Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 28-39)

MR MICHAEL MOSSELMANS, DR BARBARA HENDRIE, MR PAUL SCHULTE, MS JOAN LINK AND MR GAVIN BARLOW

15 MARCH 2005

  Q28 Chairman: May I ask a couple of boring machinery of government questions? Is the Strategy Unit, looking at countries at risk of instability, the same Cabinet Office bit which deals with failing states or is there another bit which deals with failing states?

  Ms Link: It is the same unit, but it is not a permanent body, it is just the strategy unit which looks at all sorts of aspects of government which chose to do a study coming out of the strategic audit on failing states and it changed the study's name because there is a lot of controversy about whether you should say a state is failing in terms of sensitivity to the state concerned. Yes, it is the failing states study. It started off as a study on failing states and changed its name.

  Q29 Chairman: For us humble observers of what is happening in Whitehall it is quite difficult keeping up with everything which is happening in the Cabinet Office with all these units. Not now, but could someone just send us an Orbat of how you all relate to each other? My experience of Whitehall is that inter-departmental things are great, except that you end up with no minister taking responsibility for anything unless there is a kind of Cabinet sub-committee which meets at some stage. It sounds great until you then start rowing about the money and who is going to pay. That is my usual experience. I do not know about John and his experience when he was a minister in the Foreign Office but that was my experience when I was a minister in the Foreign Office. I do not want to take up time now, but could someone kindly send us an Orbat of all the bits, who is answerable to which ministers, which ministers take responsibility and how it plugs into the Cabinet Office? Would that be okay?

  Mr Mosselmans: Yes, we will do that. No problem.

  Q30 Mr Colman: You may have heard that, when the Secretary of State for International Development came to us last week, this question I am about to put to you ranked high and there was a difference of opinion within the Committee. How do you ensure that the various initiatives on conflict prevention which are happening do not result in the squeezing of poverty reduction as a priority? What safeguards are there to make sure that the money that is spent through the various Conflict Prevention Pools, some of which would previously have gone to DFID, has poverty reducing impacts? Then we were discussing Iraq, but clearly there is a wider issue and how do you make sure that the poor do not lose out?

  Mr Mosselmans: There are two things: one is that I am not sure it is either/or. Much of the work that the Government tries to do in a joined-up Whitehall way on conflict contributes towards the Government's various different objectives including poverty reduction, because obviously conflict is a major impediment towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and poverty reduction and therefore working in an as joined-up way as we can to deliver conflict reduction through the pools both contributes towards DFID's poverty reduction goals plus contributes to other legitimate government goals of other ministries. Secondly, we try to use our seat on these various mechanisms, like the Conflict Pools and with our contributions to the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, to make sure that DFID's aims are given due prominence in those mechanisms. So that is the objective and aim of the people who represent DFID in these fora and then, when Hilary Benn represents DFID in ministerial committees to talk about the Conflict Pools, he will try to make sure that other ministers keep DFID's objectives in mind when the decision is taken.

  Dr Hendrie: I do not have anything particular to add. If it is a question of what the impact is on the ground in the countries concerned—

  Q31 Mr Colman: An example could be Nepal which two years ago under the conflict prevention pool was given military helicopters and in the last 12 months was given an aircraft which worked with very short take-off and landing and whether this was in fact a pro-poor use of the conflict prevention pool or perhaps had other uses. That is an example. Would DFID see that as a pro-poor use of the monies?

  Dr Hendrie: May I defer to colleagues who run that particular part, who work on the global prevention pool, to answer?

  Mr Mosselmans: I think you are right, that not every single thing that is funded under these arrangements is pro-poor because there are a variety of government interests that feed into the arrangements and a variety of money from different government sources. The number of interventions made by these pools which are not pro-poor is small.

  Q32 Mr Colman: What are the safeguards then, to make sure DFID money does not go down this route?

  Ms Link: May I take this as I am from the Foreign Office and not DFID? The way the pools were set up, originally money came in from the three departments concerned. The Treasury also added quite a lot of extra money themselves and now the Conflict Prevention Pools do their own spending round bid. So it is not actually money that is labelled for one department or another, it is money that is bid for by each pool and it sits in a separate part of the budget, in the DFID budget for Africa, and in the FCO budget for the global pool, but we are not allowed to vire the money into and out of the departmental budget. It is actually a separate entity now and it means that some of the aspects of the spending will relate perhaps to harder security aspects of stabilising a country and some will relate more to the development side of things. For example, in Nepal the programme is actually quite an integrated programme with issues to do with supporting the Nepalese government in stabilising the situation—and there are problems, as you know, on the political side about that at the moment—but also towards providing alternative livelihoods for people in poor areas in Nepal, so that they have something else they can rely upon rather than being coerced constantly. It is definitely a mixture of areas that come together to try to help stabilise and prevent further conflict.

  Q33 Chairman: In that case who is the accounting officer for all these pools?

  Ms Link: The GCPP is accounted for by the Permanent Secretary in the Foreign Office and the Africa pool by the Permanent Secretary in DFID. There are overlapping areas of work, but because of the need for absolute clarity about where the money is spent, there has to be an individual accounting officer for each budget.

  Q34 Mr Davies: This is a question mostly for Mr Schulte. What lessons have you been able to learn so far from Afghanistan and Iraq?

  Mr Schulte: We are in the process of doing a fairly detailed and extended assemblage of past lessons and that will not be complete for some more weeks. The main themes which are already coming out and were not perhaps apparent before we started our work are the desirability of prior planning, an ability to bring people out to apply expertise within a plan rather quickly and to maintain them and monitor them in a coherent way. That forms the basis of what we are going to try to set up within the PCRU and it is central to our mandate.

  Q35 Mr Davies: In other words, it is clear that in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, we did not plan the need for the reconstruction or the capacity-building effort as early as we might have done.

  Mr Schulte: I was not involved in that planning.

  Q36 Mr Davies: That was not an implied criticism of you or anybody else. I was simply asking whether that is the objective conclusion that you draw.

  Mr Schulte: Our objective conclusion is that we need to find ways of doing that institutionally better in the future and the unit exists to do that.

  Q37 Mr Davies: And incorporated into the planning of any military operation of that kind, in a way that was not done on those two occasions.

  Mr Schulte: Yes, we have a very definite understanding with the defence ministry that we will work closely with their plans so they move seamlessly into ours.

  Q38 Mr Davies: Does that mean that you will have DFID personnel actually integrated into the planning staff in the MoD when they are planning operations of that sort?

  Mr Schulte: We will have staff from the PCRU, who may or may not be DFID personnel, depending on who is doing which specific job on the day.

  Q39 Mr Davies: And you will be involved in the operational planning.

  Mr Schulte: Yes. We certainly will be and our staff includes DFID as well as FCO and other departmental personnel.


 
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