Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220-239)
RT HON
HILARY BENN
MP AND MS
ANNA BEWES
23 FEBRUARY 2005
Q220 Tony Worthington: There was a report
on the BBC this morning that the attacks were still going on with
the Janjaweed supported by attack helicopters. Certainly when
we were there, on the airfields you would see four helicopters
and an Antonov alongside each other, ready for the next scheduled
flight, or something like that. It ought to be, with a willing
government, very, very easy to monitor flights, as to whether
actually the aircraft take off and what they do. Could we get
that degree of co-operation from the Sudanese government?
Hilary Benn: I do not know which
reports you are referring to, relating to this morning.
Q221 Tony Worthington: The Today
programme.
Hilary Benn: We have checked with
the British Embassy in Khartoum. As I understand it, there has
been a claim by one of the rebel movements that there has been
an aerial bombardment of Labado by Government of Sudan forces.
The African Union refutes this. Indeed, the AU peacekeepers are
actually in the town at the moment, and that has enabled 10,000
IDPs to resettle there in the last week. So I think there is some
dispute about what may have happened today. I just thought that
up-to-date information might be of assistance, and that is what
we have been told this morning. I agree with you; in theory it
should be possible; the problem throughout has been ensuring that
the Government of Sudan, and indeed more recently the rebels also,
do what they have said they are going to do, and that is why I
think it is very important the international community, looking
at the new UN Security Council resolution, does send a very, very
clear signal by our actions that we are serious about this.
Q222 Tony Worthington: Could I just switch
to the south, for a moment, because we visited there as well.
I do not know whether you have the detailed answer on this but
I am sure you could write if not. I have never been anywhere where
I have been so overwhelmed by the scale and seen what happens
to a country if it has been at war for nearly 30 years, where
your roads disappear and transport, and everything—there
is a retreat of the state. That area is going to clearly need,
as part of the consequences of the peace agreement, a lot of assistance.
Is that going to be able to be done with the southerners alone,
or does it have to go through Khartoum? Will the emphasis be on
building up the institutions of a state within the southern area,
which will have the right to decide whether it secedes in six
years' time, or is that all going to Khartoum and then being deployed?
Hilary Benn: Obviously, there
will be a new government and a new set of circumstances as a result
of the Comprehensive Peace Deal, and I think what you saw in southern
Sudan (and I have not been there because I have been to Khartoum
and Darfur on my three visits to the country in the last year)
illustrates just why concluding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
was so important. We discussed this when we talked about this
in December. I think it was absolutely right and proper that alongside
doing what we have done in relation to Darfur we also worked very
hard to help shepherd that peace process to a conclusion, because
without that then the possibility of development assistance in
the south in the new circumstances (and it is for the SPLM and
the Government of Sudan in forming the new administration to work
out exactly how they are going to do it, and the SPLM has very
strong and very clear views about how they want it to happen)—that
opens up that possibility. There continues to be a balance to
be struck between, on the one hand, demonstrating that there is
a peace dividend to the Naivasha process while, on the other hand,
as I have said very clearly to the Government of Sudan, it is
not all going to happen as long as Darfur remains in the state
that it is—in particular on the question of debt relief,
because debt relief is very important, as we all know, to the
Government of Sudan. I have made it very clear there is not going
to be movement on debt relief until the problem of Darfur has
been sorted out. Throughout there has, of course, been a balance
that has had to be struck, but the needs in the south are enormous,
and I am sure that the SPLM's part of the new government is going
to be very vigilant in ensuring that that is used in the right
way and to the best effect. I would be very happy to write to
the Committee if that would be of assistance, to provide some
further details about what we have already got on the way. I do
not know whether, Anna, you would like to add anything?
Ms Bewes: There has been a UN-led
Joint Assessment Mission over the past year or so which has included
both the SPLM and the government as part of the teams and donor
representatives have also been involved. The aim of that has been
to look at the needs throughout the country, both in north and
south, and to come up with a list of needs across the board, really,
in a whole variety of sectors. It is reporting at the moment (we
are starting to see draft reports) and over the next few weeks
we are going to be discussing with the government, with the parties
and with other donors how we can best help and how we and other
donors can best meet those needs. Of course, given the scale of
the needs in the south compared to the north, the majority of
the assistance will go to the south, at least to begin with, and
that will include capacity-building for the government institutions
in the south because they are setting up the Government of South
Sudan. Our own assistance is going to, perhaps, focus particularly
on capacity-building in the justice sector in the Government of
South Sudan. So, yes, we are very aware of the different needs
within the south compared to the north and there is a concerted
donor effort to address those needs.
