House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Fifth Report

1 Darfur, Sudan and the Responsibility to Protect

'The issue is not one of a right to intervene, but rather of a responsibility of the whole human race to protect our fellow human beings from extreme abuse wherever and whenever it occurs

The crisis in Darfur

1. Sudan has a population of nearly 34 million, and in 2003 had a per capita annual income of US$460.[2] It is a vast and desperately poor country which successive regimes have struggled to govern from Khartoum. Development and politics in Sudan are best understood therefore in terms of Khartoum's relationships with the peripheries of Sudan.[3] In early 2003, as progress was being made in resolving the long-running North-South conflict, and world attention was focussed on Iraq, another centre-periphery conflict erupted in Darfur — a region the size of France, in the west of Sudan — as the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) took up arms against the Government of the Sudan (GoS).[4] The uprising drew its support primarily from the "African" tribes of Darfur — including the Fur, the Massalit and the Zaghawa — and was motivated by a sense of long-term marginalisation and neglect by Khartoum.[5] This sentiment was heightened by Darfur's exclusion from the North-South peace process, and given focus by the Sudanese government's failure to prevent or punish attacks by Arab militias.[6]

2. The Sudanese government sought to crush the rebellion, both through the use of conventional armed forces — including helicopter gun-ships, MIG jets and Antonov bombers — but also through arming proxy Arab militias and granting them impunity to commit atrocities.[7] As the authoritative and comprehensive report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) confirmed, government forces and militias — the so-called "Janjaweed" — have conducted indiscriminate attacks throughout Darfur, including the killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, the destruction of villages, rape, pillaging and forced displacement (see the appendix to our report for the ICID's executive summary). The government's actions may not amount to genocide — the key issue here is one of proving intent — but there have been widespread and systematic war crimes and crimes against humanity which may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.[8] The guilt or otherwise of the 51 individuals named in a sealed list — which includes 10 senior government officials — remains to be determined by a court; the report of the ICID does not rule out the possibility that such individuals in the GoS and militias had genocidal intent.[9] The rebel groups are also culpable, although their attacks have not been as widespread and have not systematically targeted civilians.[10] The regime in Khartoum, as the government, bears the primary responsibility.

3. Historically, the tribes of Darfur had lived together relatively peacefully.[11] Settled farming communities would allow nomadic herders access to grazing, benefiting in turn from the manure provided by the nomads' animals. Tribes would trade and inter-marry, and ethnic boundaries were fluid. But driven by population growth and desertification, recent decades have seen increased competition for land and resources, and sporadic conflicts.[12] The picture is complex, but in outline it is one of conflict between primarily "Arab" tribes of nomadic herders, and primarily "African" tribes of sedentary farmers[13] (but see paragraphs 109-110 on Arab tribes that have stayed out of the conflict). Traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution have been neglected and at times undermined by Khartoum. Small arms have become widely available as a result of regional conflicts. And tensions have been stoked by the selective arming of "Arab" militia by the Sudanese government's security apparatus, informed by a racist pro-Arab ideology.[14] The GoS, using divide-and-rule tactics familiar from its war in the South, has deliberately and recklessly stoked ethnic and tribal tensions.[15]

4. Darfur's total population is approximately 6 million. Within Darfur, 2.4 million people are directly affected by the crisis and in need of humanitarian assistance. Of these, 1.84 million people have been driven out of their homes but remain in Darfur.[16] Another 200,000 people have fled across the border to Chad. The lack of reliable statistics on mortality, and the misuse of what data there is, is a scandal. There is a situation of "statistical anarchy".[17] The figure of 70,000 deaths estimated by the World Health Organization (WHO) is perhaps the most-used and certainly the most abused. In Sudan, Manuel da Silva, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, and in Westminster, Hilary Benn, the Secretary of State for International Development, both told us that the 70,000 estimate included deaths due to violence.[18] They were mistaken. The only violent deaths which the WHO's estimate includes are those which took place in the camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Of those attacked in their villages, only those who made it to the camps before dying would be included in the WHO's estimate. With the exception of these cases, the WHO's estimate does not include deaths due to the violence from which people have fled.[19] In addition, the WHO estimate covers only the period from March to mid-October 2004, and only takes account of deaths in accessible areas within the borders of Darfur. Cited without clear explanation of its limitations, the WHO's estimate is extremely misleading.[20]

