Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
Darfur mortality estimates
1. The
only violent deaths which the WHO's estimate includes are those
which took place in the camps for Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs). Of those attacked in their villages, only those who made
it to the camps before dying would be included in the WHO's estimate.
With the exception of these cases, the WHO's estimate does not
include deaths due to the violence from which people have fled.
In addition, the WHO estimate covers only the period from March
to mid-October 2004, and only takes account of deaths in accessible
areas within the borders of Darfur. Cited without clear explanation
of its limitations, the WHO's estimate is extremely misleading.
(Paragraph 4)
2. Political pressure
must be exerted on the Government of the Sudan to enable the WHO
or a different competent organisation to conduct further assessments
of mortality resulting from the crisis in Darfur. And, in a situation
where statistics are deflated, inflated and used by all sides
as political weapons, the WHO must ensure that its statistics
are not open to mis-interpretation and abuse. The WHO's press
release of 14 October 2004, conflating two types of violence,
demonstrated at best extreme naivety if not gross incompetence.
(Paragraph 5)
The responsibility to protect
3. Sovereignty
entails responsibilities as well as rights. States have the primary
responsibility for their citizens, but in circumstances where
states commit crimes against humanity and war crimes against their
own citizens, the international community has an obligation and
a duty to those citizens — a "responsibility to protect."
Sovereignty does not give states the right to commit gross human
rights violations and war crimes against their citizens. (Paragraph
10)
Meeting humanitarian needs?
Early warnings, donor response and the role
of the media
4. The
international community chose to ignore the early warnings of
NGOs and senior UN officials. Other factors — poor access,
continuing insecurity, a flawed humanitarian system, and an unfavourable
political context — played a part too, but by ignoring the
warnings, the international community helped to ensure that the
initial humanitarian response to Darfur was, as Médecins
Sans Frontières put it, "a staggering failure".
(Paragraph 15)
5. The UK Government
deserves credit for its speedy and generous response to the crisis
in Darfur. The EC/ECHO and the USA deserve praise too. Particularly
noteworthy is the EC's early support for the AU's work in Darfur.
Other donors, including other European countries, should have
done more. Arab countries have donated 2.5 percent of the total,
mainly through in-kind bilateral humanitarian aid. This is disappointing.
The donor response to Darfur has, after a slow start, been very
good. But huge needs remain across Sudan and elsewhere. (Paragraph
16)
6. Governments and
politicians must not wait to act until images of death and destruction
are on the TV screens. By then it is too late. (Paragraph 18)
7. Governments play
an active part in shaping the news agenda. The UK Government could
and should have done more to try to ensure that Darfur received
greater news coverage in 2003 and early 2004. We invite the Government
to outline, in its response to our report, its strategy for more
effective media engagement around complex emergencies such as
Darfur. (Paragraph 19)
Humanitarian access: Government obstructions,
logistics, insecurity
8. We
condemn the Government of the Sudan for its deliberate policy
of limiting humanitarian access to Darfur. We applaud the UK Government
and the British Embassy in Khartoum for their persistent efforts
to get restrictions lifted. The humanitarian response would have
been more effective if diplomatic pressure had led to an earlier
lifting of the Sudanese government's bureaucratic restrictions,
but Hilary Benn and Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, deserve
much credit for ensuring that such restrictions were eventually
eased. Effective humanitarian response to crises such as Darfur
depends upon unhindered humanitarian access. (Paragraph 21)
9. Continuing diplomatic
pressure is needed to ensure that humanitarian agencies and staff,
including those involved in human rights and protection work,
are not harassed. In a context where the Sudanese government is
failing to protect its own people, it will not and must not escape
criticism from agencies concerned with protection and human rights.
