Examination of Witnesses (Questions 39-50)
DR CHRISTOPHER
STEVENS, MS
JANE NALUNGA,
MR MATTHEW
GRIFFITH, MR
MICHAEL GIDNEY
AND MS
DIANNA MELROSE
30 NOVEMBER 2004
Q39 Chairman: Thank you very much for
coming and helping us out. If I can make a few general points,
if you would like between you to decide who will answer the questions,
I think there are one or two which might just be directed to one
of you, you might all want to answer one, or some of you might
just want to answer. Secondly, if you could be very kind and help
us by speaking up because the acoustics are not brilliant. Having
heard officials give their evidence, are there any general overarching
themes that you want to pick up by way of general statements to
set them in context. Michael, do you want to start and then Matthew?
Mr Gidney: Thank you. First of
all, we welcome the chance to come and talk to you and also we
welcome your scrutiny of EPAs: we think it is very timely and
necessary. I think you put your finger on it in your last questions
to the officials—it is our view that we lack a really coherent
Government policy towards EPAs in terms of vision, but also in
terms of how that vision is going to be realised. This policy
should explain how the statements on development which are in
the Cotonou Agreement and in the EC's negotiating mandate are
going to be translated into action, and how we are really going
to know before the conclusion of negotiations that the intended
development outcomes are going to be achieved. Very specifically,
we have some quite serious differences of opinion with the Government's
position on the inclusion of the "new issues" in EPA
negotiations, which I think various of us might wish to talk about.
I will just make one comment and then pass over to Matt. The officials
were saying just now that as related to the "new issues"'
it is up to the ACP to tell us what they want; but it is our view
that the ACP have told us very clearly what they want. Your suggestion
that this is three-dimensional chess, ie over-complicated, is
right, but I do not think it needs to be seen as being as complicated
as that. Possibly there is a certain amount of deliberate muddying
of the waters by the Commission, because the ACP have made it
very clear in their negotiating mandate on EPAs and also in their
statement reviewing Phase 1 of the negotiations that they do not
want to negotiate on "new issues" at all now, as this
has been their position at the WTO. It is a point of stated fact.
Q40 Chairman: Right.
Mr Griffith: Just an initial request,
we would value it if you tabled a question asking the Government
for their position. The White Paper that is going to be forwarded
to you I think is six or seven paragraphs and it does not flesh
out a lot of the questions that we will be asking. I would also
specifically like to pick up on some points that were made on
the Singapore issues around ACP opposition and what was agreed
at Cotonou. Amanda mentioned that the new issues were included
in Cotonou, but it is important to look at the detail of how they
were included. Of the four issues, three were included but they
were mentioned in the context of development co-operation and
regional integration, they were not mentioned in the context of
trade negotiation based on a principle of non-discrimination,
which is how they were included in the European Union negotiating
mandate. The fourth, Government procurement, is not in the Cotonou
agreement at all. It is also worth looking at the differences
between what the Cotonou agreement says and what the European
Union negotiating mandate says. We have a couple of examples.
The Cotonou agreement around investment talks about co-operation
"aimed at creating a more favourable environment for private
investment", but the EU negotiating mandate goes much further
and asks for "a regulatory framework based on principles
of non-discrimination, openness, transparency and stability".
The second one, on Government procurement, Cotonou does not make
any reference to it, as already stated, but the EU negotiating
mandate asks for "progressive liberalisation of procurement
markets on the principle of non-discrimination". From our
point of view those are clearly offensive interests, they have
been opposed by the ACP at the all-ACP level, and we think the
Government should put pressure on the Commission to drop them.
