Select Committee on International Development Fifth Report


4 The responsibility for development

102. There are three elements to the responsibility to protect; the responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild.[294] Fulfilling the responsibility to rebuild will include peace-building, security, justice and reconciliation and development. Darfur is not in a post-conflict phase. More effective "reaction" — political pressure on the GoS and the rebels to enhance security and to move towards a political resolution, and effective humanitarian response — remains crucial, and has been the main focus of our report. But in this chapter our focus is on the responsibility to rebuild, and in particular, for development, for Darfur and for Sudan as a whole.

103. Conflict often affects poor countries. Countries are made poorer by conflict. There is a simple, vicious and deadly cycle. Development can break that cycle. It can both prevent crises starting and re-starting, and — by offering the warring parties a future of sustainable peace, security and increasing prosperity — can help to bring existing conflicts to an end. By tackling the root causes, development offers a way of preventing, and a way of reacting to, crises. It may well be the most cost-effective way in which the international community can fulfil its responsibility to protect.[295] In the remainder of this chapter we outline how the international community and the new National Government of the Sudan which is due to be established by July of this year when the SPLM gains a share of power, and the new Government of Southern Sudan, might begin to fulfil their shared responsibilities to protect the people of Sudan, by taking on their responsibilities for development. The messages we heard in Sudan were clear. In the South: there are great needs; peace has been delivered; the international community must now support development. In Darfur: there are immediate needs, but the fulfilment of these (humanitarian relief, enhanced security and political progress) must not mean that planning for peace and development is delayed until the conflict is over.[296] Actions now should be taken within a long-term strategic framework.[297]

Governance and political change: Institutions for peace?

THE NEW SUDAN: GOOD GOVERNANCE, JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

104. The British Ambassador, whom we acknowledge is particularly well-informed about the realities of politics in Sudan, suggested that there might have to be a trade-off between justice and peace. That is, that pursuing justice for the crimes that have been committed in Darfur might be detrimental to the peace process. Political negotiations would be disrupted were key players in the GoS, who are likely to be named in the International Commission of Inquiry's sealed annex of 51 names, removed from the political process. This is no doubt true, and is an argument for making progress on peace irreversible, but we do not accept that there is a trade-off, or choice to be made, between justice and peace. If the aim is a sustainable peace, then justice and accountability are required.[298] Political negotiations with those responsible for crimes against humanity are hardly a sound basis for a sustainable peace. There should be a referral of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (see paragraphs 90-91). In addition, an International Compensation Commission, as recommended by the International Commission of Inquiry, would do much to ensure that victims of crime were afforded redress.[299]

105. In our view, justice matters to the future of Sudan more broadly too. Along with trust and fairness, justice is what holds societies together. At the national level, if Sudan is to hold together as a country — the stated desire of the GoS, the SPLM, and, it seems, the people of Darfur — then resources and power must be fairly shared, and not distributed unfairly according to ethnicity or religion. Otherwise, Sudan will fail as a state. There must be a significant chance that it will. At the personal level too, trust and fairness are key. On our visit to Leer, a village which had been the front-line of conflict for many years, we met with soldiers from the Sudanese government's Armed Forces and from the SPLM. These military men, sitting together drinking tea with each other and smiling, and looking slightly uncomfortable in each other's presence, had known nothing but conflict, war and poverty throughout their lives. Their lives tell their own tales of the need for reconciliation, trust, justice, peace, development, and support.

106. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed on 9 January 2005, is an agreement between the GoS and the SPLM. Its six protocols provide a framework for peace based on sharing power and resources fairly. The CPA provides an historic opportunity for sustainable peace and development, not just for the South, but for the whole of Sudan.[300] It also demonstrates that even the longest and bloodiest conflicts can be brought to an end through political negotiation.[301] Fighting for decades to gain a seat at the negotiating table, is not an attractive option. But the CPA is only the starting point; implementing the agreement will be as challenging as was its negotiation, and will require similarly sustained international support. The CPA represents an opportunity for the regime in Khartoum to turn away from conflict and towards sustainable peace, development and fuller participation in the international community. The mind-set of the regime's leaders will have to change too, to focus on inclusive development rather than fighting a war. For the South it offers hope of a permanent end to a conflict which has left its people with nothing. The SPLM, as it becomes the Government of Southern Sudan as well as a partner in the National Government, will need to develop, to become a movement for (good) governance, rather than an army for war; assuming, of course, that it is seriously committed to making a success of a new, but still unified, Sudan, rather than preparing for secession.[302] The UK Government and others must work alongside the SPLM and the Khartoum regime to help them to prepare for governing Sudan. The parties seem committed to implementing the CPA. Their goal, and that of the international community, must be to ensure that the nature of politics in Sudan is transformed so that when the South votes on secession in six years' time, the decision is respected by all.

107. Darfur was not party to the CPA negotiations. The SPLM is sympathetic to the rebels' cause in Darfur, and may be able to bring pressure to bear on them to negotiate, but the CPA cannot be expected to have an immediate impact on Darfur.[303] As it stands, the CPA risks being seen as another example of the marginalisation and exclusion of Darfur, and also of the East. For Darfur, the hope is that the principles of the CPA — the autonomy it gives to the South, the sharing of wealth and of power, and the agreements on contested areas at the North-South border[304] — might provide a framework for an inclusive peace and the emergence of a new Sudan.[305] This is a hope which the GoS claims to share; that the Naivasha process can be built on by bringing in all those previously excluded.[306] One fear is that continuing conflict in Darfur and in the East might destabilise the CPA.[307] Another fear is that meeting Darfur's demands might lead to the unravelling of the CPA.[308] The immediate challenge is to ensure that the Constitutional Review Commission — the body charged with translating principles of fairness into law — is inclusive, so that all regions, including Darfur and the East, feel represented.[309]

108. From a human rights perspective, much reform is needed if peace and justice are to be institutionalised across Sudan.[310] This is one of the gaps in the CPA.[311] The justice system has failed to protect those who have suffered human rights violations at the hands of the GoS and its militias. Reform of the justice system is crucial if there is to be any confidence in the rule of law.[312] Prisoners of conscience should be released immediately and without conditions. Fair trials should be instituted. Detainees should have prompt access to a judicial authority, to lawyers and to their families. The laws which allow detention without charge for up to nine months (Article 31 of the National Security Forces Act), and which give immunity to members of the security forces (Article 33) should be amended. All places of detention must be registered and independently inspected, with prompt and impartial investigation of all allegations of torture. And there should be freedom of expression and association.[313] With a comparative advantage in supporting judicial reform and good governance, the UK has an important role to play in Sudan. We look forward to hearing more about DFID's plans.[314]

LOCAL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS OVER LAND AND RESOURCES

109. There are two inter-linked conflicts in Darfur. That which has received most attention is between the GoS (and its allied militias), and the rebel groups. A second conflict, which is intertwined with the first, in part as a result of the Sudanese government arming its favoured Arab militias, is over access to land and resources. This conflict pits sedentary farmers, mainly "African", against nomadic herders who are mainly "Arab", and has been exacerbated by the break down of traditional mechanisms for dealing with tribal tensions.[315] Tackling the root causes of this conflict will require tribal reconciliation and the negotiation of local agreements, and regional agreements across Darfur, within the framework provided by a national agreement between the GoS and the rebels.[316] There is some hope. The Janjaweed do not represent all the Arab tribes of Darfur.[317] To their great credit, the larger and more powerful Arab tribes in Darfur have deliberately stayed out of the conflict, despite pressures, intimidation and incentives offered by the GoS.[318] But those Arab tribes who have joined the conflict — and who have become known as the Janjaweed — will not welcome the return of the IDPs onto land which they covet. When the IDPs return home, with the encouragement of the GoS which armed the Janjaweed, this may set the government and the Janjaweed on a collision course. If the people of Darfur are to live in peace, there is a need for tribal reconciliation across the board.[319]

