Select Committee on International Development Fifth Report


3 Providing protection and security by exerting political pressure?

Negotiating the political and security landscape

49. Fundamentally, the crisis in Darfur is political, involving struggles for control over resources. Its solutions will be political too. Stronger political pressure is needed on all sides to protect civilians, to enhance security, and to encourage progress towards a political resolution. A political agreement between the GoS and the rebels will not resolve Darfur's problems, but it will set a framework within which local solutions can be found to complex problems of land, resources and governance.

50. The landscape on which humanitarian agencies work is shaped by politics and (in)security. If the rebels had not taken up arms, and if the GoS and its allied militias had not responded with a policy of ethnic cleansing, then the crisis in Darfur would have been on a smaller scale, and there would have been less need for humanitarian assistance. If the GoS and the rebels had stuck to their commitments, persuaded by more effective international pressure, then less relief would have been needed, and it would have been delivered more effectively. And if international politics and the priorities of governments had allowed and led to a more concerted international response and sustained pressure on the GoS and the rebels, then many of the reasons why the humanitarian response was slow and insufficient — the early warnings which were ignored, the lack of media attention, the slow donor response, the bureaucratic obstructions imposed by the Sudanese government, the insecurity, the coordination gaps as regards IDPs and camp management, and the leadership vacuum at the UN in Sudan — would have been diminished.[163]

51. In this chapter we address the political and security dimensions of the international community's response to Darfur: what the response has been; how effective it has been; why it hasn't been more effective; and what needs to be done now to make it more effective. We examine in particular the international community's prioritisation of the North-South peace process, the roles played by the AU (political mediation, ceasefire monitoring and verification), and by the UN Security Council.

Sequencing and the prioritisation of the North-South peace process

WAS THE NORTH-SOUTH PEACE PROCESS (CPA) PRIORITISED OVER DARFUR?

52. As the crisis in Darfur was emerging in 2003 and escalating in early 2004, the North-South peace process was making good progress. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) — a framework for peace, power-sharing and resource-sharing — would be signed by the GoS and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on 9 January 2005. The international community wanted to see progress both on the North-South peace process (hereafter, the CPA), and also on Darfur. The international community had a choice of three approaches: one, prioritise the CPA over Darfur; two, prioritise Darfur over the CPA; or three, adopt a "whole of Sudan" approach and deal with Darfur and the CPA in the round. The evidence shows that the international community — including the UK[164] — chose to treat the CPA and Darfur sequentially, with the priority given to securing the North-South peace through the CPA, in the hope that it would in turn provide a template for peace in Darfur. Governments, including our own, felt that highlighting events in Darfur, and pressurising the Sudanese government in relation to Darfur, might throw the CPA peace process off-track.[165] Some countries may also have felt that their national interests — in oil and possible uranium deposits, in seeing the SPLM enter government, or in demonstrating their diplomatic prowess — were best-served by prioritising the CPA.[166]

53. When Mukesh Kapila visited the capitals of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council in late 2003 and early 2004, he was told: "We sympathise with the problems of Darfur but do not make too much noise and trouble now, let us sort this Naivasha thing out and then everything will be alright."[167] The international community is not, as its failure to act in concert through the Security Council shows (see paragraphs 83-89), an indivisible block. As the crisis in Darfur evolved, the USA was keen to apply sanctions and stronger pressure on the GoS, but other countries — including Norway and the UK — were not.[168] Recalling his visit to London to raise the issue of Darfur, Mukesh Kapila told us:

    "I remember saying to the Foreign Office, 'Please refer this matter [to the Security Council]. As a UN coordinator I am bringing to your attention that there are crimes against humanity being committed. This must be brought to the Security Council's attention', and I was told 'Not yet'".[169]

THE PRIORITIZATION OF THE CPA: CONSEQUENCES FOR DARFUR

54. Governments did not deliberately sacrifice the people of Darfur to ensure that the CPA process wasn't destabilised. Nevertheless, the sequential approach to engaging with the Sudanese government on the CPA and on Darfur had major implications for the evolution of the crisis in Darfur which were "obvious to anyone".[170] Governments, including our own, failed to speak out about Darfur at an early stage; failed to get the UN Security Council to adopt a Resolution about Darfur until July 2004; failed to put concerted pressure on the Sudanese government to allow humanitarian access; and failed to make the government take seriously its responsibilities for protecting the people of Darfur and for complying with its ceasefire commitments and legal obligations.[171] On the ground, this catalogue of diplomatic failures had serious repercussions. In early 2004, with the international community prioritising the CPA process, the Government of the Sudan unleashed its deadly and totally disproportionate counter-insurgency strategy.[172] It was given a window of opportunity, and — with its room for manoeuvre soon to be reduced by the entry into power of the SPLM — a reason to take it quickly. If Darfur had not been sidelined, there is no doubt that events would have turned out differently.[173] The International Crisis Group, an organisation which consistently provides first-rate analysis, put it thus:

    "The international community refrained from intervening in the Darfur crisis during its crucial first phase when it was still possible to arrest the escalation and steer the parties to an early negotiated solution. Instead, the wrong-headed belief that more aggressive pressures would cause Khartoum to opt out of the IGAD negotiations prevailed. The government used that lack of resolve to slow the IGAD [Inter-Governmental Authority on Development] process, while its army, air force, and allied Janjaweed militia jointly bombed, raided, and burned to the ground hundreds of villages predominantly inhabited by groups of African ancestry, forcibly displacing their inhabitants and indiscriminately killing, maiming, and raping many in the process."[174]

SEQUENCING: A MISGUIDED AND UNNECESSARY APPROACH?

55. In his evidence, the Secretary of State acknowledged the dilemmas with which the international community — wanting to see progress on the CPA, but wanting to avoid an escalation of the conflict in Darfur — had to grapple as it made judgements and balanced different considerations.[175] Having acknowledged the difficulties, Hilary Benn offered a stout defence of the (sequential) approach which the UK Government, along with most of the other external governments involved in Sudan, had taken.[176] There were three strands to his defence.[177] First was the desirability of a peace deal between the North and the South of Sudan. The prospect of an end to a civil war that had left 2 million people dead, and the opportunity to foster much-needed development in the South, had to be grasped.[178] Second, the CPA process had already begun, under the auspices of IGAD; the UK, along with the USA and Norway, was committed to it. And third, the CPA would provide a template — negotiating principles — for a peace which would encompass the whole of Sudan.[179]

56. We understand the points made by the Secretary of State; it certainly would have been wrong to let the chance of securing the North-South peace, and perhaps a template for a wider peace, slip away. But prioritising the CPA ran counter to the needs of the people of Darfur for protection, security and humanitarian assistance.[180] When the conflict in Darfur escalated in early 2004, this much was crystal clear. Added to which, the analysis which informed the sequential approach was flawed. There are two elements to this. One is that, in contrast to the analysis offered by Hilary Benn which portrayed a choice between pursuing the CPA or pressing on Darfur, the international community did not need to make such a choice, and — by emphasising one set of issues (the CPA) rather than the other (Darfur) — was playing into the hands of the Sudanese government.[181] The regime's actions in Darfur strongly support this view. The International Crisis Group rejected the view that more aggressive pressure on Khartoum would cause the regime to opt out of the CPA negotiations.[182] Human Rights Watch told us that the sequential approach was based on a "grave misunderstanding".[183] The international community could have pushed harder on Darfur without risking the CPA negotiations. A more holistic approach would not, it seems to us, have prevented the signing of the CPA (it may have delayed it by a few months, but as the North-South peace had already been established, this would have been at no great practical cost), and it would certainly have prevented the crisis in Darfur getting as bad as it did. In the simple terms of balancing likely costs and benefits, prioritising the CPA was misguided.[184] A more holistic approach was possible, and, in terms of likely impact, was preferable.