Dr Stevens: I think the discussion
on new issues illustrates a much more general problem which would
be greatly reduced if the Government were to make a very clear
and detailed statement of what it wishes to see in an EPA. The
general problem is that the ACP are negotiating under considerable
duress; they do not want these negotiations but they are faced
with the prospect that unless they come to a conclusion by the
end of 2007, or these ephemeral alternative arrangements are in
place, then they will have imposed upon them significant market
access barriers for their exports to the EU, and in the case of
new issues what they fear is that the EU will twist their arm
to accept within EPAs things that they would never have to accept
on the more level playing field negotiating environment of the
Doha Round. The official position is that these fears are misplaced,
and I do not necessarily think these official views are incorrect.
I do not think that the European Union is hell-bent on forcing
ACP countries to do highly undesirable things, but if I were an
ACP minister I would fear the worst because there have been no
statements of what the European Union want in specific terms,
and if these negotiations are to take place in a reasonable atmosphere
and come out with a good development solution, then the worst
fears have got to be alleviated, and they can easily alleviated
by ideally a European Union statement and, failing that, a Government
one of the maximum that the EU will be looking for. For example,
in the earlier discussion we talked about the undesirability of
countries being forced to accept dumped agricultural exports from
the EU and it was suggested that a special safeguard clause should
not be ruled out. Why not say it should be definitely ruled in,
that all EPAs will contain provisions that would allow Governments
which wish to do so to restrict the imports of goods which are
being sold below the cost of production? That would go a long
way to getting some sort of Governmental statement to reinforce
the information we were given from the Commission officials that
the degree of reciprocity would range between I think it was 70%
and 83%. That would do a great deal to calm the atmosphere and
allow the negotiations to focus on specifics.
Chairman: I think that is a good point
for you, John, to ask your point about the relationship between
Cotonou and Doha.
Q41 John Barrett: Given the issue of
WTO compatibility which features quite strongly in the EU's negotiating
mandate and given the delay in the conclusion of the Doha Development
Agreement, what would be the benefits and the disadvantages of
postponing the conclusion of EPAs until after the completion of
the WTO Round?
Dr Stevens: If it were feasible
it would be quite desirable for a whole range of reasons. There
is a strong economic case to be made that the benefits from liberalisation,
to the extent that they exist, result from multilateral liberalisation
and not strictly liberalisation towards a specific trading partner,
so to build upon the outcome of Doha rather than to try and pre-judge
the outcome would be desirable. Secondly, of course, the rules
within which these EPAs are trying to be convoluted might well
have changed and, thirdly of course, it would remove this deadline
of the world as we know it coming to an end on 1 January 2008.
The practical problem is that the reason why we are in negotiations
is because of the increased difficulty of obtaining waivers which
have, over the history of GATT, been the traditional way in which
industrialised countries justified preferential trade agreements,
and the waiver expires in 2007. Again, in practical terms it would
take at least two years for any challenge to a continuation of
preferences to go through the WTO system, so even without an extension
to the waiver it is probably possible to continue with the current
regime until 2009, and one can think of all sorts of little ruses
which would extend that possibility, such as, for example, agreeing
EPAs which had a phase one for immediate implementation under
which ACP agreed to reduce to zero all the products which they
currently have zero tariffs on, and left to a decision within
the next five years the next phase. If the EU were willing it
could find ways to extend the lifetime of the current regime in
order to allow negotiations to finish after the Doha Round.
Mr Gidney: I would like to add
that there could be some very significant logistical as well as
development gains from phasing the negotiations in this way, because
it was always the intention, of course, that EPAs would follow
on from what was agreed at the WTO. The Cotonou Agreement, talks
about negotiations "remaining in conformity with WTO rules
then prevailing"[11];
at the moment we are asking the ACP to hit a moving target because
of course the DDA[12]
is not complete and so we do not know the circumstances which
are "prevailing", and it is impossible therefore to
predict. Ultimately decisions about phasing the negotiations should
be up to the ACP and we would expect the ACP to have a line on
this. It is not for us to tell the ACP how it should conduct their
negotiations.
Q42 John Barrett: I wonder if you could
just elaborate on why the revised GSPs fall short as an alternative
to EPAs and what could be done to make these into a viable alternative?
