Examination of Witness (Questions 40-54)
DR SULIMAN
BALDO
29 NOVEMBER 2004
Q40 Mr Davies: You are not recommending
any concrete action, any sanction, against the government?
Dr Baldo: Sanctions form part
of the package of recommendations we made in the submission to
you but we are not calling for blanket, indiscriminate sanctions.
We are calling for targeted, selective sanctions.
Q41 Hugh Bayley: What lessons do you
draw from this appalling crisis about the responsibility of people
from outside the country in question to intervene in a case of
genocide or gross violation of human rights?
Dr Baldo: I think the most important
lesson is never to wait until you are facing this type of situation
and to intervene as early as there are the first signals of real
trouble brewing in a particular area. In this case, these signals
occurred in the middle of last year that a campaign was building
up to use ethnic factors in a counter-insurgency campaign and
the ground was really being prepared for inflagration, for a real
breaking out of ethnic conflict.
Q42 Hugh Bayley: That would mean putting
troops on the ground?
Dr Baldo: It does not necessarily
mean that. If you wait until the last minute, then there would
be that type of intervention to which I have referred. Early intervention
could achieve better results.
Q43 Hugh Bayley: This would be early
intervention up to and including the use of military force if
necessary? The "if necessary" means if the genocide,
or the violation of human rights, does not stop?
Dr Baldo: Exactly.
Q44 Mr Bercow: On a similar theme, and
this is talking about the criteria for action and the need for
reform, do you think under Article 6 of the UN Charter or the
UN Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948 that Sudan would
currently qualify for expulsion on the grounds of persistent violations
of human rights? In other words, is the UN making a mockery of
its own Charter? I am not a lawyer, by the way, and I say that
as a matter of pride. Should the UN simply apply the existing
Charter or does the Charter need to be toughened? I was looking
at it the other day and it just seems to me that, with a number
of notable exceptions, very few countries have actually been kicked
out of the UN, despite the most bestial violations of human rights.
I am not quite clear how the UN expects to be taken seriously
if it makes these highfalutin declarations which it then proceeds
completely to ignore in practical situations.
Dr Baldo: We were reminded again
recently of the limitations of the international system when,
a couple of days ago, the General Assembly voted not to take action
on the situation in Darfur. There was a draft resolution before
the General Assembly to condemn Sudan for mass violations of human
rights and the motion was to take no action. I believe that was
done through political calculation because of other considerations
of the balance of power and the prevailing anti-Americanism that
people seem to consider more important than the protection of
humans of the type for which international law provides.
Q45 Hugh Bayley: Could we go back, Dr
Baldo? You were saying that there is a responsibility on people
from outside Sudan to intervene early with interventions up to
and including the use of military force to prevent gross violation
of human rights and genocide. You were talking, in answer to an
earlier question, about a responsibility to protect human beings
against violation of human rights. In this particular case, who
has that responsibility? Is it the African Union? Is it neighbouring
countries? Is it the wider community?
Dr Baldo: It is the wider international
community.
Q46 Hugh Bayley: Then why are we only
talking about an African Union military presence and not, for
instance, a Russian, or NATO, or American, or British, or French
military presence?
Dr Baldo: There is a certain history
of disengagement of the northern countries from peacekeeping in
Africa.
Q47 Hugh Bayley: Not in Sierra Leone,
which is a good example of a British intervention which has prevented
gross violation of human rights and has allowed a good measure
of security and order to be returned?
Dr Baldo: Yes, in the case of
Sierra Leone and the British force there, in the case of Ituri
in the Congo with the intervention of the French in operations.
I may have missed one. Here we had historic links between certain
international powers and particular countries in Africa. The prevailing
model now, since the Rwandan genocide and the most infamous failing
of the international system, is really to try and push regional
powers to intervene and contain conflicts on the continent. This
has been for several years in West Africa the role of the sub-regional
organisation there, ECOWAS, under the leadership of Nigeria. Now,
with the African Union, the African states have the political
will to develop peace and security organs and mandates and, unlike
the OAU, to intervene in Member States' affairs when there are
gross violations. This has provided a convenient means for the
others to say, "All right, we support you. You can take care
of that". This is the attitude now.
Q48 Hugh Bayley: Let me say that I agree
with you that there should be an escalation process and that one
should expect African institutions and African armed forces, if
armed force is necessary, to take the lead. The reason why I asked
you earlier to make the distinction about whether outsiders have
a right to protect or a responsibility to protect is because to
my mind the word "responsibility" implies that it is
something you have an obligation to do. If the responsibility
to protect was taken, as has been the case in this instance, by
the African Union, I think it is quite right that they should
be the first to take that responsibility but if the violation
of human rights does not end, and it patently has not ended, then
surely others have responsibilities too?
Dr Baldo: This is indeed the case.
What I am concerned about—and this was in my opening statement—is
that there are dynamics now in play that if allowed to develop
wildly could carry the conflict, which is already very messy and
quite disastrous for civilians, to an even more destructive phase.
