Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by the UN World Food Programme (WFP)

SUMMARY

    —  The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) is the largest humanitarian actor in the Darfur region of western Sudan.

    —  WFP has a team of 65 international staff and 300 national staff currently working in an emergency operation that aims to deliver food aid to up to two million people a month by the end of this year.

    —  WFP is working across all three states of North, South and West Darfur, coordinating the delivery of food aid by land, rail and air.

    —  WFP Logistical support for the operation is provided by a fleet of more than 300 trucks, seven cargo aircraft, and an air passenger service which WFP runs for the humanitarian community working in Darfur.

THE CRISIS

BACKGROUND

  Darfur has a long history of tribal conflict due to competition over scarce resources. In early 2003, clashes between African and Arab groups took on a political dimension, with the mainly African, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), fighting for greater autonomy from the Government of Sudan. The main reason given for the conflict is the widespread feeling among the resident population of Darfur of socio-economic marginalisation.

  In response to the uprising by African rebel groups, the Sudanese government is alleged to have armed and funded groups of Arab militia, known as Janjaweed, encouraging them to attack African communities in Darfur. As a result, hundreds of African villages across Darfur have been looted and burnt, water wells have been destroyed, and crops and livestock have been stolen, leaving approximately two million people in an extremely precarious position.

THE RESPONSE

  WFP was working in the Darfur region long before the current crisis emerged. It responded to the crisis that begin in early 2003 with its first emergency operation in June 2003. As the scale of the humanitarian disaster escalated in early 2004 further measures were required and a new emergency operation was launched to cover the period April-December 2004.

  Month by month, from April onwards, WFP has increased its reach in the Darfur region, negotiating access to more areas, and providing food aid to increasing numbers of beneficiaries.

  By the end of 2004, WFP aims to be feeding up to two million people in the three states of North, South and West Darfur. Of this number, approximately 1.6 million are estimated to be internally displaced people who have fled their villages due to the recent conflict. The remaining 400,000 are those living in host communities whose access to traditional food sources has been adversely affected by the conflict. A further 200,000 refugees have fled the Darfur region of Sudan and are receiving food aid in camps in neighbouring Chad.

WFP Food aid Distribution in Darfur (April to September 2004)
Metric
Tonnage
Number of
Beneficiaries
April8,599548,201
May9,998593,020
June10,128652,429
July15,493959,919
August16,088940,418
September21,5351,336,992

CONSTRAINTS

  The Darfur crisis has presented a unique challenge to humanitarian agencies. It has combined logistical difficulties, with high levels of insecurity and environmental obstacles caused by the annual rainy season in August and September. Simply getting food aid to those in need is extremely difficult. For example, Al Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, is the furthest town from any coastline on the African continent. Even under the best of circumstances it can take up to three weeks to move food aid by road from Port Sudan where it is delivered by cargo ships, to Al Geneina. During the rainy season, many internally displaced people outside Al Geneina could only be reached by airdrops.

  The main constraints can be divided into five categories:

    (i)  Lack of access.

    (ii)  Lack of capacity.

    (iii)  Level of funding.

    (iv)  Insecurity.

    (v)  Weather.

1.   Lack of access

  Humanitarian access to populations affected by the conflict in the Darfur region was extremely limited until May 2004. Up until May, the Sudanese government had largely blocked relief operations in areas outside the state capitals of Al Geneina, El Fasher and Nyala.

  As a result of intense international pressure, the government lifted some of the travel restrictions in May, and announced a series of measures to facilitate humanitarian access to Darfur.

  As of October 2004, WFP had access to approximately 80% of the areas where populations in need of food assistance have been identified. Most of the remaining inaccessible locations are in areas under the control of the SLA and the JEM. WFP has reached agreement with these two rebel groups to allow free passage for humanitarian missions but in practice, access to rebel areas remains complex and unpredictable.

2.   Lack of capacity

  The extent of the crisis in Darfur only become truly quantifiable once access to the whole region opened up. As with many emergencies, it took time to muster the logistical and human capacity necessary to deal with the problem.

  WFP had to negotiate the purchase of hundreds of trucks to ferry food aid by road to the needy. Extra cargo and passenger aircraft had to be chartered to provide air support. Contracts were signed with the Sudanese railway authorities to allow the transport of food aid by rail. Additional staff had to be swiftly deployed to Darfur to support the growing logistical operation.

WFP logistical capacity (October 2004)
6 X 6 All Terrain trucks120
Long-haul trucks200
Ilyushin 76 cargo aircraft4
Antanov 12 cargo aircraft3
Helicopters4
Passenger aircraft7


  While every effort was made to expedite the process of delivering food aid, the sheer scale of what was required meant that it has taken several months for WFP to approach what is a reasonable operating capacity in Darfur.

