Joint memorandum submitted by Suliman
Baldo, James Morton, Roland Marchal and Alex de Waal
DARFUR IN 2004: THE MANY FACES OF A CONFLICT
A Working Paper
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper summarises discussions among four
international specialists on Sudan and Darfur. The four bring
together long experience in Darfur with up-to-date knowledge of
the current political situation in Sudan, including the regime
in Khartoum as well as wider issues such as the Naivasha process
which is working towards peace in the south of the country. Section
Two outlines the current situation and Section Three takes a closer
look at the local roots of the conflict. Section Four then examines
the national and regional dimensions. The last section looks at
some proposed actions to address the situation. (Annex 1 summarises
the four authors' background and involvement in Darfur.)
2. BACKGROUND
The crisis in Darfur is immense and complex.
The basic outlines of the disaster are well-known: it is widely
recognised as the world's worst humanitarian disaster today, while
the name "Janjawiid" has become synonymous with atrocity.
But this high profile has not, at all times, been matched by an
adequate understanding of the deep and complex roots of this crisis.
The large-scale humanitarian response and political engagement
launched by the UN, African Union and international community
at large have been largely ad hoc, in ways more influenced by
experience of other disasters (Rwanda, Bosnia and Southern Sudan,
for example) than a thorough understanding of Darfur itself.
3. LOCAL DYNAMICS
Darfur is a crisis with deep local roots. Five
aspects are important.
— Identity—Identities
in Darfur have always been complex, subtle and fluid, with the
possibility of individuals or groups changing identity in response
to political and economic circumstance. These identities are in
the process of being manipulated by both Darfurian and external
political actors, to create simplified and radically polarised
"Arab" versus "African" identities. Political
Arabism in Darfur is a relatively recent creation, related to
Darfurian Arabs' linkages with Sudanese political parties and
Libya. The mobilisation around "African" identity is
even more recent, associated with links to the SPLA (the Sudanese
Peoples Liberation Army, the main southern rebel movement) and
bargaining for influence with the international community. There
are worrying signs that a discourse over "autochthony"
(belonging) is emerging in Darfur and elsewhere. Much remains
to be learned about how local identities are playing out in the
conflict. For example, the extension of the war to southeastern
Darfur raises important questions about the neutrality of the
Rizeigat, the most powerful "Arab" tribe. There is a
danger that external engagement may reinforce competitive identity
formation.
— Land and resources—The
influence of land tenure and competition for resources is controversial;
there is a conventional view that identifies these as central
to the genesis of the conflict, while an alternative view is that
land is sufficiently available so that resource conflict is not
a significant issue. According to the latter view, what is occurring
now is not "ethnic cleansing" (an attempt to resettle
areas formerly inhabited by one group by members of another) but
the use of land as a political weapon. Moreover, the provision
of transport infrastructure, markets and basic commodities could
contribute importantly to conflict resolution and prevention.
This is an area demanding further attention.
— Governance and law and order—A
major cause of the conflict, and its intractability, is the incapacity
of the Sudanese government in Darfur. Local government simply
does not function. The absence of an effective civil police force
and the dismantling of the Idara Ahlia ("native" or
"civil administration"), which was at the heart of local
dispute resolution, were both major contributors to the escalation
of violence. Distorted forms of Idara Ahlia were established by
the government in the mid 1990s, with the aim of undermining the
influence of certain chiefs and rival political parties (ie the
Umma Party), thereby contributing especially to conflict in Dar
Masalit (the area of Western Darfur along the border with Chad
which is home to the Masalit ethnic group). The government has
recently proposed the reintroduction of this form of local administration.
Though tribal authorities have been continuously weakening since
the 1960s, this initiative should be seriously considered as a
major part of the solution to the Darfur crisis. However, the
Idara Ahlia can only function if there is a powerful and neutral
sovereign force able to enforce decisions as ultimate arbiter.
This is the role in which the Sudanese state has failed most utterly.