5. Mortality data which do not include deaths due to the violence from which people have fled are gross under-estimates.[21] Nobody knows how many people have died from the violence in Darfur.[22] Some estimates put the total excess mortality figure at 300-400,000.[23] Jan Egeland, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, whilst stating that no-one knows the true figure, suggested that total excess mortality is "several times" as high as the WHO's 70,000 estimate.[24] Political pressure must be exerted on the Government of the Sudan to enable the WHO or a different competent organisation to conduct further assessments of mortality resulting from the crisis in Darfur. And, in a situation where statistics are deflated, inflated and used by all sides as political weapons, the WHO must ensure that its statistics are not open to mis-interpretation and abuse. The WHO's press release of 14 October 2004, conflating two types of violence, demonstrated at best extreme naivety if not gross incompetence. Whatever the real level of mortality, the displaced millions, unable to plant seeds for this year's harvest, face a bleak, uncertain, hungry and insecure future.

Figure 2: Darfur timeline

Period of time Events

Jan-Feb 2003 Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) emerges
First early warnings of tensions in Darfur given by NGOs

March-April 2003 SLA attack on El Fasher airport and other military installations
GoS decides to "unleash" the army to crush the rebellion

May-June 2003 GoS pursues military response to Darfur insurgency

July-August 2003 Conflict and displacement of civilians grows

Sept-Oct 2003 UN Greater Darfur Special Initiative appeal for funds launched

Nov-Dec 2003 UN-OCHA warns of humanitarian crisis in Darfur
Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, visits Khartoum
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, issues statement about Darfur

Jan-Feb 2004 Escalation of violence continues (Jan-April sees greatest intensity)
Extremely restricted humanitarian access (Jan-May)

March-April 2004 Mukesh Kapila, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, describes situation in Darfur as "ethnic cleansing" and is then required to leave Sudan
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (N'Djamena Agreement)
First briefing to UN Security Council by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland

May-June 2004 AU Mission in Darfur established
Easing of bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian access
Media coverage begins to grow
Hilary Benn visits Khartoum and Darfur

July-August 2004 Joint Communiqué and Plan of Action - UN and GoS
UN Resolution 1556, 30-7-04 (includes demand to disarm Janjaweed)
Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, visits Darfur
US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and Kofi Annan visit Darfur
AU-hosted peace talks begin in Abuja

Sep-Oct 2004 Colin Powell, describes events in Darfur as "genocide"
UN Resolution 1564, 18-9-04 (includes consideration of "other measures")
AU Mission in Darfur gets revised mandate, with more troops authorised
Prime Minister and Hilary Benn visit Khartoum, outlining five-point peace plan

Nov-Dec 2004 Humanitarian and Security Protocols agreed at AU-hosted talks in Abuja
UN Resolution 1574, 19-11-04 (Nairobi meeting - focus on North-South, mention of Darfur)
Build up of rebel troops and GoS "road-clearing" operations

Jan-March 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between GoS and SPLM, 9-1-05
Report of International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur - crimes "no less serious and heinous than genocide"

The Committee's inquiry and visit to Sudan

6. In September 2004 we announced our inquiry into Darfur. The inquiry's aims have been to examine the effectiveness of the international community's response to the crisis and to promote a more effective response, as well as to ensure that, once the immediate crisis is over, the international community learns the lessons and remains engaged. We held a preliminary evidence session with NGOs in September and have since held six further evidence sessions.[25] We have also received written evidence from twenty organisations; Governments, UN agencies, development NGOs, human rights organisations, and research institutes.[26]

7. In January 2005, we visited Sudan. The first leg of our visit was to the South of Sudan; it was important that we saw Darfur in context. In Rumbek, the interim capital for the South, the story we heard was one of cautious optimism, huge needs and high expectations. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) had been signed by the GoS and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on 9 January, bringing to an end a conflict which had dragged on — with a gap from 1972-1983 — since independence was achieved in 1956. The conflict has left two million people dead and four million displaced. We welcome the agreement and commend the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Chief Mediator, General Sumbeiywo, and the Troika of the USA, the UK and Norway for their role in supporting the peace process. The CPA specifies how power and resources will be divided, including revenues from the oil which has fuelled the conflict and which continues to shape the international community's dealings with Sudan.[27] The South is also promised a referendum on independence after a six-year period of power-sharing.