Specifically, the Sudanese government should be put under pressure
to ensure that the International Committee of the Red Cross —
perhaps the archetypal humanitarian organisation — has the
access which it needs to detainees. The UK Government, through
the Embassy in Khartoum, must continue to press the Sudanese government
on these issues. (Paragraph 22)
10. All organisations
tasked with the delivery of humanitarian supplies, including the
WFP, must be well-supported by the donors at an early stage. If
they are to deliver adequate supplies at the right time, then
this is essential. In return for donor support, the organisations
must deliver. The WFP must do all it can to ensure that adequate
food supplies are in place before demand peaks in August this
year. (Paragraph 23)
11. The killing of
humanitarian workers in situations of armed conflict is a war
crime. The perpetrators of such crimes must be brought to justice,
and the protection provided to humanitarian
workers under international law must be clarified, and, if necessary,
strengthened. (Paragraph 24)
12. Resolving the
security problem requires political pressure on the parties to
stick to the ceasefire, and more robust protection for humanitarian
agencies. But in the meantime, with more resources, UNDSS could
check roads more frequently, allowing it to maintain its standards
without having to declare roads "no-go" for long periods
of time. The UK Government, in its support for the humanitarian
response, must ensure that UNDSS receives adequate funding. (Paragraph
25)
13. To ensure that
the humanitarian effort is not derailed by insecurity, the AU,
the UK and other external powers must apply firmer political pressure,
bilaterally and through the UN, to ensure that the parties honour
their ceasefire commitments. But no matter what happens politically,
or in terms of sticking to the ceasefire, humanitarian relief
must be provided according to need; relief must not be made conditional.
(Paragraph 26)
The humanitarian system: Capacity, coordination
and leadership
14. Donors,
NGOs and UN agencies should give serious consideration to investing
more in training and skills development for humanitarian staff
from the developing world, so that the capacity of the humanitarian
system can be enhanced. (Paragraph 29)
15. Humanitarian donors
must do more to support their implementing partners in the times
between crises. In the absence of core-funding, it is no surprise
that NGOs find it difficult to train and retain staff and to respond
quickly to need. We would appreciate further information about
DFID's policy on this. (Paragraph 29)
16. If the international
community is to be able to fulfil its responsibility to protect,
it must act now to ensure that it is able to deal effectively
with crises involving IDPs. Ad hoc arrangements will not
see duties adequately fulfilled. To respond to IDPs' needs with
excuses about institutional mandates would be laughable if it
did not have such tragic human consequences. (Paragraph 32)
17. The UK Government
should - on behalf of the UK taxpayers who help to fund the agencies
— find out why UNHCR and UNICEF were unwilling to take on
the responsibility for the management of IDP camps in Darfur.
(Paragraph 33)
18. All IDPs are affected
by violence, but the needs of women and girls affected and threatened
by rape and gender-based violence stand out. Many attacks take
place when women — putting themselves at risk of attack,
rather than their husbands and sons, who might be killed —
are collecting firewood outside the camps. Fuel-efficient stoves
can help, and arrangements should be made to ensure that trustworthy
police patrols are stepped up to protect women collecting firewood
More attention and resources also need to be devoted to the rights
and needs of those who have been attacked, and to ensuring that
those responsible are brought to justice. (Paragraph 34)
19. If returns and
relocations are to be truly voluntary, then there must be extensive
consultation with the IDPs. And with the women, not just with
the male tribal leaders. (Paragraph 37)
20. Security and progress
on the political front are the pre-requisites for voluntary return.
Agreements on Voluntary Return will not in themselves bring it
about. Nevertheless, the international community must ensure that
the Sudanese government sticks to the agreements it has reached
and stops its practice of forcing IDPs to return home or to move
to other camps. Rather than waiting for security to improve, the
UN should be putting plans in place now, for the informed and
voluntary return of IDPs to their homes over the next year. (Paragraph
38)
21. Mukesh Kapila's
enforced departure from Sudan was, it seems, the inevitable result
of his decision to speak out and insist that a so-called "humanitarian
crisis" had political causes and required political pressure
for its resolution. Dr. Kapila told us that as the ethnic cleansing
was not averted, he believes that he personally failed in Darfur.
But it was the international community that failed, despite the
best efforts of Dr. Kapila, and others such as Jan Egeland. (Paragraph
39)
22. Mukesh Kapila
was right to speak out about Darfur, of that we have no doubt.
The UN system failed to ensure a smooth transition at a critical
time, because of a lack of planning, because — once sensible
suggestions for his replacement were made — of a lack of
political pressure by Member States through the Security Council,
and because of the intransigence of the Government of the Sudan.