Dr Stevens: To the extent that
there exists an alternative, the only one on the horizon at the
moment is the GSP, hence the need to try and make it in some way
an adequate alternative, but it is a difficult beast to make adequate
because its basic rationale is to treat all developing countries
the same, except you can treat Least Developed Countries more
favourably than other developing countries, and a large part of
the value to the ACP of the Cotonou Agreement is that they are
treated better than some other developing countries like Brazil
or Malaysia. The only obvious way in which the current proposed
new GSP for the period up to 2008 could be made a halfway acceptable
alternative would be if all the ACP countries or a majority of
them were classified for inclusion under a special prong to the
proposed GSP which would provide a special incentive for countries
which satisfy a range of labour, social and environmental standards.
Even if that went ahead though, there would be at least three
shortcomings to GSP; one is that there is no guarantee that this
proposed special regime will be shown to be WTO-compatible. The
reason why it has been created is that the EU has lost the case
with the WTO over its existing GSP special preferences for countries
which are engaged in the struggle against narcotics. The current
special preferences proposal seeks to provide a similar level
of preferences but in a fashion which is more compliant with the
WTO, but it is by no means certain that it will succeed a challenge
because it excludes a priori a certain number of countries
which, however good their social, labour and environmental policies,
can never benefit from special preferences. The second problem
is that of course it does nothing for the protocol products; further
elaboration of the GSP would be required to do that—and
the third problem is that the Rules of Origin are very poor in
terms of cumulation which is allowing different countries in the
group to add bits to the final product. A fourth problem to add
to the three I have identified is the lack of any connection to
aid, and as I think came out of the previous round of evidence,
there is a huge need to provide positive support to ACP countries
to improve their supply capacity and to improve the poverty impact
of any trade preferences.
Mr Griffith: To follow up on that,
as well as within the GSP there are other possible alternatives,
and the most obvious secondary one would be for there to be a
revision of the WTO rules on regional trade agreements, what is
called Article XXIV, to incorporate Special and Differential Treatment
(S&DT). At the moment there is no S and DT within Article
XXIV and that is something of an anomaly if you look at the rest
of the WTO where S and DT runs throughout; that could be revised.
The ACP has tabled a proposal to revise Article XXIV which the
EU has not supported, so that is an area where we think the UK
Government could put pressure on the Commission. I would also
like to flag up our perspective on the Government efforts so far
with alternatives. In 1998 the UK Government was very good in
pushing the Commission to give a commitment to alternatives within
the Cotonou Agreement, and the UK Government also gave a pledge
to this Committee—which is partly why we are here today—that
they would provide strong alternatives. In the past year or so
we have been encouraging the Government to actually demonstrate
what alternatives would look like and also to put concrete plans
in place. A few months ago our efforts were rewarded with a one
and a half pager which we were concerned was slightly inadequate,
given the Government's pledge. I have been reading through the
submission that the Government recently put to this evidence session
on what work they plan on alternatives, which we welcome, it is
a step forward, but I would like to flag up where we think it
rolls back from what they committed to the IDC in 1998, and I
would just like to highlight why we think it rolls back. This
is under paragraph 44 of the Government's submission[13].
The current IDC submission only promises research which would
be shared with others to help analysis, and it goes on to say
that this could possibly lead to a more in depth examination of
alternatives, but there is no commitment made within the Government's
current submission that this will happen. There is also no explicit
commitment to provide an alternative and any further work on alternatives
would be dependent on an ACP country "opting out", which
we interpret as saying that an alternative would only be presented
after an ACP country had explicitly rejected an EPA, so it would
be quite late in the day and it would require an ACP country to
really go out on a limb, whereas in 1998 the Government said that
alternatives "are to be made available" and it said
that this would happen before the finalisation of an EPA. So we
would say the Government still has much more work to do to make
sure that alternatives are presented as a choice alongside a final
EPA, and it needs to get moving on this quite quickly because
the expiry date is 2006.