8. The CPA represents an historic opportunity for Sudan to set itself on the road to sustainable peace, security and development. There is hope that the CPA will provide a blue-print for peace in Darfur, offering a greater degree of resource and power-sharing, enabling elections, and leading to human rights and judicial reforms. The entry into government of John Garang's SPLM — the Government of Sudan's opponents for many years in the North-South civil war — may also improve the prospects for peace. But if groups in Darfur and elsewhere feel that they are excluded and conclude that their only hope is to use force to win a seat at the negotiating table, then the North-South deal could have the opposite effect and stimulate further conflict which in turn might destabilise the North-South peace. The Red-Sea State in the east, and Kordofan, just east of Darfur, are potential flash-points.[28] Continued international engagement — pressure on all sides to resolve the crisis in Darfur, and the delivery of desperately needed aid to the people of Sudan - will be crucial. Achieving the correct balance between maintaining pressure and providing incentives is the key[29] (see paragraphs 115-117).

9. The second leg of our Sudan visit — after a brief stop in Khartoum to hear from hard-pressed UN agencies and NGOs — was to Darfur. Based in Nyala, South Darfur, we also travelled to West and North Darfur, visiting six camps for Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs) as well as El Fasher and Zaleingi.[30] We spoke with IDPs, and had meetings with UN agencies, the African Union (AU), NGOs, human rights organisations and government officials. We were unable to meet with representatives of the rebels, or the Janjaweed. We were extremely impressed with the professionalism and dedication of the humanitarian agencies' staff, working tirelessly to relieve suffering in the most trying of circumstances, and by the tremendous efforts being made by an under-resourced AU. The protagonists in Darfur have signed ceasefire agreements and protocols on humanitarian access and security, but they frequently break them. Recent weeks may have been relatively calm in Darfur, but the conflict, or, to be precise, the conflicts are far from over (see paragraph 109). The resulting insecurity hinders the provision of humanitarian assistance, and prolongs and extends the suffering of the people of Darfur. Images that will stay with us from our visit include: the burnt and destroyed villages which we saw en route from Nyala to Zaleingi; the tears of women recounting the death of family members at the hands of the Arab militias — the so-called Janjaweed; the fear on the faces of women who, dreading rape, were too terrified to stray beyond the relative safety of their camps; and the aircraft at Nyala airport — at one end of the runway those for bombing and killing, at the other end those for monitoring the so-called ceasefire and delivering humanitarian assistance. We also remember the words of denial uttered by many of the Sudanese government officials we met, seemingly indifferent to the suffering of Darfur, dismissing the deaths of tens or hundreds of thousands as the inevitable casualties of the government's counter-insurgency campaign.[31] They appeared untroubled by their growing reputation as lepers among the international community.

The responsibility to protect

10. Mid-way through our inquiry into Darfur, the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change released its impressive and wide-ranging report. The report argues that there is a shared responsibility for the provision of global security. It outlines first how prevention can enhance security, second how — when prevention fails — force might then be used to enhance security, and third how the UN itself can be a more effective player in the provision of collective security. In relation to internal conflicts, the report of the High-level Panel concludes that "the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal acts or large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing".[32] We entirely agree. Sovereignty entails responsibilities as well as rights. States have the primary responsibility for their citizens, but in circumstances where states commit crimes against humanity and war crimes against their own citizens, the international community has an obligation and a duty to those citizens — a "responsibility to protect". Sovereignty does not give states the right to commit gross human rights violations and war crimes against their citizens.[33] The "responsibility to protect" includes the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild and develop. As a last resort, reaction can include the use of force, which in all but the most exceptional of cases should be authorised in advance by the UN Security Council (see paragraphs 81-100).

11. The Government of the Sudan, its allied militias, and the rebel groups are the guilty parties. All must share the blame. But the primary responsibility for civilian deaths and suffering in Darfur rests with the Government of the Sudan. The root causes of the crisis are primarily Sudanese, so too will be its solutions. But the international community has responsibilities too. In 2001 the Prime Minister acknowledged, that were a situation similar to the Rwandan genocide to happen again "we would have a moral duty to act".[34] It is not clear to whom precisely the "we" refers, and what sort of action this moral duty entails (see paragraphs 96-100). But if the responsibility to protect means anything, it ought to mean something in Darfur.[35] In this report we explain exactly what we believe it should mean in Darfur. Once the crisis in Darfur had begun to escalate,[36] fulfilling the responsibility to protect would have entailed three elements:

a) Political pressure on the Government of the Sudan, its allied militias and the rebels, to: stop targeting civilians with violence and coercion; stop the conflict and move towards a peaceful resolution of its underlying causes; provide true security for Darfur; and, to allow unhindered access for humanitarian assistance;

b) Humanitarian relief and protection for people affected by the crisis, provided in an effective and timely manner; and

c) Support for people to rebuild and develop communities and a country devastated by decades of conflict and marginalisation, in Darfur, and across Sudan.

