Select Committee on International Development Fifth Report


Conclusions and recommendations


Introduction

Darfur mortality estimates

1.  The only violent deaths which the WHO's estimate includes are those which took place in the camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Of those attacked in their villages, only those who made it to the camps before dying would be included in the WHO's estimate. With the exception of these cases, the WHO's estimate does not include deaths due to the violence from which people have fled. In addition, the WHO estimate covers only the period from March to mid-October 2004, and only takes account of deaths in accessible areas within the borders of Darfur. Cited without clear explanation of its limitations, the WHO's estimate is extremely misleading. (Paragraph 4)

2.  Political pressure must be exerted on the Government of the Sudan to enable the WHO or a different competent organisation to conduct further assessments of mortality resulting from the crisis in Darfur. And, in a situation where statistics are deflated, inflated and used by all sides as political weapons, the WHO must ensure that its statistics are not open to mis-interpretation and abuse. The WHO's press release of 14 October 2004, conflating two types of violence, demonstrated at best extreme naivety if not gross incompetence. (Paragraph 5)

The responsibility to protect

3.  Sovereignty entails responsibilities as well as rights. States have the primary responsibility for their citizens, but in circumstances where states commit crimes against humanity and war crimes against their own citizens, the international community has an obligation and a duty to those citizens — a "responsibility to protect." Sovereignty does not give states the right to commit gross human rights violations and war crimes against their citizens. (Paragraph 10)

Meeting humanitarian needs?

Early warnings, donor response and the role of the media

4.  The international community chose to ignore the early warnings of NGOs and senior UN officials. Other factors — poor access, continuing insecurity, a flawed humanitarian system, and an unfavourable political context — played a part too, but by ignoring the warnings, the international community helped to ensure that the initial humanitarian response to Darfur was, as Médecins Sans Frontières put it, "a staggering failure". (Paragraph 15)

5.  The UK Government deserves credit for its speedy and generous response to the crisis in Darfur. The EC/ECHO and the USA deserve praise too. Particularly noteworthy is the EC's early support for the AU's work in Darfur. Other donors, including other European countries, should have done more. Arab countries have donated 2.5 percent of the total, mainly through in-kind bilateral humanitarian aid. This is disappointing. The donor response to Darfur has, after a slow start, been very good. But huge needs remain across Sudan and elsewhere. (Paragraph 16)

6.  Governments and politicians must not wait to act until images of death and destruction are on the TV screens. By then it is too late. (Paragraph 18)

7.  Governments play an active part in shaping the news agenda. The UK Government could and should have done more to try to ensure that Darfur received greater news coverage in 2003 and early 2004. We invite the Government to outline, in its response to our report, its strategy for more effective media engagement around complex emergencies such as Darfur. (Paragraph 19)

Humanitarian access: Government obstructions, logistics, insecurity

8.  We condemn the Government of the Sudan for its deliberate policy of limiting humanitarian access to Darfur. We applaud the UK Government and the British Embassy in Khartoum for their persistent efforts to get restrictions lifted. The humanitarian response would have been more effective if diplomatic pressure had led to an earlier lifting of the Sudanese government's bureaucratic restrictions, but Hilary Benn and Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, deserve much credit for ensuring that such restrictions were eventually eased. Effective humanitarian response to crises such as Darfur depends upon unhindered humanitarian access. (Paragraph 21)

9.  Continuing diplomatic pressure is needed to ensure that humanitarian agencies and staff, including those involved in human rights and protection work, are not harassed. In a context where the Sudanese government is failing to protect its own people, it will not and must not escape criticism from agencies concerned with protection and human rights. Specifically, the Sudanese government should be put under pressure to ensure that the International Committee of the Red Cross — perhaps the archetypal humanitarian organisation — has the access which it needs to detainees. The UK Government, through the Embassy in Khartoum, must continue to press the Sudanese government on these issues. (Paragraph 22)

10.  All organisations tasked with the delivery of humanitarian supplies, including the WFP, must be well-supported by the donors at an early stage. If they are to deliver adequate supplies at the right time, then this is essential. In return for donor support, the organisations must deliver. The WFP must do all it can to ensure that adequate food supplies are in place before demand peaks in August this year. (Paragraph 23)