(Paragraph 40)
Towards effective humanitarian relief
23. If,
as seems certain, the IDPs are unable to return home this spring
in time to plant crops, continuing food aid will still be needed
this year to feed 3 or perhaps 4 million people, nomadic Arabs
as well as African sedentary farmers. There is an extremely serious
risk of famine. Having arrived late in the day, the humanitarian
community must not now turn its back on Darfur. (Paragraph 41)
24. There is strong
case for initiating an inter-governmental review of the humanitarian
response, along the lines of that which took place after Rwanda,
led perhaps by an African country. The UK Government should consider
supporting such a review. (Paragraph 43)
25. There may be value
in having a system of graded warnings which, depending on the
level of warning, require mandatory action by governments. (Paragraph
44)
26. The international
community needs to establish ways of working which deliver humanitarian
aid when it is needed, but which do not institutionalise artificial
and unhelpful divisions between humanitarian relief, reconstruction
and development. (Paragraph 45)
27. We endorse strongly
the suggestions made by the Secretary of State for International
Development for reforming the international humanitarian system,
particularly as regards funding and giving UN-OCHA a stronger
role in coordination. More broadly, we share his concern that
there are no clear means of holding humanitarian donors and agencies
to account. In the absence of accountability, the provision of
humanitarian relief will be slow to improve. (Paragraph 46)
28. The suffering
of Darfur's millions is not the result of a natural disaster.
It is not solely a "humanitarian crisis". It is a political,
human rights and humanitarian crisis, and — as the UN Security
Council has confirmed — a crisis which threatens international
peace and security. Every opportunity should be taken to make
this clear. Unless the causes as well as the symptoms of the crisis
in Darfur are dealt with, and the humanitarian response is able
to proceed in a secure context — with political progress
being made — no amount of money will resolve the crisis.
(Paragraph 47)
29. Humanitarian aid
is not a substitute for political pressure, and, if necessary,
military action, to enhance security. The humanitarian community
must not be made a scapegoat for the international community's
failure to respond adequately to Darfur on the political level.
(Paragraph 48)
Providing protection and security by exerting
political pressure?
Sequencing and the prioritisation of the North-South
peace process
30. The
evidence shows that the international community — including
the UK chose to treat the CPA and Darfur sequentially, with the
priority given to securing the North-South peace through the CPA,
in the hope that it would in turn provide a template for peace
in Darfur. Governments, including our own, felt that highlighting
events in Darfur, and pressurising the Sudanese government in
relation to Darfur, might throw the CPA peace process off-track.
(Paragraph 52)
31. Governments, including
our own, failed to speak out about Darfur at an early stage; failed
to get the UN Security Council to adopt a Resolution about Darfur
until July 2004; failed to put concerted pressure on the Sudanese
government to allow humanitarian access; and failed to make the
government take seriously its responsibilities for protecting
the people of Darfur and for complying with its ceasefire commitments
and legal obligations. (Paragraph 54)
32. On the ground,
the catalogue of diplomatic failures had serious repercussions.
In early 2004, with the international community prioritising the
CPA process, the Government of the Sudan unleashed its deadly
and totally disproportionate counter-insurgency strategy. It was
given a window of opportunity, and — with its room for manoeuvre
soon to be reduced by the entry into power of the SPLM —
a reason to take it quickly. If Darfur had not been sidelined,
there is no doubt that events would have turned out differently.
(Paragraph 54)
33. It certainly would
have been wrong to let the chance of securing the North-South
peace, and perhaps a template for a wider peace, slip away. But
prioritising the CPA ran counter to the needs of the people of
Darfur for protection, security and humanitarian assistance. When
the conflict in Darfur escalated in early 2004, this much was
crystal clear. (Paragraph 56)
34. The international
community did not need to make such a choice, and — by emphasising
one set of issues (the CPA) rather than the other (Darfur) —
was playing into the hands of the Sudanese government (Paragraph
56)
35. The international
community could have pushed harder on Darfur without risking the
CPA negotiations. A more holistic approach would not, it seems
to us, have prevented the signing of the CPA (it may have delayed
it by a few months, but as the North-South peace had already been
established, this would have been at no great practical cost),
and it would certainly have prevented the crisis in Darfur getting
as bad as it did. In the simple terms of balancing likely costs
and benefits, prioritising the CPA was misguided. A more holistic
approach was possible, and, in terms of likely impact, was preferable.
(Paragraph 56)
36. We believe that
the UK Government has had honourable intentions throughout; but
mistakes were made. Strategies for dealing with governments to
move dual peace-processes forward will be needed again. Lessons
must be learnt. In its response to our report, we invite the Government
— not solely DFID — to outline the lessons which have
been learnt about sequencing and prioritisation as a result of
the experience of Darfur. (Paragraph 58)
The role of the African Union: African-led
solutions for African problems?
37. We
unreservedly welcome the AU's involvement in Darfur, for two reasons.
