Follow up response submitted by Dr Joost
R. Hiltermann, Middle East Project Director, International Crisis
Group, to questions raised on standing up credible security
forces in Iraq during a meeting with Dr Reinoud Leenders,
Middle East Analyst, Tuesday 25 January
The creation of credible security forces in
Iraq requires time, resources and—last but not least—a
legitimate government that broadly represents all sectors of the
Iraqi population. What we have seen so far in the rebuilding from
scratch of both a national army and police force is that the process
was rushed to the extreme, with out-of-country training that was
dangerously abbreviated and inadequate follow-up once the trainees
returned to Iraq for deployment. Recruits were commonly drawn
from the poorest, most desperate sectors of society. Deprived
of proper training, many fled or switched sides at the merest
hint of combat. Moreover, due to the deteriorating security situation,
Iraqi units were sent into battle that, while capable fighting
forces, were of such a composition (all Kurds, for example) as
to raise sectarian tensions in such volatile localities as Falluja
and Mosul. The problem was that these were the only units available
at the time, the Kurds in particular being fighters hardened in
battle.
Army and police recruits need to receive proper
and sustained training, including inside Iraq, by qualified trainers
able to impart skills and instill discipline and loyalty. This
will require major resources over a period of 3-5 years, and many
Western trainers will need to be made available to respond to
the demand and cover all aspects of the curriculum. Proper follow-up
should be conducted following deployment in Iraq to ascertain
the functioning of command structures, make adjustments, and weed
out weak elements. Every effort should be made to draw recruits
from all sectors of Iraqi society, and not to privilege one group
over another.
However, no conveyance of technical skills will
suffice if there is not a single authority in place that is accepted
by a cross section of Iraqis. Only a legitimate political process,
culminating in the establishment of a legitimate government that
is broadly representative will ensure the degree of loyalty that
will turn well-trained security forces into effective arms of
the state rather than vehicles for sectarian rivalry and civil
war. (The recent elections, while partly successful, were marred
by the near-total absence of Sunni Arabs from the polls, itself
a reflection of their growing alienation from reconstruction.
If this process is not reversed, it may become impossible to build
security forces that will not, in the end, be involved in repression.)
February 2005
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