Chairman: John, I think you have a question
for Jane.
Q43 Mr Bercow: Yes, my question is to
Jane Nalunga. If Economic Partnership Agreements were to proceed
as currently envisaged by the EU, what in your judgment would
be the impact of such an agreement on the development of Uganda?
Ms Nalunga: The EPAs are basically
about the liberalisation of ACP economies in more areas than agriculture
and market access, and as we have been discussing here they go
far beyond into "new issues", into labour standards
and so on. When you look at a country like Uganda which has undergone
a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) under the World Bank,
at the moment you find that a number of the industries have collapsed,
for example the textile industry and cotton growing because of
liberalisation, and further liberalisation I believe will lead
to more de-industrialisation because our industries cannot compete
with the subsidised goods from the EU. A number of impact assessments
have been carried out in the region; Uganda carried out one, but
it was a small study, which was funded by the EU, and the study
really brings it out that in Uganda, if the EPAs are signed the
way they are it would lead to de-industrialisation, the agriculture
will collapse, there will be massive unemployment and also the
reduction in livelihoods. So it is a clearly stated outcome from
the assessment study, not just for Uganda, but for Mauritius,
Kenya, and all the ESA (Eastern and Southern African) countries.
There is an argument that EPAs will be good for consumers because
of cheap things which will come in, but I think consumption has
to be sustainable because at the end of the day where are you
going to get the money to buy those cheap consumer goods? Today,
in Uganda, foreign exchange is got from immigrant workers from
outside because there are no industries, and this is going to
continue. Maybe another issue which is also important in consideration
of the effect of EPAs on Uganda is regional integration. The East
African Countries will sign the customs protocol in January 2005
but in the EPA negotiations Uganda and Kenya are in the ESA group
while Tanzania is in SADC, and we have been asking what is going
to happen, will we sign the protocol and, if we sign it, how are
we going to sign the EPAs? SADC also has problems, because SADC
is minus South Africa, minus the SACU countries. In SADC it is
Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola who are supposed to negotiate
the EPAs and all these are LDCs. So there is a problem when it
comes to regional integration. Another problem also is that of
the negotiating capacity in the ACP countries in terms of human
resources. Today in our Ministry of Trade there is one person
who is working on the EPAs and he shuttles between Brussels, between
COMESA and all the various meetings at home. There is also a problem
with the financial resources; the EU is funding almost 100% of
the negotiations—the tickets, the studies and so on. It
is good that we are getting funding but it is sort of a double-edged
sword in a way; you cannot negotiate objectively, you cannot say
no, and also there is no ownership of the process. Most ACP countries
are also not ready. There is supposed to be a National Development
Trade Forum in each country to look at the national position for
the EPAs. To date we have had in Uganda maybe just two meetings
in that forum, we have not yet come up with any position; the
16 ESA countries have their Regional Negotiating Forum which is
supposed to come up with a regional position to present to the
EU, but to date there is no position that has been tabled in that
group. There is no position on any of the issues in that negotiating
forum.
Q44 Mr Bercow: It certainly seems clear,
Jane, from your response that you have a welter of objections
and of course the argument for EPAs under the Regional Trade Agreements
tend to favour the stronger negotiating party. Can I just extrapolate
a bit from what you have said and just try to establish a more
precise position. I understand what you are saying about negotiating
issues, the funding and all the rest of it; however, in the event—I
know it is not yet on the table—that the proposal were that
you grant market access not to subsidised products but to unsubsidised
products, would you then be content, would your other objections
evaporate, or would you still be against the whole idea?
Ms Nalunga: If what? Could you
repeat it?
Q45 Mr Bercow: If the proposal were that
Uganda were obliged as part of that EPA to open its markets to
European agricultural products, not to subsidised or dumped produce
but to unsubsidised produce, would you then be content with such
an arrangement?