— Militia mobilisation—The
Sudan Government has used a militia strategy (specifically militarising
rural communities) as a means of pursuing its war since the early
1980s. The use of the Janjawiid in Darfur is just the most recent
example of this. While the government may have little capacity
to provide services, it does have the capability to play a cynical
game of divide and rule. Meanwhile, the exact identity of the
Janjawiid remains unclear. Some are Chadians, some are sedentarised
former nomads from Darfur's own Arab tribes, others are drawn
from tribal self-defence units, and the leadership appears to
be an integral part of the Popular Defence Force (local militias
organised as early at the 1990s by the Sudanese Government). While
there is little doubt that Khartoum set up and unleashed the PDF/Janjawiid
this does not imply that it can easily rein them in or disarm
them.
— Darfur opposition mobilisation—The
leadership of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM—one of
the two principal Darfur rebel movements) is young and inexperienced,
resulting in part from the decapitation of Darfur's radical leadership
in the early 1990s following the failed SPLA incursion in 1990.
(And possibly the fact that more experienced leaders are not willing
to participate.) The SLM is an amalgam of pre-existing local militia
and self-defence groups (mostly from the Zaghawa/Tuer, Masalit
and Fur ethnic groups), emerging from a constellation of small
conflicts, rather than a hierarchical and centralised army. Its
political agenda is focused on Darfurian issues. The Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM—the other principal rebel movement)
has a more sophisticated leadership, drawn from ethnic Zaghawa/Kobe
members of the Islamist movement who split with the Sudanese Government
in 1999. The JEM was planned in Khartoum, as part of an agenda
for regaining state power by the Islamists or at least reframing
the national political arena. It has a smaller and more localised
presence on the ground.
It seems clear that none of the major players
in Darfur fully understood the combustible nature of the problems
in the region when they mounted armed actions in 2003-04. The
conflict has been more vicious and far-reaching than either side
can have envisioned, and the parties are struggling to cope with
the monster they have unleashed. The high level of cruelty reflects
both the traditionally violent nature of Darfurian society, and
the disregard for human life by the "security cabal"
in Khartoum.
4. NATIONAL AND
REGIONAL DYNAMICS
Beyond its local dynamics, the Darfur conflict
has both national and regional dimensions, which need to be addressed
in any attempted solution. The national and regional dimensions
include the following:
— Split in the ruling Islamist party—Before
the 1999 split, the Congress Party included substantial membership
from Darfur, and also an (ambiguous) embrace of "African"
Islamism alongside its traditional roots in the Arab-Islamist
tradition of the Nile Valley. The split helped create the conditions
for the conflict, by (a) pushing many Darfurian Islamists out
of government and the Congress Party, (b) initiating a purge of
local government officials and PDF leaders. Additional divisions
within the government and party have arisen as a result of the
Darfur war, which might jeopardise the position of Vice President
Ali Osman Taha and the security clique around him. This is a group
concerned solely with remaining in power, which has created a
strong core Islamist party and security institutions, but a weak
state.
— Oil revenues as a new factor in
reframing grievances—As the regime's ideological ambitions
have slowly been abandoned, the focus has shifted more and more
to retaining control of power and revenue. Oil money, in particular,
is reframing both the reasons to rule and the grievances to contest
the State. After two decades of economic decay, many from the
elites and counter-elites are determined to secure their share,
feeling that Khartoum (alone) is enjoying a new prosperity. The
revenue-sharing agreement with the SPLA risks providing a "demonstration
effect" of how resistance followed by negotiation may win
a new share of State revenues.
— Links to the other Sudanese peace
processes—The talks between the Government and the Darfur
rebels in Abuja, Nigeria (the "Abuja talks") are making
slow progress and are unlikely to come to a rapid successful conclusion.
Reasons for the lack of progress include the political inexperience
of the SLM and JEM, stonewalling by the Government (related both
to a policy of obstructionism and to divisions in the leadership),
and some missteps by the mediators, notably raising the issue
of disarming the rebels in advance of a political settlement.