110. There are signs of progress. Communal peacemaking efforts at the local level have begun, with pacts taking place between some of the major Arab and non-Arab groups. Such pacts might involve Arab tribes withdrawing from areas which were traditionally home to sedentary farmers, in return for guarantees of secure access to grazing routes. On a larger scale, Libya has hosted two rounds of a tribal reconciliation conference. This is a useful initiative which provides a forum for Darfurians — predominantly, we fear, men — to discuss the issues which matter to them.[320] When we were in Khartoum, we met eight MPs from Darfur; the fact that their meeting with us was also the first time they had met together indicates a need for more intra-Darfur dialogue. There have been disagreements at the Libyan-hosted talks: over an amnesty requested by the GoS for crimes committed; over the issue of whether or not Darfur should remain divided into three states; and over the question of Darfurian representation in national politics. But some progress has been made; on questions of land tenure, and on systems of local governance (tribal administration). The Libyan initiative is the only current forum in which it might become possible to clarify the political demands of the nomadic herders. It is not clear whether there will be another round of the Libyan-hosted tribal reconciliation talks. It is important that the relationship between any such talks and the Abuja peace process is clear. Stakeholders such as the UK should — whilst being careful to remain neutral — offer support to such initiatives. Attention must also be given to the establishment of a Land Commission for Darfur, to determine a fair formula for access to land.[321]

Development and livelihoods: Incentives for peace?

OIL REVENUES, TRANSPARENCY AND DEVELOPMENT

111. Since its discovery in the early 1980s, oil has played in important role in shaping both the internal politics of Sudan,[322] and the outside world's dealings with Sudan (see paragraphs 81-82).[323] Oil may have fuelled the civil war, but it also provided an incentive for peace. Oil revenues paid for military hardware, but the oil could not be extracted efficiently during the civil war. Sudan began exporting oil in 1999. Its output is now 250,000 barrels per day, a figure which is expected to rise to 600,000 barrels per day by 2007. Earnings of $2bn per year are a significant sum for a country as poor as Sudan.[324] The CPA's protocol on wealth-sharing includes an agreement to share the oil revenues. The formula approximates to equal shares going to the Government of Southern Sudan, and the National Government in Khartoum. Oil represents a massive opportunity for Sudan.

112. Transparency and accountability are essential if corruption is to be avoided, and the oil revenues are to be invested wisely. Sudan's international partners, including the UK, must insist that all oil-related transactions — payments by outside companies, as well as flows of finance within Sudan — are published in line with the highest international standards of transparency. Specifically, they should comply at least with the guidelines promoted by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and consult openly with civil society. A full, independent audit of the state oil company should also be carried out, and the results published.[325] The audit trail must not stop there. Somewhere between forty and eighty percent of the Sudanese government's spending is on the military.[326] No government can maintain such spending patterns and expect to receive the support of the international community. The UK Government should make its financial support to the Government of the Sudan conditional on a substantial and rapid decline in military spending, and encourage other donors to do likewise.[327]

REBUILDING SHATTERED LIVELIHOODS

113. The oil will not last forever. Neither will its development benefits necessarily trickle down as far and as fast as we might like. There is a great need both for economic diversification beyond oil, and — at the local level — for support for poor people's livelihoods. Across Sudan, this primarily means support for rural livelihoods, based on agriculture. In Darfur, as well as in other areas affected by conflict, rural livelihoods have been devastated. Families have lost assets, some of which might have taken generations to acquire; seeds, beds, blankets, utensils, tools, donkeys, livestock, orchards, irrigation pumps, grinding mills, lorries and tractors.[328] Forced to flee the violence, hundreds of thousands of people escaped only with their lives. They, the "lucky" ones, have nothing except the clothes they are wearing.[329] The fundamental problem affecting livelihoods in Darfur is insecurity. Fearing attack, people are unable to move. Any activity that involves movement has been drastically curtailed: herding livestock to grazing lands and to market; travelling to rural areas to collect firewood, fodder and wild foods; migrating to town, or to Libya and sending money back. In Darfur, livelihoods are under siege.[330] As the International Crisis Group put it in their recent briefing: "By displacing its agricultural and trading partners and destroying their livelihoods in pursuit of short term advantage, the Janjaweed has set in motion the demise of the region's medium term economic potential and thus significantly worsened the humanitarian situation for all its residents, not just those targeted for ethnic cleansing."[331]

