
discharged into the rivers and waterways. Since then investment
has brought existing pumping stations back into service and repairs
have been made to broken equipment. A major wastewater treatment
plant in Baghdad began operating on May 19, 2004: the first major
plant in the country to operate in over 12 years. Major investment
is planned to extend and improve water and sanitation for the
large parts of the population still lacking these basic services.
49. The health service suffered badly from
neglect and mismanagement under Saddam Hussein. Since the conflict,
the Iraqi Ministry of Health (MoH) has been reformed and, with
international assistance, is increasingly able to deliver essential
health care. MoH has identified priority areas such as primary
health care, disease surveillance, pharmaceutical policy and professional
training. Iraq's 240 hospitals and 1,200 primary health centres
are functioning. Routine vaccination for children and mothers
restarted in mid-2003: so far 30 million doses have been delivered.
National polio and measles vaccination programmes were completed
in September 2004. However, much work remains to be done on maintaining
reliable drugs supplies, coordinating funding, and implementing
the MoH's plans. Security problems continue to restrict access
to health facilities for both the general population and health
workers.
50. The education system is functioning.
Iraq has 6 million pupils and 300,000 teachers in over 20,000
schools. In Higher Education institutions there are 350,000 students
and 50,000 employees. USAID, UN agencies and NGOs are undertaking
programmes in teacher training and school refurbishment. 70 million
new textbooks have already been distributed. The World Bank plans
to spend $100 million for emergency education projects: a $40
million textbooks project is underway, and a $60 million school
rehabilitation project is expected to begin soon. The UN is also
undertaking school rehabilitation programmes.
51. Long-term rehabilitation of the energy
sector continues, although security problems have slowed progress.
Power generation is now averaging 4,750 MW, compared with the
pre-conflict level of 4,400 MW. Most of Iraq is receiving between
9 and 15 hours of electricity daily, which should improve as demand
reduces in the cooler months. The Interim Iraqi Government has
set a target of 6,000 MW by the end of 2004. A newly completed
rehabilitation of the power grid is ensuring more equitable distribution
across Iraq.
52. The creation of a free and independent
media is an essential part of Iraq's transition to an open and
democratic society. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime,
new newspapers have flourished. DFID is spending about £7
million to support media development, primarily through the BBC
World Service Trust and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting.
53. After the 2003 conflict an independent
High Judicial Council was established, judges and prosecutors
were vetted, and criminal defendants were guaranteed certain rights.
The Iraqi Special Tribunal, which will try members of the former
regime suspected of crimes against humanity, has been established.
The Human Rights Ministry now has 130 staff, and two lawyers have
been appointed as onsite monitors at the Abu Ghraib prison. DFID
is providing £2 million support to the sector, focusing on
training for the judiciary, prosecution service and the bar.
54. Key bridges have been reconstructed,
new rail tracks have been laid, and ports are being rehabilitated
and opened to commercial traffic. Baghdad International Airport
(BIAP) is now processing an average of 45 non-military arrivals
and departures a day. Iraqi Airways has recommenced commercial
flights after being grounded for 14 years. Telecommunications
have improved significantly with a 49 per cent increase in telephone
subscribers since the conflict. Internet access has become more
widespread, the number of subscribers increasing from around 11,000
pre-conflict, to almost 80,000 in August this year.
55. According to the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) there were about 400,000 Iraqi
refugees around the world in early 2002. UNHCR is providing assistance
for voluntary returns, and so far 14,000 have returned to Iraq
under this programme. Many more Iraqis have returned to their
country without assistance. The number of spontaneous returns
is not yet clear; estimates range from 15,000 to 50,000. We are
pressing the UNHCR for a more accurate figure.
October 2004
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