Joint memorandum submitted by Department
for International Development and Department of Trade and Industry
SUMMARY
1. We welcome the Committee's decision to
hold an evidence session on the emerging Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the EU and African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) states.
2. The Government is committed to ensuring that
EPAs produce real developmental benefits for the ACP states,
consistent with the aims and principles of the Cotonou Agreement.
EPAs will not be Regional Trade Agreements in the traditional
sense. They are intended to be new instruments that will promote
development through trade, by maintaining ACP preferential access
to the EU market, whilst assisting ACP countries to benefit from
further integration into the world trading system.
3. Negotiations of EPAs are still at an
early stage and therefore much of the substance of the agreements,
such as coverage, transition times and rules, have yet to be agreed.
The key challenge will be to ensure that the development objective
is central to the negotiations. This will include giving ACP countries
sufficient flexibility over the timescale and sectors in which
they are required to open their own markets to the EU and to their
neighbours. Given many of the ACPs' least developed or vulnerable
economy status, longer transition periods will be required than
in other trade agreements. This is essential if they are to promote,
rather than undermine, ACP countries' national development and
poverty reduction plans, and their regional integration efforts.
The negotiations must include the provision of capacity building
to support the ACP in negotiating the agreements, technical assistance
in implementing the agreements and trade adjustment support for
individual ACP countries.
4. The Government will continue to work
closely with the European Commission, other EU Member States,
ACP countries, NGOs and the private sector to achieve agreements
that help the ACP harness the potential of trade to promote economic
growth and sustainable development.
COTONOU AGREEMENT
AND THE
NEED FOR
CHANGE
5. The Cotonou Agreement has three pillars:
political co-operation, trade growth and development assistance.
Its objectives are: "To promote and expedite the economic,
cultural and social development of the ACP states, with a view
to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable
and democratic political environment. The partnership shall be
centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating
poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development
and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world
economy." [1]
6. The Government is fully committed to
achieving these objectives. The UK Government's desired outcome
for the negotiations is to help the ACP better realise the potential
of trade to stimulate economic growth and development through
increased trade with the EU and with each other. The outgoing
European Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, has described EPAs as
tools for development. The EU as a whole has made clear that we
do not have "offensive" market access interests. In
the 2004 White Paper on Trade and Investment, the Government has
made a clear policy commitment that the UK will seek to hold our
EU partners to this.
The Failures of Preferences
7. ACP countries have enjoyed long-standing
preferential access to the EU market under successive Lomé
conventions and now the Cotonou Agreement. These preferences were
designed to benefit traditional ACP trading partners, more than
half of which are least developed countries (LDCs) and other vulnerable,
small island and landlocked states. The margins of preference
that resulted depend on both the EU's standard tariff for each
product (its MFN rate) and the preference granted to the ACP (for
example duty free or x% of the MFN rate). Preference margins vary
for each product but can be as high as 24% for some fisheries
products. However, preferences have failed to boost ACP exports
as intended, for a number of reasons, including supply side constraints
in the ACP economies and the erosion of preferences over time
due to multilateral trade liberalisation (that has reduced MFN
tariff rates). By 2002, only 3% of EU imports originated from
ACP states, as compared to 6.7% in 1976.
WTO Compatibility
8. In addition, these preferences are incompatible
with WTO rules. One of the central tenets of the WTO is non-discrimination.
Developed countries can apply lower tariff rates (ie offer preferential
access) to exports from developing countries, thereby discriminating
between developed and developing countries under WTO rules. However,
with the exception of the WTO recognised category of Least Developed
Countries (LDCs), they cannot discriminate between developing
countries. This is exactly what Lomé/Cotonou preferences
do, in discriminating between those developing countries that
are members of the ACP group and those that are not.
9. The preferences are currently covered
by a WTO waiver until the end of 2007, hence the planned timetable
for EPAs to come into force in 2008. The waiver was only secured
after lengthy and difficult negotiation. The EU could seek to
have this waiver renewed, which would require the agreement of
at least three quarters of the 148 WTO members although in practice
waivers of a magnitude such as this are usually adopted by consensus.
However, the European Commission, and the Government, judges that
the consensus required to extend the waiver is unlikely to be
forthcoming due to the high probability of a challenge from non-ACP
developing countries.
