Memorandum submitted by the Department
for International Development (DFID)
SUMMARY
1. The conflict in Darfur has a number of
underlying causes: marginalisation, tribal disputes, incentives
to escalate the violence, conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists,
and issues of land ownership / native administration. It has led
to a total vulnerable population of 2.3 million and has involved
widespread abuses of human rights. Darfurians have suffered from
chronic food insecurity and under-development for many years.
Humanitarian needs are acute and are likely to continue for the
next 18-24 months.
2. The UK is one of the leading international
supporters of peace in Sudan. The peace talks between North and
South offer the best solution to conflict and under-development
across Sudan. The UK lobbied the Government of Sudan immediately
following the rebel attack on El Fasher airport in April 2003,
raising concerns about the Government arming tribes in response.
Several UK Ministerial visits to Sudan, including by the Prime
Minister, have taken place over the past year to press our concerns
at the highest levels to the Government of Sudan. UK Ministerial
lobbying of the Government resulted in reduced bureaucratic constraints
on access to Darfur. The UK has played a key role in getting the
Government to consider a political, rather than a solely military,
solution.
3. Our humanitarian response to Darfur is
consistent with our Country Engagement Plan objective to "meet
life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian, recovery and reintegration
needs". We were one of the first donors to contribute to
the response to the emerging crisis in Darfur—as early as
October 2003. Our total commitment is now £62.5 million—the
second largest bilateral donor. Our approach has focused on supporting
the UN-led response (funding, provision of personnel and humanitarian
supplies) as well as significant funding for international non-governmental
organisations and the Red Cross.
4. Our political and humanitarian response
to Darfur is integrated through the joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit
and British Embassy in Khartoum. We are working closely with the
international community, including considerable support for the
African Union's efforts and support for human rights organisations.
5. The international humanitarian response
to Darfur has generally been slow and insufficient. Access to
the population affected—due to bureaucratic restrictions,
insecurity and rains—has been poor but is improving. Humanitarian
agencies have struggled to find sufficient staff for Darfur. Coordination
between humanitarian agencies has not always been adequate, resulting
in a lack of strategic coordination of some sectors. The UN in
Sudan suffered a leadership vacuum between March and June 2004
and the work of the various agencies needed much more effective
coordination. Donors have been slow to commit resources and funding
remains inadequate. We have consistently lobbied other donors
for greater contributions.
6. The AU has taken the lead both in monitoring
the ceasefire and chairing further talks between the rebels and
Government. Humanitarian and political aspects of the crisis were
not understood in the round by some in the international community.
The UN Secretary General's reports to the UN Security Council
and the series of UN Security Council Resolutions have maintained
the pressure on the Government of Sudan to comply. The UK has
provided strong support to the AU, both bilaterally and through
the EU. We also co-sponsored the UN Security Council Resolutions
on Sudan.
ORIGINS AND
NATURE OF
THE CRISIS
IN DARFUR
7. Darfur is a relatively poor area of western
Sudan (population about 6 million) with a history of conflict.
The Darfur rebellion started in February 2003 as a conflict between
farmers and pastoralists over access to land and water. It quickly
escalated following an attack on El Fasher, North Darfur, by rebels.
Against a backdrop of the failure of both the Khartoum government
and the traditional leadership to address the region's problems,
the political ground for rebellion was fertile. There are two
principal rebel movements, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army
(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The SLM and
JEM recruited fighters from the disenchanted populace of Darfur,
drawing principally on the "African" Fur, Masalit and
Zaghawa tribes.
8. The Chadian government has brokered two
cease-fire agreements between the rebels and the Government. After
the second, in April 2004, the Government agreed to the deployment
of an African Union-led monitoring mission to ensure all parties
observe the cease-fire. In spite of this, both sides continue
to violate the cease-fire and proxy militias still operate with
apparent impunity. The underlying causes of the conflict have
yet to be addressed. The Justice Africa Background Briefing of
June 2004 is annexed (Ev 76).
9. The reasons behind the crisis in Darfur
are many.
— Marginalisation: The political
agenda of the rebels focuses around marginalisation, lack of investment,
development and power and wealth sharing (not necessarily for
themselves but for Darfurians as a whole).