57. The second element of the charge that the prioritisation of the CPA was based on flawed analysis, is that the CPA will only work if the conflict in Darfur is resolved. Or, put another way, the crisis in Darfur — along with potential conflicts in other regions excluded from the CPA — risks destabilising the CPA.[185] A more integrated, less sequential approach, was possible at the time, preferable in terms of immediate consequences, and would have provided a more secure basis for building a sustainable country-wide peace. The sequential approach, attempting to parcel off Sudan's problems rather than treat them in an integrated manner, was short-sighted, misleading and unhelpful, particularly so when dealing with a regime that is adept at playing games with the international community.[186] Unless the problems of Sudan as a whole are tackled, a sustainable peace will remain a pipe dream.[187] As Human Rights Watch put it in their memorandum: "The 'we're too busy now to think about that other problem' school of policy-making may seem sensible in the short term; in the long term, it is not."[188]

58. The international community, including the UK Government, seems reluctant to acknowledge that it was a mistake to sideline Darfur. It is now rightly focused on trying to ensure that the CPA does provide benefits for the whole of Sudan, including Darfur (this is our focus in Chapter 4). But there are signs that lessons might be being learnt, at least in DFID. When pressed about the sequential approach, the Secretary of State for International Development told us:

    "Clearly, knowing what we know now, if we went back in time, I would certainly do some things differently — let us be honest. That is a luxury we have. […] Looking back on it, could we have been louder earlier about Darfur? Yes, we could — I could have been, actually, if I was being self-critical — and it is important that we do learn those lessons."[189] [emphasis added]

We regret that the Foreign Secretary did not accept our invitation to give evidence; he may have been able to throw more light on the UK's approach to Darfur and the CPA, and might have benefited from being questioned on the wisdom of a sequential approach. We believe that the UK Government has had honourable intentions throughout; but mistakes were made. Strategies for dealing with governments to move dual peace-processes forward will be needed again. Lessons must be learnt. In its response to our report, we invite the Government — not solely DFID — to outline the lessons which have been learnt about sequencing and prioritisation as a result of the experience of Darfur.

The role of the African Union: African-led solutions for African problems?

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE AFRICAN UNION

59. The African Union has taken centre-stage in the international community's response to the crisis in Darfur, with the UN Security Council providing post-facto endorsement.[190] We unreservedly welcome the AU's involvement in Darfur, for two reasons.[191] First, the AU's involvement signals a new commitment by African countries to take responsibility for dealing with the problems of their neighbours, a commitment which will in time do much to enhance the world's ability to deal with crises and conflict.[192] Second, and more importantly, the AU was and remains the only entity willing to involve itself so fully in trying to tackle the crisis and protect the people of Darfur. Indeed, as authorisation from the UN Security Council for military intervention by other organisations has never looked likely, the AU has been the only realistic option. The Sudanese government — perhaps mistakenly imagining that the AU would be a "soft touch"[193] — has been prepared to accept the involvement of the AU in what it regards as an internal matter.[194] The AU, it should be noted, is only in Sudan with the consent of the host government. The Sudanese government has repeatedly ruled out military intervention by non-African organisations[195], and is backed up by Chad, Egypt, Liberia and Nigeria in its promotion of "African solutions for African problems".[196] The AU however, has a mandate for intervention in cases of genocide, gross human rights violations, military coups and rigged elections which threaten peace and security in its Member States. The thresholds for triggering intervention remain unclear, and would be determined by the AU's Peace and Security Council. The politics of the AU and the Peace and Security Council are complex (see paragraphs 78-80), but sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct, as SaferAfrica's Brigadier General Pal Martins — a top-level adviser to the AU/NEPAD on peace and security — put it to us.[197]

60. In the case of Darfur, the UK Government's rhetoric of "African-led solutions for African problems" is rather simplistic; many countries have had a role in the evolution of Sudan's problems. But nevertheless, HMG deserves a great deal of credit for its support of the AU.[198] As its first donor, the UK enabled the AU mission to establish itself. Further funds have been provided from the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (£12m), and also — with the UK's encouragement — from the EU's Peace Facility (€80m).[199] More recently, the UK has provided much practical support, and indicated its willingness to provide more. In concrete terms, the AU Mission in Darfur has an extra 143 vehicles thanks to the UK Government.[200] With the support of the UK and others, the AU is working hard to help to resolve what is unquestionably a very complex crisis, both in terms of helping the parties to come to a political resolution to the crisis, and, in the meantime, by putting troops on the ground to monitor the commitments entered into — the ceasefire, and the humanitarian and security protocols — by the GoS and the rebels.[201]

THE AU-HOSTED TALKS IN ABUJA

61. Nigeria, the current Chair of the AU, has been hosting and mediating talks in Abuja between the GoS and the rebel groups — the SLA/M and the JEM — aimed at finding a political solution to the crisis in Darfur. There have been three rounds of negotiations. The first round began on 23 August 2004 and broke up in mid-September, after inconclusive talks on a humanitarian protocol. The second round led to the signing of two protocols — on humanitarian issues and on security — on 9 November 2004. The Humanitarian Protocol includes commitments on free movement and access for humanitarian agencies; the protection of civilians; the role of the international community; and an implementation mechanism — the Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit.[202] The Security Protocol recommits the parties to the N'Djamena Ceasefire of April 2004, reiterates the Sudanese government's responsibility for disarming the Arab militias (Janjaweed), and specifies a reporting mechanism for the AU ceasefire monitors.[203] A third round of talks in December 2004 was intended to lead to the signing of a "Political protocol", but the talks were abandoned because of escalating violence in Darfur, caused in large part by the Sudanese government's aggressive "road-clearing" operations.

62. This illustrates one of the problems with the Abuja talks; they are liable to be thrown off course by events on the ground in Darfur, particularly when the parties to the conflict fail to live up to the commitments they have entered into. This problem was acknowledged by Jan Pronk, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, in his January 2005 proposal to "de-link" the political negotiations from immediate humanitarian and security issues[204]; this approach will likely be taken up at Abuja. The rebel groups have not negotiated seriously. As relatively new political movements, they have little experience; their demands are ill-defined; their leadership structures are unclear, with the leadership based in Eritrea; and, they have failed to demonstrate serious commitment to the negotiations.[205] For its part, the Sudanese government has not been an enthusiastic negotiator and — by initiating other negotiations — has deliberately muddied the waters. The AU too has made some mistakes in its role as mediator.[206]

63. The third round of talks, which stalled in December 2004, had been scheduled to resume in February 2005. This did not happen. It remains unclear when the talks, focussed on a political resolution to the crisis, will recommence. When we were in Sudan, the British Ambassador suggested to us that it would be a mistake to resume the Abuja talks until the work had been done to give them a reasonable chance of success. We agree. At the AU's Summit in Abuja from 30-31 January 2005, a group of "concerned countries" was established, including Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Chad and Gabon (but not Eritrea, the base for the rebels' leadership). This group met on the 17 February to consider how to make the AU's involvement more effective. Concerted efforts also need to be made to examine how the CPA might inform a political solution to the crisis in Darfur (see paragraphs 106-107). If the Abuja talks are to make progress on a political solution, sustained international pressure on the Government of the Sudan and the rebels will be needed, along with a clear vision of a desirable outcome.[207] But it would be better to wait a month or two and get it right, than resume negotiations now, only to see them fall apart next week.[208]

THE AU'S MISSION ON THE GROUND

64. As we witnessed when we spent a half-day in Leer on the South-North border learning about the impressive work of the Verification and Monitoring Team, relatively small operations can play important roles in peace-building. But this can only happen if they have the trust of parties committed to peace, if they work to resolve conflicts at the level, and if they are adequately-resourced. In the Nuba Mountains, the Joint Military Commission, which is also funded by North American and European governments, has been similarly effective, albeit with more resources.

65. In Darfur, with a mandate provided by the AU's Peace and Security Council, and endorsed by the UN Security Council, the AU Mission in Sudan has taken the lead in monitoring and reporting on the ceasefire agreed at N'Djamena on 8 April 2004.[209] Reports made by the AU Mission go to the Joint Commission, a body made up of representatives from the GoS, the SLA and JEM, the Chadian mediators, the AU, and the USA and EU, with the UN granted observer status. This, it is hoped, will reduce the scope for the parties to violate the ceasefire with impunity, and hence reduce violations. In its early stages, the AU mission numbered less than 500. In October 2004, the AU's Peace and Security Council revised the mandate. The AU Mission was given a more pro-active monitoring and (limited) civilian protection role, and plans were made to deploy a total of 3320 personnel, including 815 police, by the end of February 2005. Darfur is something of a test-case for the AU, which is desperately keen to show what it can do. We welcome the AU's ambition. But that aside, the job of the AU Mission is to monitor and report on ceasefire violations, so as to reduce their occurrence and - in large part through its monitoring and reporting - to protect the civilians of Darfur.