10. The existence of a WTO waiver is not
in itself sufficient to protect these preferences. The waiver
will provide protection against challenges based on specific provisions
of the WTO agreements mentioned in the waiver but would not protect
the EU against challenges based on other provisions not specifically
referred to in the text of the waiver. The Philippines, Thailand
and Indonesia successfully challenged the EU's preference for
some ACP fish exports on the grounds that this discrimination
against non-ACP developing countries was harming their domestic
industries. The situation was resolved through the creation of
a specific quota for these Asian exporters. By extending preferential
access to the EU market, the value of the ACP preferences was
reduced, thereby affecting the profitability of ACP industries.
OPTIONS AVAILABLE
TO ACP STATES
UNDER COTONOU
11. EPAs, linked to support for trade related
capacity building and wider development assistance, are intended
to support ACP countries' integration into the global economy
on a more sustainable basis than continuing dependence on eroding
trade preferences. The intention is to promote structural transformation
and diversification of ACP economies into sectors in which they
have a longer-term comparative advantage. The stated objective
is that they should enhance "the production, supply and
trading capacity of the ACP countries as well as their capacity
to attract investment".
EPAs
12. The Cotonou Agreement provides the framework
for this integration and within it, the ACP and EU have chosen
to negotiate RTAs with self-selected groupings of ACP countries.
To be WTO-compatible, these RTAs must include reciprocity. [See
paras 19-25.] However, EPAs go beyond conventional RTAs, as they
will be negotiated within the broader development framework of
the Cotonou agreement. Any change to current trading arrangements
is of significant concern to ACP countries, as the EU is the major
trading partner for most, particularly African members.
13. The ACP regional groupings and the EU
have agreed to "roadmaps" for the EPA negotiation[2]
which reflect the "stepping stone" approach to ACP market
opening to the EU. The first stage in the negotiations is regional
economic integration. The Cotonou Agreement explicitly states
that the new trading arrangements must help accelerate the process
of regional integration among ACP states as a basis for their
further integration into the multilateral trading system. It also
includes a phased approach to ACP tariff reductions to "remove
progressively barriers to trade between [the EU and ACP] and enhance
co-operation in all areas relevant to trade".
Alternatives to EPAs
14. LDC members of the ACP already have
full tariff and quota-free access to the EU market under the Everything
But Arms (EBA) regime. Many LDCs at present choose to use Cotonou
preferences, rather than the theoretically more generous EBA access.
This is because Cotonou rules of origin (ROOs) are more generous
than EBA rules, allowing ACP countries to source inputs (cumulate)
from any other ACP country.
15. Article 37.6 of the Cotonou Agreement
states that, in the case of non-LDC ACP states, all WTO compatible
alternatives should be considered in 2004. The Commission has
subsequently agreed to postpone this review until 2006 at the
request of the ACP. The roadmaps contain opt-out clauses should
an ACP region, or any country within it, wish to pursue an alternative
arrangement instead of an EPA. The Cotonou Agreement states that
should this occur, the ACP country should enjoy no worse
market access to the EU than they currently enjoy under the Cotonou
preferences.
Possible alternatives include:
EBA access for all ACP
16. The EU could grant greater preferential
access to ACP non-LDCs through the Generalised System of Preferences
(GSP). The GSP is currently being reviewed with a revised GSP
coming into force in 2006. "Everything But Arms" (EBA),
is an arrangement within the GSP that gives all LDCs duty and
quota free access to the EU market (including for sugar, rice
and bananas by 2009). A further proposed arrangement within the
GSP, GSP+, will give close-to-EBA access to developing countries
that ratify key international conventions, such as human rights
treaties, ILO conventions and good governance agreements. Extending
EBA access to non-LDC ACPs through either the GSP+ or EBA itself,
would therefore fulfil the commitment in the Cotonou Agreement
that any ACP states unable to enter into an EPA should enjoy no
worse market access to the EU than they currently do. The Government
will work closely with the Commission to ensure that the renegotiated
GSP could be amended to provide a viable alternative to an EPA,
should any country wish not to join one.
17. The UK Government argued strongly for
an ambitious result on market access in the development of the
Commission's negotiating mandate for EPAs and a statement to this
effect, supported by the Danish Government, was annexed to the
text.