Q223 Tony Worthington: Do you think it
is a very, very important issue that there is going to be this
vote on whether there is to be an independent southern Sudan.
Are we anticipating that there will be in the interim, like a
minister for health in the south, a minister for education and
a minister for justice, and that what we will be seeking to do
is to liaise with the, hopefully, growing political institutions
in the south rather than it being dealt with through the overall
government in Khartoum?
Ms Bewes: Yes, the Government
of South Sudan will have a variety of ministries dealing with
southern Sudan affairs. The things that should be dealt with by
the national government in Khartoum will be things like foreign
affairs and defence—things which are of national interest—but
the southern Sudan government will have health, education and
justice, and we will be dealing with them. Separately, in the
north, we will be dealing with, perhaps, the health and education
ministries in the north. Certainly it is a separate Government
of South Sudan in the south.
Q224 Chairman: Coming back to the African
Union, peacekeeping troops—or, in this case, ceasefire monitoring
troops—if they are UN troops they are paid for by the UN;
with the African Union, they have to be paid for by the Member
States. We, I think, contribute 143 vehicles. One got the impression
from talking to the AU officers that we met that there was no
shortage of being able to recruit potential troops; the difficulties
are financial constraints on the part of African states to committing
troops that they are going to have to pay for and so forth. If
the African Union peacekeeping operation is going to work, would
it not be sensible for the international community to see if it
could not set up a peacekeeping fund which is within the control
of the African Union but which will enable them to access more
peacekeepers? I think there is a concern I have that if we are
not careful South Africa, in particular, after a while, is going
to feel they are being particularly heavily leant upon to take
the lead on so many of these operations, and we will then start
to see African Union missions failing simply because there is
not the willingness to devote troops from within Africa to those
operations.
Hilary Benn: I think this is exactly
something that the international community has got to look at.
We have given, I think I am right in saying, £14 million
so far. There has been considerable support from the Peace Support
Facility, as you know, which was Poul Neilson's idea, as the EU
Commissioner, and I think we need to find a mechanism that will
allow funding to support AU peace support operations on a more
consistent and long-term basis. I think that is self-evidently
an enormous need that has got to be dealt with and it is something
the AU itself is very conscious of, and it is one of the ways
in which we can offer practical support. I think that is a very
important suggestion and we are going to need to find a way of
doing that.
Q225 Chairman: Perhaps we could commend
it as a Commission for Africa, G8—
Hilary Benn: Watch this space
for a little bit longer.
Q226 John Barrett: Yesterday we had a
very compelling evidence session from Dr Mukesh Kapila, the former
Humanitarian Co-ordinator in the Sudan. It was quite clear that
the evidence he was giving related to the time he was over there,
but he did make some very strong claims and allegations, which
have been denied by the Sudanese government, not least of all
that when we, the Committee, spoke to the Sudanese government
and they were in denial, he was alleging that they were actively
promoting the killing, the systematic rape of women, and the burning
and destruction of villages. When we were over there, we saw from
the air these destroyed villages, we went into the camps (like
you) and took the evidence; we saw the Antonov bombers and the
gun ships on the same airstrips as the African Union helicopters.
We saw it at first hand and we heard evidence. What I would like
to find out is: are you content that Dr Kapila's evidence, which,
as I say, I found absolutely compelling yesterday and I would
recommend anybody reading it—do you believe his version
of the story? His version of the story does put the Sudanese government,
quite clearly, into that group of war criminals, or whatever,
and that there are a whole number of events that have to flow
from that because of what is trying to be negotiated in the south
and in the west in Darfur. You must be aware of what he has said
in the past.
Hilary Benn: If the straight question
is: do I think that the Government of Sudan did not know what
was going on? No, I do not think that they did not know what was
going on. I think that would be stretching credulity too far.
However one describes it (and the Chair of the Select Committee
has used the phrase "in denial" and I used that when
I came back from my visit), I think it is very clear that they
know what is going on. Of course, the International Commission
of Inquiry has looked into that, has reached its conclusions and,
in the sealed annex, has a list of names. That is my answer to
a very fair question.
Q227 John Barrett: What then follows
from that is the debate about the trade-off between pursuing those
guilty of what has happened in the Sudan and putting that slightly
to the backburner while the peace agenda is pursued. He was, really,
of the opposite view from our Ambassador, who I think is doing
an excellent job, that we must be seen to be in hot pursuit of
those who have been guilty of these crimes, rather than feeling
that, "Well, we want the peace discussions to continue so
that can be slightly put off the accelerator—the pursuit
of the justice aspect."