11.  The killing of humanitarian workers in situations of armed conflict is a war crime. The perpetrators of such crimes must be brought to justice, and the protection provided to humanitarian workers under international law must be clarified, and, if necessary, strengthened. (Paragraph 24)

12.  Resolving the security problem requires political pressure on the parties to stick to the ceasefire, and more robust protection for humanitarian agencies. But in the meantime, with more resources, UNDSS could check roads more frequently, allowing it to maintain its standards without having to declare roads "no-go" for long periods of time. The UK Government, in its support for the humanitarian response, must ensure that UNDSS receives adequate funding. (Paragraph 25)

13.  To ensure that the humanitarian effort is not derailed by insecurity, the AU, the UK and other external powers must apply firmer political pressure, bilaterally and through the UN, to ensure that the parties honour their ceasefire commitments. But no matter what happens politically, or in terms of sticking to the ceasefire, humanitarian relief must be provided according to need; relief must not be made conditional. (Paragraph 26)

The humanitarian system: Capacity, coordination and leadership

14.  Donors, NGOs and UN agencies should give serious consideration to investing more in training and skills development for humanitarian staff from the developing world, so that the capacity of the humanitarian system can be enhanced. (Paragraph 29)

15.  Humanitarian donors must do more to support their implementing partners in the times between crises. In the absence of core-funding, it is no surprise that NGOs find it difficult to train and retain staff and to respond quickly to need. We would appreciate further information about DFID's policy on this. (Paragraph 29)

16.  If the international community is to be able to fulfil its responsibility to protect, it must act now to ensure that it is able to deal effectively with crises involving IDPs. Ad hoc arrangements will not see duties adequately fulfilled. To respond to IDPs' needs with excuses about institutional mandates would be laughable if it did not have such tragic human consequences. (Paragraph 32)

17.  The UK Government should - on behalf of the UK taxpayers who help to fund the agencies — find out why UNHCR and UNICEF were unwilling to take on the responsibility for the management of IDP camps in Darfur. (Paragraph 33)

18.  All IDPs are affected by violence, but the needs of women and girls affected and threatened by rape and gender-based violence stand out. Many attacks take place when women — putting themselves at risk of attack, rather than their husbands and sons, who might be killed — are collecting firewood outside the camps. Fuel-efficient stoves can help, and arrangements should be made to ensure that trustworthy police patrols are stepped up to protect women collecting firewood More attention and resources also need to be devoted to the rights and needs of those who have been attacked, and to ensuring that those responsible are brought to justice. (Paragraph 34)

19.  If returns and relocations are to be truly voluntary, then there must be extensive consultation with the IDPs. And with the women, not just with the male tribal leaders. (Paragraph 37)

20.  Security and progress on the political front are the pre-requisites for voluntary return. Agreements on Voluntary Return will not in themselves bring it about. Nevertheless, the international community must ensure that the Sudanese government sticks to the agreements it has reached and stops its practice of forcing IDPs to return home or to move to other camps. Rather than waiting for security to improve, the UN should be putting plans in place now, for the informed and voluntary return of IDPs to their homes over the next year. (Paragraph 38)

21.  Mukesh Kapila's enforced departure from Sudan was, it seems, the inevitable result of his decision to speak out and insist that a so-called "humanitarian crisis" had political causes and required political pressure for its resolution. Dr. Kapila told us that as the ethnic cleansing was not averted, he believes that he personally failed in Darfur. But it was the international community that failed, despite the best efforts of Dr. Kapila, and others such as Jan Egeland. (Paragraph 39)

22.  Mukesh Kapila was right to speak out about Darfur, of that we have no doubt. The UN system failed to ensure a smooth transition at a critical time, because of a lack of planning, because — once sensible suggestions for his replacement were made — of a lack of political pressure by Member States through the Security Council, and because of the intransigence of the Government of the Sudan. (Paragraph 40)

Towards effective humanitarian relief

23.  If, as seems certain, the IDPs are unable to return home this spring in time to plant crops, continuing food aid will still be needed this year to feed 3 or perhaps 4 million people, nomadic Arabs as well as African sedentary farmers. There is an extremely serious risk of famine. Having arrived late in the day, the humanitarian community must not now turn its back on Darfur. (Paragraph 41)