66. Evidence suggests that the AU Mission in Darfur has had a positive impact on security. Through prompt and objective monitoring and reporting on ceasefire violations, and by making its presence felt, the AU has both enhanced accountability for violations and prevented violations from taking place. However, comprehensive data on ceasefire violations — how frequent they are, who is responsible for them, and what the trends are — does not seem readily available. The AU should make such information public.[210] The AU Mission has not yet put itself out of a job. The responsibility for ceasefire violations rests with the parties. If they stuck to their commitments — with more encouragement from their African neighbours (through the AU Peace and Security Council) and the wider international community (through the UN Security Council) — then the AU Mission would no longer have a role. But whilst ceasefire violations continue, the AU must do all it can to enhance the effectiveness of its mission in Darfur.

A STRONGER MANDATE

67. The initial AU mandate for Darfur was ceasefire monitoring. The revised mandate, from October 2004, was extended to include some civilian protection. It does not extend to peace enforcement or disarmament. There has been confusion about the interpretation of the civilian protection mandate. The mandate gives the AU Mission the task of "protecting civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within its resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS."[211] It is not surprising that this has been interpreted in different ways.[212] The AU, at the level of its Peace and Security Council, and on the ground in Darfur, needs to ensure that the mandate is clear, and clearly understood by all parties. Further, it is not clear that the mandate will be sufficient, even if the AU Mission works right at the limit of its civilian protection mandate.[213] Decisions about mandate are for the AU's Peace and Security Council to make, in consultation with the wider international community. However, if security does not improve in Darfur within weeks, and if large-scale killing continues, then the mandate of the AU must be revised to enable it to use force to protect civilians, and to disarm militias. As a first next-step, the AU should do more pro-actively to police the no-fly zone, agreed to by the parties as part of the 9 November Security Protocol.[214] The AU must also be provided with the logistical and technical support to enable it to fulfil its mandate.

MORE TROOPS AND POLICE

68. Darfur is the size of France, or Iraq. There are serious questions about whether the AU Mission will have enough troops to fulfil its mandate. It was supposed to have 3320 personnel by the end of February but even now (mid-March) the total number of troops, police and support staff, remains at 1942.[215] The speed of deployment, hindered by a lack of planning capacity at AU headquarters and by inefficient contractors, has been unacceptable. During our visit, some were keen to emphasise that the AU Mission was deploying more quickly than would a UN mission. This may be correct, but it offers little comfort to the people of Darfur. The UN and its Member States, alongside regional organisations such as the AU, urgently need to find ways of deploying troops more quickly. We are not in a position to know how many troops are needed, but it seems clear that the number currently planned for will be nowhere near enough. In El Fasher, the AU Mission told us that they require "no less than 6000 troops — a battalion in each sector". On 23 February, Hilary Benn reported to us that the AU's Commander had told him that more troops would be needed. Messages take time to filter through from the Mission in Darfur, to the AU's headquarters in Addis Ababa and the politics of the AU Peace and Security Council, and to countries eager to provide support[216] (see paragraphs 78-80).

Figure 3: Selected UN interventions - mandates and personnel
Intervention
Duration
Mandate
Authorised no. of personnel
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR)
Feb 1992 - March 1995
Initially established in Croatia to ensure demilitarization of designated areas. The mandate was later extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the delivery of humanitarian relief, monitor "no fly zones" and "safe areas". The mandate was later extended to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for preventive monitoring in border areas 38,599 (actual max)
Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
Dec 1992 - Dec 1994
ONUMOZ was established to help implement the General Peace Agreement, signed by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana. The mandate included facilitating the implementation of the Agreement; monitoring the ceasefire; monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces and providing security in the transport corridors; providing technical assistance and monitoring the entire electoral process 6,625 military; 1,144 civilian police
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
Oct 1999 - present
To cooperate with the government and the other parties in implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. 17,500 military incl. up to 170 civilian police
Democratic republic of Congo (UNMONUC)
Feb 2000 - present
To monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire. 16,700 military; 475 civilian police
Burundi (ONUB)
June 2004 - present
To support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Agreement. 5,650 military; 120 civilian police.
Somalia (UNOSOM II)
March 1993 - March 1995
To take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. 28,000 military and civilian police.
Cambodia (UNTAC)
Feb 1992 - Sept 1993
To ensure implementation of the Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. The mandate included aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of elections, military arrangements, civil administration, maintenance of law and order, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and rehabilitation of Cambodian infrastructure. 15,547 military; 3,500 civilian police

Data source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp

69. Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, the commander of UN forces in Rwanda in 1994, has estimated that 44,000 troops are required to bring peace to Darfur.[217] John Garang, the leader of the SPLM has called for a force of between 15,000 and 30,000 troops, to be made up of troops provided by the GoS, the SPLM/A and troops provided to the African Union.[218] And Jan Egeland has called for a four- or five-fold increase in the AU force.[219] Certainly if the AU Mission were to have a role in disarming the militias and providing security for the IDPs once they have returned home, many more troops than are currently planned would be needed.[220] The number of personnel required — soldiers and police — depends upon the role they are expected to fulfil. And as Iraq illustrates, even well-equipped forces, backed by the support of powerful states, can find it difficult to fulfil their missions. It would be a mistake to give the AU Mission an impossible job.[221] The AU Mission is in the best position to know how many troops are required to fulfil a particular mandate. Their views must be given much weight: by the AU's Peace and Security Council; by the members of the AU who have accepted a role in bringing peace and security to Africa; and by the UK, the EU and others who are in a position to respond to requests for assistance. Those African countries who have provided troops and police to the AU can be proud of their contributions as can the troops on the ground. They embody Africa's commitment to African solutions for African problems.[222]

70. More police and better policing is needed, both in the IDP camps and in the countryside. Policing will be essential to the provision of basic law and order, and is needed now to provide protection for IDPs and others.[223] The Sudanese government has stepped up policing in the camps, but these police — who include former Janjaweed militia — are, rightly, not trusted.[224] Civil policing will be an essential element of post-conflict reconstruction in Darfur, but the lack of protection must be addressed now. The international community must apply sustained pressure on the Sudanese government, so that Janjaweed are not absorbed into the police, and the policing element of the AU Mission must be strengthened.

71. The AU Mission is intended to include 815 police, but as the Secretary of State acknowledged, deploying this element of the mission is proving very difficult. Only a quarter of the total have been deployed, the latest batch provided by South Africa.[225] In December, Hilary Benn told us that the UK Government was looking at what practical assistance it might provide on the policing front and that this issue had been the subject of much discussion over the previous few months.[226] Two months later, the Secretary of State was able to provide us with some, but not much, good news. The AU has drawn up a plan for a civilian police component to monitor the activities of the Sudanese government's police, and the UK has been pressing the EU to see what more help it can provide, and to assess whether more direct involvement in capacity-building might be possible.[227] Such limited progress is disappointing. Helping the AU Mission, and bringing pressure to bear on the Government of the Sudan, to improve policing, is a matter of considerable urgency; the UK and the EU must do more to provide support, more quickly. As discussions continue, and action follows, attention must also be given to ensuring that there are sufficient numbers of women police officers and civilian specialists so that reports of violence against women and girls can be dealt with appropriately.[228]

COOPERATION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS AND OTHERS

72. Beyond the mandate and troop numbers, other aspects of the AU Mission also demand attention. One is the fact - raised by the AU's Commander Mensah on BBC's Panorama, and confirmed to us in Sudan by him, and by Ian Martin of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN-OHCHR) — that the inclusion of representatives of the rebels and the GoS on monitoring and verification missions ensures that troops on the ground receive advance warning to leave the area and to destroy any evidence of atrocities.[229] The inclusion in ceasefire-monitoring and verification missions of representatives of the Sudanese government and of the rebel groups does much to ensure that the AU Mission is trusted as being impartial. This, we were told, is also the case for the JMC in the Nuba Mountains. But it is not difficult to come up with solutions which allow for this but which do not inhibit the monitors' effectiveness: don't tell the parties' representatives exactly where the monitoring mission is going; and, don't let them carry satellite phones.