Bilateral Trade agreements
18. A further option would be for the EU
to enter into bilateral RTAs with those ACP states that choose
not to enter into a regional EPA. However, such an agreement would
have to meet the same WTO rules on RTAs as EPAs. Although the
individual ACP state would have greater scope to tailor the provisions
to its specific needs, a single country would be in a much weaker
negotiating position with the EU than within a regional grouping.
Under a bilateral RTA, an ACP state would neither gain nor cede
market access to other ACP states. This would at best bypass and
at worse obstruct autonomous moves towards greater regional economic
integration.
RECIPROCITY IN
EPAS
19. NGOs have expressed strong concerns
that reciprocal opening of ACP markets to EU exporters will expose
them to unfair competition in domestic and regional markets and
endanger fragile regional integration processes. Some argue that
the ACP should not be obliged to offer any degree of market opening
to the EU.
20. The Government's view is that in the
longer-term, prospects for economic growth and development in
ACP countries will be boosted if they open their own markets.
Poor consumers in ACP countries stand to benefit from cheaper
imports, from other ACP countries as well as from the EU, as do
ACP businesses. These gains will not accrue if ACP states fail
to liberalise their economies. However, neither will they materialise
if liberalisation is implemented without careful consideration
of the poverty and social impact of trade reforms. Social safety
nets and transitional assistance will be essential to cushion
the most vulnerable and to assist ACP producers exploit new trading
opportunities.
21. In the framework for the current round
of WTO negotiations agreed in July, LDCs, unlike all other WTO
members, will not be required to make further commitments to reduce
their tariff levels. However, LDCs that join non-LDCs in a regional
ACP grouping to negotiate an RTA/EPA with the EU will be required
to offer a degree of reciprocity to both the EU and other developing
countries within its regional grouping.
22. The coverage and pace of reciprocal
market opening between the EU and ACP under EPAs must comply with
the WTO rules in this area. These rules are contained in Article
XXIV of the GATT and the 1994 Understanding on the Interpretation
of Article XXIV of GATT. This includes the coverage of an RTA
(ie what percentage of trade should be covered) and the period
over which trade should be liberalised. However, the actual wording
in the rules on both these issues is vague. With respect to coverage,
they state that RTAs should cover "substantially all trade".
With respect to timescale, they state that reciprocal market opening
within an RTA should take place "within a reasonable amount
of time". The 1994 Understanding states, however, that the
reasonable length of time for moving to a free trade area or a
customs union should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases.
Where the parties to an agreement believe that 10 years would
be insufficient they are required to provide a full explanation
to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods of the need for a longer
period. The rules do not preclude asymmetrical reciprocity, that
is, allowing developing countries more time to liberalise and
include less of their trade in the RTA than the developed country
members.
23. As the Commission has acknowledged,
the need for a flexible approach to reciprocity in the design
of EPAs will be critical to their ability to complement ACP countries'
national poverty reduction plans. Further analysis will need to
be done to look at which sectors, and on what timescale, reciprocal
market opening by the ACP would best meet their development needs,
whilst remaining compatible with WTO rules.
24. The ACP have submitted a proposal to
reform these particular WTO rules to clarify the terms of asymmetrical
reciprocity between developed and developing country members of
an RTA. The Commission's view is that the rules already provide
sufficient flexibility for RTAs between developing and developed
countries to take account of the special needs of the latter.
The ACP proposal does indicate that the ACP concern is not necessarily
the principle of reciprocity per se, but the nature of
that reciprocity.
25. A further element of "asymmetric"
liberalisation is that ACP farmers should be protected from import
surges of EU agricultural products, which threaten their livelihoods
and domestic industries (whether unfairly subsided or not). WTO
members have agreed to develop a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM)
that developing countries could use for this form of protection.
This mechanism is being developed through the current round of
WTO negotiations and DFID has commissioned the International Centre
for Trade Sustainable and Development (ICTSD) to assist in the
formulation of this concept.
"NEW ISSUES"
IN EPAS
26. Some suspect the EU of using the EPA
negotiations to pursue through the "back door" the Singapore
Issues (including investment and competition) that will not now
be part of the single undertaking in the current WTO negotiations
(apart from trade facilitation). The European Commission has stated
that regional trading agreements are "necessarily WTO plus",
as integration at the regional level is both broader and deeper
than at the multilateral level.