24.  There is strong case for initiating an inter-governmental review of the humanitarian response, along the lines of that which took place after Rwanda, led perhaps by an African country. The UK Government should consider supporting such a review. (Paragraph 43)

25.  There may be value in having a system of graded warnings which, depending on the level of warning, require mandatory action by governments. (Paragraph 44)

26.  The international community needs to establish ways of working which deliver humanitarian aid when it is needed, but which do not institutionalise artificial and unhelpful divisions between humanitarian relief, reconstruction and development. (Paragraph 45)

27.  We endorse strongly the suggestions made by the Secretary of State for International Development for reforming the international humanitarian system, particularly as regards funding and giving UN-OCHA a stronger role in coordination. More broadly, we share his concern that there are no clear means of holding humanitarian donors and agencies to account. In the absence of accountability, the provision of humanitarian relief will be slow to improve. (Paragraph 46)

28.  The suffering of Darfur's millions is not the result of a natural disaster. It is not solely a "humanitarian crisis". It is a political, human rights and humanitarian crisis, and — as the UN Security Council has confirmed — a crisis which threatens international peace and security. Every opportunity should be taken to make this clear. Unless the causes as well as the symptoms of the crisis in Darfur are dealt with, and the humanitarian response is able to proceed in a secure context — with political progress being made — no amount of money will resolve the crisis. (Paragraph 47)

29.  Humanitarian aid is not a substitute for political pressure, and, if necessary, military action, to enhance security. The humanitarian community must not be made a scapegoat for the international community's failure to respond adequately to Darfur on the political level. (Paragraph 48)

Providing protection and security by exerting political pressure?

Sequencing and the prioritisation of the North-South peace process

30.  The evidence shows that the international community — including the UK chose to treat the CPA and Darfur sequentially, with the priority given to securing the North-South peace through the CPA, in the hope that it would in turn provide a template for peace in Darfur. Governments, including our own, felt that highlighting events in Darfur, and pressurising the Sudanese government in relation to Darfur, might throw the CPA peace process off-track. (Paragraph 52)

31.  Governments, including our own, failed to speak out about Darfur at an early stage; failed to get the UN Security Council to adopt a Resolution about Darfur until July 2004; failed to put concerted pressure on the Sudanese government to allow humanitarian access; and failed to make the government take seriously its responsibilities for protecting the people of Darfur and for complying with its ceasefire commitments and legal obligations. (Paragraph 54)

32.  On the ground, the catalogue of diplomatic failures had serious repercussions. In early 2004, with the international community prioritising the CPA process, the Government of the Sudan unleashed its deadly and totally disproportionate counter-insurgency strategy. It was given a window of opportunity, and — with its room for manoeuvre soon to be reduced by the entry into power of the SPLM — a reason to take it quickly. If Darfur had not been sidelined, there is no doubt that events would have turned out differently. (Paragraph 54)

33.  It certainly would have been wrong to let the chance of securing the North-South peace, and perhaps a template for a wider peace, slip away. But prioritising the CPA ran counter to the needs of the people of Darfur for protection, security and humanitarian assistance. When the conflict in Darfur escalated in early 2004, this much was crystal clear. (Paragraph 56)

34.  The international community did not need to make such a choice, and — by emphasising one set of issues (the CPA) rather than the other (Darfur) — was playing into the hands of the Sudanese government (Paragraph 56)

35.  The international community could have pushed harder on Darfur without risking the CPA negotiations. A more holistic approach would not, it seems to us, have prevented the signing of the CPA (it may have delayed it by a few months, but as the North-South peace had already been established, this would have been at no great practical cost), and it would certainly have prevented the crisis in Darfur getting as bad as it did. In the simple terms of balancing likely costs and benefits, prioritising the CPA was misguided. A more holistic approach was possible, and, in terms of likely impact, was preferable. (Paragraph 56)

36.  We believe that the UK Government has had honourable intentions throughout; but mistakes were made. Strategies for dealing with governments to move dual peace-processes forward will be needed again. Lessons must be learnt. In its response to our report, we invite the Government — not solely DFID — to outline the lessons which have been learnt about sequencing and prioritisation as a result of the experience of Darfur. (Paragraph 58)

The role of the African Union: African-led solutions for African problems?

