Memorandum submitted by The International
Crisis Group (ICG)
ICG's MISSION AND INVOLVEMENT IN DARFUR
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent,
non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 100 staff members
on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level
advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
ICG has been at the forefront of those battling
to bring the crisis in Darfur to the world's attention and get
action taken to address it, publishing field research results
and putting forward detailed policy recommendations to prevent
a worsening of the situation. Our earliest reporting on the emerging
crisis could be found in "Sudan's Other Wars," 25 June
2003, "Sudan Endgame," 7 July 2003, and "Sudan:
Towards an Incomplete Peace," 11 December 2003. Our latest
reports are "Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis," 25
March 2004, "Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur," 23 May
2004, and "Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan,"
23 August 2004. The latest Sudan report "Sudan's Dual Crises:
Refocusing on IGAD," published on 5 October 2004, also deals
extensively with the Darfur crisis. All reports are available
on our website (www.icg.org).
I. A WORSENING
CRISIS
Darfur became the latest chapter in Sudan's
civil wars when Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA) and Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels—mostly members of African
sedentary tribes, such as Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit—took
arms against the Khartoum government in February 2003, in protest
against years of political, economic and social marginalization
of the region. After a string of rebel military victories in spring
2003, Khartoum responded to the insurgency by arming Arab "Janjaweed"
militias to clear civilian population bases of African tribes
thought to be supporting the rebellion. This policy led to the
displacement of between 1.5 to 2 million civilians in Darfur,
and the death of at least 100,000. A ceasefire agreement signed
between the government and the Darfur rebels in April 2004 failed
to stop the violence.
Urgent action is required on several fronts
if the conflict in Darfur is to be prevented from metamorphosing
into a full fledged interethnic war. The situation in Darfur is
deteriorating despite the efforts of the international community
to improve it. The ceasefire is collapsing; banditry and abductions
are on the rise; and attacks against relief agencies have restricted
humanitarian access.
Negotiations mediated by the Intergovernmental
Authority for Development (IGAD) between the government and southern-based
rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA) to
end Sudan's major civil war inched closer to conclusion as the
Darfur crisis escalated. If the elusive comprehensive peace agreement
pursued under the IGAD process is not completed soon and the situation
in Darfur does not begin to improve, the country could easily
implode as nation-wide conflict erupts in the West, South, and
East and unease spreads to the central region as well. This would
set the cause of peace in the country back many years and would
have a devastating impact on the region as a whole. Most importantly,
the humanitarian implications would be staggering.
II. INADEQUATE
RESPONSES
The international community refrained from intervening
in the Darfur crisis during its crucial first phase when it was
still possible to arrest the escalation and steer the parties
to an early negotiated solution. Instead, the wrong-headed belief
that more aggressive pressures would cause Khartoum to opt out
of the IGAD negotiations prevailed. The government used that lack
of resolve to slow the IGAD process, while its army, air force,
and allied Janjaweed militia jointly bombed, raided, and burned
to the ground hundreds of villages predominantly inhabited by
groups of African ancestry, forcibly displacing their inhabitants
and indiscriminately killing, maiming, and raping many in the
process. The government and allied militias also systematically
destroyed the economic and social assets of the targeted communities,
by—among others—poisoning wells, destroying fruit
tree orchards and burning schools and clinics, in an apparent
bid to prevent the return of the IDPs to their home areas. By
the first quarter of 2004, evidence of widespread war crimes and
crimes against humanity being committed in Darfur became too embarrassing
to ignore. Only then did the international community speak out
to demand an end to atrocities; alas, it has yet to follow its
rhetorical condemnations with meaningful action.
Thus far, the UN Security Council Resolutions
1556 and 1564 on Sudan have not yet been backed up with an appropriate
response, despite the failure of the parties to fulfil their obligations
as specified in these documents. The Council must be prepared
to take far stronger action in order to help stop the carnage
in the Sudan, principally against the government of Sudan for
continuing to sponsor and carry out attacks against its civilians,
while failing to take any meaningful steps to neutralize the Janjaweed
militias. The credibility of the Council is on the line. With
each passing week that it does not follow up on its threats, the
Council loses leverage and is taken less seriously by the parties.
III. THE CURRENT
SITUATION IN
DARFUR
As the IGAD process continues, the government
has also been conducting negotiations in Abuja with the two Darfur
rebel movements, the SLA and JEM, under the auspices of the African
Union (AU). Talks resumed in the Nigerian capital Abuja in late
October, continuing from a first round which broke in mid-September.
The mediators succeeded by 9 November in persuading the parties
to sign two accords- the humanitarian and security protocols.
The parties had agreed to the protocol on humanitarian issues
in the August-September round, but the rebel movements refused
to sign it without securing an agreement on security issues as
well. The Protocol on Security Arrangements was made possible
after the Khartoum government dropped its objection to a clause
committing it to renounce offensive military flights over Darfur.