The Darfur conflict erupted as
the IGAD ("Naivasha") peace process between the Sudan
Government and the SPLA was approaching completion. This is not
coincidental. One of the lessons from Naivasha for Sudanese parties
is that those who carry a gun will win a place at the negotiating
table. The SPLA appears to have welcomed and even abetted the
insurrection, anticipating that it would strengthen its political
hand—a position it is now reconsidering as the Darfur conflict
threatens to jeopardise the gains it has achieved at Naivasha.
The Sudanese Government believed that the imminence of an overall
agreement gave it a free pass from the international community
in Darfur. For a while, the Darfur war put the Naivasha process
on ice, which did not unduly worry the Sudan Government. By October,
however, the primacy of Naivasha in finding an end to Sudan's
conflicts had been reasserted.
Meanwhile, in a separate track,
Khartoum is negotiating with the National Democratic Alliance
(the NDA, the main coalition of "Northern" Sudanese
opposition groups and parties) in Cairo under Egyptian auspices.
The agenda for these talks implies a complete rewriting of agreements
emerging from Naivasha, in favour of greater powers for central
government. The Cairo talks are also the only forum at which the
Beja are represented (a north-eastern Sudanese "non-Arab",
Islamic nomadic ethnic group whose Beja Congress has been waging
a ten year rebellion). There is considerable concern that the
Beja may be the locus of Sudan's next serious insurrection and
humanitarian crisis, unless the underlying political issues are
dealt with soon (similar fears pertain in South/West Kordofan,
where a new insurgent group, al Shahama, has recently announced
its existence).
— Neighbouring countries—Chad's
position is complicated. Zaghawa elements amongst the rebel leadership
have strong ties in the Chadian government, while Chad's President
Idris Deby has major worries about the ambitions of the Chadian
Arabs, many of whom are represented in the Janjawiid. But Deby
is also indebted to Khartoum, which helped bring him to power.
He is striving to stay out of the conflict, and accommodate the
demands of both Zaghawa and Arabs.
Eritrea is hosting and supporting
the Darfurian opposition fronts, working hard to create unity
within and between them, and appears opposed to any peace settlements
until its own problems with its neighbours are resolved.
Egypt is hosting the Government-NDA
talks and is supporting a settlement of all Sudan's conflicts
favourable to central government. Egypt continues to regard Sudan
as an internal security issue, not a foreign policy matter.
The African Union, including
Nigeria—The AU was initially welcomed by Khartoum in
anticipation that it would prove a "soft touch". It
has proved more energetic than expected, and Chairperson Alpha
Konare has made Darfur the test case for the AU's peace and security
agenda. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who has hosted the
Abuja talks, has similarly sought to make Darfur a showcase for
Africa's capacity to resolve its own conflicts. Nigerian involvement
must be seen in the context of Nigeria's internal politics and
the President's need to play to his own Muslim majority.
Meanwhile, the AU decision to
hold its July 2005 Summit in Khartoum threatens to complicate
matters. If Sudan's conflicts are not resolved, the location of
the summit could be a cause for serious dispute between the AU,
the US and Europe, while the mobilisation of African countries
along a polarised "Arab"-"African" axis could
seriously divide the AU and undermine its peace and security agenda.
The present AU role in Darfur
includes both mediation and a cease-fire monitoring force, protected
by an AU military force. Though modest and handicapped by weak
logistics and administrative capacity, an upgrading of the AU
force was recognised as potentially the most effective response
in the short term, and one which the Sudanese Government might
be persuaded to see as its "least worst option".
— Engagement of the international
community—There is a clear risk of collisions between
actions undertaken by the international community, including the
UN system. There appeared to be a disconnect between the strategies
pursued by the Security Council on the one hand, and those of
UN's presence on the ground on the other. Humanitarian action
plans were being drawn up in Khartoum without apparent consultation
with the rebels. There is a further danger that the peace talks
might produce agreements that require the UN to attempt impossible
tasks. Until October, the humanitarian engagement in Darfur was
very fortunate in that there have been no serious incidents involving
international staff. The deaths of two aid workers, one expatriate
and one Sudanese, in a landmine explosion may prefigure a serious
deterioration of personal security in the region.