First, the AU's involvement signals a new commitment by African
countries to take responsibility for dealing with the problems
of their neighbours, a commitment which will in time do much to
enhance the world's ability to deal with crises and conflict.
Second, and more importantly, the AU was and remains the only
entity willing to involve itself so fully in trying to tackle
the crisis and protect the people of Darfur (Paragraph 59)
38. In the case of
Darfur, the UK Government's rhetoric of "African-led solutions
for African problems" is rather simplistic; many countries
have had a role in the evolution of Sudan's problems. But nevertheless,
HMG deserves a great deal of credit for its support of the AU.
(Paragraph 60)
39. If the Abuja talks
are to make progress on a political solution, sustained international
pressure on the Government of the Sudan and the rebels will be
needed, along with a clear vision of a desirable outcome. But
it would be better to wait a month or two and get it right, than
resume negotiations now, only to see them fall apart next week.
(Paragraph 63)
40. Evidence suggests
that the AU Mission in Darfur has had a positive impact on security.
Through prompt and objective monitoring and reporting on ceasefire
violations, and by making its presence felt, the AU has both enhanced
accountability for violations and prevented violations from taking
place. However, comprehensive data on ceasefire violations —
how frequent they are, who is responsible for them, and what the
trends are — does not seem readily available. The AU should
make such information public. (Paragraph 66)
41. The AU, at the
level of its Peace and Security Council, and on the ground in
Darfur, needs to ensure that the mandate is clear, and clearly
understood by all parties. Further, it is not clear that the mandate
will be sufficient, even if the AU Mission works right at the
limit of its civilian protection mandate. (Paragraph 67)
42. Decisions about
mandate are for the AU's Peace and Security Council to make, in
consultation with the wider international community. However,
if security does not improve in Darfur within weeks, and if large-scale
killing continues, then the mandate of the AU must be revised
to enable it to use force to protect civilians, and to disarm
militias. As a first next-step, the AU should do more pro-actively
to police the no-fly zone, agreed to by the parties as part of
the 9 November Security Protocol. The AU must also be provided
with the logistical and technical support to enable it to fulfil
its mandate. (Paragraph 67)
43. The speed of deployment,
hindered by a lack of planning capacity at AU headquarters and
by inefficient contractors, has been unacceptable. During our
visit, some were keen to emphasise that the AU Mission was deploying
more quickly than would a UN mission. This may be correct, but
it offers little comfort to the people of Darfur. The UN and its
Member States, alongside regional organisations such as the AU,
urgently need to find ways of deploying troops more quickly. (Paragraph
68)
44. The AU Mission
is in the best position to know how many troops are required to
fulfil a particular mandate. Their views must be given much weight:
by the AU's Peace and Security Council; by the members of the
AU who have accepted a role in bringing peace and security to
Africa; and by the UK, the EU and others who are in a position
to respond to requests for assistance. Those African countries
who have provided troops and police to the AU can be proud of
their contributions as can the troops on the ground. They embody
Africa's commitment to African solutions for African problems.
(Paragraph 69)
45. The international
community must apply sustained pressure on the Sudanese government,
so that Janjaweed are not absorbed into the police, and the policing
element of the AU Mission must be strengthened. (Paragraph 70)
46. Helping the AU
Mission, and bringing pressure to bear on the Government of the
Sudan, to improve policing, is a matter of considerable urgency;
the UK and the EU must do more to provide support, more quickly.
As discussions continue, and action follows, attention must also
be given to ensuring that there are sufficient numbers of women
police officers and civilian specialists so that reports of violence
against women and girls can be dealt with appropriately. (Paragraph
71)
47. The inclusion
in ceasefire-monitoring and verification missions of representatives
of the Sudanese government and of the rebel groups does much to
ensure that the AU Mission is trusted as being impartial. This,
we were told, is also the case for the JMC in the Nuba Mountains.
But it is not difficult to come up with solutions which allow
for this but which do not inhibit the monitors' effectiveness:
don't tell the parties' representatives exactly where the monitoring
mission is going; and, don't let them carry satellite phones.