37.  We unreservedly welcome the AU's involvement in Darfur, for two reasons. First, the AU's involvement signals a new commitment by African countries to take responsibility for dealing with the problems of their neighbours, a commitment which will in time do much to enhance the world's ability to deal with crises and conflict. Second, and more importantly, the AU was and remains the only entity willing to involve itself so fully in trying to tackle the crisis and protect the people of Darfur (Paragraph 59)

38.  In the case of Darfur, the UK Government's rhetoric of "African-led solutions for African problems" is rather simplistic; many countries have had a role in the evolution of Sudan's problems. But nevertheless, HMG deserves a great deal of credit for its support of the AU. (Paragraph 60)

39.  If the Abuja talks are to make progress on a political solution, sustained international pressure on the Government of the Sudan and the rebels will be needed, along with a clear vision of a desirable outcome. But it would be better to wait a month or two and get it right, than resume negotiations now, only to see them fall apart next week. (Paragraph 63)

40.  Evidence suggests that the AU Mission in Darfur has had a positive impact on security. Through prompt and objective monitoring and reporting on ceasefire violations, and by making its presence felt, the AU has both enhanced accountability for violations and prevented violations from taking place. However, comprehensive data on ceasefire violations — how frequent they are, who is responsible for them, and what the trends are — does not seem readily available. The AU should make such information public. (Paragraph 66)

41.  The AU, at the level of its Peace and Security Council, and on the ground in Darfur, needs to ensure that the mandate is clear, and clearly understood by all parties. Further, it is not clear that the mandate will be sufficient, even if the AU Mission works right at the limit of its civilian protection mandate. (Paragraph 67)

42.  Decisions about mandate are for the AU's Peace and Security Council to make, in consultation with the wider international community. However, if security does not improve in Darfur within weeks, and if large-scale killing continues, then the mandate of the AU must be revised to enable it to use force to protect civilians, and to disarm militias. As a first next-step, the AU should do more pro-actively to police the no-fly zone, agreed to by the parties as part of the 9 November Security Protocol. The AU must also be provided with the logistical and technical support to enable it to fulfil its mandate. (Paragraph 67)

43.  The speed of deployment, hindered by a lack of planning capacity at AU headquarters and by inefficient contractors, has been unacceptable. During our visit, some were keen to emphasise that the AU Mission was deploying more quickly than would a UN mission. This may be correct, but it offers little comfort to the people of Darfur. The UN and its Member States, alongside regional organisations such as the AU, urgently need to find ways of deploying troops more quickly. (Paragraph 68)

44.  The AU Mission is in the best position to know how many troops are required to fulfil a particular mandate. Their views must be given much weight: by the AU's Peace and Security Council; by the members of the AU who have accepted a role in bringing peace and security to Africa; and by the UK, the EU and others who are in a position to respond to requests for assistance. Those African countries who have provided troops and police to the AU can be proud of their contributions as can the troops on the ground. They embody Africa's commitment to African solutions for African problems. (Paragraph 69)

45.  The international community must apply sustained pressure on the Sudanese government, so that Janjaweed are not absorbed into the police, and the policing element of the AU Mission must be strengthened. (Paragraph 70)

46.  Helping the AU Mission, and bringing pressure to bear on the Government of the Sudan, to improve policing, is a matter of considerable urgency; the UK and the EU must do more to provide support, more quickly. As discussions continue, and action follows, attention must also be given to ensuring that there are sufficient numbers of women police officers and civilian specialists so that reports of violence against women and girls can be dealt with appropriately. (Paragraph 71)

47.  The inclusion in ceasefire-monitoring and verification missions of representatives of the Sudanese government and of the rebel groups does much to ensure that the AU Mission is trusted as being impartial. This, we were told, is also the case for the JMC in the Nuba Mountains. But it is not difficult to come up with solutions which allow for this but which do not inhibit the monitors' effectiveness: don't tell the parties' representatives exactly where the monitoring mission is going; and, don't let them carry satellite phones. (Paragraph 72)