We have not reached that point yet. We do not have people against
people, a war situation, in Darfur, but if the current chaos is
allowed to continue, then a situation may develop and we may get
to a worst case scenario.
Q49 Hugh Bayley: Does that not conflict
with what you were saying earlier about the need to intervene
early?
Dr Baldo: Exactly, and the level
of intervention that I have been calling for is to arrest this
trend, to address what is happening by calling for graded responses
for action to be taken immediately. Your colleague was asking
me what needs to be done now to arrest these developments.
Q50 Tony Worthington: Dr Baldo, I have
been listening to you with great interest. I went to Sudan twice
about a dozen years ago during another conflict. I have been asking
what we are saying now that we did not say then and where is history
repeating itself and where is it just the same. There are two
points I would like to make. One thing that intrigues me is that
it would not have been possible a dozen years ago to talk for
an hour and half and not mention Sharia law as a source of conflict
within Sudan. We have gone for an hour and a half and that issue
has not come up at all. I know Darfur is different from a north-south
situation. Is that because that issue has been settled or is on
the backburner, or what is it?
Dr Baldo: This has not come up
in the context of Darfur because Darfur is uniformly Muslim. All
the parties in the conflict are uniformly Muslim. The Sudan Liberation
Movement and Army are more of a secular mind. I have mentioned
the influence of the SPLA on the Darfurian Sudan Liberation Army.
That is an intellectual and ideological influence, including to
the level of commitment to separation of religion from the state.
Q51 Tony Worthington: If I understood
your remarks about JEM correctly, that would be less secular;
they would be fighting in order to have a more Islamic party in
control as a sort of disillusionment with Bashir's government.
Is that right?
Dr Baldo: That is indeed the case.
The SLA is more locally rooted; it is more about Darfur. JEM is
more about national politics and the seat of power in Khartoum
and what should be happening there. They co-ordinate on the ground
militarily and politically in negotiations, except on the point
of Sharia law, with SLA demanding as its political platform a
separation between the state and religion and JEM preserving the
right to deny that and to say, "You are not ready for that;
this should be left to the population to decide".
Q52 Tony Worthington: Would that be about
bringing back Hassan el-Turabi?
Dr Baldo: Exactly.
Q53 Tony Worthington: The other bit that
intrigued me, and Ann Clwyd referred to it earlier, is that at
that time an area of great concern was the Nuba Mountains and
the concern was about the destruction of the Nuba people by the
Baggara Arabs rather than the Janjaweed. I am very intrigued by
these groups and the relationship with the Sudanese government.
When you have a conflict and you may be wanting to divide and
rule, what is the nature of the deal that you are offering the
Arabs? Is it a contract to go and kill and maim or is it a contract
to say, "This is about land disputes, and you are pastoralists
and these other people are sedentary farmers,"? What is the
element of the relationship? Everyone alleges that there is a
very close relationship between the Sudanese government and sundry
para-militias. What is the nature of the contract between the
government and the militias?
Dr Baldo: In the case of the Baggara
Arab militias, those of south Kurdofan in relation to the Nuba
Mountains and of South Darfur in relation to Rizeigat in southern
Sudan, these were the Rachamin. These are communal groups of young
men who accompany the herds in their regular nomadic movements
between areas in the transitional zone and parts of the northern
section of southern Sudan. They have always existed. They have
had generations of intermarriages and exchanges of interests with
their neighbours, either in the Nuba Mountains or in the north
in Rizeigat. If you see the Baggara Hawazma Arabs of south Kurdofan,
they are physically indistinguishable from the Nubas because of
intermarriages and divisions. The Arab groups have adopted many
of the traditional African practices of the Nubas and the Nubas
likewise have adopted many of the practices of the Sudan. What
has happened since the outbreak of war in 1983 is that Khartoum's
military establishment and Khartoum's successive governments,
not only the current government but successive governments since
1982, have seen an opportunity to use these groups as informal
paramilitary forces. The idea behind that is that they would be
capable of adopting the same guerrilla tactics as the rebel groups;
that is to say, to have mobility, strike and run and scatter quickly.
The incentive for the militias is cattle looting and the Dinka
are very rich in cattle and therefore they are as poor as the
Dinka. The government gave them blanket cover to go and loot whatever
they want in the Nuba Mountains.
Q54 Tony Worthington: "You can loot
and we will not do anything about it"?
Dr Baldo: Exactly. This is a cornerstone
in the war economy in Darfur today; that is to say, looting of
cattle in Darfur is providing a material incentive to continue
the war for the Janjaweed. It is the same type of functional,
ruthless and inhumane thinking which is still dominating the military
establishment in Darfur now.
Tony Worthington: Dr Baldo, thank you
very much indeed. You have given us a great deal to think about.
You are Sudanese yourself and it is rare indeed to have, as it
were, an outside observer who is also an insider. That is very
useful. Thank you very much indeed.
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