Memorandum submitted by Alex Vines, Head,
Africa Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham
House
UN SANCTIONS AND SUDAN
This submission focuses upon the history of
UN Sanctions on Sudan and their possible use. It draws upon my
experience as a UN sanctions weapons investigator on Liberia from
May 2001 to May 2003 and subsequent research on sanctions conducted
at Chatham House.
UN SANCTIONS AND
SUDAN
The threat of UN sanctions has hung over Sudan
since July 2004. Security Council adopted a resolution on 30 July—although
expressed in rather foggy language—that gave Sudan 30 days
to disarm and arrest leaders of the Janjaweed or possibly face
UN sanctions. China and Pakistan abstained from an otherwise unanimous
vote for the measures; Algeria and Russia also lobbied for more
time.
This process was repeated in September 2004
when a second US-drafted resolution had to be significantly watered
down to deal with opposition from China, Pakistan and Algeria.
China even threatened to veto the resolution, which was passed
on 18 September. Beijing has an interest in avoiding oil sanctions
in particular because it has invested heavily in Sudan's oil industry.
Such measures could be easily achieved through a blockade of Port
Sudan, but this is something that Khartoum also greatly fears.
The US has consistently sought a strongly worded
resolution, but because of a lack of consensus in the Security
Council has worked with Britain on alternative approaches such
as getting the Sudanese government to accept more African Union
(AU) troops to protect civilians.
NOT NEW
The question of sanctions against the Sudanese
government as a result of its failure to stop the violence, has
become a prominent theme, but such measures are not a new issue
for Sudan. UN diplomatic sanctions against Sudan were imposed
in April 1996 in response to the country's failure to extradite
three suspects connected to a June 1995 assassination attempt
on the life of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.
More far-reaching travel restrictions were provisionally
approved by the Security Council but never implemented. This was
due in part to a UN pre-assessment report on the likely humanitarian
impact of such measures, as well as Egypt's reluctance to support
stronger sanctions. Egypt feared that it would suffer significantly
from sanctions and was concerned that Sudan may retaliate by reducing
the flow of water along the Nile and expelling hundreds of thousands
of Egyptians working there. Cairo also opposed an arms embargo.
Sudan never handed over anyone connected with
the 1995 incident. However, the Sudanese government sent a letter
to the Security Council in May 1996 indicating that it had asked
Osama bin Laden, who was suspected of funding radical Islamist
groups, to leave the country. Bin Laden subsequently moved from
Sudan to Afghanistan. At that time sanctions may have also encouraged
a split between the Islamic National Front of Sudan and the country's
military leaders, who wanted to avoid such measures after the
experiences of Iraq and Libya. The UN lifted its diplomatic sanctions
in September 2001.
Because of the civil war between the north and
south, the European Union had already imposed an arms embargo
on Sudan in 1994 followed by US economic sanctions in 1997. In
September 2004 it threatened to widen the sanctions package if
Sudan failed to end the Darfur crisis. It said it would consider
a travel ban on the Janjaweed militia leaders and even an oil
embargo.
Although there has been much discussion of sanctions
there has been less reflection on what this would actually entail,
what kind of instruments they would be and their likely impact.
Since the early 1990s there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of occasions when sanctions have been imposed
by the Security Council. Before then they had only been imposed
on two countries: Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. Since
then the Council has imposed sanctions on Iraq in 1990; the former
Yugoslavia in 1991, 1992 and 1998; Libya in 1992; Liberia in 1992
and 2001; Somalia in 1992; Haiti in 1993; Angola's UNITA movement
in 1993, 1997 and 1998; Rwanda in 1994; Sudan in 1996; Sierra
Leone in 1997; Afghanistan in 1999; Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000;
and parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from July
last year and and on Cote D'Ivoire in November 2004.
The peace and security mechanisms of Chapter
VII of the UN Charter provide the legal basis for the Council
to impose sanctions. Such measures have provoked controversy,
not least because of the humanitarian crisis in Iraq during the
1990s, which was related to, if not directly caused by, UN sanctions.
BANS, CONTROLS,
EMBARGOES
The arms embargo is the most widespread sanction
used in Africa. Such controls were imposed on Angola, Ethiopia/Eritrea,
Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia and last year on parts
of the Congo and on Cote D'Ivoire in November. There have also
been commodity embargoes such as those on diamonds exports from
Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia and timber from Liberia and these
are threatened on Cote D'Ivoire for December 2004. Travel bans
were applied on Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The sale of
petroleum products to the Angolan rebel movement UNITA was prohibited.