  Now that the capacity has been increased, additional problems such as a recurrent shortage of aviation fuel, a lack of apron space to park aircraft at the main airports, and insecurity along road routes and railway lines are playing havoc with attempts to increase the delivery of aid.

3.   Funding

  The current WFP emergency operation for Darfur is now almost fully funded until the end of the year. However, as late as July this year, the operation had barely one third of the funds required.

WFP funding requirements for April—December 2004 Emergency Operation


Emergency food assistance:
$203 million (£113 million)
Special operations:$36 million (£20 million)
Total:$239 million(£133 million)


  As of the 4th of November, 2004, WFP was facing a 15% shortfall on the budget for this emergency operation.

  While bridging loans and other mechanisms can be used during the course of an emergency to cover gaps in funding, planning is far easier if the budget is covered at the earliest possible date.

  Intense international interest and blanket coverage of the crisis by the media certainly played a role in ensuring that the necessary funds for the Darfur crisis were raised in August, September and October. There is, however, no guarantee that this level of interest will be sustained in the coming months, at a time when the humanitarian operation is moving into a critical stage.

4.   Insecurity

  Perhaps more than any other factor, widespread insecurity has presented a huge constraint on the work of humanitarian agencies in Darfur. In the early months of 2004, conflict across large parts of the region, coupled with the Sudanese government's refusal to grant access beyond the main towns of Darfur, blocked the provision of aid.

  Humanitarian agencies like the World Food Programme will not attempt to deliver food aid if this puts the well-being of our staff at risk. Although the area of military conflict in Darfur has decreased, pockets of intense fighting still exist.

  In recent weeks, there has been a dramatic deterioration in security across the Darfur region that can be broadly attributed to two factors.

  Firstly, the Sudan Liberation Army has undertaken increasingly bold action against Sudanese government forces in an attempt to expand the amount of territory under rebel control. Clashes have been occurring in all three states of Darfur, but they have been particularly intense in the Jebel Mara mountains and the northern sector of north Darfur.

  Secondly, October and November is the time of year when traditional tensions between pastoralists and farmers tend to peak as the herds start moving from south to north (cattle) and from north to south (camels).

  In addition, there has been a worrying increase in random incidents of banditry and criminality including armed ambushes and robbery across the Darfur region. These incidents have grown in frequency.

  Drivers ferrying food aid for WFP have been stopped, held at gunpoint, and had their personal belongings stolen. On several occasions, drivers have been shot and seriously injured. National and intenational staff from WFP have been robbed at gunpoint. Humanitarian workers have been forced to retreat from camps during food distributions due to disturbances involving armed men.

  Whenever an incident like this takes place roads or locations are closed off to humanitarian workers until security clearance is received. The immediate effect is a slow-down in the delivery of aid to the beneficiaries.

  In early October, a mine explosion in North Darfur killed two aid workers from Save the Children UK, and led to the temporary suspension of WFP activities in an area where approximately 50,000 people were about to receive food aid.

  Also in October, in South Darfur, a commercial truck carrying WFP food from Khartoum to Nyala was stopped by a group of unidentified men at Ishma (between Nyala and Muhajaria). Twenty Metric Tonnes, or 400 bags of sorghum were looted. Local leaders in SLA-controlled areas reportedly distributed the 400 bags to the community.

  As this paper was being finalised in the first week of November, heightened insecurity in West Darfur had led to the temporary withdrawal of humanitarian aid workers from the camps of Zalingei, Golo and Nertiti where approximately 160,000 internally displaced people are located. In addition, access to two camps on the edge of Nyala in South Darfur was severely restricted on 2 November when police surrounded the locations and moved around 250 families to a different area further from the town.

  If the frequency of these incidents increases, it is likely to have a serious negative impact on the ability of agencies like WFP to reach the hungry.

5.   Weather

  The onset of the annual rainy season in Darfur in August and September placed an additional strain on WFP's efforts to move food aid by road. Heavy rainfall also limited the use of some of the more rudimentary airstrips situated in the Darfur region.

  Infrastructure across Darfur is extremely undeveloped and the road network is rudimentary. Outside the state capitals of Nyala, El Fasher, and Al Geneina, most of the roads become mud or sand tracks that traverse open countryside, and dry river beds.

  When the rainy season begins, the rivers fill with fast-flowing muddy water. At the height of the rains, WFP truck convoys carrying food to Darfur could find themselves trapped on one side of a river bed waiting for several days before the waters dropped.

  At the height of the rainy season in August, WFP began airdrops of food in West Darfur. The airdrops were directed at 70,000 displaced people and local residents who had been cut off due to heavy rains and insecurity.

  While dropping food by air is the most expensive last resort, it became necessary at the height of the rainy season.