— Tribal Disputes: When the
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) emerged in February 2003 it was primarily
made up of the Fur tribe which had been angered by the Government's
inadequate response to attacks on it by Arab tribal militias.
Conflict between the Zaghawa tribe and some of the Arab tribes
in North Darfur have also contributed to the conflict.
— Incentives: When regular forces
were making little progress against the rebels (around summer
2003) the Government called on Darfurians to join them in fighting
the rebels. Many of the Arab tribal militias answered the call
and see themselves as part of the regular army or Popular Defence
Forces.
— Pastoralists vs Agriculturists:
Due to the shortage of water and land resources and increasing
population there have been increasing clashes over these resources.
This conflict has led to conflict between the settled farming
tribes (mostly African but some Arabs) and the nomadic tribes
(mostly Arab but some Africans).
— Land Ownership/Native Administration:
A big motivational factor for some of the Arab tribes that
make up the "janjaweed" is the desire for land. Under
British rule land was allocated to some tribes and the other tribes
that lived on it paid tribute to the land owners. With land ownership
came positions in the native tribal administration (and the tribal
titles and ranks). Those tribes without land are therefore fighting
for land and positions within the native tribal administration.
CURRENT HUMANITARIAN
SITUATION
10. The UN estimates that the conflict has
led to a total vulnerable population of 2.3 million. This includes
over 1.5 million people internally displaced within Sudan, and
at least a further 200,000 people who have fled to Eastern Chad.
Urban poor and host communities make up the remaining vulnerable
population. These numbers are increasing, particularly in outlying
areas, and their food security status is deteriorating as a result
of the conflict. The conflict has involved widespread abuses of
human rights, including forced displacement, destruction of villages,
arbitrary killing of civilians and rape.
11. The humanitarian situation in Darfur
and Eastern Chad at present remains dire, with large numbers of
internally displaced people (IDPs) living in camps and host communities
with poor water and sanitation and health facilities. Essential
food and non-food supplies are, in some places, intermittent or
non-existent and there is considerable risk from outbreaks of
communicable disease. Even before the crisis broke out, many areas
of Darfur suffered from chronic food insecurity and under-development.
Many IDPs do not wish to return to their homes because of widespread
insecurity across Darfur. This is a complex and acute crisis,
with protection of civilians at its heart, which is likely to
continue for the next 18-24 months.
12. Current humanitarian needs are significant
in all sectors.
— Protection: Reports indicate
that security of IDPs within the camps is improving, but areas
around the camps are still insecure. Reports of rape, sexual and
gender-based violence are widespread. Some IDPs have recently
been subject to forced relocation to new camps around Nyala, South
Darfur.
— Food and Nutrition: The World
Food Programme (WFP) estimates that approximately 2.3 million
people are in need of food assistance in Darfur, but this is likely
to increase as more areas of Darfur are accessed. WFP estimated
that it provided food assistance to 1.3 million IDPs in September.
An inter-agency food security survey has suggested that levels
of malnutrition are significantly above emergency thresholds.
— Health: The health of the
IDP and refugee population is in a critical state. The World Health
Organisation has estimated that between 6,000 and 10,000 people
are dying each month in Darfur. Outbreak of Hepatitis E, measles,
polio and cases of meningitis have been diagnosed. There are serious
concerns about cholera. Vaccination campaigns against measles,
meningitis and polio are underway.
— Shelter: Provision of adequate
shelter is vital for protection against the harsh desert climate.
Some temporary shelter has been provided but it has not reached
all IDP settlements.
— Water and Sanitation: The
lack of clean water remains acute. Poor sanitation (alongside
malnutrition, lack of healthcare and high disease prevalence)
is a significant factor in child mortality and the vulnerability
in the displaced population.
UK APPROACH
13. Since 2000, the UK has been, along with
US and Norway, one of the leading international supporters of
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace talks
in Kenya between the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM)
and the Government of Sudan (GoS), which should bring to an end
21 years of war between the North and South of Sudan. These talks
offer the best solution to conflict and under-development in all
marginalised areas of Sudan.