48.  The AU Mission should share its reports on ceasefire violations widely, without having to secure the consent of the parties. Access to reports should be unrestricted and immediate for UN agencies, including UN-OHCHR. Serious consideration should also be given to the inclusion of a human rights monitor, a nurse, and a child protection officer, on monitoring missions. Concerns about their security are not insuperable. Adopting this proposal would: enable the monitoring of human rights violations and enhance the chances of people being brought to justice for human rights violations; enable the provision to rape victims of emergency contraceptives, and drugs to reduce the likelihood of HIV transmission; and ensure that the needs of child victims of atrocities — a neglected group in the crisis — are better met. If the international community is serious about protecting the civilians of Darfur, such measures are essential. (Paragraph 73)

49.  The UK and the EU have been particularly generous with financial support for the AU, but as Hilary Benn acknowledged — and the Commission for Africa reiterated in its recommendation that donors provide fifty percent of the AU's peacekeeping requirements — there is a need to find a mechanism that will allow funding to support AU peace support operations on a more consistent and long-term basis. (Paragraph 74)

50.  Following the UK's lead, other donors should make vehicles available to the AU Mission on request, and satellite intelligence and help with radar to monitor the no-fly zone must be provided. The UK Government should take the lead on this, working with its partners in the EU and the USA. (Paragraph 74)

51.  The UK should second technical experts to the AU in Addis Ababa to provide the support which the AU requires. Political support to the AU is crucial too; the UK Government and others must publicise and condemn the ceasefire violations which the AU confirms, and ensure that the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council use the evidence collected by the AU Mission to hold the parties to account, and to ensure that consequences follow. (Paragraph 74)

52.  Providing military assistance to the AU is an option which should not be closed off. On the contrary, it should be explored without delay. Policy should be based on the analysis of options and their attendant risks. Military intervention entails risks, but it is risky too for the international community to fail in its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur. (Paragraph 76)

53.  What concerns us most about the international community's delegation of responsibility to the AU is: first, that there seems little sense of urgency; and second, that the support which the international community provides to the AU Mission, does not seem to be based on a strategy in which the risks attendant to different options are assessed. Complex challenges are best tackled on the basis of a clear strategy; muddling through, or waiting and seeing, rarely works. Starting from the basis that protecting the people of Darfur, and holding the parties to account for ceasefire violations is the goal, we must have clear answers to the following questions:

  • How is the effectiveness of the AU Mission being assessed, on what basis, and by whom?
  • What level of insecurity would signal that the AU Mission — working in a context largely beyond its control — was not being effective?
  • How many months does the AU Mission have to demonstrate its effectiveness?
  • If the AU Mission proves unable to fulfil its mandate effectively — monitoring and reporting on the ceasefire, and providing civilian protection — what are the next steps to ensure its success, who will ensure that they are taken, and when? (Paragraph 77)

54.  Fulfilling the responsibility to protect includes persuading others to fulfil their responsibilities too. The UK Government should be engaging with members of the AU and specifically the AU Peace and Security Council, in order to protect better the people of Darfur. (Paragraph 79)

55.  If the AU is to play its role in helping Africa to a peaceful, secure and more prosperous future, then its Member States must be prepared to make clear, through action as well as words, that sovereignty does not give states the right to commit gross human rights violations and war crimes against their citizens. African countries too have a responsibility to protect, as the AU's mandate affirms. Nevertheless, the fact that African countries have a responsibility to protect, and that the AU is increasingly willing to take on that responsibility, does not absolve others of their responsibilities. Countries beyond Africa share the responsibility for the success of the AU Mission, and for protecting the people of Darfur. If Africa needs assistance to protect the people of Darfur, then richer countries should step in. The AU's involvement is extremely welcome, but it must not become an excuse for inaction on the part of others (Paragraph 80)

The UN Security Council: Maintaining international peace and security?