It is essentially a framework agreement designed to improve upon
the existing cease-fire. It reiterates the government's responsibility
to disarm the Janjaweed militias and to identify those militias
over whom it has control, to be verified by the AU-led Ceasefire
Commission (CFC). It also calls on the parties to provide their
respective areas of control to the CFC, which should enable it
to better monitor the Ceasefire.
If things were getting better in Darfur, the
ongoing troop deployment of the African Union might have been
sufficient. But the situation is in fact deteriorating rapidly.
Yet, to date—more than a year and a half after the crisis
began—less than 100 observers are on the ground in Darfur.
The Security agreement will be boosted by the recent decision
of the AU Peace and Security Council to expand the AU force in
Darfur to roughly 3,320 troops, including more military observers,
a larger protection force, and an 800 strong civilian police component.
The AU force will eventually expand its presence from 6 sectors
at present to 15 sites once the deployment is fully completed.
Yet, it is far from clear that such a force will be sufficient
or can be operational fast enough, as it will take months to deploy.
What is needed is an even larger force, a more robust civilian
protection mandate, and wider international participation that
will provide the African troops with equipment, airlift, and command
and control capabilities.
Taking steps to improve the security situation
in Darfur must be the top priority for the international community.
What little progress had been made towards stabilizing the situation
on the ground is now in danger of being reversed. Despite repeated
commitments and promises, there is little evidence that the government
has taken any consistent and meaningful action against the Janjaweed
militias, beyond integrating them into the formal security services
such as the army and the police. Pledges by the government to
bring to justice those responsible for human rights abuses or
crimes against the civilian population remain unfulfilled, fuelling
the already existing culture of impunity and extending the cycle
of violence.
Twice in the last few weeks the government raided
al-Geer displaced camp, as well as Otash camp, near the city of
Nyala, capital of South Darfur, and forcibly removed camp dwellers
using tear gas and physical violence. The incident, which directly
contradicts the agreement on voluntary returns signed by the government
and the International Organisation for Migration, occurred in
full view of AU observers, UN humanitarian workers and the international
media, and shortly before a planned visit by the SRSG in what
amounted to a deliberate provocation. The recent rise in inter-communal
tensions and the fact that Janjaweed militias still prey on civilians
around the camps is of equal concern. Reports of resettlement
(mostly in West Darfur State) by Arab tribes on land cleared of
its original inhabitants indicate that more robust action is required
to help improve the situation and allow the safe return of the
IDPs to their original villages and home areas.
Just as distressing is the attitude of most
government officials towards the situation in Darfur. With few
exceptions, there is a sense of complete denial, both officially
and unofficially, regarding the crisis. The government does not
act with a sense of urgency, and doesn't see itself as having
any responsibility for the situation there. Over the past few
months, government officials have offered four explanations for
the crisis in Darfur:
(1) the SPLA is supporting the Darfur rebels
to increase pressure on the government at the negotiating table;
(2) the US government was exaggerating the
situation there in order to use it for its domestic political
agenda ahead of the elections;
(3) it is part of a Western or Zionist conspiracy
against the Muslim/Arab world; or
(4) it is being supported by the traditional
Sudanese opposition parties, in anger that the Khartoum regime
has made peace with the South , while their own efforts to gain
political stature have failed.
This reflects a general understanding inside
government circles that Darfur is primarily an externally fuelled
problem, that there are no "legitimate" root causes
to the conflict that explain why the rebellion began, and, ultimately,
that the government bares no responsibility for the crisis or
for its resolution. The strategy of the government mediation team
at the Abuja talks clearly exhibited this approach. Government
delegates repeatedly pushed several points. First, the SLA and
JEM are essentially tribal militias who are not representative
of Darfur and are therefore not qualified to engage in substantive
political negotiations. Second, since responsibility for individual
actions in Darfur rests with one's tribe, a solution can come
only through a tribal conference/negotiation, in which the government
need not be directly involved. By extension, the message being
sent is that those militias used by the government to carry out
the atrocities and displace 1.8 million Darfurians over the past
year and a half are autonomous tribal militias, who can only be
disarmed and reined in in parallel to the disarming of all the
other armed groups in Darfur, including the rebel movements. This
despite the recent admission by the head of Sudan's security services,
Salah Abdallah "Gosh", that the government had armed
tribal and other militias as a counter insurgency measure and
had targeted civilian villages he claims were being used as rebel
bases.
