Annex 2
Darfur: Revised Forward Humanitarian Strategy
October 2004-March 2005
SUMMARY
1. The humanitarian situation remains precarious.
The response has incrementally improved over the last three months,
but remains insufficient to stabilise the situation fully. Protection
remains paramount. Concerted effort is required to consolidate
assistance to existing beneficiaries and expand operations to
address the needs of the newly displaced and increasingly food
insecure, non-displaced populations.
2. The broad thrust of the Forward Humanitarian
Strategy (July 2004) remains valid. The focus on supporting interventions
that enable the rapid expansion of delivery is starting to bear
fruit. Logistic capacity is now in a better position to support
agency delivery, particularly in the food and non-food sector.
There is a need to continue frontloading operations, filling critical
gaps and allowing agencies sufficient resources to drive forward
their programmes.
INTRODUCTION
3. A review of the Darfur Forward Humanitarian
Strategy (developed in July 2004) was undertaken from 21-28 September
by the Sudan Unit and the British Embassy Khartoum (BEK). This
involved consultation with donors and humanitarian agencies. This
revised strategy takes stock of the impact of actions undertaken
over the past three months and recommends further measures to
be adopted. The focus of these is on the next three months. This
strategy reflects only part of the UK efforts on Darfur and is
designed to inform allocations from the financial resources available.
The UK is also intensively engaged on the political and security
aspects of the crisis. (See information available on DFID and
FCO web sites)
REVIEW
Current humanitarian situation
4. The humanitarian situation remains precarious.
At the start of September, the UN estimated that there were 1.45
million internally displaced, with a new caseload of 230,000 appearing
in August. The number of non-displaced, including host communities,
requiring assistance is not known, but is thought to be in excess
of 0.5 million. Many people are not receiving adequate assistance,
because of security concerns, operational capability and logistical
constraints faced by agencies. In summary, the humanitarian response
is still gearing up and moving forward, though struggling to keep
pace with the growing number of people requiring assistance. Humanitarian
capacity is improving, but insecurity remains a key constraint.
There have also been difficulties in sustaining experienced humanitarian
personnel to deliver effective assistance.
DFID strategy and response
5. This review of the Forward Humanitarian
Strategy (July 2004) revealed that DFID funding is having a positive
impact on the emergency response. The focus on supporting interventions
that enable the rapid expansion of delivery is starting to bear
fruit. There is still however a long way to go in order to stabilise
the situation. There is a need to maintain close engagement with
agencies in Darfur, Khartoum and at headquarters to help drive
forward and support the consolidation and expansion of humanitarian
operations. This requires continued frontloading of operations,
filling critical gaps and allowing agencies sufficient resources
to drive forward and sustain their programmes. At the same time
there is a need to engage in and support planning and preparedness
for returns and recovery.
Donor response
6. The UN estimates that donors have contributed
a further $349 million to the UN, INGOs, Red Cross and the AU
over the last quarter (July-September 2004). Although this represents
a step change in resources compared to that provided previously,
it still falls short of the mark. The UN revised up its appeal
for the Darfur crisis (covering Darfur and Chad) in late August
to $530 million. This remains (as of end September) 56% funded,
with unmet requirements of $234.8 million. This appeal does not
include contributions to NGOs and the Red Cross, which have been
provided $155 million and $37 million respectively. The UK's contribution
to the crisis from Sept 2003 to date is 12.4% ($116 million) (including
pledges), which makes it the second largest donor.
7. One of the greatest problems to be faced
will be in sustaining significant contributions for the next 12-24
months. The Darfur component of the UN appeal in 2005 is expected
to be larger than current requirements in Darfur. It is also critical
that the significant needs elsewhere in Sudan continue to be supported
and that timely and appropriate resources are made available.
ASSUMPTIONS AND
FUTURES
8. The overarching assumption continues
to be that there will be a slow and gradual improvement of the
political and security situation. This represents what is currently
being aimed for by HMG and reflects the current strategy and plan
of action. The actions presented in this revised strategy reinforce
these. Progress can still not be guaranteed, with the potential
for deterioration in the security situation, GoS cooperation and
concerted international political engagement. These would have
a significant impact on the humanitarian situation.
FORWARD GOALS,
OBJECTIVES AND
OUTPUTS
Goals
9. The goals remain unchanged:
Immediate
— Stabilise the acute humanitarian
crisis faced by the war-affected people of Darfur and ensure their
protection from further violence, human rights violations, sexual
abuse and forced movement.
Medium term
— Support the return of the displaced
to their communities in safety and dignity and the rehabilitation
of the livelihoods of war-affected populations as part of a broader
returns process in Sudan.
OBJECTIVES
10. The following objectives are set, which
should be the focus of actions over the course of the next three
months.
— Consolidate humanitarian response
to beneficiaries already served and enhance the quality of delivery.
— Expand operations into newly accessible
and remote areas, and meet the needs of non-displaced populations.