Hilary Benn: I do not think the
two are incompatible because what the International Commission
of Inquiry has done very clearly is to answer the question: what
has gone on? That is why we, and others, were very strong supporters
of establishing the International Commission of Inquiry, as proposed
by the Secretary General. It is essential that the Security Council
sends a clear message that there is not going to be any impunity
and people's past activities and crimes are going to catch up
with them, because it acts as quite a powerful incentive, one
hopes, on people if they are still doing it to stop because they
get a greater sense they are not going to be able to get away
with it. At the same time (as I say, I do not think they are mutually
incompatible, so there has to be a clear process which is going
to set out how that is going to happen and then it is for the
judicial process to do its job), we have to find a political solution
to this problem, because we know that it is only a political solution
that is going to bring this to an end and allow the people to
go home. That is exactly what has been successfully achieved in
relation to the North/South civil war, which is why it was right
and proper—and it is not defensiveness—to continue
to work very hard to help bring that to a successful conclusion
because it is the only way you can open up dealing with the legacy
of lack of development, trauma, suffering and death that has bedevilled
the south of the country. I think both need to take place and
I do not see an incompatibility between the two.
Q228 John Barrett: Finally, following
on the point on the African Union, when I mentioned that helicopters
were on the same airstrips as the gun ships, have you given much
consideration to the mandate of the African Union? Clearly, there
seems to be agreement that increased numbers and logistical support
is something that everyone would back. Are you content that the
existing mandate is detailed enough?
Hilary Benn: I think there are
two issues: one is the AU has shown an astonishing capacity to
be flexible in the way that it is worked. To use the non-technical
term, "they put themselves about", and they have received
praise from a lot of quarters for putting themselves about, including,
as I mentioned earlier, from Jan Pronk and others, and that is
enormously to their credit. I do pay tribute to them. The second
point I would make in relation to two lots of helicopters on the
airfield, is that that is exactly why we are now keen to explore
ways in which the AU could play a role in making sure that things
that people have said that they will not do they do not do, by
monitoring movements in and out, because I think that is a really
valuable task that the AU could undertake to give us some reassurance
that aircraft and gun ships—and the Government of Sudan
has said the Antonovs are being withdrawn, so assuming that is
the case and remains the case—are not used in a way that
the Government of Sudan has promised previously that they will
not be used. I think that is a role the AU could very usefully
take on.
Q229 Mr Bercow: I would like to press
the Secretary of State on the issue of the AU mandate. With fairly
predictable and, some might say, monotonous regularity now, we
hear tributes to the African Union force, and we know the personnel
that make up the force are doing everything they can and we applaud
that. However, it is quite important that we do not end up with
a situation in which the AU is simply set up for a fall. Can I
just ask you: what do you think of the idea of a peace enforcement
mandate as opposed to a monitoring mission or a peacekeeping force?
Hilary Benn: The AU's mandate
is, clearly, for the AU to determine. It is a different kind of
mandate to the one that they have got. If you are talking about
shooting at people—it depends what you mean by "peace
enforcement mandate". It is for the AU itself to determine
what its mandate should be. Clearly, there would be difficulties
and issues that would arise in those circumstances. The Peace
and Security Committee of the AU has asked the AU to look at the
mandate again currently. The question, really, is what is the
most effective way of providing the peace and stability that the
people of Darfur want? This was before you came in, Mr Bercow,
but the indication we have since the beginning of the month is
that there is an uneasy calm. There were some reports of an attack
this morning but it is not entirely clear that that actually took
place. If the situation were to get worse then I think all of
us would have to consider what else might need to be done. The
other thing I did refer to earlier, again before you came in,
was with the deployment of a peace support operation from the
UN in the south of the country, the draft UN resolution links
the way in which that might be able to provide support to what
the AU is doing in Darfur. I think, frankly, those are the options
that are open to us, including to the AU.
Q230 Mr Bercow: I am sorry I missed the
earlier information and I look forward to picking up on that later.
Let us just pursue briefly this discussion about what is most
effective. Leaving aside death from malnutrition or other health-induced
causes, what is your present estimate of the monthly death rate
in Darfur?
Hilary Benn: The last and best
figure that we have, as I recollect, is the estimate that the
World Health Organisation produced when they came up with their
70,000 total, which as I understand it includes both those who
have died as a result of disease and, also, by way of violence.