The situation is becoming even more complicated
due to the emergence of three new armed groups in Darfur and neighbouring
Western Kordofan state. The National Movement for Reconstruction
and Development (NMRD) is a faction of the JEM that broke off
in March 2004 over disagreements with the political leadership
of the party. Allegedly receiving support from the government
of Chad, the NMRD is intent on gaining a seat at the table at
the AU sponsored peace talks. It sent a delegation to the August-September
talks, but was refused entry after the JEM threatened to pull
out if NMRD was recognized. Unless it is brought into the peace
process, it has threatened to target members of the AU force and
NGOs. NMRD has had several clashes with government forces, and
at least one with JEM forces, and currently has a presence in
the Jebel Moon area of West Darfur. It claims to disagree with
the Islamist agenda of the JEM, and professes to have a secular
political vision similar to that of the SLA. A second ground called
Kharbaj (whip) has emerged in South Darfur; so far, little is
known about this group and its intentions. A third group calling
itself Al-Shahamah has recently emerged in neighbouring Western
Kordofan State. The group is opposed to the government and is
calling for the re-opening of the agreements reached between the
government and the SPLA on Abyei and the Nuba Mountains. [114]
IV. LESSONS LEARNED
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Without international pressure the government
would not have taken any serious steps to help the civilian population
affected by the conflict in Darfur and would have continued its
military strategy to crush the rebellion irrespective of the enormous
civilian death toll. The only actions taken by the government
have come as a direct response to immense pressure from the international
community. Yet, many of Khartoum's promises have proven empty.
The Security Council and the international community must take
firmer action against the government in order to influence its
calculations and must include the following concrete steps in
order to help improve the situation:
1. The existing arms embargo against the
rebels and government-backed Janjaweed militias should be extended
to cover the regime and should be properly enforced.
Emerging evidence suggests that the government
is not only continuing to attack rebel positions and civilian
populations, but continues to arm and support the Janjaweed militias
as well. A mechanism for monitoring the arms embargo must also
be created by the Security Council.
2. Setting clear benchmarks and a timetable
for the government-led disarmament of the Janjaweed militias,
to be verified by the AU Ceasefire Commission, beginning with
the immediate identification by the government of militias under
its control, as promised in the August Plan of Action signed with
the UN.
There is still great confusion over the exact
definition of the Janjaweed and the specific armed groups and
militias that are covered by that term. The government has not
yet identified those militias under its control, despite agreeing
to do so in the Plan of Action signed with the UN on 5 August.
Establishing a clear definition of the Janjaweed will facilitate
the monitoring of the government's efforts and the status and
actions of those groups. The government should provide this information
within five days of the next Security Council Resolution and the
information should be cross-checked with the JEM and SLA, the
AU CFC, and relevant international organisations and NGOs who
have collected information on the topic.
3. A travel ban and an asset freeze should
be applied to ruling party senior officials and businesses.
It is time to implement punitive measures against
the government of Sudan for its failure to fulfil its various
security-related obligations under Security Council Resolutions
1556 and 1664, such as imposing targeted travel bans on regime
officials responsible for the government policies in Darfur and
key Janjaweed leaders responsible for war crimes. Targeted measures
to freeze all known assets of the same pool of officials, allied
militia chiefs, and ruling party companies incorporated abroad
should be adopted.
4. The no-fly zone the government has agreed
to under the security protocol it signed with the Darfur rebels
in Abuja should be closely monitored to ensure compliance.
The parties agreed to no-fly zone over Darfur
in the 9 November Abuja security protocol. Despite Security Council
Resolution 1664, which urged the government to refrain from conducting
military flights in and over Darfur, there have been continued
allegations by both rebel movements that aerial bombardment and
helicopter gunship attacks have continued over the past month.
The Security Council should authorise the AU Ceasefire Commission
to board any airplane or helicopter that takes off anywhere in
Darfur, without prior notification, as a means of monitoring the
actions of the government air force.
5. Provide immediate support to the AU and
its efforts to expand its force in Darfur, and begin planning
for further expansion of the force in the future.
The expanded AU force offers the best chance
to significantly alter the dynamics on the ground in Darfur in
the short-term, but its expected size (roughly 3300 troops), and
limited mandate are unlikely to be sufficient to adequately stabilize
the situation.
The Security Council should also strongly consider
granting a civilian protection mandate to an expanded AU force,
as well as requisite political and logistical support.
6. Increase the number of UN Human Rights
Observers in Darfur
From the current eight observers to several
dozen, so that there is at least one representative in each IDP
camp, and one in each refugee camp in neighbouring Chad.
7. Increase pressure on the JEM and SLA rebel
groups to abide by the N'Djamena ceasefire agreement
This will be done in part by better monitoring
of the arms embargo, but also by strengthening the political dialogue
with both parties. A travel ban and asset freeze should be imposed
on rebel commanders responsible for attacks on civilians, humanitarian
personnel, and supplies.
8. Prioritise collection of evidence of genocide
The current UN investigation into war crimes
and crimes against humanity that occurred and continue to occur
in Darfur and whether these constitute genocide should prioritize
the collection of evidence and the building of dossiers against
culpable officials and militia leaders. Rape as a crime of war
should thoroughly be investigated. The exact mechanism of accountability
has not yet been envisioned, but it should be made clear to all
the warring parties in Sudan, particularly regime officials, that
culpability will some day be punished.
November 2004
114 The Nuba Mountains agreement dissolved Western
Kordofan State, incorporating most of it into the Nuba Mountians
(Southern Kordofan) State. The Abyei agreement granted a referendum
to the people of Abyei to choose between remaining in the North
or joining the South. Abyei is currently part of Western Kordofan
State. Back
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