27. To ensure that EPAs are true "tools
for development", the EU must therefore protect the right
of ACP countries to regulate their economies and support, not
supersede, regional progress on these issues. Building on what
is happening within ACP regions, further detailed analysis is
needed into how these issues might best be incorporated into EPAs
to help ACP states benefit from both regional and multilateral
trade and investment flows. Given the sensitivity of investment
and competition within the WTO, the ACP will expect the EU to
also understand these sensitivities in the context of how these
issues may be included within an EPA.
28. Inclusion of these issues in an EPA
does present potential gains for the ACP; and a predictable and
transparent set of rules governing investment will inspire greater
confidence in potential investors. The UK already has bilateral
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs) with 29
of the 77 ACP countries. Research is now being undertaken, for
example by the Commonwealth Secretariat, to consider how investment
provisions may be most beneficially incorporated into an EPA.
Negotiations on trade facilitation measures within EPAs will need
to complement those within the WTO. This entails an explicit link
being made between the implementation capacities of ACP countries
and the progress of the negotiations in this area. It also means
that the EU will need to support trade facilitation through well
co-ordinated support for technical assistance and capacity building.
RULES OF
ORIGIN
29. The Government believes that simplification
and improvement of rules of origin are essential to enable all
developing countries to take advantage of the preferences offered
to them. Restrictive and complicated rules of origin (ROOs) not
only reduce the value to developing countries of current preference
schemes, but also inhibit their export competitiveness. LDCs do
not take full advantage of quota and tariff free access to the
EU market under EBA (Everything But Arms), both because of supply-side
constraints and restrictive ROOs. EBA ROOs are the same as those
of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) that apply to other
developing countries.
30. Under these ROOs, LDC producers cannot
easily use inputs from any other country if they want to claim
duty free access to the EU market. Lomé/Cotonou rules are
slightly more favorable in that they allow the ACP to source inputs
from other ACP suppliers, but far less so from non-ACP developing
countries. As a result of the restrictive ROOs that apply to EBA,
GSP and Cotonou, ACP clothes manufacturers cannot buy the best-priced
cotton from other developing countries in South or East Asia.
This either increases the cost of their exports or stops exports
altogether. An example of the development gains of more flexible
ROOs is the US AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) preference
scheme. Under a derogation from normal rules, these ROOs allow
eligible African countries to buy from any developing country.
In the case of Lesotho, this has attracted stable foreign investment
in the garments industry. Exports have trebled in three years,
making the industry the largest employer in the country, especially
of women workers.
31. Restrictive EBA ROOs should not be used
as a stick to compel LDCs to join EPAs. To deliver on the commitments
made at the Evian Summit, the EU should ensure that ROOs "do
not inadvertently preclude eligible developing countries from
taking advantage of preference programmes". For this to happen,
ROOs must be sufficiently flexible to enable ACP countries to
source inputs from the most competitive source, which may be outside
the EPA region. This is necessary to facilitate the development
of globally competitive industries in the ACP. The Commission
is currently consulting on amendments to preferential rules of
origin and the Government has submitted proposals for their simplification
and improvement.
EU/ACP REGIONAL AND
SUB-REGIONAL
NEGOTIATIONS
32. EPA negotiations were launched in September
2002 with an agreement to sequence the negotiations in two phases.
Phase I consisted of negotiations at the all ACP level addressing
"horizontal" non-country specific issues. Phase II will
consist of region specific negotiations. See Annex I for details
of the self-selected ACP regions. Some in the ACP wanted the outcome
of Phase I be made into a binding commitment before moving on
to Phase II, but this was not agreed to by the EC. The European
Commission did not see any added value in this approach given
that EPAs are part of the binding commitment of the Cotonou Agreement
itself. Discussions at all-ACP level are continuing in parallel
with Phase II through the all-ACP-EC Technical Monitoring Committee.
Dispute settlement and the "non-execution clause" have
already been discussed. Future discussions will focus on rules
of origin, trade facilitation and sanitary and phytosanitary standards.
33. Phase II negotiations between the EC
and six regional and sub-regional groupings were originally expected
to start in September 2003, but the last set of negotiations were
launched in the second half of 2004. The process of defining their
negotiating groups has been long and complicated for ACP states,
especially in Southern Africa. This is because of their overlapping
memberships of different regional groups (SADC, COMESA) and SACU
(South Africa Customs Union).[3]
In other cases, the self-designated negotiating groups have broadly
followed the lines of existing regional groups, such as CARICOM
(Caribbean) and ECOWAS (West Africa). The reality of EPAs negotiations
has forced the pace of rationalisation of regional groups—when
choices now have real economic consequences.