Ms Nalunga: I do not think Uganda
can compete whether products are subsidised or not because even
if they are not subsidised, when you look at the cost of production,
you do not have the production capacity constraints that we have,
our production capacity is very low, we do not have the infrastructure—we
have so many internal problems that even if your products are
not subsidised and they come on our market our products will not
compete. Let me give you an example of some of the problems in
West Africa where there is the issue of the chicken parts. I understand
here they say that chicken is not subsidised directly, but because
agriculture is subsidised the feeds are cheaper. Even if the chicken
parts are not subsidised, the chicken industry in West Africa
cannot compete. So even if they are not subsidised I doubt whether
our economies, as they are now, can compete.
Mr Bercow: I am very grateful for that,
that is a very clear answer.
Chairman: Does anybody want to say anything
about new issues that has not already been said? No. Then let
us go onto Everything But Arms. John.
Q46 John Barrett: Do you have any idea
as to how the Rules of Origin could be altered to increase access
to the EBA agreements?
Dr Stevens: Thank you very much.
I am glad the Rules of Origin came up in the previous evidence,
and I strongly support what was said then. The problem with the
Rules of Origin is that they reflect a pattern of global production
which applied 40 years ago and they have not changed. In those
days it was quite normal for a large part of any product to be
made in one single country; now the norm is global production
and both within the GSP, and also within the Cotonou Agreement,
the Rules of Origin have done a great deal to prevent countries
taking advantage of the preferences on offer because they would
require the countries to do something which is commercially unviable.
The great merit of the US example that was quoted is that for
the first time, and in relation to only one product, clothing,
they have allowed the lesser developed countries of Africa to
do what is effectively known in the jargon as "simple assembly"
of imported goods. Both the GSP and the Cotonou Agreement state
that simple assembly can never give a country originating status,
and that needs to be changed—not just for clothing but for
the whole range of manufactured goods so that we could see the
possibility of countries exporting footwear, leather goods, processed
agricultural products. It would require a very substantial change
in the Rules of Origin which, at the moment, are very complicated,
but they require in broad terms 30, 40 or 50% value to be added
in a country. Industry studies of electronics and video components
in South-East Asia suggest that a realistic target is 5, 6 or
7%, so we are talking not about a minor modification but a root
and branch change to bring the Rules of Origin up to date and
relevant to the industry sector concerned.
Q47 John Barrett: Would you agree with
the suggestion by ODI that the EU "bind" or secure the
EBA access in the WTO?
Dr Stevens: I think it would be
a very good idea, I think it would be a good idea from a whole
range of perspectives. The idea was floated at one stage by Renato
Ruggiero when he was head of the WTO and it has never been acted
upon. It would certainly give a guarantee of continued availability
to EBA which is absent at the moment—I think I agree with
the previous evidence that it is unlikely the EU would withdraw
it, but this would give a guarantee that they could not. It would
also be good in the WTO because it would give more concrete manifestation
to special and differential treatment, that you can bind different
levels of tariff for different groups of countries and it would
lead directly on to the sort of change in the WTO that Matthew
was talking about in terms of getting an alternative to EPAs.
If the WTO accepts that you can have different tariffs bound in
the WTO without requiring countries to go through the hoops of
Article XXIV, then that would be a highly desirable way to go.
Mr Griffith: To follow up on that
and echoing why improving EBA is so important, this whole question
of an alternative came out in our submission[14]
and it also came out in the ODI submission[15]
that, at present, LDCs have very little reason to sign up to an
EBA. The Commission is asking them to reciprocate at the same
level to market access, yet they are not getting any commensurate
benefits in return. We do not think that is a very good idea,
so it is very important that an alternative is available for them
and that for an EPA to be a suitable alternative these sorts of
measures have to be put in place, otherwise LDCs will have nowhere
to jump. The concern that we have is that at present the Government
is not really looking at the problems created by EPAs in terms
of regional integration. The difference in incentives for LDC
and non-LDC groups within the ACP group is very big and we cannot
see any clear reason why LDCs would want to join an EPA. This
is a major problem. For example, in COMESA 13 of the 16 are LDCs;
if 13 of them say we do not want to join a regional grouping you
will have three fairly random, non-LDC groups who would have to
join up, but the Government's submission did not admit that this
was a problem, it did not tell us anything about the solutions
to this problem and how to get round it, and we have not got any
convincing solutions or attempts to address this problem from
either the Government or the Commission, which we think is a fairly
fundamental one.
