Memorandum submitted by Christian Aid
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
— Security remains the primary concern
of Christian Aid's partners, who are effectively obliged to conceal
their identity as humanitarian organizations in order to continue
working.
— Many Iraqis now regard the multinational
force as a force of occupation, and there is considerable public
support in many parts of the country for insurgency against the
interim administration and its security forces, as well as the
multinational force.
— The presentation by Coalition nations
of the US-led military mission to Iraq as a partly "humanitarian"
intervention has led to a failure to establish neutral humanitarian
space in which NGOs, Red Cross and UN agencies can safely access
those in need. There is an urgent need for a new policy with clear
separation of military and humanitarian actors.
— Inter-ethnic and inter-confessional
tensions have greatly increased in Iraq over the last year and
the potential for future violence over such issues as the control
of land and resources, the central or devolved nature of the state,
secular versus religious law, regional autonomy or secession,
is now considerable.
— There is an urgent need to select,
recruit, protect and train Iraqi police and security forces, in
such a way that they will have the confidence of the communities
they will serve.
— As displaced Iraqis seek to return
to their original homes, there is a need for increased support
for the newly established Iraqi Property Claims Commission and
for the establishment of a compensation fund for those who find
themselves displaced in turn, without a housing solution. Unless
the problem of disputed property and secondary displacement is
addressed, it is likely to become a direct cause of further conflict.
— Concerns remain about the transparency
of accounting for Iraqi oil revenues, both during the CPA period
and under the present Iraqi interim administration.
— Local accountability has not been
a familiar concept in Iraqi society to date. There is a need to
support central and local government structures in the fields
of strategic planning, communication, co-ordination, transparency
and local accountability.
INTRODUCTION
Christian Aid believes that the deterioration
of working conditions for both international and local humanitarian
organisations, as well as ICRC, UN and bilateral government agencies
such as DFID, represents the greatest impediment to establishing
the basis for Iraq's long-term development. Addressing the sources
of insecurity in ways that facilitate the long-term objectives
of Iraqis themselves to reconstruct their state and society should
be a priority for all those committed to providing humanitarian
assistance to Iraq.
This submission is based both on Christian Aid's
own observations and responses to questions asked of six Iraqi
partner organisations during the course of August and September
2004. These NGOs' views represent a snapshot of the conditions
in which they have been working since the transfer of authority
to the Iraqi interim government on 28 June 2004. However, we are
concerned about the difficulties we and our partners are experiencing
in gaining accurate information about conditions for development
across the whole of Iraq. There are large swathes of the country
about which little is currently known, above all to Iraqis themselves.
Since security remains the primary concern of
the organisations Christian Aid supports, we have relayed their
responses anonymously. We regret that partners have to disguise
the fact that they are humanitarian and development NGOs by such
measures as removing external signs from their premises and travelling
in unmarked cars and taxis. In rural communities, far from insurgents
and armed forces, their security is assured by the communities
they serve. But in urban areas they are forced to be discreet
about their sources of funding and their activities.
Before the war Christian Aid's programme in
Iraq was confined to the formerly autonomous Kurdish region of
northern Iraq. Since 1992, Christian Aid has supported local NGOs
in a range of rehabilitation and development activities, and continues
to do so. A substantial water, sanitation and community development
programme has been co-funded by DFID. Since May 2003, Christian
Aid has extended its operations to provide humanitarian support
in the central and southern parts of the country, including emergency
relief, landmine clearance, water and sanitation supply, seed
banks and nurseries, education, medical and community needs assessment.
As well as keeping in close touch with our Iraqi partners, Christian
Aid staff visited Iraq in June 2003, providing technical assistance
to partners and spending time principally in Baghdad, Kerbala,
Basra, Kirkuk and the formerly autonomous Kurdish governorates.
Since the August 2003 bombing of the UN in Baghdad,
the security situation has deteriorated to the point where Christian
Aid staff are no longer free to travel to Iraq. We are therefore
unable to make first hand assessments, meet local organisations
or the beneficiaries of their programmes on the ground, or monitor
projects in the field. Alternative methods of liasing with Iraqi
partners and local organisations have been pursued, mainly by
meeting in Amman: two such meetings have been held so far (the
most recent in April 2004) and the next is planned for October
2004. Amman has proved an effective location for partner capacity
building workshops and liaison between CA, other NGOs and UN organisations.