73. A second issue concerns the way in which the AU Mission releases information. Justice Africa report that the AU Mission "is possibly the most outspoken monitoring mission in history, certainly in comparison to the UN in Rwanda in 1994."[230] The UN's record in Rwanda is hardly a benchmark of success, but an energetic AU Mission is very welcome. Its work should be widely used. The AU Mission should share its reports on ceasefire violations widely, without having to secure the consent of the parties. Access to reports should be unrestricted and immediate for UN agencies, including UN-OHCHR. Serious consideration should also be given to the inclusion of a human rights monitor, a nurse, and a child protection officer, on monitoring missions. Concerns about their security are not insuperable. Adopting this proposal would: enable the monitoring of human rights violations and enhance the chances of people being brought to justice for human rights violations;[231] enable the provision to rape victims of emergency contraceptives, and drugs to reduce the likelihood of HIV transmission; and ensure that the needs of child victims of atrocities — a neglected group in the crisis — are better met. If the international community is serious about protecting the civilians of Darfur, such measures are essential.

WORKING ON THE BASIS OF STRATEGY?

74. The AU's Mission in Darfur must succeed; if Africa is to take more responsibility for its own peace and security in the years ahead, then this is essential. And the people of Darfur must be protected. The immediate steps to make it more effective include revising its mandate (see paragraph 67) and increasing the troop numbers (see paragraphs 68-71). The international community should continue to make clear that it will respond positively to all requests for support from the AU. The UK and the EU have been particularly generous with financial support,[232] but as Hilary Benn acknowledged — and the Commission for Africa reiterated in its recommendation that donors provide fifty percent of the AU's peacekeeping requirements — there is a need to find a mechanism that will allow funding to support AU peace support operations on a more consistent and long-term basis.[233] Beyond money, the AU needs more support with logistics, planning and technical capacity, and personnel development. Following the UK's lead, other donors should make vehicles available to the AU Mission on request, and satellite intelligence and help with radar to monitor the no-fly zone must be provided. The UK Government should take the lead on this, working with its partners in the EU and the USA. At the AU's headquarters in Addis Ababa there is a need for much more capacity; we were told that there are fewer than 10 peace and security advisers to cover the AU's 53 member-states. The UK should second technical experts to the AU in Addis Ababa to provide the support which the AU requires. Political support to the AU is crucial too; the UK Government and others must publicise and condemn the ceasefire violations which the AU confirms, and ensure that the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council use the evidence collected by the AU Mission to hold the parties to account, and to ensure that consequences follow.[234]

75. Beyond supporting the AU Mission, and keeping its mandate and troop numbers under close, systematic, and regular review, the strategy for enhancing protection and security is not clear. One option which comes closer as the months pass by is cooperation between the UN peace-support operation in the south of Sudan, and the AU Mission in Darfur. The nature of such cooperation — whether it would amount to the UN taking over from the AU — is far from clear.[235] A second option would be for countries with the military capacity, to provide support to the AU Mission in Darfur. This option does not appeal, either to the GoS, or to those countries which might be expected to play a part in providing such support. For instance, Chris Mullin MP, the Foreign Office Minister for Africa, told BBC's Panorama that:

    "the odds are that if any western force did intervene it would become bogged down and that some new cause for all the Jihadists in the world would emerge and we'd find ourselves very quickly being shot at by all sides, plus we would probably destabilise the whole of Sudan which is the size of western Europe and the last thing we want is a failed state the size of Western Europe on our hands."[236]

76. No-one wants to see this scenario come to pass. But there might be ways of offering military assistance to the AU which do not run such risks. It might, for instance, be possible to provide the AU with appropriate stand-by tactical support units,[237] perhaps with EU troops working under an AU Commander. The Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mike Jackson, has signalled the British Army's ability to provide up to 5000 troops if requested.[238] And in February 2005, Kofi Annan urged the EU and NATO to give serious consideration to what they can do to help.[239] Providing military assistance to the AU is an option which should not be closed off. On the contrary, it should be explored without delay. Policy should be based on the analysis of options and their attendant risks. Military intervention entails risks, but it is risky too for the international community to fail in its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur.

77. The effectiveness of the AU Mission in Darfur is dependent on many factors beyond its control. These include: the attitudes and actions of the GoS forces and the rebels; the mandate and troop numbers that the AU Peace and Security Council and African countries provide; and, the political pressure exerted by the international community, including through the UN Security Council. But what concerns us most about the international community's delegation of responsibility to the AU is: first, that there seems little sense of urgency; and second, that the support which the international community provides to the AU Mission, does not seem to be based on a strategy in which the risks attendant to different options are assessed. Complex challenges are best tackled on the basis of a clear strategy; muddling through, or waiting and seeing, rarely works. Starting from the basis that protecting the people of Darfur, and holding the parties to account for ceasefire violations is the goal, we must have clear answers to the following questions:

  • How is the effectiveness of the AU Mission being assessed, on what basis, and by whom?
  • What level of insecurity would signal that the AU Mission — working in a context largely beyond its control — was not being effective?
  • How many months does the AU Mission have to demonstrate its effectiveness?
  • If the AU Mission proves unable to fulfil its mandate effectively — monitoring and reporting on the ceasefire, and providing civilian protection — what are the next steps to ensure its success, who will ensure that they are taken, and when?

AN EXCUSE FOR INACTION BY OTHERS?

78. In El Fasher we were told that the AU Mission requires no less than 6000 troops. Others have called for more (see paragraph 69). The UK Government and others have declared that they will respond favourably to the AU's requests for support. But still the AU Mission has a deployment of around 1800 troops and 93 police and there seems little sense of urgency to accelerate or increase the deployment.[240] There is clearly a problem, a blockage somewhere along the line from the needs of the AU Mission, to the requests for support made by AU Headquarters, and to the international community's provision of support. One aspect of the problem is the slow deployment of the planned 3320 troops. Another would seem to be that the needs of the AU Mission, are not known, or are not quickly reiterated, by the AU's Peace and Security Council. Well-trained and fully-equipped troops cannot be magically made to appear; countries have to provide them and preparations have to be made. But if the AU's Peace and Security Council had called for no less than 6000 troops and satellite intelligence, as a starting point — this was the AU Mission's request to us on 2 February in El Fasher — then urgent action might have followed.

79. We appreciate that the AU wants to show what it can do in Darfur. But we believe that this is not the only reason for its reticence in asking for assistance. Sudan has friends in the African Union and on the AU's Peace and Security Council.[241] The politics of the AU — as well as the needs of Darfur — shape the statements made by the AU Peace and Security Council. As a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, the UK knows only too well that politics shapes the actions and inactions of such bodies. We have received no indication that the UK Government is engaging with the members of the AU Peace and Security Council, to emphasise their "responsibility to protect".[242] Fulfilling the responsibility to protect includes persuading others to fulfil their responsibilities too. The UK Government should be engaging with members of the AU and specifically the AU Peace and Security Council, in order to protect better the people of Darfur.

80. Many African countries are uncomfortable with the idea of intervening in the affairs of their neighbours, especially when former colonial powers are involved. But if the AU is to play its role in helping Africa to a peaceful, secure and more prosperous future, then its Member States must be prepared to make clear, through action as well as words, that sovereignty does not give states the right to commit gross human rights violations and war crimes against their citizens. African countries too have a responsibility to protect, as the AU's mandate affirms. Nevertheless, the fact that African countries have a responsibility to protect, and that the AU is increasingly willing to take on that responsibility, does not absolve others of their responsibilities. Countries beyond Africa share the responsibility for the success of the AU Mission, and for protecting the people of Darfur. If Africa needs assistance to protect the people of Darfur, then richer countries should step in. The AU's involvement is extremely welcome, but it must not become an excuse for inaction on the part of others[243] (see paragraphs 96-100 on the responsibility to protect and collective in-action).

The UN Security Council: Maintaining international peace and security?