114. Security is the key to rebuilding rural livelihoods. Without security, people cannot move around. Without mobility, people will not survive. When security is established, and there is progress towards a political resolution to the crisis in Darfur, there will be a great need to help people to rebuild their lives and their means of survival. The humanitarian response must be integrated with plans for longer-term development. Working with the new Government of the Sudan, donors including the UK should consider how Reconstruction and Development Funds, such as those provided for in the CPA, might be used to support the rebuilding of livelihoods in Darfur.[332] And, whilst the focus of livelihood rehabilitation will be on agriculture and related activities, the looming threat of HIV/AIDS must not be forgotten.

Shared responsibilities, accountability and effective partnerships

INVESTING IN PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

115. The responsibility to make the Sudan a success following the signing of the CPA, and to bring peace and security to Darfur, has to be widely shared. The soldiers we met in Leer, along with millions of others in Darfur and across Sudan, must be provided with opportunities to make a living so that they, and the country as a whole, do not slip back into conflict. In a country full of guns, conflict-relapse is a huge risk. The new National Government of the Sudan, the Government of Southern Sudan (that which the SPLM will become), and the rebels in Darfur all have important roles to play. The continuing support of the international community is crucial too, both in terms of political support and pressure, and in terms of resources. Unless the international community provides Sudan with the funds it needs for peace and development now, the opportunity provided by the CPA will be squandered. The Joint Assessment Mission, a team made up of GoS and SPLM members, recently concluded its assessment.[333] They report that nearly $8bn dollars will be needed over the next two years for reconstruction and development, to help Sudan to recover from the civil war. This figure does not include the cost of the UN peace-support operation to the South of Sudan, or any funds required to restore stability to Darfur. Donors will have to find $2.66bn; over $5bn will come from domestic oil revenues.[334] The assessment is not simply a request for funds from donors; it is also a statement of political commitment, and a plan for how domestically-generated resources are to be spent for development.

116. International support is needed, but the signs are not very good, especially as regards the South. The UN Workplan for Sudan for 2005, launched on 30 November 2004, requested $1.56bn, with $691m of that sum required for activities in Darfur.[335] By mid-March, a total of $388m had been provided by donors for the whole of Sudan's needs. This is a positive response, but it remains insufficient and hugely imbalanced. Resources needed for food aid are 73% covered. All other sectors are less than 5% covered.[336] In Khartoum, the heads of the UN agencies in Sudan told us they had no money. And, on a recent visit to Sudan, and speaking specifically about the South, Jan Egeland noted a "disturbing discrepancy" between what the world promised the signatories to the CPA that it would deliver, and what has since been forthcoming.[337] The South, he noted, had actually received only five percent of what it needs to implement the UN Workplan, with another five percent promised. Donor countries are failing to support the peace process. This year is a make or break year for Sudan. The historic opportunity provided by the CPA must not be lost. If the international community is generous with its support, that will not only help Sudan on the road to sustainable peace and development, but it may also have a knock-on effect throughout Africa. If the peace falters, Sudan risks sinking further into crisis, with consequences across Africa and beyond. Donors must be generous, immediately and at the donors' conference in Oslo from April 11-12. The needs are immediate, and will be long-term; the support should be too. We expect the UK Government, which has worked tirelessly in support of the CPA, to provide generous and immediate financial support. It should also persuade its European partners to invest in the Sudanese peace.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