14. The UK began to lobby the Government
of Sudan on the problems in Darfur as early as April 2003 following
the rebel attack on El Fasher airport and early reports that the
Government was arming tribes in response. The Secretary of State
for International Development has visited Sudan three times over
the past year. During his December 2003 visit he lobbied the Government
about Darfur and encountered general denial of the problem. In
his second visit in June 2004 he was able to press a number of
issues relating to access for the humanitarian effort, which subsequently
improved substantially. The most recent visit was alongside the
Prime Minister in October 2004. During Summer 2004, the Foreign
Secretary undertook a visit to Sudan focussed on Darfur and the
Minister for Africa visited a number of locations in the country.
These visits have involved detailed discussions with the Government
of Sudan and resulted in steps being taken by the Government in
a variety of areas, in particular greater engagement with the
rebels at the peace talks and better co-operation with the African
Union.
15. The UK played a key role in persuading
the Government to abandon sole reliance on the military option
and to consider a political solution. UK officials have been present
at talks between the Darfur rebels and Government of Sudan in
N'Djamena, Addis Ababa and Abuja. We have maintained contact with
rebel groups and pressed them to abide by humanitarian protocols,
allow access for humanitarian workers and reach a political settlement
with the Government of Sudan.
16. The first objective of the UK's Country
Engagement Plan for Sudan (published November 2003) is to "meet
life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian, recovery and reintegration
needs". Our humanitarian response to the Darfur crisis is
consistent with that objective. The Darfur Forward Humanitarian
Strategy (July 2004—annexed) (Ev 80) has as its immediate
goal to: "stabilise the acute humanitarian crisis faced by
the war-affected people of Darfur and ensure their protection
from further violence, sexual abuse and forced movement";
and in the medium term to: "support the return of the displaced
to their communities in safety and dignity and the rehabilitation
of the livelihoods of war-affected populations". These goals
have remained in later versions of the strategy.
17. We made our first contribution to the
humanitarian effort in early October 2003. We had committed £9.5
million by the end of March 2004—before many donors had
become active. Further commitments followed this financial year,
bringing our total commitment to £62.5 million and making
us the second largest bilateral donor. In January 2004 we seconded
a senior humanitarian adviser to UN Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs in Khartoum, plus three others to establish
OCHA offices in the three Darfur states. This was the first of
many secondments that have enabled UN agencies to get up and running
before their recruitment procedures might have otherwise allowed.
To date, we have provided seven staff to UNICEF, eight to OCHA,
five to WFP and five to WHO. We have also increased our own staffing
in Khartoum and London to deal with the crisis. A timeline of
the UK response and table of UK humanitarian commitments are annexed
(Ev 85/Ev 88).
18. Our approach has focused on support
of the UN-led response as well as significant funding for international
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the Red Cross, which
are undertaking the bulk of the delivery of humanitarian provisions
and services. In some cases we were instrumental in getting humanitarian
agencies into Darfur. Our support to the UN has been characterised
by considerable support for common services (such as security,
co-ordination, information management and logistics) as well as
funding for the UN's sector-based activities, including direct
provision of humanitarian supplies. In many cases we have provided
seed funding to get UN operations up and running. We have consistently
lobbied other donors for greater contributions and worked with
the humanitarian agencies to improve their performance. The UK
is working with UNICEF on an evaluation of its response. Our objectives
for October-December 2004 are to: consolidate humanitarian aid
to those already being helped and to enhance the quality of delivery;
expand operations into newly accessible and remote areas, and
meet the needs of non-displaced populations; and increase our
understanding of the local context to ensure more strategic and
coherent programmes and initiate recovery planning and preparedness.
We are beginning work to look at ways to support livelihoods in
Darfur in the longer term.
19. Our political and humanitarian response
to Darfur is integrated through the joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit
and the British Embassy in Khartoum. This has enabled us to ensure
a co-ordinated political and humanitarian response while we engage
with the Government of Sudan and others on key issues of humanitarian
access and security. This has been supported with significant
funding and other support for humanitarian agencies.