(Paragraph 72)
48. The AU Mission
should share its reports on ceasefire violations widely, without
having to secure the consent of the parties. Access to reports
should be unrestricted and immediate for UN agencies, including
UN-OHCHR. Serious consideration should also be given to the inclusion
of a human rights monitor, a nurse, and a child protection officer,
on monitoring missions. Concerns about their security are not
insuperable. Adopting this proposal would: enable the monitoring
of human rights violations and enhance the chances of people being
brought to justice for human rights violations; enable the provision
to rape victims of emergency contraceptives, and drugs to reduce
the likelihood of HIV transmission; and ensure that the needs
of child victims of atrocities — a neglected group in the
crisis — are better met. If the international community
is serious about protecting the civilians of Darfur, such measures
are essential. (Paragraph 73)
49. The UK and the
EU have been particularly generous with financial support for
the AU, but as Hilary Benn acknowledged — and the Commission
for Africa reiterated in its recommendation that donors provide
fifty percent of the AU's peacekeeping requirements — there
is a need to find a mechanism that will allow funding to support
AU peace support operations on a more consistent and long-term
basis. (Paragraph 74)
50. Following the
UK's lead, other donors should make vehicles available to the
AU Mission on request, and satellite intelligence and help with
radar to monitor the no-fly zone must be provided. The UK Government
should take the lead on this, working with its partners in the
EU and the USA. (Paragraph 74)
51. The UK should
second technical experts to the AU in Addis Ababa to provide the
support which the AU requires. Political support to the AU is
crucial too; the UK Government and others must publicise and condemn
the ceasefire violations which the AU confirms, and ensure that
the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council
use the evidence collected by the AU Mission to hold the parties
to account, and to ensure that consequences follow. (Paragraph
74)
52. Providing military
assistance to the AU is an option which should not be closed off.
On the contrary, it should be explored without delay. Policy should
be based on the analysis of options and their attendant risks.
Military intervention entails risks, but it is risky too for the
international community to fail in its responsibility to protect
the people of Darfur. (Paragraph 76)
53. What concerns
us most about the international community's delegation of responsibility
to the AU is: first, that there seems little sense of urgency;
and second, that the support which the international community
provides to the AU Mission, does not seem to be based on a strategy
in which the risks attendant to different options are assessed.
Complex challenges are best tackled on the basis of a clear strategy;
muddling through, or waiting and seeing, rarely works. Starting
from the basis that protecting the people of Darfur, and holding
the parties to account for ceasefire violations is the goal, we
must have clear answers to the following questions:
- How is the effectiveness of the AU Mission being
assessed, on what basis, and by whom?
- What level of insecurity would signal that the
AU Mission — working in a context largely beyond its control
— was not being effective?
- How many months does the AU Mission have to demonstrate
its effectiveness?
- If the AU Mission proves unable to fulfil its
mandate effectively — monitoring and reporting on the ceasefire,
and providing civilian protection — what are the next steps
to ensure its success, who will ensure that they are taken, and
when? (Paragraph 77)
54. Fulfilling the
responsibility to protect includes persuading others to fulfil
their responsibilities too. The UK Government should be engaging
with members of the AU and specifically the AU Peace and Security
Council, in order to protect better the people of Darfur. (Paragraph
79)
55. If the AU is to
play its role in helping Africa to a peaceful, secure and more
prosperous future, then its Member States must be prepared to
make clear, through action as well as words, that sovereignty
does not give states the right to commit gross human rights violations
and war crimes against their citizens. African countries too have
a responsibility to protect, as the AU's mandate affirms. Nevertheless,
the fact that African countries have a responsibility to protect,
and that the AU is increasingly willing to take on that responsibility,
does not absolve others of their responsibilities. Countries beyond
Africa share the responsibility for the success of the AU Mission,
and for protecting the people of Darfur. If Africa needs assistance
to protect the people of Darfur, then richer countries should
step in. The AU's involvement is extremely welcome, but it must
not become an excuse for inaction on the part of others (Paragraph
80)
The UN Security Council: Maintaining international
peace and security?
56. The
Government of the Sudan will not comply with resolutions which
it considers counter to its interests unless there is sustained
and concerted international pressure, with consequences of non-compliance
spelt out clearly. (Paragraph 87)
57. Disarming the
Janjaweed is important in itself, but it also illustrates the
failure of the UN Security Council on Darfur. To be effective,
demands must: be well-defined; be ambitious but achievable; include
mechanisms for monitoring compliance; specify a timetable; and
spell out the consequences which will flow from non-compliance.