Mr Gidney: Can I just add a line
about urgency on this? The Government persists in stating that
EPAs are at a preliminary stage—indeed, that was contained
also in the Government's evidence—but we think differently.
The Eastern and Southern Africa EPA will be agreed in outline
form by next year and substantial provisions on market access
will be agreed by next March. So the fact that the Government
is only at this stage beginning to think about what might constitute
support to the regional integration process, and what are the
potential alternatives, we feel is too little too late.
Chairman: Let us just have a quick tour
de table. John.
Q48 Mr Battle: I think the pressure in
the immediate term is going to be on reform of the protocol for
sugar. What would you recommend as the best policy to help ACP
states, particularly the Caribbean at the present time, if those
changes go ahead, which we all want, but could damage the Millennium
Development Goals going forward?
Mr Griffith: Unless Chris wants
to say something on this would it be possible to give a written
reply[16]
because we have had limited numbers for sugar expertise within
our group and we cannot really comment to a level that would be
useful.
Mr Battle: That is very welcome, thank
you.
Q49 Chairman: As this is the only session
we are doing on this, Dianna, is there anything that you would
like to say, not in reply, but is there any comment you would
like to make on the comments that have just been made?
Ms Melrose: Yes, if I might. It
is a very interesting idea there on the WTO challenge taking a
long time, we had not thought of that one. I just wanted to clarify
in relation to what Matt in particular said, that there is no
way in which the Government is rowing back on its commitment to
look at viable alternatives. The point is that it was the ACP
themselves that asked for a delay until 2006 to look at the alternatives
and, basically, we do not see that it makes sense for the Government
to come up with a blueprint because we do not know—without
looking at the detail—what is best for development, hence
the emphasis on research is precisely because we need to get it
right. That is the critical point and we also think that our primary
target should be to inform the ACP, and obviously we would use
the same evidence to influence the Commission as hard as we can.
I certainly want to say that there is no sense of complacency
here. Our Ministers are very exercised about the issue.
Q50 Chairman: Can I just make an overall
comment, having heard the evidence this afternoon? All of us—the
development community, the NGOs, the Parliamentarians, Ministers,
the media and others—have spent huge amounts of time talking
about WTO and this Committee has done two very substantial reports
on WTO[17]
and there have been acres of media coverage. Cotonou has got practically
no coverage at all, absolutely nothing, yet we heard Jane this
afternoon saying look, if these proposals go through as they are,
there will be a devastating outcome for agriculture. I have a
concern that everyone is focused on the WTO but there are some
potentially serious negotiations going on in Cotonou in which
we have not sufficiently engaged—and that may be our fault.
Firstly, I think, as this Committee, we should create an early
opportunity in 2005 to try and seek a meeting with Commissioner
Mandelson to start to engage on these issues. Those of us who
were at Cancún and saw how the Commission operated under
the previous Commissioner know that these are essentially issues
of community competence and it is therefore quite important to
do that, but I also want to publicly say that I think there is
an issue in which the NGOs collectively—the usual suspects—can
assist. I noticed just the other day on Making Poverty History,
postcards on trade policy, fair trade and so on, and maybe we
ought to say to Oxfam and all those who are very much engaged
in WTO that they ought to be thinking about doing some immediate
briefing to us as Members of Parliament and also to MEPs on Cotonou
and the usual groups that lobby MPs and MEPs on Cotonou, because
I do not think that sufficient people are starting to get their
minds around this. One senses that there are two things, that
whilst in terms of the language of these—there is no criticism
here of DFID—there has been nothing written in stone, actually
as Chris has said quite a lot has been written in stone quite
quickly, so to a certain extent speed is of the essence, and I
think this is a topic on which we all need to focus rather more
attention. Michael.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmintdev/92/92.pdf.