OIL, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE UN

81. On the walls of the office of the Sudanese Ambassador to the UK, there are two maps. One is of the UK; the other is of oil and gas concessions in Sudan. Oil plays an important role in shaping the views of individual states, and, in turn, the actions, or lack of them, of the UN Security Council in relation to Darfur (as it does in relation to other countries). Oil plays a two-edged role; it has both fuelled the conflict, and has been one of the motivations behind the push for peace. The current holders of oil and gas concessions in Sudan include Chinese, Malaysian, Indian and French-Belgian companies.[244] Incurring costs because of the North-South conflict, the US oil company Chevron pulled out of Sudan in the early 1990s. Although US oil companies are keen to return, they are restricted from so doing.[245] The French-Belgian oil company, Total-Fina-Elf has been waiting in the wings, eager to resume its oil exploration activities once peace is established. Oil contracts are supposed to remain in place with the entry into government of the SPLM. But recent claims by White Nile trading that it has secured oil concessions with the SPLM, and reports in the Washington Post, suggest that there are those — inside and outside of Sudan — who would like to see a restructuring of oil concessions.[246]

82. Mukesh Kapila threw light on how Member States' national interests complicated his work as coordinator of the UN in Sudan. His task was to juggle a range of Member State interests and efforts to shape the UN's activities, and to try to piece them together into a coherent and effective response to the needs of Sudan and its people.[247] The UN's role in Sudan was, we were told, circumscribed as a result of the wishes of Member States. The members of the Troika — the USA, the UK and Norway — wanted to retain control of the CPA peace process, with the result that the UN was largely excluded from involvement in the peace process.[248] The UN's role in Sudan was to remain humanitarian and, where appropriate, developmental. The fact that the CPA was concluded might indicate that this was wise. The fact that there has been little political progress as regards Darfur, might indicate the opposite (see paragraphs 52-58 on prioritising the CPA). Mukesh Kapila, whilst emphasising that the UN is driven by its Member States, was sure: "the failure of the UN to take a political approach to Darfur is fundamentally responsible for the fact that we could not deal with ethnic cleansing."[249]

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: DIVISIONS AND WEAKNESS

83. In Sudan, as elsewhere, Member States determine the role of the UN, ultimately by the decisions that they make, in accordance with the UN Charter, on the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council, divided over the war in Iraq, and with many Member States keen to see the CPA concluded, was slow to give serious consideration to the crisis in Darfur. In late 2003 and early 2004, the USA was the only member of the Security Council keen to press the GoS to fulfil its responsibilities to protect its own people. Many other countries were not in a mood to hear the concerns voiced by the USA.[250] From mid-2004, Darfur received more attention: Kofi Annan, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Jack Straw and Hilary Benn visited the region; the USA declared on 9 July 2004 that genocide was occurring, something which President Bush had noted in reference to the Clinton regime's failure to act on Rwanda would not occur "on his watch"; media coverage exploded; and Member States such as the UK decided to take a firmer line. The UN Security Council sprang into action, of a sort, adopting four Resolutions about Sudan in the latter half of 2004.

84. The UN Security Council adopted its first Resolution on Darfur (1556) in July 2004, with a second (1564) following in September.[251] Both of these Resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, implying that the crisis in Darfur represents a threat to international peace and security. As such, the UN Security Council could legitimately and legally adopt mandatory punitive measures against the Sudanese government in the event of non-compliance, including economic sanctions, and, if necessary, military action. The Resolutions called on all parties to allow humanitarian access, to cooperate with AU mediation efforts, and to respect their ceasefire and other commitments. Resolution 1556 demanded that the GoS fulfil its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed and bring their leaders to justice, requesting a report on compliance in thirty days time, to be followed by monthly reports. The Security Council also expressed its intention to consider further unspecified economic and diplomatic sanctions in the event of non-compliance, and decided to implement an arms embargo covering all non-governmental entities. Resolution 1564 expressed grave concern at the lack of progress with regard to security and the protection of civilians, and the disarmament of the Janjaweed, demanded that the GoS provide the Security Council with the names of Janjaweed leaders, and requested the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry. The Security Council noted that it would consider additional measures such as actions to affect Sudan's petroleum sector and the GoS, or individual members of the regime, in the event of non-compliance.[252]

85. China and Pakistan had abstained on the first Resolution, while Russia and Algeria ultimately supported it but felt that the Sudanese government should be given more time. China, Russia, Algeria and Pakistan abstained on the second Resolution. They all felt that sanctions were inappropriate, and that the GoS deserved more credit for the steps it had taken to comply. A stronger Resolution would likely have been vetoed by China, and possibly Russia.[253] The UN Security Council met in Nairobi from 18-19 November, to emphasise the importance which the international community attached to peace in Sudan.[254] The Nairobi Resolution (1574) urged the GoS and the SPLM to conclude the CPA, and emphasized that progress towards resolving the crisis in Darfur would create conditions conducive for the delivery of assistance for the implementation of the CPA.[255] It made no mention of the Government of the Sudan's obligations under previous Resolutions, and backtracked on prior threats of sanctions.[256] It was passed unanimously.

86. The Resolutions of the UN Security Council succeeded in focusing attention on Darfur, within the context of Sudan, but made few demands of the Sudanese government, or the rebels, and failed to specify what consequences would flow from non-compliance. The one clear demand that the Resolutions did make was that the GoS must disarm the Janjaweed and bring their leaders to justice. Eight months later, despite repeated commitments and promises, there is no evidence that the GoS has made any serious effort to comply with this resolution; the Janjaweed remain at large, supplied with arms and operating in a climate of impunity.[257] With the exception of the occasional slip of the tongue by people such as Major General Salah Abdallah "Gosh" (Director General of GoS Security),[258] the GoS denies responsibility for arming the Janjaweed. This is a lie.[259] Reining in the Janjaweed is not an easy task, but doing next-to-nothing does not amount to compliance with the UN's demands.[260] We have seen no evidence to suggest that the Sudanese government is even trying to fulfil its responsibilities.

87. In the absence of a more robust mandate for the AU, the GoS is best-placed to disarm the Janjaweed. The responsibility lies ultimately with the GoS. But the UN Security Council too needs to reflect on the Sudanese government's non-compliance with its demands. One lesson is that the Government of the Sudan will not comply with resolutions which it considers counter to its interests unless there is sustained and concerted international pressure, with consequences of non-compliance spelt out clearly. The UN Security Council made mistakes: first in demanding something which would allow the GoS, at a later date, to claim reasonably that it was unable to do; and second in failing to specify clear benchmarks and a timetable for the Sudanese government's efforts to disarm the Janjaweed.[261] Disarming the Janjaweed is important in itself, but it also illustrates the failure of the UN Security Council on Darfur. To be effective, demands must: be well-defined; be ambitious but achievable; include mechanisms for monitoring compliance; specify a timetable; and spell out the consequences which will flow from non-compliance.[262] The UN Security Council has recent, bitter and divisive experience of what can happen when its demands for compliance fail to deliver, and when it fails to specify — in terms which are precise and well-understood by all — what consequences will result.

88. The members of the UN Security Council are fully aware that unless consequences flow from non-compliance with their resolutions, their authority and that of the UN is undermined.[263] The fact that the UN Security Council is failing on Sudan is not simply a mistake, it is the result of the dynamics of the Security Council.[264] Countries' involvement in Sudan, and engagement with its government, might be driven by a wide range of (often mixed) motives. Motives include: stopping the killing in Darfur; helping Sudan to move towards a future of sustainable peace and development; ensuring that Sudan does not become a haven for terrorists; exporting arms, including MIG-fighters and Antonov bombers, to a lucrative market; and, maintaining or securing access to Sudan's oil and mineral deposits. China, it should be noted, is beginning to enjoy the fruits of its forty percent stake in Sudan's oil industry.[265] Many countries, to further their various interests, would like to see a change of regime in Sudan. Others are content with the existing regime. During our visit to Sudan, a senior UN official suggested to us that the UN Security Council "works without strategy". This is abundantly clear, and, driven as it is by Member States which have a range of interests in Sudan, and in the role played by the UN in world affairs, it is not surprising.