(Paragraph 87)
58. It is a scandal
that interests in oil and arms exports can prevent the Security
Council from acting firmly on behalf of the international community
to protect the people of Darfur. It shames those countries which,
fuelling the crisis in Sudan, are happy to turn a blind-eye to
crimes no less serious and heinous than genocide. And it demonstrates
the impotence of the international community to act to prevent
such crimes and to fulfil its responsibility to protect. (Paragraph
89)
59. The International
Criminal Court (ICC) — a court which 44 African countries
have signed up for — must be the venue in which those responsible
for atrocities in Darfur are brought to justice. It was set up
to deal with such cases. (Paragraph 90)
60. The ICC is the
only venue that will provide reliable, timely, cost-effective
justice. The UK Government, which claims to enjoy a privileged
relationship with the USA, must stand firm on this; to state that
the ICC is HMG's "clear preference" is not firm enough.
The UK Government, in concert with its EU partners, has to persuade
the USA that its commitment to stopping the conflict in Darfur,
and bringing those responsible to account, is best served in this
instance by pragmatism. The USA should make clear that it will
not veto an ICC referral from the UN Security Council. This would
do much to re-establish the transatlantic unity which is vital
if the international community is to fulfil its responsibility
to protect the people of Darfur. (Paragraph 91)
61. We support the
use of sanctions. Well-designed sanctions that target key individuals
within the regime, through travel bans and asset freezes, will
send a strong message that the international community has had
enough of the Sudanese government's non-compliance and murderous
policies in Darfur. We applaud the UK Government for the firm
line it is now taking on sanctions. In addition, the UN arms embargo,
which applies to non-governmental entities, should be extended
to cover the Government of the Sudan, with an effective monitoring
mechanism established. (Paragraph 92)
62. There is little
purpose in diplomatic energy being wasted on a Resolution which
achieves consensus on the Security Council but nothing for Darfur.
The USA and the UK should force a vote on a Resolution which extends
the arms embargo, imposes targeted sanctions, makes clear demands,
and outlines what further sanctions — to include oil sanctions
— will follow in the event of non-compliance. A failed Resolution
which exposes the "blocking" states would be better
than the current stalemate, a stalemate which adds weight to the
recommendation of the UN High-level panel that Member States should
come to an agreement not to use the veto, except in circumstances
where vital interests are genuinely at stake, and also to the
proposal that indicative voting, to reveal countries' positions
on proposed actions, be adopted. (Paragraph 93)
63. The international
community's major failing has been its failure to intervene at
an early stage. Waiting has allowed the crisis to grow, and a
larger crisis requires stronger, more intrusive, intervention.
Stronger and more intrusive intervention — especially military
intervention — may, on the one hand make consensus hard
to achieve, and on the other, demand the agreement of the UN Security
Council. Without consensus, legally-authorised action is hard
to take. And so the cycle continues. The lesson is clear: do not
wait to intervene — work hard for a consensus for early,
non-military, intervention. (Paragraph 94)
64. Some simple guidelines
for dealing with regimes like the Sudanese government are: do
not trust what they say; demand hard evidence to back up what
they say they have done; establish clear benchmarks and timetables
against which their actions can be judged; and, specify what consequences
will flow, and when, if the government fails to meet its commitments.
Dealing with the rebels has its own problems too, with a lack
of clarity as regards their organisation and their demands at
the top of the list. Efforts must be made to engage with the rebels,
not least to identify their demands. (Paragraph 95)
65. The application
of political pressure through different channels is the right
approach, but it must be better coordinated. The AU, the UN, and
its international partners must work from a coordinated strategic
plan, with roles and responsibilities made clear. (Paragraph 96)
66. The "responsibility
to protect" is an emerging legal norm, but as yet it has
no firm legal basis. As a result, a shared responsibility to protect
risks degenerating into a game of passing the buck and avoiding
responsibilities. When everyone is responsible for collective
security, it might be that no-one will take responsibility. To
put it differently, when the Prime Minister says that in a situation
similar to Rwanda in 1994, "we would have a moral duty to
act", who precisely is the "we", and what action
would be required? Despite the commendable efforts of the UK and
others to promote the notion of the "responsibility to protect",
and what it terms the "doctrine of humanitarian intervention",
regrettably, there are no clear answers. There may be a shared
responsibility to protect, but the mechanisms of accountability,
to ensure that responsibilities are shouldered, are lacking. (Paragraph
97)
67. If the UN Security
Council fails to act on Darfur, it will once more find its position
undermined, in two ways. First, many will conclude that the workings
of the UN Security Council do not promote the responsibility to
protect. And second, if frustrated Member States act successfully
outside the authority of the Security Council, many will conclude
that the UN is not necessary. (Paragraph 100)
68. Those who do not
wish to see the UN authorise military interventions for humanitarian
purposes, for fear that they might be abused, have legitimate
concerns. They should however, consider the following: if such
interventions are left to "coalitions of the willing",
acting without UN-authorisation, then they will be more open to
abuse, will be more likely to be driven by national interests,
and will be less responsive to humanitarian need. For those of
us who believe that membership of the international community
requires that countries adhere to certain minimum standards of
behaviour, and who regard the UN — flawed as it is —
as the best hope of achieving collective security and sustainable
development, this would be nothing short of disastrous. Global
social justice — in relation to peace, security, development,
and the environment — requires an effective and accountable
UN. (Paragraph 100)
The responsibility for development
Governance and political change: Institutions
for peace?
