Memorandum submitted by the UN World Food
Programme (WFP)
SUMMARY
— The United Nations World Food Programme
(WFP) is the largest humanitarian actor in the Darfur region of
western Sudan.
— WFP has a team of 65 international
staff and 300 national staff currently working in an emergency
operation that aims to deliver food aid to up to two million people
a month by the end of this year.
— WFP is working across all three states
of North, South and West Darfur, coordinating the delivery of
food aid by land, rail and air.
— WFP Logistical support for the operation
is provided by a fleet of more than 300 trucks, seven cargo aircraft,
and an air passenger service which WFP runs for the humanitarian
community working in Darfur.
THE CRISIS
BACKGROUND
Darfur has a long history of tribal conflict
due to competition over scarce resources. In early 2003, clashes
between African and Arab groups took on a political dimension,
with the mainly African, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM), fighting for greater autonomy from
the Government of Sudan. The main reason given for the conflict
is the widespread feeling among the resident population of Darfur
of socio-economic marginalisation.
In response to the uprising by African rebel
groups, the Sudanese government is alleged to have armed and funded
groups of Arab militia, known as Janjaweed, encouraging them to
attack African communities in Darfur. As a result, hundreds of
African villages across Darfur have been looted and burnt, water
wells have been destroyed, and crops and livestock have been stolen,
leaving approximately two million people in an extremely precarious
position.
THE RESPONSE
WFP was working in the Darfur region long before
the current crisis emerged. It responded to the crisis that begin
in early 2003 with its first emergency operation in June 2003.
As the scale of the humanitarian disaster escalated in early 2004
further measures were required and a new emergency operation was
launched to cover the period April-December 2004.
Month by month, from April onwards, WFP has
increased its reach in the Darfur region, negotiating access to
more areas, and providing food aid to increasing numbers of beneficiaries.
By the end of 2004, WFP aims to be feeding up
to two million people in the three states of North, South and
West Darfur. Of this number, approximately 1.6 million are estimated
to be internally displaced people who have fled their villages
due to the recent conflict. The remaining 400,000 are those living
in host communities whose access to traditional food sources has
been adversely affected by the conflict. A further 200,000 refugees
have fled the Darfur region of Sudan and are receiving food aid
in camps in neighbouring Chad.
WFP Food aid Distribution in Darfur (April
to September 2004)
| Metric
Tonnage
| Number of
Beneficiaries |
| April | 8,599 | 548,201
|
| May | 9,998 | 593,020
|
| June | 10,128 | 652,429
|
| July | 15,493 | 959,919
|
| August | 16,088 | 940,418
|
| September | 21,535 | 1,336,992
|
| | |
CONSTRAINTS
The Darfur crisis has presented a unique challenge to humanitarian
agencies. It has combined logistical difficulties, with high levels
of insecurity and environmental obstacles caused by the annual
rainy season in August and September. Simply getting food aid
to those in need is extremely difficult. For example, Al Geneina,
the capital of West Darfur, is the furthest town from any coastline
on the African continent. Even under the best of circumstances
it can take up to three weeks to move food aid by road from Port
Sudan where it is delivered by cargo ships, to Al Geneina. During
the rainy season, many internally displaced people outside Al
Geneina could only be reached by airdrops.
The main constraints can be divided into five categories:
1. Lack of access
Humanitarian access to populations affected by the conflict
in the Darfur region was extremely limited until May 2004. Up
until May, the Sudanese government had largely blocked relief
operations in areas outside the state capitals of Al Geneina,
El Fasher and Nyala.
As a result of intense international pressure, the government
lifted some of the travel restrictions in May, and announced a
series of measures to facilitate humanitarian access to Darfur.
As of October 2004, WFP had access to approximately 80% of
the areas where populations in need of food assistance have been
identified. Most of the remaining inaccessible locations are in
areas under the control of the SLA and the JEM. WFP has reached
agreement with these two rebel groups to allow free passage for
humanitarian missions but in practice, access to rebel areas remains
complex and unpredictable.
2. Lack of capacity
The extent of the crisis in Darfur only become truly quantifiable
once access to the whole region opened up. As with many emergencies,
it took time to muster the logistical and human capacity necessary
to deal with the problem.
WFP had to negotiate the purchase of hundreds of trucks to
ferry food aid by road to the needy. Extra cargo and passenger
aircraft had to be chartered to provide air support. Contracts
were signed with the Sudanese railway authorities to allow the
transport of food aid by rail. Additional staff had to be swiftly
deployed to Darfur to support the growing logistical operation.
WFP logistical capacity (October 2004)
| 6 X 6 All Terrain trucks | 120
|
| Long-haul trucks | 200 |
| Ilyushin 76 cargo aircraft | 4
|
| Antanov 12 cargo aircraft | 3
|
| Helicopters | 4 |
| Passenger aircraft | 7 |
| |
While every effort was made to expedite the process of delivering
food aid, the sheer scale of what was required meant that it has
taken several months for WFP to approach what is a reasonable
operating capacity in Darfur.