89. Beyond the Security Council, the Sudanese government has the strong support of many of its neighbours (see paragraph 59), as well as other countries with commercial interests in Sudan, and — it would seem by their virtual silence — from many Arab and Islamic countries.[266] But what matters most in terms of action is those countries which might veto proposed Security Council Resolutions. It is a scandal that interests in oil and arms exports can prevent the Security Council from acting firmly on behalf of the international community to protect the people of Darfur. It shames those countries which, fuelling the crisis in Sudan, are happy to turn a blind-eye to crimes no less serious and heinous than genocide. And it demonstrates the impotence of the international community to act to prevent such crimes and to fulfil its responsibility to protect.

A REFERRAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?

90. The most recent issue to divide the Security Council is the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur's recommendation that the situation in Darfur be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Those responsible for atrocities must be brought to justice, not least to demonstrate to others that crimes against humanity will not go unpunished. A sustainable peace requires accountability and justice[267] (see paragraphs 104-105). The Sudanese legal system is not currently equipped to deliver justice. To use the Rwanda tribunal or to establish other ad-hoc tribunals would delay justice as well as imposing unnecessary costs.[268] An ICC referral also has the strong support of a broad coalition of more than 40 primarily Africa-based civil society organisations, operating as "the Darfur Consortium".[269] The International Criminal Court — a court which 44 African countries have signed up for — must be the venue in which those responsible for atrocities in Darfur are brought to justice. It was set up to deal with such cases.

91. The UK Government has been a strong supporter of the ICC and continues to state that the ICC is its preferred option.[270] The USA is firmly opposed to the ICC and does not want to give it support by allowing it to deal with the case of Darfur.[271] The ICC is the only venue that will provide reliable, timely, cost-effective justice. The UK Government, which claims to enjoy a privileged relationship with the USA, must stand firm on this; to state that the ICC is HMG's "clear preference" is not firm enough.[272] The UK Government, in concert with its EU partners, has to persuade the USA that its commitment to stopping the conflict in Darfur, and bringing those responsible to account, is best served in this instance by pragmatism. The USA should make clear that it will not veto an ICC referral from the UN Security Council. This would do much to re-establish the transatlantic unity which is vital if the international community is to fulfil its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur.[273]

TARGETED SANCTIONS AND AN EXTENDED ARMS EMBARGO

92. The question of an ICC referral is not the only issue which the UN Security Council has to consider. Member States including the USA and the UK are keen to see a strongly worded resolution threatening sanctions again the GoS. Not everyone is convinced about the desirability of sanctions. Poorly-designed sanctions might end up punishing the Sudanese people themselves; others argue that sanctions would be ineffective.[274] We support the use of sanctions. Well-designed sanctions that target key individuals within the regime, through travel bans and asset freezes, will send a strong message that the international community has had enough of the Sudanese government's non-compliance and murderous policies in Darfur.[275] We applaud the UK Government for the firm line it is now taking on sanctions.[276] In addition, the UN arms embargo, which applies to non-governmental entities, should be extended to cover the Government of the Sudan, with an effective monitoring mechanism established.[277] In a situation where the Sudanese government actively arms its preferred non-governmental entities, the Janjaweed, an embargo which does not include the GoS is next to useless. Sanctions should of course apply equally to the rebels.

93. Those members of the Security Council who back the Sudanese government might veto any proposed sanctions or extension of the arms embargo. Their bluff should be called. There is little purpose in diplomatic energy being wasted on a Resolution which achieves consensus on the Security Council but nothing for Darfur. The USA and the UK should force a vote on a Resolution which extends the arms embargo, imposes targeted sanctions, makes clear demands, and outlines what further sanctions — to include oil sanctions — will follow in the event of non-compliance.[278] A failed Resolution which exposes the "blocking" states would be better than the current stalemate, a stalemate which adds weight to the recommendation of the UN High-level panel that Member States should come to an agreement not to use the veto, except in circumstances where vital interests are genuinely at stake, and also to the proposal that indicative voting, to reveal countries' positions on proposed actions, be adopted.[279] It may be held that some states are too powerful to respond to pressures and incentives. This should be tested; perhaps using the EU's arms embargo with China. An additional way in which the blockage on the UN Security Council might be removed would be for the AU to make a request for a firm Resolution and decisive action on Darfur. A request has been made to the UN Security Council by the Darfur Consortium of civil society organisations.[280] A request from the AU itself might achieve much. China likes to think of itself as a friend of Africa; it might be reluctant to block a friend's request for international assistance.[281]

Diplomatic negotiations and the responsibility to protect

94. The international community has failed the people of Darfur, as well as those of its members who take seriously their responsibility to protect. The international community's major failing has been its failure to intervene at an early stage.[282] Waiting has allowed the crisis to grow, and a larger crisis requires stronger, more intrusive, intervention. Stronger and more intrusive intervention — especially military intervention — may, on the one hand make consensus hard to achieve, and on the other, demand the agreement of the UN Security Council. Without consensus, legally-authorised action is hard to take. And so the cycle continues. The lesson is clear: do not wait to intervene — work hard for a consensus for early, non-military, intervention. The international community has failed to bring to bear on the GoS, effective, coordinated, consistent political pressure. This is apparent as regards the prioritisation of the CPA (see paragraphs 52-58), the lack of a clear strategy for ensuring the success of the AU's mission (see paragraphs 74-80), and the lack of action on the part of the UN Security Council (see paragraphs 81-93). There are two common elements in this catalogue of failures: first, the GoS; and second, a failure on the part of the international community to act in a strategic and well-coordinated manner.

DEALING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SUDAN

95. The Sudanese government makes concessions in response to concerted pressure, and only then.[283] Protecting the people of Darfur requires the international community to exert concerted and consistent political pressure on the GoS, and on the rebels, to stick to their commitments. Dealing with the GoS has proved a challenge for the international community, no matter whether negotiations have been bilateral, through the AU, or mediated through the UN Security Council.[284] There are differences of opinion and approach within the GoS, but those in control of the military and security apparatus have a history of untrustworthiness. The GoS is skilled in dealing with the international community, making just enough concessions, just in time, creating diversions and distractions, seeking to divide the international community, and to provide it with reasons for vacillating. Nevertheless, the international community has considerable practice in dealing with such regimes and ought to be able to take account of such characteristics in its negotiations. Some simple guidelines for dealing with regimes like the Sudanese government are: do not trust what they say; demand hard evidence to back up what they say they have done; establish clear benchmarks and timetables against which their actions can be judged; and, specify what consequences will flow, and when, if the government fails to meet its commitments. Dealing with the rebels has its own problems too, with a lack of clarity as regards their organisation and their demands at the top of the list. Efforts must be made to engage with the rebels, not least to identify their demands.

COLLECTIVE IN-ACTION: WHO HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT?

96. The Government of the Sudan has been able to avoid international political pressure on Darfur, in part because such pressure has been poorly coordinated. There has been pressure at various levels — bilaterally, through the AU, and through the UN Security Council — but the relationships between these different fora are not clear, as, in general terms, the report of the Commission for Africa acknowledged.[285] To illustrate, consider the following questions, none of which have been conclusively answered by the international community: does the AU mission require explicit authorisation by the UN Security Council; has the AU mission got UN authorisation, specifically to use force to protect civilians; at what point, and on whose say-so, might the UN Security Council authorise military intervention to ensure that the mission currently being carried out by the AU in Darfur is effective; and, what would happen if the AU declared that it did not need such assistance? (see paragraphs 59 and 75). The application of political pressure through different channels is the right approach, but it must be better coordinated. The AU, the UN, and its international partners must work from a coordinated strategic plan, with roles and responsibilities made clear.[286]

97. At the root of the problem is the fact that there is no clear legal obligation on any state or supra-state organisation to prevent another government from committing war crimes against its own citizens.[287] No-one is ultimately accountable. The "responsibility to protect" is an emerging legal norm, but as yet it has no firm legal basis. As a result, a shared responsibility to protect risks degenerating into a game of passing the buck and avoiding responsibilities. When everyone is responsible for collective security, it might be that no-one will take responsibility. To put it differently, when the Prime Minister says that in a situation similar to Rwanda in 1994, "we would have a moral duty to act", who precisely is the "we", and what action would be required? Despite the commendable efforts of the UK and others to promote the notion of the "responsibility to protect", and what it terms the "doctrine of humanitarian intervention", regrettably, there are no clear answers. There may be a shared responsibility to protect, but the mechanisms of accountability, to ensure that responsibilities are shouldered, are lacking. We are aware that perceptions of the UK's role in the build-up to war in Iraq, and the legal arguments used to justify that intervention, will no doubt have made some countries question the UK's motives in promoting a doctrine of intervention, including military intervention, for humanitarian purposes.