Christian Aid is nevertheless concerned that the continuing inability
of staff to travel to Iraq itself will, over time, damage our
ability to extend our assistance beyond the partnerships we have
already established.
Of the many aspects required for the successful
delivery of development assistance in Iraq, the most urgent is
restoration of a secure environment. The military strategy adopted
by the Coalition nations over the last 18 months has been to present
the multinational force as a partly humanitarian intervention.
As a result, the understanding which might have developed among
the Iraqi population for neutral humanitarian work has never been
established. A clear separation between humanitarian and security
work is now urgently required.
We also believe that actions can be taken now
to restore the trust of Iraqis and pre-empt further outbreaks
of violence. This submission focuses on what we perceive to be
the most urgent courses of action that the British Government
should take.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
— That the British government use its
influence and example to ensure that the security mission of the
multinational forces in Iraq prioritise the needs of ordinary
Iraqis, safeguard their lives and livelihoods, and move as swiftly
as possible towards handing over control of their own security
arrangements to Iraqis themselves as a prerequisite for development
(paras 1.1 to 1.7). A new policy of a clear separation
between military and humanitarian actors is now required. This
will begin to establish neutral humanitarian space within which
the UN agencies, ICRC, international and national NGOs can begin
to play a full role in meeting the needs of ordinary Iraqis and
reconstruction.
— That the British government, through
DFID, take note of rising insecurity fuelled by interethnic tensions
in the northern provinces of Iraq and resource and accelerate
the work of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) in reviewing
and adjudicating property claims in the city of Kirkuk and surrounding
areas, where property disputes are leading to inter-communal violence.
The British government should also promote and financially contribute
to a Compensation Fund to provide relocation resources to those
whose claim to the land and properties they currently occupy is
disallowed by the IPCC, or who remain homeless or internally displaced
(paras 2.1-2.3)
— That the British government fulfil
its moral obligation to provide full and transparent accounts
for the funds accruing to and disbursed from the Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI) over which it shared joint responsibility with
US authorities as a member of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) until 28 June 2004. The British government should also assist
the official auditors (KPMG) and the International Advisory and
Monitoring Board (IAMB) in their continuing work, and use its
influence and expertise to ensure the Interim Iraqi Government
(IIG) and its successors set up systems to monitor the extraction
and export of Iraqi oil, safeguarding the expenditure of oil revenues
for the benefit of Iraqis in the most transparent fashion possible
(paras 3.1-3.3)
— That in addition to strengthening
central government institutions the British government reinforce
and resource the capacity of local authorities to coordinate and
promote programmes for the long-term development of Iraq. Local
elections are likely to be delayed by the requirements of preparing
national elections by early 2005. In the interim, the British
government should focus its assistance on ensuring that both Iraqi
local authorities and ministries of the IIG involve local communities
in identifying, designing and implementing development projects
and in holding their local authorities to account for local expenditure
and the granting of contracts for both reconstruction and development
(paras 4.1-4.5).
1. Security for Development
1.1 Of immediate concern to Christian Aid
are the humanitarian consequences of continued military action
in Iraq for a population that remains, despite Iraq's potential
wealth, dependent on external assistance and on a crumbling infrastructure
neglected over many years. Iraqi people certainly require more
security than most currently enjoy. We are especially concerned
at the rise in terrorist and insurgency-related civilian deaths,
as well as the use of military force to combat insurgencies, where
this force results in civilian deaths. The Iraqi Ministry of Health
has recorded 3,186 civilian deaths through terrorist and security
force attacks in the period 5 April to 12 September 2004, a figure
that has increased by at least 100 in subsequent weeks. The death
of civilians is not only unacceptable, but undermines efforts
to create a climate conducive to the sustained and long-term development
of Iraq.