69. We
do not accept that there is a trade-off, or choice to be made,
between justice and peace. If the aim is a sustainable peace,
then justice and accountability are required. Political negotiations
with those responsible for crimes against humanity are hardly
a sound basis for a sustainable peace. (Paragraph 104)
70. The UK Government
and others must work alongside the SPLM and the Khartoum regime
to help them to prepare for governing Sudan. The parties seem
committed to implementing the CPA. Their goal, and that of the
international community, must be to ensure that the nature of
politics in Sudan is transformed so that when the South votes
on secession in six years' time, the decision is respected by
all. (Paragraph 106)
71. With a comparative
advantage in supporting judicial reform and good governance, the
UK has an important role to play in Sudan. We look forward to
hearing more about DFID's plans. (Paragraph 108)
72. It is not clear
whether there will be another round of the Libyan-hosted tribal
reconciliation talks. It is important that the relationship between
any such talks and the Abuja peace process is clear. Stakeholders
such as the UK should — whilst being careful to remain neutral
— offer support to such initiatives. Attention must also
be given to the establishment of a Land Commission for Darfur,
to determine a fair formula for access to land. (Paragraph 110)
Development and livelihoods: Incentives for
peace?
73. Sudan's
international partners, including the UK, must insist that all
oil-related transactions — payments by outside companies,
as well as flows of finance within Sudan — are published
in line with the highest international standards of transparency.
Specifically, they should comply at least with the guidelines
promoted by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
and consult openly with civil society. A full, independent audit
of the state oil company should also be carried out, and the results
published. (Paragraph 112)
74. The UK Government
should make its financial support to the Government of the Sudan
conditional on a substantial and rapid decline in military spending,
and encourage other donors to do likewise. (Paragraph 112)
75. The humanitarian
response must be integrated with plans for longer-term development.
Working with the new Government of the Sudan, donors including
the UK should consider how Reconstruction and Development Funds,
such as those provided for in the CPA, might be used to support
the rebuilding of livelihoods in Darfur. And, whilst the focus
of livelihood rehabilitation will be on agriculture and related
activities, the looming threat of HIV/AIDS must not be forgotten.
(Paragraph 114)
Shared responsibilities, accountability and
effective partnerships
76. Donors
must be generous, immediately and at the donors' conference in
Oslo from April 11-12. The needs are immediate, and will be long-term;
the support should be too. We expect the UK Government, which
has worked tirelessly in support of the CPA, to provide generous
and immediate financial support. It should also persuade its European
partners to invest in the Sudanese peace. (Paragraph 116)
77. The Government
of Southern Sudan must be provided with the resources it needs
to become a partner for peace and development, and to invest in
the human development of its citizens. But the provision of debt
relief and of funds which would primarily benefit the National
Congress Party — the Khartoum regime responsible for the
crisis in Darfur — must be conditional on resolving the
crisis in Darfur. The conditions to be met must be clearly benchmarked,
the timetables for meeting them spelt out, and the consequences
which flow from meeting or not meeting commitments must be specified.
The UK Government should take the lead on this, ensuring that
donors speak with one voice at Oslo. (Paragraph 117)
78. If the international
community is to fulfil its shared responsibility to protect, then
we must all fulfil our responsibilities, and hold others to account
for fulfilling theirs. The UK Government has, on the whole, responded
well to Darfur. The international community must fulfil its responsibility
to protect the people of Darfur, now. Attacked by the government
which is meant to protect them, the people of Darfur, who we have
collectively and demonstrably failed, deserve no less. Action
is needed now. (Paragraph 119)
| 