I think, at the time, people said that was running at between
7,000 and 10,000 a month. The World Health Organisation wants
to undertake a further assessment, and has, as I understand it,
faced some obstacles from the Government of Sudan in trying to
do that, but the latest information I have is that they want to
undertake that next month or the month after. There is a dearth
of hard, accurate information. That is the best that I think is
available currently, and certainly that I am aware of.
Q231 Mr Bercow: It is always very difficult,
Chairman, to argue with the intelligence available to the Secretary
of State, and one should take great care in doing so, but I must
say that my impression was that the 70,000 estimate made by the
WHO did not include victims of violence. At any rate, let me just
put it to you in these terms, Secretary of State, terms with which
I am sure you will be very familiar: that WHO estimate was on
the basis of figures between March and mid-October 2004, so there
is a very substantial period of the conflict before then and since
then which those figures do not cover. What I am really driving
at—we all share the same humanitarian and human rights objectives,
I think, around this table—is this: there is a sense amongst
a lot of people who are desperately unhappy about what was taking
place in Darfur that a certain sort of stability of death rate
is coming to seep into the subconscious and to be regarded as,
if not acceptable, something that one just has to tolerate in
the short term. Can I put it to you that the significance of the
peace enforcement mandate is that unlike the peacekeeping mandate
it does not depend upon the existence of a peace agreement (there
is not a peace agreement, as you know, there is merely a ceasefire
agreement). Is there not an argument for saying that if regular
killing on a substantial scale by helicopter gun ships and by
Antonov aeroplanes and by Janjaweed militias continues simply
the present mandate, the present numbers, the present deficiency
of logistical and satellite support, is going to make permanent
that loss of life, which none of us wants to see and which all
of us should take action to demonstrate is unacceptable?
Hilary Benn: Clearly, that would
not be acceptable were that to be the case. It is my best information
that the WHO estimate for the period March to October—it
is the same number of months—2004 did include deaths from
injuries and from violence. The honest answer is we do not know
because that is the only estimate that we have had. We do not
know, but the AU's job there is, in part, of course, to respond
to reports about attacks. Now, the best estimate we have of the
current situation since the start of the month has been one of
uneasy calm; should the situation change and we return to a pattern
of attacks in which people lose their lives then of course the
international community, and the AU and others, will have to say
to themselves: "What are we going to do if it starts to get
worse again?" I do not know the answer to how many people
have died as a result of violence in the last three months. The
truth is nobody knows, but the AU itself investigates all of the
reports that it receives, and certainly the number of deaths,
if one looks at what the AU itself has looked into and reported
(and it is no consolation but that is the case), it is a lot less
than it was a year ago, which was again, as far as we know, the
period when a lot of people were being killed during that time
when it was very difficult for anybody to get into Darfur to see
what was going on and when the AU was not there.
Q232 Mr Bercow: Mr Barrett has already
pressed you on the issue of bringing people to justice and a referral
to the ICC—and I apologise if I cut across anything that
my colleague asked. I think I rightly understand the Government's
position to be that you support a referral to the ICC—I
think there have been written parliamentary answers from your
colleague Chris Mullin to that effect. Can I just establish the
strength of commitment that the British Government has to trying
to build a coalition of support for that position through the
UN? The Prime Minister's very close relationship with President
Bush is well-understood and by some of us, at least, on all sides
of the House, admired and respected. Is it your intention that
the Prime Minister intends to exert his very considerable persuasive
powers over the President? Is there not a certain obscenity about
the fact that, on the one hand, the United States is, rightly,
the most denunciatory of the Government of Sudan for its commission
of crimes against humanity that may be no less serious and heinous
than genocide (to quote the report) but, on the other hand, speaking
with the authentic voice of self-interest, it opposes the ICC
and is, therefore, more likely than not to oppose a referral?
Is this not a case in which your good friend the Prime Minister
could intervene to very, very good and effective consequence?
Hilary Benn: The Government's
position is, indeed, very clearly set out, as you alluded to at
the start of the question, Mr Bercow. We have been a very long-standing
supporter of the International Criminal Court (ICC), as you know,
and our clear preference in this case is for the case to be referred
to the ICC. The position of the Administration of the United States
of America is, also, equally well-known, namely one of opposition
to the ICC. It is for the UN Security Council to take that decision,
and discussions are taking place, as we speak, on what that outcome
is going to be. Our view is very, very clear: what is essential
is that those who have been responsible for these crimes, as reported
in the International Commission of Inquiry report are brought
to justice. I can assure you that all parts of the British Government
are working very, very hard to ensure that that is the case.