56.  The Government of the Sudan will not comply with resolutions which it considers counter to its interests unless there is sustained and concerted international pressure, with consequences of non-compliance spelt out clearly. (Paragraph 87)

57.  Disarming the Janjaweed is important in itself, but it also illustrates the failure of the UN Security Council on Darfur. To be effective, demands must: be well-defined; be ambitious but achievable; include mechanisms for monitoring compliance; specify a timetable; and spell out the consequences which will flow from non-compliance. (Paragraph 87)

58.  It is a scandal that interests in oil and arms exports can prevent the Security Council from acting firmly on behalf of the international community to protect the people of Darfur. It shames those countries which, fuelling the crisis in Sudan, are happy to turn a blind-eye to crimes no less serious and heinous than genocide. And it demonstrates the impotence of the international community to act to prevent such crimes and to fulfil its responsibility to protect. (Paragraph 89)

59.  The International Criminal Court (ICC) — a court which 44 African countries have signed up for — must be the venue in which those responsible for atrocities in Darfur are brought to justice. It was set up to deal with such cases. (Paragraph 90)

60.  The ICC is the only venue that will provide reliable, timely, cost-effective justice. The UK Government, which claims to enjoy a privileged relationship with the USA, must stand firm on this; to state that the ICC is HMG's "clear preference" is not firm enough. The UK Government, in concert with its EU partners, has to persuade the USA that its commitment to stopping the conflict in Darfur, and bringing those responsible to account, is best served in this instance by pragmatism. The USA should make clear that it will not veto an ICC referral from the UN Security Council. This would do much to re-establish the transatlantic unity which is vital if the international community is to fulfil its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur. (Paragraph 91)

61.  We support the use of sanctions. Well-designed sanctions that target key individuals within the regime, through travel bans and asset freezes, will send a strong message that the international community has had enough of the Sudanese government's non-compliance and murderous policies in Darfur. We applaud the UK Government for the firm line it is now taking on sanctions. In addition, the UN arms embargo, which applies to non-governmental entities, should be extended to cover the Government of the Sudan, with an effective monitoring mechanism established. (Paragraph 92)

62.  There is little purpose in diplomatic energy being wasted on a Resolution which achieves consensus on the Security Council but nothing for Darfur. The USA and the UK should force a vote on a Resolution which extends the arms embargo, imposes targeted sanctions, makes clear demands, and outlines what further sanctions — to include oil sanctions — will follow in the event of non-compliance. A failed Resolution which exposes the "blocking" states would be better than the current stalemate, a stalemate which adds weight to the recommendation of the UN High-level panel that Member States should come to an agreement not to use the veto, except in circumstances where vital interests are genuinely at stake, and also to the proposal that indicative voting, to reveal countries' positions on proposed actions, be adopted. (Paragraph 93)

63.  The international community's major failing has been its failure to intervene at an early stage. Waiting has allowed the crisis to grow, and a larger crisis requires stronger, more intrusive, intervention. Stronger and more intrusive intervention — especially military intervention — may, on the one hand make consensus hard to achieve, and on the other, demand the agreement of the UN Security Council. Without consensus, legally-authorised action is hard to take. And so the cycle continues. The lesson is clear: do not wait to intervene — work hard for a consensus for early, non-military, intervention. (Paragraph 94)

64.  Some simple guidelines for dealing with regimes like the Sudanese government are: do not trust what they say; demand hard evidence to back up what they say they have done; establish clear benchmarks and timetables against which their actions can be judged; and, specify what consequences will flow, and when, if the government fails to meet its commitments. Dealing with the rebels has its own problems too, with a lack of clarity as regards their organisation and their demands at the top of the list. Efforts must be made to engage with the rebels, not least to identify their demands. (Paragraph 95)

65.  The application of political pressure through different channels is the right approach, but it must be better coordinated. The AU, the UN, and its international partners must work from a coordinated strategic plan, with roles and responsibilities made clear. (Paragraph 96)

66.  The "responsibility to protect" is an emerging legal norm, but as yet it has no firm legal basis. As a result, a shared responsibility to protect risks degenerating into a game of passing the buck and avoiding responsibilities. When everyone is responsible for collective security, it might be that no-one will take responsibility. To put it differently, when the Prime Minister says that in a situation similar to Rwanda in 1994, "we would have a moral duty to act", who precisely is the "we", and what action would be required? Despite the commendable efforts of the UK and others to promote the notion of the "responsibility to protect", and what it terms the "doctrine of humanitarian intervention", regrettably, there are no clear answers. There may be a shared responsibility to protect, but the mechanisms of accountability, to ensure that responsibilities are shouldered, are lacking. (Paragraph 97)

67.  If the UN Security Council fails to act on Darfur, it will once more find its position undermined, in two ways. First, many will conclude that the workings of the UN Security Council do not promote the responsibility to protect. And second, if frustrated Member States act successfully outside the authority of the Security Council, many will conclude that the UN is not necessary. (Paragraph 100)