1.2 Christian Aid's Iraqi partners share
the concerns expressed in a recent survey by the Washington-based
Center for Strategic and International Studies, which show that
many in Iraq now believe the multinational force to be a force
of occupation, regardless of its intent or future actions. [1]In
this respect, we support calls for a more appropriate use of military
force, which recognises that civilian deaths directly undermine
the core objective of the mission: to return Iraq to democratic
Iraqi control.
1.3 To this end, we welcome recent moves
to accelerate the recruitment, training and retention of an Iraqi
police force to provide local security, but stress that new recruits
and applicants need increased protection from the multinational
forces in Iraq. To gain popular respect, this force needs to be
legitimate in the eyes of the local community and sensitive to
local objections to the re-instatement of former Ba'athist officers
and officials. Our partners have expressed dismay at the training
of security forces overseas, at what is considered to be disproportionate
cost and in ways (and places, such as Jordan and Egypt) reminiscent
of practices of the old regime. Expenses paid overseas are deemed
to encourage further corruption within the security forces and
discourage the kind of patriotism needed for the new circumstances
of Iraq.
1.4 Iraqi civil society organisations also
emphasise the need to "de-militarise" security operations
as soon as possible, so that the Iraqi National Guard are trained
as border guards only, and that the multinational forces support,
rather than lead, the swift return to an Iraqi led civilian security
operation. The need to replace the external military mission with
a locally rooted civilian police force as soon as possible arises
from the increasing concern of Christian Aid partners with new
and increasing sources of criminality. Among the most worrying
are the growth in kidnappings for profit, not just of foreigners,
but of Iraqi citizens, and the targeted assassinations of local
officials, politicians and contractors deemed to be "working
for the Americans." The daily lives of Iraqis with whom our
partners work are more often affected by this kind of ambient
criminality than they are by insurgencies, unless they live in
or near combat zones. To tackle the diverse sources of crime,
local police forces need to receive human rights training and
be supported by a functioning justice system. In the absence of
due process and local accountability, some police have "reverted
to their previous practice of torturing prisoners and death threats
to gain information/confessions from them", according to
more than one of our partners.
1.5 In addition to the continuing death
toll, Christian Aid remains extremely concerned at the damage
inflicted to the neutrality of the humanitarian community, both
local and international, by the presentation of the US-led military
mission to Iraq as "humanitarian". This association
has, in our view, endangered the personal security of the staff
of those international humanitarian agencies to have remained
in Iraq after the UN relocated its HQ to Jordan last autumn, and
has led in recent weeks to their forced withdrawal. As well as
the dangers faced by foreign nationals, we are concerned for the
Iraqis who continue to engage in reconstruction and long-term
development of their country. Many of them are threatened by association
with the activities of multinational force military personnel.
1.6 There is still a tendency, particularly
in the US, to assume that the multinational forces and Baghdad
government continue to face an organised and united insurgency,
focused around Sunni Arab Ba'athist loyalists with some assistance
from Al-Qaida linked foreign terrorists. The reality is much more
messy and dangerous, in that the US-UK Coalition over the past
year has managed to alienate large sections of the population,
including Shi'ia Arabs in the south and centre, who had welcomed
the overthrow of the Ba'athist regime and might have been expected
to support a US-led reconstruction operation in Iraq. Only among
the Kurds of the north is the public approval level of the multinational
forces still reasonably high, and this approval is likely to disappear
rapidly if Kurdish aspirations for autonomy or independence are
blocked.
2. Property disputes, displaced people and
security
2.1 We believe that the unresolved and long-standing
issues of land and property rights require urgent attention if
further inter-communal strife and violence are to be avoided.
This eventuality, we believe, could be prevented if the British
Government were to lend its full support to the work of the Iraqi
Property Claims Commission. It should help set up and contribute
to a Compensation Fund to relocate families already displaced,
to assist those who are willing to move but lack the means, and
to compensate those who will need an incentive to move if the
adjudication process goes against them.