  Even now that the rains have ended, land travel around the Darfur region is extremely demanding. Many of the mud roads have dried into rutted tracks which are punishing to the most robust of vehicles. Although the waters have now subsided, they have left behind dry sandy river beds where trucks carrying food can all too easily sink up to their axles and become stuck.

THE LESSONS

  The humanitarian situation in the Darfur region remains precarious. However, as with any major emergency operation, it is always important to step back and assess how the levels of assistance can be improved, and where the delivery of food aid can be streamlined.

  Two areas of major concern for WFP are the continuing unacceptable levels of insecurity that disrupt the flow of aid to Darfur, and the nutritional status of the beneficiaries.

NUTRITITIONAL STATUS OF BENEFICIARIES IN DARFUR

  In an attempt to get a clearer picture of the nutritional status of beneficiaries in the Darfur region, WFP led a survey in all three states in August and September this year. WFP collected data on more than 5,000 people at 56 sites in collaboration with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, the UN Children's Fund, the Atlanta-based Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, the United States and United Kingdom branches of Save the Children and with the support of Sudan's Ministries of Health and Agriculture, and its Humanitarian Aid Commission.

Main Findings of the Survey

    —  Almost 22% of children under the age of five are malnourished. A figure of 15% malnutrition among children of this age is normally taken as indicating a serious situation.

    —  Almost half of all families are not consuming enough food to sustain an active and healthy life.

    —  Internally Displaced People are markedly worse off than local residents, with just 6% of people in camps able to obtain sufficient food by their own means and not relying on food assistance, in contrast to 46% of local residents.

    —  Food aid has played a critical role by reaching 70% of households among 1.45 million internally displaced people at the time the survey was carried out.

    —  Only 18% of the malnourished children identified by the survey were receiving the supplementary feeding they required.

    —  Health problems are widespread with more than 40% of children having diarrhoea and 18% acute respiratory infections. Both of these problems are a major cause of death among children in developing countries.

    —  Large numbers of children, women and pregnant women in Darfur were found to be deficient in minerals and vitamins. More than half of the children and a quarter of the women are suffering from anaemia. The survey found a 25.8% prevelance of goiter—an enlargement of the thyroid caused by a lack of iodine—among non-pregnant mothers.

    —  With a poor crop year ahead and the nutrition and livelihoods of the poorest residents of Darfur already at risk, targeted food assistance will be needed in 2005 for people living in conflict-affected villages.

    —  The survey put the crude mortality rate for February to August in Darfur at 0.72 deaths per 10,000 people per day. The under-five mortality rate was 1.03 deaths per 10,000 per day. Both rates are below the emergency threshold. However, the report noted that these figures are for mortality across a population of IDPs and residents over a seven month period. This survey is therefore not comparable with other surveys taken among different population sub-groups or different geographic areas where mortality rates may be higher.

Main Recommendations of the Survey

    —  Given the low coverage of selective feeding programmes identified by the survey, WFP and UNICEF in conjunction with implementing partners should undertake a review of protocols and programmes for supplementary and therapeutic feeding.

    —  Blanket supplementary feeding must be implemented on the ground for all children 6-59 months of age and pregnant and lactating women (in total, approximately 20% of the population).

    —  The very high prevalence of diarrhoea (40%) among children needs to be addressed through improved access to health care, water and sanitation.

    —  Step-up efforts to ensure that the net (consumed) ration is 2100 kcal met through a complete food basket consisting of cereals, pulses, CSB, fortified oil and salt.

    —  Ensure more regular delivery of the general ration.

    —  To help address the problem of iodine deficiency among beneficiaries, increase the amount of iodized salt provided in the ration from 5-10 grams.

THE PROBLEM OF INSECURITY

  The continuing problem of insecurity can undermine all of the gains made so far in reaching the hungry of Darfur. Steps can be taken to avoid dangerous roads by using longer routes, but inevitably, this has a knock-on effect, slowing down the delivery of food aid.

  WFP is considering with the relevant bodies of the United Nations, two options to address this problem:

    (i)  Request the African Union (AU) to provide AU escorts for food aid relief convoys: This would become a viable option if the AU mandate is expanded to a size that would allow it to shoulder this additional task. However, at this moment in time, the AU does not have enough troops on the ground to provide this service.

    (ii)  Implement a notification system: WFP could implement an advance notification system in which the Government of Sudan and rebel troops are notified of WFP convoy movements. A tentative schedule would be provided to the Government of Sudan and rebel troops, indicating that the convoy would be identified by two WFP vehicles, one in front and one at the back. UN security officers should have the means to contact the relevant field commanders along the key routes to notify them of any significant delays. It should be recognised, however, that this would be difficult to implement given the loose and decentralised nature of the SLA hierarchy. This option would only be used as a "bridging arrangement" pending the deployment of additional AU troops that could be used as described above in option one.

November 2004





 
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