Now that the capacity has been increased, additional problems
such as a recurrent shortage of aviation fuel, a lack of apron
space to park aircraft at the main airports, and insecurity along
road routes and railway lines are playing havoc with attempts
to increase the delivery of aid.
3. Funding
The current WFP emergency operation for Darfur is now almost
fully funded until the end of the year. However, as late as July
this year, the operation had barely one third of the funds required.
WFP funding requirements for April—December 2004 Emergency
Operation
Emergency food assistance: |
$203 million | (£113 million)
|
| Special operations: | $36 million
| (£20 million) |
| Total: | $239 million | (£133 million)
|
| | |
As of the 4th of November, 2004, WFP was facing a 15% shortfall
on the budget for this emergency operation.
While bridging loans and other mechanisms can be used during
the course of an emergency to cover gaps in funding, planning
is far easier if the budget is covered at the earliest possible
date.
Intense international interest and blanket coverage of the
crisis by the media certainly played a role in ensuring that the
necessary funds for the Darfur crisis were raised in August, September
and October. There is, however, no guarantee that this level of
interest will be sustained in the coming months, at a time when
the humanitarian operation is moving into a critical stage.
4. Insecurity
Perhaps more than any other factor, widespread insecurity
has presented a huge constraint on the work of humanitarian agencies
in Darfur. In the early months of 2004, conflict across large
parts of the region, coupled with the Sudanese government's refusal
to grant access beyond the main towns of Darfur, blocked the provision
of aid.
Humanitarian agencies like the World Food Programme will
not attempt to deliver food aid if this puts the well-being of
our staff at risk. Although the area of military conflict in Darfur
has decreased, pockets of intense fighting still exist.
In recent weeks, there has been a dramatic deterioration
in security across the Darfur region that can be broadly attributed
to two factors.
Firstly, the Sudan Liberation Army has undertaken increasingly
bold action against Sudanese government forces in an attempt to
expand the amount of territory under rebel control. Clashes have
been occurring in all three states of Darfur, but they have been
particularly intense in the Jebel Mara mountains and the northern
sector of north Darfur.
Secondly, October and November is the time of year when traditional
tensions between pastoralists and farmers tend to peak as the
herds start moving from south to north (cattle) and from north
to south (camels).
In addition, there has been a worrying increase in random
incidents of banditry and criminality including armed ambushes
and robbery across the Darfur region. These incidents have grown
in frequency.
Drivers ferrying food aid for WFP have been stopped, held
at gunpoint, and had their personal belongings stolen. On several
occasions, drivers have been shot and seriously injured. National
and intenational staff from WFP have been robbed at gunpoint.
Humanitarian workers have been forced to retreat from camps during
food distributions due to disturbances involving armed men.
Whenever an incident like this takes place roads or locations
are closed off to humanitarian workers until security clearance
is received. The immediate effect is a slow-down in the delivery
of aid to the beneficiaries.
In early October, a mine explosion in North Darfur killed
two aid workers from Save the Children UK, and led to the temporary
suspension of WFP activities in an area where approximately 50,000
people were about to receive food aid.
Also in October, in South Darfur, a commercial truck carrying
WFP food from Khartoum to Nyala was stopped by a group of unidentified
men at Ishma (between Nyala and Muhajaria). Twenty Metric Tonnes,
or 400 bags of sorghum were looted. Local leaders in SLA-controlled
areas reportedly distributed the 400 bags to the community.
As this paper was being finalised in the first week of November,
heightened insecurity in West Darfur had led to the temporary
withdrawal of humanitarian aid workers from the camps of Zalingei,
Golo and Nertiti where approximately 160,000 internally displaced
people are located. In addition, access to two camps on the edge
of Nyala in South Darfur was severely restricted on 2 November
when police surrounded the locations and moved around 250 families
to a different area further from the town.
If the frequency of these incidents increases, it is likely
to have a serious negative impact on the ability of agencies like
WFP to reach the hungry.
5. Weather
The onset of the annual rainy season in Darfur in August
and September placed an additional strain on WFP's efforts to
move food aid by road. Heavy rainfall also limited the use of
some of the more rudimentary airstrips situated in the Darfur
region.
Infrastructure across Darfur is extremely undeveloped and
the road network is rudimentary. Outside the state capitals of
Nyala, El Fasher, and Al Geneina, most of the roads become mud
or sand tracks that traverse open countryside, and dry river beds.
When the rainy season begins, the rivers fill with fast-flowing
muddy water. At the height of the rains, WFP truck convoys carrying
food to Darfur could find themselves trapped on one side of a
river bed waiting for several days before the waters dropped.
At the height of the rainy season in August, WFP began airdrops
of food in West Darfur. The airdrops were directed at 70,000 displaced
people and local residents who had been cut off due to heavy rains
and insecurity.
While dropping food by air is the most expensive last resort,
it became necessary at the height of the rainy season.