12. In chapter two we address the humanitarian dimension of the international community's response. We outline the effectiveness of the response, analyse the reasons why the response was inadequate, and make recommendations as to how the response, and responses to future crises, might be improved.[37] In chapter three we address the political and security dimensions of the international community's response to Darfur. We assess the wisdom of the apparent prioritisation of the North-South peace process over Darfur, analyse the extent to which the international community — working with and through the African Union and the UN — has discharged its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur, and make recommendations about what needs to be done to improve the response. In chapter four we outline what the international community needs to do now, along with the new National Government of the Sudan, and the Government of Southern Sudan, to ensure that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the promise of development lead Sudan, including Darfur, towards sustainable peace. All parties need to deliver on their shared responsibilities for development. Handled carefully by the international community, and with a Sudanese government committed to peace, the interplay between the North-South peace process and the situation in Darfur could now become a positive one. Handled badly, the insecurity and suffering in Darfur will continue, and the historic opportunity provided by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will be squandered.

1 Kofi Annan, Address to the Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide, January 2004 - available at http://www.preventinggenocide.com Back

2 World Bank, World Development Indicators - available at http://www.worldbank.org Back

3 Ev 105 [Associate Parliamentary Group on Sudan memorandum]; Ev 152 [Liberation memo]. Perhaps the best up-to-date analysis of Darfur and Sudan is produced by Justice Africa - see http://www.justiceafrica.org/ - and by the International Crisis Group - see http://www.icg.org Back

4 The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) emerged a little later than the SLA/M. The two groups cooperate closely, but JEM is an Islamist movement whilst the SLA is secular. The SLA has had some support and encouragement from the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), which has, until recently, been engaged in a long-running conflict with the Government of the Sudan; Q 3 [Dr Suliman Baldo, African Program Director, International Crisis Group (ICG)]; see also ICG, Darfur: The failure to protect, 8 March 2005, p.12 on the emergence of other armed groups - see http://www.icg.org//library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/089_darfur_the_failure_to_protect.pdf Back

5 Ev 71 and 72 [Department for International Development (DFID) memo]; Ev 115 [Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre (DRDC) memo]. The Government of the Sudan disputes the suggestion that Darfur has been neglected, see Ev 134 [Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan memo]. Back

6 Ev 107 [Dr Suliman Baldo, James Morton, Roland Marchal and Alex de Waal memo] ; Q 5 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]; Ev 72 [DFID memo]; Q 14 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

7 Ev 72 [DFID memo]; Ev 151 [ICG memo]; Alex de Waal "Counter-insurgency on the cheap", London Review of Books, Vol. 26, No. 15, 5 August 2004 - see http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/waal01_.html Back

8 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) to the United Nations Secretary-General, Geneva, 25 January 2005, pp.3-4 - see http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf Back

9 ICID, p.4 - see footnote 8 for full citation; Justice Africa, Prospects for peace in Sudan, February 2005 Briefing, para 15 - available at http://www.justiceafrica.org/; see also Human Rights Watch, Darfur documents confirm government policy of militia support, Briefing Paper, 19 July 2004 - see http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/072004darfur.pdf; "Sudan ordered death squads", The Independent, 3 March 2005; Human Rights Watch, Darfur: militia leader implicates Khartoum, 2 March 2005 - see http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/02/darfur10228_txt.htm Back

10 ICID, p.60, para 240 - see footnote 8; Q 196 [Dr Mukesh Kapila, Former United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator for the Sudan]; Justice Africa, February 2005 Briefing, para 16 - see footnote 9. Back

11 Ev 112 [DRDC memo]; Ev 133 [Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan memo]. Back

12 Ev 110 [DRDC memo];Ev 72 [DFID memo]; Ev 134 and Ev 135 [Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan memo]. Back