98. The UN Security Council might seem the best place to pin down the responsibility to protect. The UN Security Council has the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Article 24-1 of the UN Charter).[288] If the Security Council determines that a crisis — which can include a humanitarian disaster — is a threat to international peace and security,[289] then it is treated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In such cases, the principle of non-intervention in sovereign states in relation to matters which are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" (Article 2-7 of the UN Charter) is effectively overridden. The evidence demonstrates this to be the case: "The Security Council has on a number of occasions cited severe cases of internal repression or humanitarian disasters in determining that a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and has acted to address the situation, for example in Somalia, eastern Zaire, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Haiti."[290]

99. The Security Council's two main Resolutions on Darfur (1556 and 1564) were adopted under Chapter VII. As such, intervention — economic sanctions or military intervention — could be considered, and, ultimately, authorised. The fact that the Security Council has failed to authorise decisive intervention of any sort is explained more by politics and the interests of Member States, than by the legal complexities. Nevertheless, a lack of legal clarity does not help. The "responsibility to protect" is as yet only an emerging legal norm. But — given credence by human rights treaties, the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions and international practice — the principle is becoming more widely accepted.[291] As the report of the UN High-level panel put it:

    "The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing, which can properly be considered a threat to international security and as such provoke action by the Security Council."[292]

100. As our report was being finalised, the UN Security Council was in its fifth week of discussions about a new Resolution on Darfur. Predictably, there have been disagreements over an ICC referral, and over proposals to extend the arms embargo, to impose sanctions on the oil sector, and to freeze the assets of key individuals within the Khartoum regime. The failure of the UN Security Council to act decisively has serious consequences, both for the people of Darfur and for the credibility of the UN. If the UN Security Council fails to act on Darfur, it will once more find its position undermined, in two ways. First, many will conclude that the workings of the UN Security Council do not promote the responsibility to protect. And second, if frustrated Member States act successfully outside the authority of the Security Council, many will conclude that the UN is not necessary.[293] Those who do not wish to see the UN authorise military interventions for humanitarian purposes, for fear that they might be abused, have legitimate concerns. They should however, consider the following: if such interventions are left to "coalitions of the willing", acting without UN-authorisation, then they will be more open to abuse, will be more likely to be driven by national interests, and will be less responsive to humanitarian need. For those of us who believe that membership of the international community requires that countries adhere to certain minimum standards of behaviour, and who regard the UN — flawed as it is — as the best hope of achieving collective security and sustainable development, this would be nothing short of disastrous. Global social justice — in relation to peace, security, development, and the environment — requires an effective and accountable UN.

101. If the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is to provide a template for sustainable peace and development across Sudan, and a framework for a political agreement between the GoS and the Darfur rebels, an effective UN will be crucial. Peace will only be established once the parties see that other options offer more than does continued conflict. This scenario will only come to pass when the Sudanese government, and its international partners, jointly deliver on their shared responsibilities, not just to protect, but also for development.


163   Ev 151 [ICG memo]. Back

164   Q 201 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

165   Ev 100 [Amnesty International UK memo]; Q 68 [Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch]; Ev 120 [DRDC memo]; Ev 148 [Human Rights Watch memo]; Ev 146 [ICG memo]; Q 13 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]; Q 64 [Toby Porter, Sudan Advocacy Coalition]; Q 64 [Maniza Ntekim, Amnesty International UK]. Back

166   Q 200 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

167   Ibid. Back

168   Q 204 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

169   Ibid. Back

170   Q 187 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

171   Q 204 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]; Ev 148 [Human Rights Watch memo]. Back

172   Q 13 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

173   Q 200 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

174   Ev 149 [ICG memo]; Ev 107 [Baldo et al memo]; Q187 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

175   Q 114 [Hilary Benn, DFID]; Ev 75 [DFID memo].  Back

176   Q 103 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

177   Q 114 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

178   Q 222 and Q 239 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

179   Q 106 and Q 107 [Hilary Benn, DFID]; Ev 71 [DFID memo]. Back

180   Q 64 [Toby Porter, Sudan Advocacy Coalition]; Q 200 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

181   Q 13 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

182   Ev 149 [ICG memo]. Back

183   Q 93 [Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch]. Back

184   Q 200 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

185   Ev 104 [Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan memo]. Back

186   Q 68 [Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch]. Back

187   Q 64 [Maniza Ntekim, Amnesty International UK]. Back

188   Ev 148 [Human Rights Watch memo]. Back

189   Q 114 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

190   Paragraph 2 of UN Security Council Resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004 "endorses" the AU Mission. Paragraph 2 of UN Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 "welcomes and supports the intention ... to augment" the AU Mission - see http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html Back

191   Q 214 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

192   Q 102, Q 111 and Q 138 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

193   Ev 107 [Baldo et al memo]. Back

194   Ev 135 [Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan memo]; Ev 75 [DFID memo]. Back

195   "Sudan says no to non-African troops for Darfur", Reuters Foundation, 16 February 2005 - available at http://www.reliefweb.int Back

196   These four countries, along with Sudan, held a summit on 17 October 2004. The resulting communiqué rejected "any foreign intervention by any country, whatsoever in this pure African issue", stressed "the importance of non-interference in the internal affairs in a manner which hampers the efforts exerted to attain stability and security throughout the Sudan." - see http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Sudan/darfur/minisumoct04.pdf Back

197   Q 47 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]; see also Elizabeth Wilmshurst "Scales of law unbalanced", International Development Magazine, November 2004. Back

198   Ev 73 [DFID memo]. Back

199   Ev 73 [DFID memo]. Back

200   Q 102 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

201   Q 16 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

202   See http://www.unsudanig.org/emergencies/darfur/reports/data/misc/humanitarian-protocol-abuja.doc Back

203   See http://www.unsudanig.org/emergencies/darfur/reports/data/misc/security-protocol-abuja.doc; Ev 150 [ICG memo]. Back

204   See http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/infocusnewssudan.asp?NewsID=846&sID=23 Back

205   Ev 106 [Baldo et al memo]; Q 174 [Jan Egeland, UN-OCHA and ERC]. Back

206   Ev 107 [Baldo et al memo];Ev 121 [DRDC memo]. Back

207   Ev 121 [DRDC memo]. Back

208   Justice Africa, February 2005 Briefing, paras 25-28 - see footnote 9. Back

209   Ev 74 [DFID memo]. Back

210   Q 131 [Hilary Benn, DFID]; Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 10, 1 January 2005, p.3 - see footnote 16; Justice Africa, February 2005 Briefing, para 24 - see footnote 9. Back

211   Communiqué of the Seventeenth Meeting of the [African Union] Peace and Security Council, 20 October 2004 - available at http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/homedar.htm# Back

212   Ev 122 [DRDC memo]. Back

213   Q 28 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

214   Q 228 [Hilary Benn, DFID]; Ev 152 [ICG memo]. Back

215   United Nations: Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 15 of resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraph 17 of resolution 1574 (2004), S/2005/140, 4 March 2005, para 53 - available at http://www.un.org/documents/ Back

216   Q 218 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

217   "South Africa 'should play greater part in resolving crisis'", Business Day (Johannesburg), 25 February 2005. On the need for more troops see also Ev 98 [Aegis Trust memo]; and, Q 171 [Jan Egeland, UN-OCHA and ERC]. Back

218   "Sudanese rebel leader wants large force in Darfur", Reuters Foundation, 9 February 2005 - available at http://www.reliefweb.int Back

219   "Sudan: World must act on Darfur situation, with millions of lives at stake - UN relief chief", UN News Service, 21 February 2005 - available at http://www.reliefweb.int Back