34. The initial phase of all six regional
negotiations is focusing on developing regional markets.
This reflects the Cotonou commitment to foster regional economic
integration within the ACP. The EPA negotiations need to help
the process forward, but at a pace acceptable to the different
ACP members. If EPAs are to help promote regional economic integration
on a sustainable basis, the EU needs to recognise that a one size
fits all European model will not work in very different regional
and sub-regional contexts. Substantive negotiations on the content
of the trade agreements will begin early in the New Year.
CHALLENGES FOR
THE ACP
35. Besides the complexities of liberalising
trade within emerging regional economic groupings, EPAs pose a
number of challenges to the ACP. Major challenges face the ACP
on substantive trade adjustment issues. They include finding alternative
sources of revenue as tariffs come down; introducing reforms (eg
regulating domestic service industries in a way that best suits
their domestic economies); avoiding trade diversion, as EU imports
become cheaper, and addressing underlying supply-side constraints
and the need to diversify their economies.
36. ACP negotiating capacity will be stretched
thin with simultaneous negotiations in the WTO, and regional trade
agreement negotiations with other trade partners (such as the
US) as well as within their regional groupings. Progress in the
Doha Round will have far-reaching implications on the shape of
EPAs. In some areas (eg realising the EU's commitment to eliminate
agricultural export subsides), progress in the EPA negotiations
will follow progress in the WTO. The negotiating process will
need to be an organic one that builds on the phased approach of
the regional road maps, and responds to developments in the WTO.
In article 39 of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU and ACP agreed
"to co-operate closely in identifying and furthering their
common interests in international economic and trade cooperation
in particular in the WTO". The EU should continue to consult
and work with ACP countries to further their integration into
the world trading system and to ensure that a successful outcome
to the current Doha Round is achieved.
SUPPORT FOR
TRADE ADJUSTMENT
37. It is clear that some ACP members, that
are more heavily dependent on EU preferences in specific sectors,
will need additional, targeted assistance to help the adjustment
process. The challenge for the international community, as set
out in the Government White Paper on Trade and Investment, is
to ensure that the transitional assistance, which will be needed
by these countries, is guaranteed, credible and additional, as
well as being delivered in a timely fashion.
38. With respect to reform of the Sugar
Regime, we await detailed Commission proposals, but it is expected
that the EU will offer assistance to those ACP countries most
affected through both aid and trade provisions. EPAs are the most
likely vehicle for the latter. Different sources of finance for
this transitional assistance need to be considered, to make sure
that we meet the White Paper challenge.
39. The European Commission has rejected
the ACP request for additional financial resources to accompany
EPAs. However, joint EC-ACP Regional Preparatory Task Forces (RPTFs)
have been established to ensure that the EU's development assistance
supports the process of change in implementing EPAs. This will
include considering both the priority given to trade in EDF (European
Development Fund) allocations, as well as in the development assistance
of EU Member States and other donors. DFID will be urging other
EU donors to work together to coordinate their assistance to the
ACP as an integral part of their engagement on EPA issues.
40. The EU has provided
22.8 million to help strengthen ACP capacity to negotiate
effectively. This has been used to fund over 50 impact studies,
confidential to the ACP, to help inform their negotiating positions.
In addition, the EC is funding Sustainability Impact Assessments
(SIAs), which aim to help both the EU and ACP to frame EPAs in
the most developmentally and environmentally beneficial way. The
UK has expressed concerns to the EC that there is a risk that
the approach to the SIAs and their timing may limit their usefulness
in informing the negotiations. DFID has provided some input to
the methodology and stands ready to contribute expertise, based
on its experience of Poverty and Social Impact Assessments (PSIAs).
The ACP will also have access to the EC's relatively new
50 million trade-related capacity building facility,
"Trade.Com" for EPA-related initiatives.
UK Support to the ACP
41. DFID is providing support to strengthen
the trade policymaking process in ACP countries through a number
of bilateral, regional and multilateral programmes. These include
£4 million plus to assist sub-Saharan African countries to
integrate trade issues into their poverty reduction strategies
and to develop proactive negotiating positions based on their
strategic interests; £1.6 million to support the Caribbean
trade Regional Negotiating Machinery; and some £270,000 to
EPA-specific capacity building support though the European Centre
for Development Policy Management.