That group was also subject to financial sanctions as were Liberia's
ex-President Charles Taylor and some of his associates.
The UN Security Council has threatened to implement
an arms embargo that would cut off weapons to both the militias
and rebel groups in Sudan. There has also been discussion about
a travel ban on Janjaweed leaders and informal exchanges in the
corridors about asset embargoes, particularly petroleum.
Freshly back from Sudan, the British Foreign
Secretary Jack Straw noted in his speech at Chatham House in August
2004 that financial sanctions may have worked on Libya, but they
must always be used as a last resort. Generally until the late
1990s UN sanctions had little impact. The move towards greater
effectiveness was a result of increased efforts at monitoring
compliance, but despite the new enthusiasm, the record remains
mixed.
The UN diamond embargoes on Liberia and Sierra
Leone and the timber embargo on Liberia are fairly successful.
In contrast, arms embargoes have failed across the continent.
Travel bans don't have such a good record. Sudan is likely to
follow the same pattern. Indeed the Sudan Government has its own
defence industry, producing small arms and ammunition, with a
ready supply of stockpiled raw materials, so an arms embargo would
take significant time to bite.
IMPORTANCE OF
OIL
On the other hand an oil embargo, with a naval
blockade of Port Sudan would have impact—as oil provides
a major source of revenue for Khartoum this would quickly squeeze
elite business and military interests. Before its first export
of crude oil from Sudan in August 1999, Sudan's economy was in
dire straits. Government oil revenues rose from zero to almost
42% of total government revenue in 2001. Oil revenue has had an
impact in projected military spending. The president of Sudan
announced in 2000 that Sudan was using its oil wealth to build
a domestic arms industry. Military spending in 2001 soaked up
60% of the 2001 oil revenue of US$580.2 million and continues
to be high.
WIDER DIPLOMATIC
PACKAGE
Sanctions are more successful if they are part
of a wider diplomatic package. There have been few independent
studies of the effectiveness of sanctions in Africa but the key
to a successful embargo is political will both in the Security
Council and amongst member states to implement and monitor the
measures.
In the 1990s the two countries where western
political will for effective sanctions was at its greatest were
Iraq and Libya. Sanctions probably thwarted Saddam Hussein's efforts
to procure weapons of mass destruction and in Libya they encouraged
Tripoli's rapprochement with the west. Sanctions on Liberia itself
were less successful, but worked as a measure to loosen Taylor's
grip on the Revolutionary United Front rebels of Sierra Leone.
SUSTAINING PRESSURE
It is wise not to rush into imposing UN sanctions.
Their history in Africa demonstrates that they are blunt instruments
that have limited impact on targets. The lack of Security Council
consensus about Sudan is likely to continue and the start of sanctions
is still far away. If UN sanctions fail, US and EU oil sanctions
could be a possible option.
If UN sanctions are imposed on Sudan, small,
symbolic UN monitoring panels of a handful of consultants have
limited impact. A large country like Sudan needs hundreds of well
supported monitors on the ground, with a clear-cut reporting mandate.
In Congo, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (MONUC) is assisted by a UN investigative team in watching
the arms embargo on the Ituri and north and south Kivu regions.
This could be be a template for Sudan. African Union states could
be mandated by the Security Council to play a major role in monitoring
and reporting compliance, especially if also backed up by a naval
patrol off Port Sudan with a mandate to record and search for
oil exports if UN sanctions were agreed.
A credible threat of sanctions can be more productive
than the hasty enforcement of symbolic measures that could undermine
the credibility of the UN. The Sudanese government's behaviour
shows that the threat of sanctions in July, following the circulation
of a strongly worded draft resolution threatening tough action,
helped focus attention on the humanitarian crisis. A similar reaction
occurred in the 1990s when Sudan downgraded its support for radical
Islamist groups as a result of UN sanctions. Khartoum does fear
sanctions and especially oil sanctions. The challenge is how to
sustain this pressure and how to reach consensus in a divided
Security Council or how to look at alternative avenues such as
co-ordinated and extended EU and US sanctions on Sudan.
November 2004
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