220   Q 171 [Jan Egeland, UN-OCHA and ERC]. Back

221   Q 197 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

222   As at January 2005, troops had been provided by Rwanda, Nigeria, Gambia, Egypt, Ghana, Chad, South Africa, Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Senegal, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia and Algeria. Back

223   Ev 108 [Baldo et al memo]; Q 7 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

224   Q 78 [Maniza Ntekim, Amnesty International UK]; Ev 104 [Associate Party Group for Sudan memo]; Ev 101 [Amnesty International UK]. Back

225   Q 234 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

226   Q 109 [Hilary Benn, DFID] - the phrase he used was "we are looking at ourselves" - we assume this means the UK. Back

227   Q 234 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

228   Ev 158 [UNHCR memo]. Back

229   BBC TV, "Panorama: The new killing fields", broadcast on 14 November 2004. Back

230   Justice Africa, February 2005 Briefing, para 24 - see footnote 9. Back

231   Q 241 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

232   Q 22 [Dr Suliman Baldo]. Back

233   Q 224 [Hilary Benn, DFID]; Our Common Interest, Report of the Commission for Africa, March 2005, p.162 - see http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/thereport/cfafullreport_1.pdf Back

234   Q 219 [Hilary Benn, DFID]; Q 83 [Maniza Ntekim, Amnesty International UK]. Back

235   Q 109 and Q 218 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

236   BBC TV, "Panorama: The new killing fields", broadcast on 14 November 2004. Back

237   Q 28 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

238   "UK troops 'ready to go to Sudan'", BBC online, 24 July 2004 - see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3922109.stm; Ev 123 [DRDC memo]. Back

239   "Annan tells EU, NATO more help needed", Reuters Foundation, 13 February 2005 - available at http://www.alertnet.org Back

240   United Nations: Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan - see footnote 215. Back

241   Ev 122 [DRDC memo]; see also Eric Reeves' 4 March 2005 analysis of the statement made - "Things are looking greatly better in Darfur" - by AU Chair and Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, following discussion of the crisis with Sudanese President Omer Beshir, 16 February 2005" - available at http://www.sudanreeves.org Back

242   The current Members of the AU Peace and Security Council - a question we asked of Hilary Benn at Q 144, but he was not able to answer - are: Gabon, Ethiopia, Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Sudan, Libya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Ghana, Senegal and Togo - see Ev 96 [DFID supplementary memo]. Back

243   Q 78 [Maniza Ntekim, Amnesty International UK]; Q 118 [Hilary Benn, DFID]; Q 19-20, Q 30 and Q 47 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

244   Ev 121 [DRDC memo]; "China invests heavily in Sudan's oil industry: Beijing supplies arms used on villagers", Washington Post, 23 December 2004 - see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html; Economist Intelligence Unit, Sudan - Country Reports and Country Profiles. Back

245   Congressional Research Service, Sudan: Humanitarian crisis, peace talks, terrorism, and US policy, 19 January 2005 - see http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/t11sudan.pdf; US Department of the Treasury, Sudan: What you need to know about US sanctions - see http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/t11sudan.pdf Back

246   "China invests heavily in Sudan's oil industry", Washington Post, 23 December 2004 - see footnote 244; "White Nile signs join oil venture with Sudan", Daily Telegraph, 22 February 2005; "White Nile denies needing Khartoum blessing for deal", The Guardian, 22 February 2005; "White Nile to bolster Sudan claim", Financial Times, 3 March 2005. Back

247   Q 189 [Dr Mukesh Kapila] Back

248   Q 186 [Dr Mukesh Kapila] Back

249   Q 198 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

250   Q 204 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

251   For UN resolutions, voting records and meeting transcripts see http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html Back

252   Ibid. Back

253   Ibid. Ev 174 [Alex Vines, Royal Institute of International Affairs]. Back

254   Ev 120 [DRDC memo]. Back

255   Q 16 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

256   ICG, Darfur: The failure to protect, 8 March 2005, p.3 - see footnote 4. Back

257   Ev 14 [Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch]; Ev 150 [ICG memo]; In El Fasher, the presentation we received from the AU Mission confirmed that there are "no signs of any action being taken to control the activities of the Janjaweed." Back

258   Ev 151 [ICG memo]. Back

259   Musa Hilal, the Janjaweed leader told researchers from Human Rights Watch that the Khartoum government backed and directed the activities of his militia - see http://www.hrw.org/video/2005/musa; "Sudan ordered death squads, says warlord", The Independent, 3 March 2005; Human Rights Watch, Darfur documents confirm government policy of militia support, 20 July 2004 - see http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/19/darfur9096.htm Back

260   Ev 106 [Baldo et al]; Ev 135 [Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan memo] Back

261   Ev 151 [ICG memo]; Q 192-4 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

262   Q 108 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

263   Q 235 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

264   Q 212 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

265   Ev 121 [DRDC memo]; Q 17 [Dr. Suliman Baldo, ICG] Back

266   Ev 121 [DRDC memo]; although see "The Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reaffirms the organization's commitment to energizing the political process in Darfur", Organization of the Islamic Conference, 9 March 2005 - available at http://www.reliefweb.int Back

267   Q 195 and Q 210 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]; Statement by Ms Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Security Council on The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, New York, 16 February 2005 - available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/press/NewsFrameset-1.htm  Back

268   Q 195 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]. Back

269   Darfur Consortium, African Civil Society Calls on UN Security Council to Ensure Protection and Justice for Darfur, 11 March 2005 - available at http://www.darfurconsortium.org Back

270   Q 227 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

271   Q 90 [Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch] Back

272   Q 232-3 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

273   Q 56 and Q 90 [Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch]; ICG, Darfur: The failure to protect, March 8 2005, p.22 - see footnote 4. Back

274   Justice Africa, February 2005 Briefing, para 52 - see footnote 9. Back

275   Ev 152 [ICG memo]; Q 40 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

276   Q 17 [Dr. Suliman Baldo, ICG]; Q 197 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]; Q 235 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

277   Q 235 [Hilary Benn, DFID]; Q 16 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]; Q 55 [Maniza Ntekim, Amnesty International UK]; Ev 103 [Amnesty International UK memo]; Ev 105 [Associate Party Group for Sudan memo]; Ev 151 [ICG memo]. Back

278   Q 32 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

279   A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility, Report of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004, paras 256-7 - see footnote 32; Q 97 [Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch]. Back

280   Darfur Consortium, African Civil Society Calls on UN Security Council to Ensure Protection and Justice for Darfur, 11 March 2005 - see footnote 269. Back

281   Q 132 [Hilary Benn, DFID]; Q 17 and Q 20 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG].. Back

282   Q 41 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

283   Ev 111 [DRDC memo]. Back

284   Q 56 [Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch]. Back

285   Our Common Interest, Report of the Commission for Africa, March 2005, p.163 - see footnote 233. Back

286   Justice Africa, February 2005 Briefing, para 3 - see footnote 9. Back

287   Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states "the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide … is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent or punish". Whether an undertaking amounts to a legal obligation is a matter for lawyers. We have not pursued this legal matter, or the question of whether "genocide" has taken place in Darfur, because these issues are a distraction from the urgent need to provide protection to the people of Darfur, regardless of the label attached to the crimes against humanity committed by the GoS and its allied militias. Back

288   The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001, para 6.7 - see footnote 33. Back

289   Paragraph 6.12 of the Responsibility to Protect puts it carefully: "The UN, with the Security Council at the heart of the international law-enforcement system, is the only organization with universally accepted authority to validate such operations" [to settle issues of international peace and security]. Back

290   Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2003-04, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, CM6340 p.39 - see footnote 33. Back

291   See The Responsibility to Protect, especially chapter six - see footnote 33. Back

292   A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility, Report of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations (2004), p.65, para 200 - see footnote 32. Back

293   The Responsibility to Protect, paras 6.37 to 6.40 - see footnote 33. For instance, the UK Government, in response to the Foreign Affairs Committee - see footnote 33 - wrote: "The Government has also made its view clear that international law recognises that, in exceptional circumstances, military action may be justified when it is the only way to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, and that this is the case even in the absence of explicit authorisation from the Security Council." Back


 
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