Q233 Mr Bercow: Taking 14 years about
it, as will be the ultimate effect of the ad hoc tribunal
in relation to Rwanda, would be quite unacceptable, would it not?
Hilary Benn: That is one of the
reasons why our clear preference is for the case to be referred
to the ICC.
Mr Bercow: You have much support for
that position, Secretary of State.
Q234 Mr Khabra: Secretary of State, with
the current mandate, and also the numbers, the AU is not able
to provide protection to the civilians in Darfur; therefore, the
international community has got an obligation. In your evidence
on 21 December to the Committee you said: "We are looking
at the extent to which we might be able to do more for the policing
front." What conclusions were reached about this and what
action has been taken so far?
Hilary Benn: The straight truth
is the bit of the AU deployment they have had most difficulty
with in finding the right numbers of people has been the police
deployment. Now, I think, currently, 100 of the 815 that they
were looking to deploy have arrived of the police element, and
I think another 100 are due to come from South Africa in the next
couple of weeks. The AU itself has drawn up a plan for its civilian
police component, which will monitor the activities of the Government
of Sudan police, and we have been pressing ourselves for an EU
assessment mission to look at what help the EU might be able to
provide to the AU and whether there is any value in getting involved
more directly in building the capacity of the Government of Sudan
police, and that might fit into the point that Anna Bewes made
a little earlier about working on security sector reform as part
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but it is an area in which
the AU has found it most difficult to get the right people to
do the job of work.
Q235 Mr Khabra: Following the same theme,
on the protection of civilians, you also, in your evidence on
the same day, said that the international community has to make
clear to the parties to the dispute that they have obligations
which they have to fulfil and that there will be a point where
there are consequences for the parties if they fail to meet the
obligations. That is a sort of challenge. When will that point
be reached? What might those consequences be which you consider
are necessary?
Hilary Benn: Well, indeed I did
say that. We, as the UK, want to extend the arms embargo across
the whole of Sudan and to include the current government. We are
very strongly in favour of a monitoring mechanism because it goes
back to the earlier point about being able to enforce whatever
you put in place. We support the idea for a sanctions committee
and an expert panel, and that would look at, for example, the
potential for travel bans. Slightly more difficult, because there
is a question of effectiveness, is the question of asset freezes,
but a panel would have the chance to look at that in detail. We
think that is a road down which we should go but, as I indicated
in answer to an earlier question, not all members of the Security
Council necessarily share that view, and that is part of the difficulty
here, but I think it is inconceivable that having made very clear
for a long period of time that we expect the parties to the conflict
to do what they promised to do, I think the international community
would lack credibility—and that is the issue which all members
of the Security Council are going to have to face up to—if
we end up wagging our fingers one more time at those who had been
responsible for not doing what they promised to do. That is why
I think this UN Security Council resolution is particularly important,
because it is also the case that—certainly reflecting on
the activities of the Government of Sudan—we have seen movement
in response to intense pressure. That is how we moved on humanitarian
access, because a lot of people worked very, very hard, did not
let go, pushed and pushed and pushed and, eventually, we saw some
progress. I think pressure does produce results.
Q236 Mr Khabra: With your knowledge of
the situation, how hopeful are you and what do you think the timescale
is in which any settlement of peace can be achieved?
Hilary Benn: Excuse me, Mr Khabra,
were you asking in terms of hopeful about the resolution that
is currently being looked at or more generally, or both? I was
not quite clear whether you were asking about how hopeful I was
about the resolution or about finding peace in Darfur, or both.
Q237 Mr Khabra: I was asking the question
that with your knowledge of the situation—you have personally
visited the area—do you think that there is going to be
a solution to the problem, and your estimation of what is the
timescale of that, and whether the civilians which have been caught
up in the situation like that will continue to suffer.