Even now that the rains have ended, land travel around the
Darfur region is extremely demanding. Many of the mud roads have
dried into rutted tracks which are punishing to the most robust
of vehicles. Although the waters have now subsided, they have
left behind dry sandy river beds where trucks carrying food can
all too easily sink up to their axles and become stuck.
THE LESSONS
The humanitarian situation in the Darfur region remains precarious.
However, as with any major emergency operation, it is always important
to step back and assess how the levels of assistance can be improved,
and where the delivery of food aid can be streamlined.
Two areas of major concern for WFP are the continuing unacceptable
levels of insecurity that disrupt the flow of aid to Darfur, and
the nutritional status of the beneficiaries.
NUTRITITIONAL STATUS
OF BENEFICIARIES
IN DARFUR
In an attempt to get a clearer picture of the nutritional
status of beneficiaries in the Darfur region, WFP led a survey
in all three states in August and September this year. WFP collected
data on more than 5,000 people at 56 sites in collaboration with
the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, the UN Children's Fund,
the Atlanta-based Centres for Disease Control and Prevention,
the United States and United Kingdom branches of Save the Children
and with the support of Sudan's Ministries of Health and Agriculture,
and its Humanitarian Aid Commission.
Main Findings of the Survey
— Almost 22% of children under the age of five are
malnourished. A figure of 15% malnutrition among children of this
age is normally taken as indicating a serious situation.
— Almost half of all families are not consuming
enough food to sustain an active and healthy life.
— Internally Displaced People are markedly worse
off than local residents, with just 6% of people in camps able
to obtain sufficient food by their own means and not relying on
food assistance, in contrast to 46% of local residents.
— Food aid has played a critical role by reaching
70% of households among 1.45 million internally displaced people
at the time the survey was carried out.
— Only 18% of the malnourished children identified
by the survey were receiving the supplementary feeding they required.
— Health problems are widespread with more than
40% of children having diarrhoea and 18% acute respiratory infections.
Both of these problems are a major cause of death among children
in developing countries.
— Large numbers of children, women and pregnant
women in Darfur were found to be deficient in minerals and vitamins.
More than half of the children and a quarter of the women are
suffering from anaemia. The survey found a 25.8% prevelance of
goiter—an enlargement of the thyroid caused by a lack of
iodine—among non-pregnant mothers.
— With a poor crop year ahead and the nutrition
and livelihoods of the poorest residents of Darfur already at
risk, targeted food assistance will be needed in 2005 for people
living in conflict-affected villages.
— The survey put the crude mortality rate for February
to August in Darfur at 0.72 deaths per 10,000 people per day.
The under-five mortality rate was 1.03 deaths per 10,000 per day.
Both rates are below the emergency threshold. However, the report
noted that these figures are for mortality across a population
of IDPs and residents over a seven month period. This survey is
therefore not comparable with other surveys taken among different
population sub-groups or different geographic areas where mortality
rates may be higher.
Main Recommendations of the Survey
— Given the low coverage of selective feeding programmes
identified by the survey, WFP and UNICEF in conjunction with implementing
partners should undertake a review of protocols and programmes
for supplementary and therapeutic feeding.
— Blanket supplementary feeding must be implemented
on the ground for all children 6-59 months of age and pregnant
and lactating women (in total, approximately 20% of the population).
— The very high prevalence of diarrhoea (40%) among
children needs to be addressed through improved access to health
care, water and sanitation.
— Step-up efforts to ensure that the net (consumed)
ration is 2100 kcal met through a complete food basket consisting
of cereals, pulses, CSB, fortified oil and salt.
— Ensure more regular delivery of the general ration.
— To help address the problem of iodine deficiency
among beneficiaries, increase the amount of iodized salt provided
in the ration from 5-10 grams.
THE PROBLEM
OF INSECURITY
The continuing problem of insecurity can undermine all of
the gains made so far in reaching the hungry of Darfur. Steps
can be taken to avoid dangerous roads by using longer routes,
but inevitably, this has a knock-on effect, slowing down the delivery
of food aid.
WFP is considering with the relevant bodies of the United
Nations, two options to address this problem:
(i) Request the African Union (AU) to provide AU escorts
for food aid relief convoys: This would become a viable option
if the AU mandate is expanded to a size that would allow it to
shoulder this additional task. However, at this moment in time,
the AU does not have enough troops on the ground to provide this
service.
(ii) Implement a notification system: WFP could implement
an advance notification system in which the Government of Sudan
and rebel troops are notified of WFP convoy movements. A tentative
schedule would be provided to the Government of Sudan and rebel
troops, indicating that the convoy would be identified by two
WFP vehicles, one in front and one at the back. UN security officers
should have the means to contact the relevant field commanders
along the key routes to notify them of any significant delays.
It should be recognised, however, that this would be difficult
to implement given the loose and decentralised nature of the SLA
hierarchy. This option would only be used as a "bridging
arrangement" pending the deployment of additional AU troops
that could be used as described above in option one.
November 2004
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