— Western activist constituencies—Western
constituencies portray Darfur in simple and comprehensible, but
misleading, terms, and then demand dramatic action. The most pressing
issue in this regard is the portrayal of the Darfur conflict as
"genocide", with the implication that this places the
perpetrators beyond the political pale and obliges military intervention.
Setting aside the question whether the Darfur atrocities count
as "genocide", the Genocide Convention does not specify
particular actions to prevent and punish it. US Secretary of State
Colin Powell, in his determination that Darfur was indeed genocide,
made on 9 September, made it clear that this finding would not
change US government policy. The key point is that local mechanisms
such as tribal reconciliation conferences are likely to be more
effective than formal judicial processes in achieving workable
and lasting solutions. For that reason, western military intervention
is undesirable and likely to be ineffective.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ENGAGEMENT
Specialists inevitably wish to examine causes
and dimensions of a conflict in considerable local detail. They
may wish to offer complex and sophisticated solutions to match.
However, the current situation demands clear and actionable policies.
Striking the right balance in dealing with Government of Sudan
is a particular problem. The only way to keep the Naivasha process
moving forward to win peace in southern Sudan, will be to continue
to deal with government and with Vice-President Ali Osman Taha,
in particular. It is difficult to do this while putting pressure
on the Vice-President and possibly indicting some of his colleagues
(perhaps even himself) over Darfur. And pressure alone is unlikely
to work. Some real positive inducements for the government to
cooperate are also needed.
For these reasons, there is a dilemma whether
to treat Darfur as a conflict requiring impartial mediation, or
as asymmetric violence in which one side needs protection against
the other. On balance, the first course is both more positive
and possibly also closer to the truth.
There are a number of options for engagement.
Some lean towards mediation and others to pressure and all of
them need a lot of work to make them actionable.
— Civil policing—The importance
of basic law and order cannot be over-emphasised. Any part of
a settlement in Darfur (and indeed also the South) must include
provision for a neutral, respected, well-equipped civil police
force. In the interim, a Darfur "gendarmerie", using
camels rather than vehicles for transport, might meet some success
in facing down local militias.
— Complementary track of a tribal
conference—Many of Darfur's issues are best settled
by an all-inclusive conference of tribal chiefs rather than high-level
political negotiations between government and rebels. This will
not be easy as the tribal leadership has its own agendas and links
to outside groups. It may be that such a conference would only
be possible when there is a framework political agreement in place.
Certainly, a basic agreement to ensure that all participants can
attend in confidence will be essential. Alternatively, it may
be that the conference will provide a forum for all parties to
meet and establish working relationships before seeking to address
larger issues. Either way, preparations for this second track
should begin without delay.
— Resident Magistrates—For
local dispute resolution, returning to a system of "resident
magistrates" might offer interest. A possible model involves
basing one such magistrate, with legal powers under the Sudanese
legal system but resourced and trained by the international community,
in each major population centre. Each magistrate would sit on
a panel with the regular tribal leaders to mediate and arbitrate
flashpoint issues.
— Linkages between different peace
processes—There are three different proposals for sequencing/prioritising
the peace processes. The Government wants to settle Darfur before
moving back to Naivasha. Sadiq el Mahdi (leader of the Umma party,
Sudan's largest mainstream opposition party), in an opinion reflected
by the NDA leadership, wants to settle everything in a comprehensive
national process. The SPLA leadership prefers to complete Naivasha
first.
The consensus was to advise following
this latter route: pursue Naivasha as a priority to bring the
SPLA into government (while noting the huge challenges facing
the implementation of peace in the south), meanwhile stabilising
Darfur.
— Sanctions and genocide—All
of the authors are uncomfortable with the portrayal of the Darfur
conflict as genocide and with the consequence that Sudan should
be subject to punitive sanctions and military intervention. If
sanctions are unavoidable, targeting the overseas financial assets
of individual government leaders, of the security clique, and
of corporations owned by the ruling party and security agencies
would be most effective.
November 2004
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