42. More generally, DFID is supporting a
new research programme on the Global Trade and Financial Architecture
aimed at generating new ideas on how best to address the adjustment
needs of developing countries to trade liberalisation. This includes
identifying funding mechanisms for trade adjustment and ways of
translating these ideas into meaningful Special and Differential
Treatment provisions within specific WTO agreements. The work
is co-ordinated by a steering group chaired by former Mexican
President, Ernesto Zedillo and its membership includes the South
African chair of the WTO Development Committee.
43. DTI and DFID are working closely together
to ensure that EPAs deliver their developmental potential. DFID
is stepping up its engagement on EPAs with the ACP, the European
Commission, other EU Member States, and NGOs in the North and
South. DTI and DFID we are working closely with EC officials and
have participated in various regional meetings to better understand
ACP members' views and the support they require.
44. DFID, in close collaboration with DTI
and NGOs is currently developing a programme of research on EPAs.
Our objective is to contribute to EU and ACP thinking on how to
achieve the best development outcome from the negotiations. Analysis
will be conducted into priority ACP concerns, such as reciprocity,
the inclusion of investment and competition and transitional assistance.
In line with the Government's commitment made before the Select
Committee on International Development in 1998 on the renegotiation
of the Lomé Convention, we will also undertake technical
research into possible alternatives. This analysis will be shared
with ACP members, the Commission and EU partners and could contribute
to more in-depth examination of the alternatives in 2006, should
any ACP country opt out of an EPA.
45. DFID has recently commissioned work
to develop a general framework for analysis of potential regional
trading agreements and will consider a Caribbean EPA as one of
its case studies. DFID is also considering where we might best
complement existing EPA-related technical assistance, in response
to ACP demand. Our aim is to invest resources in providing timely
support to ACP members as they develop negotiating strategies
consistent with their regional road maps.
November 2004
Annex 1
DETAILS OF ACP EPA NEGOTIATING GROUPS
ACP
Regional Grouping:
| West Africa CEDEAO + Mauritania (ECOWAS)
| Central Africa CEMAC + STP (CEMAC) |
East South Africa (ESA) (COMESA minus) |
Southern Africa (SADC minus) | Caribbean (CARIFORUM)
| Pacific (PIF) |
Negotiations
Began: |
October
2003 | October
2003
| February
2004 | July
2004
| April
2004 | September
2004
|
| 1 | Benin | Cameroon
| Burundi | Angola | Antigua
| Cook Is |
| 2 | Burkina Faso | Central Africa
| Comoros | Botswana | Bahamas
| Fed Micron |
| 3 | Cape Verde | Chad
| Congo (Dem Rep) | Lesotho |
Barbados | Fiji |
| 4 | Gambia | Congo
| Djibouti | Mozambique | Belize
| Kiribati |
| 5 | Ghana | Equat Guinea
| Eritrea | Namibia | Dominica
| Marshall Is |
| 6 | Guinea | Gabon
| Ethiopia | Swaziland | Dominican Rep
| Nauru |
| 7 | Guinea Biss | S Tome Princ (STP)
| Kenya | Tanzania | Grenada
| Niue |
| 8 | Ivory Coast |
| Malawi | | Guyana
| Palau |
| 9 | Liberia |
| Mauritius | | Haiti
| PNG |
| 10 | Mali | |
Madagascar | | Jamaica
| Samoa |
| 11 | Mauritania |
| Rwanda | | St Lucia
| Solomon Is |
| 12 | Niger | |
Seychelles | | St Vincent
| Tonga |
| 13 | Nigeria |
| Sudan | | St Kitts & Nevis
| Tuvalu |
| 14 | Senegal |
| Uganda | | Suriname
| Vanuatu |
| 15 | Sierra Leone |
| Zambia | | Trinidad & Tobago
| |
| 16 | Togo | |
Zimbabwe | | |
|
| | |
| | | |
1
Article 1, Cotonou Agreement, 2000. Back
2
Each ACP region has developed a "road map" for Phase
II of the negotiations. These detail the negotiating structure,
priority issues and indicative schedule of negotiations. Back
3
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have opted to negotiate as part of
a 16-strong COMESA group; seven are left in SADC; with 16 in the
West African; 15 in the Caribbean and 14 in Pacific regional groups. Back
| 