117. Donors face a challenge. In order to help meet the huge human development needs in Sudan, they must fulfil their promises to invest in the North-South peace process. This will involve working with the regime in Khartoum, but in so doing the international community must not take off the pressure as regards Darfur.[338] That mistake must not be made again. The Government of Southern Sudan must be provided with the resources it needs to become a partner for peace and development, and to invest in the human development of its citizens. But the provision of debt relief and of funds which would primarily benefit the National Congress Party — the Khartoum regime responsible for the crisis in Darfur — must be conditional on resolving the crisis in Darfur. The UK Government seems to understand this.[339] The conditions to be met must be clearly benchmarked, the timetables for meeting them spelt out, and the consequences which flow from meeting or not meeting commitments must be specified. The UK Government should take the lead on this, ensuring that donors speak with one voice at Oslo.

118. Development partnerships entail shared responsibilities.[340] Shared responsibilities such as the responsibility to protect, and for development, will not be met unless those responsible are accountable for their actions and inactions. As the report of the Commission for Africa rightly emphasises, accountability, along with the capacity to deliver, is the basis of good governance. If the international humanitarian system had been more accountable, and had learnt more from past responses, then it would surely have responded more effectively to the crisis in Darfur. If the Government of the Sudan had been more accountable for its actions, to its citizens, or, failing that, to the international community — working bilaterally, through the AU, and through the UN — then the crisis in Darfur would have been resolved more peacefully. And if the "international community", and in particular the UN Security Council, were more clearly accountable to those governments and people who take seriously their responsibilities to protect, then it would surely have acted more decisively on Darfur. The response to the south Asian tsunami proved that the public is willing to assist those in need, and that the international community can respond effectively. What are lacking are mechanisms to hold to account the humanitarian agencies, governments and international organisations which are entrusted with translating that willingness to help into effective action.

119. This is the lesson of Darfur. If the international community is to fulfil its shared responsibility to protect, then we must all fulfil our responsibilities, and hold others to account for fulfilling theirs. The UK Government has, on the whole, responded well to Darfur. The international community must fulfil its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur, now. Attacked by the government which is meant to protect them, the people of Darfur, who we have collectively and demonstrably failed, deserve no less. Action is needed now.


294   The responsibility to protect - see footnote 33. Back

295   Investing in Prevention: An international strategy to manage risks of instability and improve crisis response, A Prime Minister's Strategy Unit Report to the Government, February 2005 - see footnote 36. Back

296   Ev 122 [DRDC memo]. Back

297   Alex de Waal, Steps towards the stabilization of governance in Darfur, 7 January 20005, paragraph 2 - see http://www.justiceafrica.org/stabilisation_of_government.htm Back

298   Q195, Q196 and Q210 [Dr Mukesh Kapila]; Q 95 [Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights watch]; Ev 148 [Human Rights Watch memo]. Back

299   ICID, paras 590-603 - see footnote 8; Darfur: no peace without justice, DRDC briefing paper No. 4, Geneva, 21 February 2005 - see http://www.darfurconsortium.org/Assets/PDFs/DRDCPaperNo4.pdf Back

300   Ev 71 [DFID memo]. Back

301   Q 237 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

302   Q 242 [Hilary Benn, DFID]; Justice Africa, February 2005 Briefing, paras 6 and 53 - see footnote 9. Back

303   ICG, Darfur: The failure to protect, 8 March 2005, p.i - see footnote 4. Back

304   ICG, Darfur: The failure to protect, 8 March 2005, p.4 - see footnote 4. Back

305   Q 107 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

306   Ev 136 [Embassy of the Government of Sudan memo]. Back

307   "Darfur taints Sudanese hopes for a new era", Financial Times, 9 March 2005. Back