2.2 There has been a reluctance among multinational
force nations, as well as many Iraqis, to accept that most of
the violence involves Iraqis killing Iraqis. Iraqi security forces
are now taking most of the heat and incurring most of the casualties
produced by the insurgency. This violence and its legacy of bitterness
have contributed to existing tensions and mistrust between different
ethnicities and religious confessions, which have increased enormously
over the past year. We have already seen violence between Kurds,
Arabs and Turkmen over contested property in the upper centre
area of Iraq. The potential for future violence between Shi'ia
and Sunni Arabs, between Kurds and Arabs, or between Kurds, Arabs
and Turkmen, over such issues as the control of territory and
resources, secular versus religious law, the unitary or devolved
nature of the Iraqi state, Kurdish autonomy or secession, is now
very great.
2.3 Given Christian Aid's strong links with
organisations in the northern region of Iraq, we would like to
draw the Committee's attention to rising instability within communities
which, with the exception of the northern city of Tal Afar, are
often perceived to be outside the core regions of recent instability,
such as the Sunni Triangle. One of our partners in Kirkuk commented
on the rise in atrocities over the past six months "perpetrated
in order to escalate tensions between national groups". These
include at least 13 assassinations of local officials and politicians,
attacks on main roads outside the city and bomb attacks on individual
quarters within Kirkuk. Our partner reports that in the lead-up
to the national elections, the two main Kurdish parties, the PUK
and KDP, have proposed returning all internally displaced Kurds
to Kirkuk and "putting a timetable [on] sending back all
the people who came to Kirkuk from the centre of Iraq to their
own cities without giving compensation to them".[2]
There are also plans to reorganise the administrative map of Kirkuk
to include towns excluded from the province in 1968, in order
to secure a Kurdish majority on electoral rolls prior to the national
elections.
3. Accounting for Iraq's oil revenues
3.1 Following Christian Aid's reports of
October 2003 and June 2004 (Iraq: the Missing Billions
and Fuelling Suspicion: the Coalition and Iraq's oil billions'3),
we continue to be extremely concerned by the absence of full and
transparent accounts for Iraqi oil revenues and disbursements
from the Development Fund for Iraq during the period these were
entrusted to the management of the CPA. The CPA ceased its mission
on 28 June 2004 with no accounts at all for its activities over
the previous year. Only on 14 July 2004, the independent auditors,
KPMG, presented the first audits for the period 22 May 2003 to
31 December 2003 to the IAMB, who expressed their concerns over
a number of issues: the absence of oil metering during this period;
the use of unrecorded barter transactions for certain oil sales
in exchange for electricity; the use of non-competitive bidding
procedures for a number of contracts funded from the DFI; and
the absence of a draft report commissioned by the CPA reviewing
controls over the State Oil Marketing Organisation (SOMO). [3][4]
3.2 In a press release on 8 September 2004,
the IAMB voiced its concern that it has still "not received
reports of audits undertaken by various US agencies on sole-sourced
contracts, despite repeated requests" and noted that the
designated auditors, KPMG, will be delivering their next report
in early October 2004, covering the period 20 January to 28 June
2004. [5]
3.3 Christian Aid would like to bring the
Committee's attention to this report, and to reiterate our belief
that the British government has a moral obligation to account
for Iraqi funds accrued and disbursed in the period that HMG formed
part of the CPA. We believe that this moral obligation extends
to ensuring that the IIG and successor governments establish systems
to monitor the extraction and export of Iraqi oil, above all through
installing metering equipment in accordance with standard oil
industry practice. The British government should also assist the
IIG and its successors in setting up competitive bidding procedures
for the future award of contracts, so that the IIG and its successors
can clearly demonstrate that publicly owned funds are being spent
in the most efficient and transparent way possible for the benefit
of Iraqis, rather than to increase the profits of third party
contractors.