Hilary Benn: The honest answer
is I do not know. I do not know and none of us knows. What is
clear is that pressure can help to produce results and that is
why the answer I gave in relation to the Security Council resolution
and what the international community does is, in my view, very
important; that is why a political process is, in the end, the
only way this is going to be solved. That has to be a pressure
both on the Government of Sudan—because we have not talked
a great deal so far about the rebels—but undoubtedly one
of the features of the last few months has been the increasing
extent to which the rebels have been part of the outbreaks of
violence and insecurity and that is why making sure that any steps
that the Security Council takes apply also to the rebels as they
do to the Government of Sudan because it is a way of demonstrating
to all of the people causing the trouble: "There is a consequence
to you". In the end, politics is the only way this is going
to be solved. That involves the rebels being clear about what
it is they want. Coming back to the Naivasha process, which always
features—and, in my view, rightly—in these discussions,
what Naivasha has demonstrated is that politics can find a solution
to the most intractable problems, it has, and the Naivasha agreement
contains all of the elements which could be drawn upon to find
a resolution to the problems of Darfur; there are other ones that
are there that make it more complex, but if there is a will then
it is possible for people to find a solution if they are prepared
to stop fighting, start talking and use politics to bring to an
end the nightmare that the people are suffering. The question
is do they have the will to do it? The one other thing that has
changed, of course, is that the SPLM is now in the government
and when I was in Nairobi for the signing of the peace agreement
I spoke to John Garang, the leader of the SPLM, about what part
the SPLM might be able to play in encouraging the rebels, in particular,
to come to the table and use politics to find a way of solving
this.
Q238 Mr Battle: When our Prime Minister
put the five-point plan to the Sudanese President in October 2004
it actually included targets, if I recall rightly, and those targets
were about co-operation with the AU, they were about identifying
the location of troops, confining the Government of Sudan's forces
to barracks and implementing the Abuja humanitarian protocol,
for example. You have mentioned, I think I heard rightly in your
comments earlier on, that you told Sudanese ministers there would
be no debt relief until Darfur was sorted out. Now that the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement has been signed, (and, obviously, Sudan would
expect to receive large volumes of aid, and it is much needed)
will aid disbursements to Sudan actually be conditional on progress
against specific and time-bound targets in relation to action
on Darfur?
Hilary Benn: As I indicated in
answer to an earlier question, I think there is a balance to be
struck here. I want to be very straight about this, because in
order to demonstrate that the argument that politics and a political
solution is the way out of problems one also has to be able to
demonstrate that once people have chosen the political path then
there is some benefit as a result of having done that. That is
why throughout there has been a task of trying to balance these
two problems: bringing to an end the North/South conflict and
dealing with the problem in Darfur. So if we were to say—and
we are not saying that—that none of the fruits of the North/South
peace agreement in terms of development assistance in southern
Sudan was going to flow because of the problems in Darfur, well,
the first thing, of course, you would encounter is the southern
Sudanese would say: "We do not control what has been going
on in Darfur, so we have used politics to find a solution and
now you are going to deny us any of that." So we have to
make some progress on that front, there is no doubt. On the other
hand, we have to use the right carrots with the Government of
Sudan in order to ensure that they understand that all the fruits,
from their point of view, are not going to flow unless they deal
with the bit that they continue to have responsibility for. Can
I just say, very quickly, since you raise specifically the undertakings
that were given, in terms of co-operation with the AU, I think
increasingly one can say, yes, the Government of Sudan is co-operating
with the AU. As the example of Labado, which I mentioned earlier,
illustrates, the Government of Sudan withdrew from there and the
AU went in. That is something that all of us should welcome. Identifying
troops—yes, they have done that. Barracks, no, but then
neither have the rebels, so there is a bit of a problem there.
On the Abuja protocol, no they have not done that, and that remains
a continuing difficulty.
Q239 Mr Battle: That is a crucial one,
really, is it not, because, at the end of the day—even if
you draw a not very fair parallel, and I would not want to push
the analogy too far—in any situation where a ceasefire is
negotiated, to pull violence back to politics, you have to have
targets, and you can then have sticks and carrots. I refer to
the Northern Ireland situation which has gone on for some years;
yes, an improvement but there have to be targets and there have
to be some sticks as well as carrots, as we have seen in the last
few weeks. I just wonder whether you feel that there is any way
in which any pressure could be applied, or whether any pressure
at all would simply undermine the political talking—and
I do not use that phrase pejoratively at all.
Hilary Benn: We are endeavouring
to do that, and that is why what I have said, and what the Government
has said, on debt relief is a very powerful stick or carrot—depending
on which end you are looking at—because it does demonstrate
that there are things that the Government of Sudan has got to
do. We shepherd both of these processes forward, and that has
been one of the challenges throughout this whole difficult business.
I think it is right and proper to do both, because to have lost
the Naivasha process and the chance to end the civil war that
has killed two million people—I do not think history would
have been very kind to us if that had gone down the pan, frankly.
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