20. The UK is working closely with the international
community (particularly UN, EU and G8) on Darfur to reinforce
our messages on finding a political solution to the crisis and
improving security on the ground. Our approach (consistent with
our support to the IGAD process) has been to find African-led
solutions to African problems. We were the first donor to support
the African Union (AU) mission in May 2004, enabling it to get
established in Darfur. We have recently agreed a further £12
million from the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and successfully
pressed for the EU to release a further
80 million from the Peace Facility for the AU's expanded
mission.
21. We have also remained close to those
working on human rights, funding UN human rights monitors and
lobbying for access for human rights NGOs. The Foreign Secretary
was able to secure access for both Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch during his visit to Sudan in August 2004. We co-sponsored
UN Resolution 1564 which established an International Committee
of Inquiry to determine whether the crisis in Darfur is genocide.
The BBC television team that accompanied the Secretary of State
for International Development to Darfur in June 2004 provided
some of the first television footage from camps in Darfur.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
22. With some exceptions, the international
humanitarian response to Darfur was too slow and remains insufficient.
Nevertheless, the humanitarian response is making progress in
an extremely difficult operating environment. There are a number
of reasons for the generally slow build up in response—lack
of access, insecurity, problems recruiting humanitarian staff,
lack of co-ordination and insufficient donor resources—as
set out below.
23. The UN estimates that, until February
2004, the humanitarian community had access to less than 10% of
the population of displaced people (estimated at 600,000 by February
2004) and only 250,000 received any assistance before April 2004.
This was due to widespread fighting particularly between December
2003 and February 2004, as well as bureaucratic restrictions imposed
by the Government of Sudan on humanitarian agencies. There are
still about 250,000 known displaced people not being accessed
by humanitarian agencies, particularly in areas controlled by
the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). The rainy season between
June and September added to the access problems, particularly
in West Darfur and Eastern Chad.
24. Aid agencies are also facing continuing
difficulties because of insecurity. Major roads in Darfur are
often closed due to banditry, hindering delivery of assistance.
On 10 October two staff members of Save the Children UK were killed
and another seriously injured when a mine exploded; the UN has
since restricted movement to the west of Kutum in North Darfur.
25. There are now 66 international NGOs
operational in Darfur, and about 700 international and 5,500 national
staff employed by the UN, Red Cross and NGOs. It has taken many
months to reach this level of staffing and it is still not sufficient
for an operation of this magnitude. Humanitarian agencies have
struggled to find experienced and qualified people in sufficient
numbers. This is partly due to the poor living conditions, but
also because of a general overstretch of humanitarian workers
world-wide. The recent security problems involving humanitarian
workers are likely to make recruitment even harder. Until about
June 2004, some humanitarian agencies also had considerable problems
getting visas, work permits and travel permits for their staff.
At the start of the crisis, agencies that had been operational
in Darfur were following longer-term development approaches and
across the country there was a lack of capacity for acute crisis
response.
26. While coordination on the ground has
generally been satisfactory, coordination at national level has
not always been adequate. Areas of sectoral responsibility were
not always defined quickly enough and therefore some sectors lacked
strategic coordination throughout the crisis. There has been a
collective lack of good analysis of the situation throughout.
The UN suffered a leadership vacuum after the departure of Mukesh
Kapila as Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator in March 2004—a
critical moment.
27. Finally, donor resources have not been
sufficient. Donors have so far made firm commitments totalling
$678 million. The US, EC/ECHO and UK have contributed 57% of this
total. The UN reports unmet requirements of $235 million for the
period March-December 2004-44% of its appeal. This does not include
unmet requirements for NGO programmes. Latest UN funding tables
are annexed (Ev 91).
28. The AU has taken the lead in monitoring
the ceasefire agreed in N'Djamena in April 2004 and in taking
forward peace talks between the rebels and Government. The AU
ceasefire monitoring mission is mandated to investigate alleged
violations of the ceasefire agreement and to report back. The
AU's strategy is to use monitoring to reduce the scope for the
parties to violate the cease-fire with impunity.