4. Local accountability and coordination
of development assistance
4.1 Christian Aid is concerned that at provincial
and local government level, there is insufficient evidence of
a coordinated strategy for the long-term development of Iraq,
either on the part of international humanitarian agencies, or
the IIG itself. Only one of the organisations we support is aware
of DFID's activities in their locality in Iraq, and the majority
of partners who have heard of DFID do not associate DFID with
the British government or distinguish it from other international
or bilateral donor agencies. With the withdrawal of UN agencies
and foreign employees of international NGOs, local Iraqi NGOs
are concerned about the commitment of external agencies both to
remaining in Iraq and to the coordination of externally funded
humanitarian and development activities beyond Baghdad. Within
Iraqi domestic structures, there is a dearth of information on
how central and local authorities interact for the purposes of
coordinating and devolving funds for development, and few opportunities
for civil society organisations to engage in shaping local development
plans.
4.2 We believe that strengthening local
government capacity to respond to local needs is central to maintaining
the goodwill and confidence of Iraqis committed to working for
the long-term reconstruction and development of their country.
To this end, the British government should devote resources to
enhance the capacity of local authorities to coordinate and promote
programmes for long-term development, to increase their consultation
with NGOs and communities most in need, and to prioritise employment
creation. Much current reconstruction work appears to take place
on an ad hoc basis and is focused on the physical reconstruction
of Iraq, without addressing the human aspect of development. For
our partners, human-based development means that Iraqi NGOs assist
community based organisations to draw up priorities for poverty
alleviation and sustainable local employment on the basis of local
experience and expertise. Without the technical and financial
assistance of local authorities to support this process or a clear
policy framework for the future of local development, this activity
risks being isolated and unsupported.
4.3 The proliferation of unregulated Iraqi
NGOs is a cause of concern for the credibility and legitimacy
of development activities. There are now around 3,000 officially
registered national NGOs in contrast to only 250 in May 2003.
In Kirkuk, where there were 7 local NGOs a year ago, there are
now 37. Not all of these are considered to be legitimate NGOs,
since many represent narrow family interests, are linked to political
parties, are contractors posing as NGOs, or are clearly not humanitarian
in mission. Local authorities currently lack the capacity to enforce
legislation introduced by the CPA to regulate NGOs, and we would
urge that the British government address this issue by advising
local governments on how to strengthen their regulatory capacity.
As NGOs are a new type of agency in the Iraqi context, it is critical
to the success of civil society organizations working to improve
the lives of ordinary Iraqis that their role be clearly distinguished
from commercial enterprises or politically motivated groups.
4.4 Lack of financial transparency for the
purposes of development also remains a key concern. Christian
Aid's partners are aware of the different ways in which funding
arises (through oil revenue, customs and income taxes as well
via international donors), but not of how it is allocated or spent.
Accountability from central ministry level to local government
level exists in principle but could be significantly improved.
In some cases, when reconstruction works have been abruptly halted
for security reasons (usually when international contractors have
left), local authorities have not been forthcoming about plans
for completing the works or how they intend to allocate residual
funds.
4.5 Corruption has been endemic in Iraq
for years, but optimism for future change is tempered by fears
of continuing nepotism at ministerial level and the appointment
of people according to party or ethnic/religious loyalties, rather
than on the basis of qualifications or competence. In Baqubah
and Kirkuk, partners cite increased competition between central
ministries to allocate budgets and resources ahead of the general
elections. We are concerned that the allocation of aid and development
assistance according to political criteria, rather than on the
basis of need, may increase as the election period approaches.
We would encourage the British government to help the Iraqi authorities
ensure that financial accounting systems established for centrally
managed funds also apply at provincial and local levels, and that
greater efforts are made to devolve central state funding to provincial
and local authorities once these systems are in place.
October 2004
1 CSIS Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction
(September 2004, Washington DC, pp.x-xi http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0409_progressperil.pdf). Back
2
For details on the background to these issues, see Human Rights
Watch Claims in Conflict-Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern
Iraq (HRW, Vol 16, No 4(E), August 2004. http://hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804). Back
3
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/310iraqoil/index.htm and
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/406iraqoilupdate/index.htm. Back
4
See http://www.iamb.info/auditrep/pr071504.pdf Statement
by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board on Iraq-Release
of the KPMG Audit Reports on the development Fund for Iraq,
15 July 2004. Back
5
See http://www.iamb.info/pr/pr090804.htm Statement by
the International Advisory and Monitoring Board on Iraq, 8
September 2004.
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