68.  Those who do not wish to see the UN authorise military interventions for humanitarian purposes, for fear that they might be abused, have legitimate concerns. They should however, consider the following: if such interventions are left to "coalitions of the willing", acting without UN-authorisation, then they will be more open to abuse, will be more likely to be driven by national interests, and will be less responsive to humanitarian need. For those of us who believe that membership of the international community requires that countries adhere to certain minimum standards of behaviour, and who regard the UN — flawed as it is — as the best hope of achieving collective security and sustainable development, this would be nothing short of disastrous. Global social justice — in relation to peace, security, development, and the environment — requires an effective and accountable UN. (Paragraph 100)

The responsibility for development

Governance and political change: Institutions for peace?

69.  We do not accept that there is a trade-off, or choice to be made, between justice and peace. If the aim is a sustainable peace, then justice and accountability are required. Political negotiations with those responsible for crimes against humanity are hardly a sound basis for a sustainable peace. (Paragraph 104)

70.  The UK Government and others must work alongside the SPLM and the Khartoum regime to help them to prepare for governing Sudan. The parties seem committed to implementing the CPA. Their goal, and that of the international community, must be to ensure that the nature of politics in Sudan is transformed so that when the South votes on secession in six years' time, the decision is respected by all. (Paragraph 106)

71.  With a comparative advantage in supporting judicial reform and good governance, the UK has an important role to play in Sudan. We look forward to hearing more about DFID's plans. (Paragraph 108)

72.  It is not clear whether there will be another round of the Libyan-hosted tribal reconciliation talks. It is important that the relationship between any such talks and the Abuja peace process is clear. Stakeholders such as the UK should — whilst being careful to remain neutral — offer support to such initiatives. Attention must also be given to the establishment of a Land Commission for Darfur, to determine a fair formula for access to land. (Paragraph 110)

Development and livelihoods: Incentives for peace?

73.  Sudan's international partners, including the UK, must insist that all oil-related transactions — payments by outside companies, as well as flows of finance within Sudan — are published in line with the highest international standards of transparency. Specifically, they should comply at least with the guidelines promoted by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and consult openly with civil society. A full, independent audit of the state oil company should also be carried out, and the results published. (Paragraph 112)

74.  The UK Government should make its financial support to the Government of the Sudan conditional on a substantial and rapid decline in military spending, and encourage other donors to do likewise. (Paragraph 112)

75.  The humanitarian response must be integrated with plans for longer-term development. Working with the new Government of the Sudan, donors including the UK should consider how Reconstruction and Development Funds, such as those provided for in the CPA, might be used to support the rebuilding of livelihoods in Darfur. And, whilst the focus of livelihood rehabilitation will be on agriculture and related activities, the looming threat of HIV/AIDS must not be forgotten. (Paragraph 114)

Shared responsibilities, accountability and effective partnerships

76.  Donors must be generous, immediately and at the donors' conference in Oslo from April 11-12. The needs are immediate, and will be long-term; the support should be too. We expect the UK Government, which has worked tirelessly in support of the CPA, to provide generous and immediate financial support. It should also persuade its European partners to invest in the Sudanese peace. (Paragraph 116)

77.  The Government of Southern Sudan must be provided with the resources it needs to become a partner for peace and development, and to invest in the human development of its citizens. But the provision of debt relief and of funds which would primarily benefit the National Congress Party — the Khartoum regime responsible for the crisis in Darfur — must be conditional on resolving the crisis in Darfur. The conditions to be met must be clearly benchmarked, the timetables for meeting them spelt out, and the consequences which flow from meeting or not meeting commitments must be specified. The UK Government should take the lead on this, ensuring that donors speak with one voice at Oslo. (Paragraph 117)

78.  If the international community is to fulfil its shared responsibility to protect, then we must all fulfil our responsibilities, and hold others to account for fulfilling theirs. The UK Government has, on the whole, responded well to Darfur. The international community must fulfil its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur, now. Attacked by the government which is meant to protect them, the people of Darfur, who we have collectively and demonstrably failed, deserve no less. Action is needed now. (Paragraph 119)


 
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