308   ICG, Darfur: The failure to protect, 8 March 2005, p.4 - see footnote 4. Back

309   Justice Africa, February 2005 Briefing, paras 6-13 and 53 - see footnote 9. Back

310   Q 55 and Q 99 [Maniza Ntekim, Amnesty International UK]. Back

311   Q 95 [Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch]. Back

312   Ev 102 [Amnesty International UK memo]. Back

313   Ibid. Back

314   Q 242 [Anna Bewes, Head of Sudan Unit, DFID]. Back

315   Ev 110-11 [DRDC memo]. Back

316   Q 174 [Jan Egeland, UN-OCHA and ERC]; Q 64 [Toby Porter, Sudan Advocacy Coalition]; Ev 104 [Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan memo]. Back

317   Ev 114 [DRDC memo]. Back

318   Q 6 [Dr Suliman Baldo, ICG]. Back

319   Ev 108 [Baldo et al memo]. Back

320   Ev 108 [Baldo et al memo]. Back

321   Justice Africa, February 2005 Briefing, paras 31-34 - see footnote 9; Alex de Waal "Steps towards the stabilization of governance in Darfur", 7 January 2005, paragraph 18 - see footnote 297. Back

322   Ev 107 [Baldo et al memo]. Back

323   "Oil reserves transform the Sudanese civil war", Jane's Intelligence Review, 6 June 2001 - available at http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir010606_1_n.shtmlNB: This article includes a list of companies that have invested in various sectors of the Sudan oil industry. From the UK, the list includes Weir Pumps Ltd., Allen Power Engineering Ltd., and Angus Fire. Back

324   "Africa: Sudan peace in the balance", Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 1 June 2004 - available at http://jiaa.janes.com/ Back

325   For Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative see http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/extractiveindustries.asp; see also the Publish What You Pay initiative at http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/ Back

326   Q 121 [Dr Alistair McPhail, UK Special Representative for Sudan, FCO]. Back

327   Q 122 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

328   Rule of lawlessness: Roots and repercussions of the Darfur crisis, Interagency Paper, January 2005 Back

329   Imagine, if you are from the developed world: you lose your home, your car, your job, your savings, your laptop and mobile phone, your TV, your clothes, your books and CDs, your food, your access to water, your partner and two of your children. You are attacked and left for dead. If you are a woman, you may be raped. And then, faced with the threat of attack by murdering robbers, and a Government which seems at best indifferent to your plight, you have to re-build your life. In a semi-desert environment. Back

330   Livelihoods under siege - see footnote 142. Back

331   ICG, Darfur: The failure to protect, 8 March 2005, p.2 - see footnote 4. Back

332   Alex de Waal, Steps towards the stabilization of governance in Darfur, 7 January 2005, paragraph 7 - see footnote 297. Back

333   Q 222 [Anna Bewes, DFID] Back

334   "Sudan appeals for billions in post-war reconstruction, development aid", Agence France-Presse, 9 March 2005 - available at http://www.reliefweb.int/ Back

335   UN and partners, Work Plan for Sudan 2005 - available at http://www.unsudanig.org/publications/workplan/ Back

336   UN and partners, Work Plan for Sudan 2005 - see footnote 335; United Nations: Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 15 of resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraph 17 of resolution 1574 (2004), S/2005/140, 4 March 2005 - see footnote 215. Back

337   "UN official says Sudan is not getting the aid it was promised", The New York Times, 6 March 2005 - available at http://www.nytimes.com; "Emergency relief coordinator Jan Egeland concludes trip to Sudan", UN Press Release, 8 March 2005 - see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/afr1122.doc.htm; "Transcript of media briefing with Jan Egeland, UN Under­Secretary­General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator", UN-OCHA, 9 March 2005 - available at http://www.reliefweb.int  Back

338   Q 205 [Mukesh Kapila]; Q 239 [Hilary Benn, DFID] Back

339   Q 222 [Hilary Benn, DFID]. Back

340   Our Common Interest, Report of the Commission for Africa, March 2005 - see footnote 233. Back


 
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