International Development Committee, Seventh Report of Session
2002-03, Trade and Development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún,
HC 400-I. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmintdev/400/400.pdf
Mr Gidney: Might I be permitted
to make a summing-up statement from our side?
Chairman: Yes.
Mr Gidney: We would welcome your
suggestions and agree that it would be extremely helpful if the
Committee were able to meet with Commissioner Mandelson on EPAs.
Equally, we would welcome more engagement between the NGOs and
the various Parliamentary groupings who are able to exercise such
valuable scrutiny over this process. We are starting to work now
with the Government and we look forward to this being a constructive
dialogue. This is quite new, I have to say that as recently as
March/April of this year we were told by officials in both DFID
and DTI that the Government was not prepared to expend "political
capital" on EPAs. That has now changed and that is welcome,
but as it is a new development the jury is out on the outcome.
It is our view that the ACP are very clear that they cannot cope
with the level and speed of negotiations on EPAs and they have
serious concerns, expressed in their negotiating mandate and their
press statements after their meetings, about some aspects of EPAs,
particularly to do with the pace and scope of reciprocity and
the inclusion of `new issues' when they had fought successfully
against them in the WTO. If we really wanted to show good faith
and a strong commitment to development, then the British Government
is well placed to lobby for the removal of "new issues"
from the Commission's mandate and, again, the removal of the excessive
focus on fast liberalisation which has characterised the Commission's
activities so far.
Chairman: What I would say on that, Michael,
is that some of the policy dance that we have had on this, the
policy dialogue, is that usually the NGOs or the staff from the
NGOs draw up an agenda of objectives which you tend to agree amongst
yourselves, and which you manage to communicate to Parliamentarians.
I think we would welcome that because there is a lot of confusion
here about what is wood, what is forest, what is trees and who
is on whose side on what and so on. If it were possible to give
some thought to that between now and the end of the year, I think
that would be very helpful. Government departments here—the
Department of Trade and DFID—are themselves having to cope
with a lot in terms of WTO and Cotonou, and of course a lot of
these issues are cross-departmental. If you take an issue like
sugar, one can imagine that what DEFRA is saying on sugar is different—they
are concerned about ensuring that the interests of sugar beet
farmers in East Anglia are heard, so there are various tensions
here that we have to recognise on many of these commodities. Having
heard all the evidence this afternoon, both from officials and
from you, I am concerned that this is something that all of us,
the whole development community and the media, are not paying
sufficient attention to.
John Barrett: Can I add one point and
it is something that I can perhaps fire at both the NGOs and the
officials, and that is one of the pressing issues for getting
it right and up to speed is that particularly with the Caribbean
states there is the imperative that that trade goes on outwith
the negotiations, and that now that the American Government has
been successful in Columbia in restricting the narcotics trade
there, there is pressure for that to move on to the Caribbean.
We have seen what happened, for example, in Afghanistan and it
is something the DTI, DFID and the NGOs will be aware of, and
we need to move on because there are alternative products which
are not necessarily covered by these agreements that can actually
start to grow in the fields. It is another reason for keeping
the pressure up.
Chairman: Okay. We could carry on all
night, but I think we are all of one mind on this so let us move
forward. Thank you very much for coming to give us your evidence.
11 Article 37.7 Back
12
Doha Development Agenda Back
13
Ev 37 Back
14
Ev 39 Back
15
Ev 55 Back
16
Ev 49-50 Back
17
International Development Committee, First Report of Session
2003-04, Trade and Development at the WTO: Learning the lessons
of Cancu«n to revive a genuine development round, HC
92-I. Available at Back
|