29. In order to have a more direct impact
on the security situation, the AU has decided to increase the
size of its mission from less than 500 to more than 3,000 staff
and to have a more proactive monitoring role. We are working to
help deploy these people quickly, and to ensure that they have
the equipment they need. We have allocated £12 million for
this purpose (in addition to the £2 million we provided to
the initial mission in May). The EU has also agreed to provide
the AU
80 million from the Africa Peace Facility for the
expanded mission. Mobilising an effective AU mission has not been
straightforward. Darfur is a huge area to cover with massive logistical
challenges. Planning and deploying the mission has stretched the
nascent capacity of the AU Peace and Security Secretariat. Nonetheless
the mission has begun to provide an objective view of the continuing
conflict. The expansion currently in progress should produce a
much stronger impact on the security situation.
30. The peace talks between the Government
and the two rebel factions in Darfur are vital: only through political
negotiation will there be a sustainable solution to the conflict.
The AU and the observers, including a UK representative, have
helped secure the agreement of the parties to a humanitarian protocol,
committing themselves to improved humanitarian access. Both the
Government and the SLM have now committed to signing and implementing
the protocol, though they have yet to do so. Progress has also
been made towards an agreement on security issues.
31. The international community has not
always displayed sufficient understanding of both the political
and humanitarian aspects of the crisis. The delicate interplay
between the causes of the crisis in Darfur and the negotiations
between the Government and SPLM in Kenya was not fully understood.
Messages and incentives to Government and rebels in Darfur to
find a political settlement to the crisis were not always consistent
or co-ordinated.
32. The UN has established regular political
discussions with the Government of Sudan through the Joint Implementation
Mechanism to monitor progress against the UN-Government communiqué
of 3 July. The Mechanism has met monthly since then and undertaken
two verification missions to Darfur. Jan Pronk, the Special Representative
of the Secretary General, reports monthly to the UN Security Council.
His reports have shown a mixed picture of compliance by the Government
of Sudan and rebels to the commitments they have made.
LESSONS LEARNED
(i) Reaction of the international community
to the Darfur crisis was too slow. The extent of the crisis
was slow to be revealed, including in the media, meaning those
donors without strong presence in Khartoum were not sufficiently
aware of the needs. A critical mass of support for action was
slow to build up and humanitarian actors slow to engage. Limited
international presence on the ground meant that analysis and information
on the extent of crisis was patchy.
(ii) UN Response to humanitarian crises
requires stronger leadership. Difficulties in collaborative
approach to IDP crises are all too evident in Darfur. Clarity
over which agency is in the lead in certain sectors (protection,
returns and camp management) has still not been achieved. The
change of local UN leadership at a critical time with no real
plans to bridge the gap made it hard for the UN country team to
reorient themselves towards Darfur.
(iii) Need for greater surge capacity
in international humanitarian system. UN agencies, NGOs and
donors such as DFID struggled to deploy sufficient experienced
staff quickly enough.
(iv) Agencies need to have better systems
for mobilising resources in emergencies. Slow and insufficient
disbursements from donors hampered agency performance. Donors
need to give more money faster, and not wait for the political
circumstances (eg access constraints) to be addressed before disbursement.
(v) Coherent approach to the crisis
(humanitarian and political aspects) and country-wide engagement
is essential. The UK approach has linked the humanitarian
and political response not just in Darfur but in relation to the
Sudan peace process as a whole. The Sudan Unit has reduced bureaucratic
obstacles through an interdepartmental approach and provided a
one-stop-shop for policy on Sudan.
(vi) Consistent political pressure from
the international community yields results. Once the international
community had begun to engage consistently and at a high level,
improvements were seen in some key areas, eg reduction of bureaucratic
constraints on access, increased delivery of humanitarian assistance.
However, there have been problems in getting all members of the
UN Security Council to agree to apply consistent pressure.
(vii) Need to support constructive role
of African Union. There were advantages of AU engagement with
the Government of Sudan where other international engagement had
been rejected (eg monitors) and of mobilisation of African pressure
on the Government. But there is a critical need to support capacity
building in the AU Secretariat to enable an effective peacebuilding/peacekeeping
role.
November 2004
ANNEXES
1. Justice Africa Background Briefing.
2. UK Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance
for Darfur.
3. Timeline of the UK response.
4. Table of UK funding commitments.
5. UN Donor funding tables.
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