— Augment engagement in Darfur with
a better understanding of the context to ensure more strategic
and coherent programming and initiate recovery planning and preparedness.
Outputs
11. Outputs from the previous forward humanitarian
strategy remain the same. Added to these is:
— Analysis and planning for return
and recovery in Darfur is taken forward.
KEY ACTIONS
12. The following outlines revised actions
and support that should be considered to achieve our objectives.
All these actions (divided by sector) are designed to support
an effective humanitarian response, led by UN strategic oversight,
direction and sectoral leadership and co-ordination. All sectoral
interventions must also be designed to complement interventions
in other sectors and make the most of the linkages between them.
Protection and security
13. Protection and security remain paramount
for relieving the humanitarian distress of war-affected people
in Darfur and eastern Chad. There are continuing reports of violence,
including rape, against civilians.
Key actions:
— Sustain high-level political engagement
with the GoS and SLM/JEM and support expansion and management
of the AU monitoring mission.
— Engage with and support the UN on
issues of protection and engage with and support OCHA and UNHCR
strengthen protection roles and capacity in Darfur.
— Continue to support ICRC operations.
— Support robust security management
and co-ordination for UN and NGOs.
Access
14. GoS is complying with agreements set
for the entry and movement of humanitarian staff, commodities
and equipment. There are increasing reports of SLM/JEM causing
difficulties. The UN is in the process of negotiating access protocols.
Key actions:
— Continue to ensure that access is
facilitated in line with the humantarian protocols.
Donor coordination & lobbying
15. There is a need for the UN to continue
to take the lead in catalysing a more effective donor response.
A key requirement will be to galvanise support for sustaining
humanitarian operations with significant resources for the next
12-24 months.
Key actions:
— Continue to lobby other donors to
contribute.
— Encourage the UN to take a strategic
overview of the resource needs for Sudan and including critical
pipeline requirements in key commodities and set out its strategy
for mobilising adequate resources.
— Maintain close donor coordination
in Khartoum.
Common services, fuel and logistics
16. Logistics remain a major challenge,
and common services will continue to be essential to the humanitarian
response. Fuel is currently less of an issue, but UNJLC is looking
into this further.
Key actions:
— Provide further support for
sustaining UNJLC operations for Darfur and maintain surge capacity
support for UNJLC and UNHAS where appropriate.
Food
17. WFP is increasing the number of beneficiaries
receiving food. With other donors we will need to continue to
support effective systems for targeting and post distribution
monitoring. The food pipeline appears to be nearly full for the
next three months, but the upward revision of beneficiary requirements
will increase the need. The EMOP is still under-funded and the
pipeline breaks in early 2005. WFP also has shortfalls in transport
augmentation, humanitarian air services and security communications.
Key actions:
— Continue to provide support to WFP
operations in Darfur to address immediate humanitarian needs.
— Sustain engagement with the EC for
further food aid support and assess potential EC contributions
for 2005.
— Support WFP to strengthen post impact
distribution monitoring and the targeting of beneficiaries.
Nutrition
18. Nutrition should be linked to wider
public health indicators. The number of children admitted to therapeutic
(TFC) and supplementary (SFC) feeding centres remains high across
the region. Discharge, mortality and defaulter rates remain high.
Agencies need to ensure the quality as well as quantity in the
delivery of nutrition and feeding programmes. Low cure rates and
high mortality in feeding programmes should not be seen in isolation
of the wider context (ie gaps across other sectors). Routine EPI
must be strengthened, outreach screening improved and wat/san
interventions expanded.
Key actions:
— Encourage the standardisation of
care and training in feeding centre protocols.
— Support a three-month training programme
on the usage of community feeding practices in Darfur.
— Continue to support NGOs and UNICEF
on nutrition interventions.
Camp management
19. Greater engagement in the management
of the larger IDP camp and settlements would have a dramatic impact
on the well being of the displaced and their protection. It is
currently being undertaken on an ad hoc basis.
Key actions
— Engage with the RC/HC Coordinator
in Khartoum and OCHA and IOM in Geneva to establish clear leadership,
coordination and a plan of action for addressing IDP camp and
settlement management.
Shelter, NFI and cooking fuels
20. Despite an upsurge in coverage over
the last three months, there remains a 46% gap in the provision
of shelter and NFIs. The pipeline remains precarious with no buffer
stock available in country to respond to any new displacement.
There is a need for additional NFIs. The bulk of previous DFID
support to the common pipeline has been as in-kind contributions.
Key actions:
— Additional support for procurement
of non-food items and effective registration of recipients.
— Maintain regular coordination with
UN agencies and key donorsover the management and requirements
for the non-food pipeline.
Water and sanitation
21. There are long-term chronic problems
of access to safe water supplies and adequate sanitation services
throughout Darfur. Over the last three months agencies have worked
hard to reduce the risk of water borne disease. Poor rainfall
will compound the problem of water supply further.
22. In recognition of the link between wat/san
and nutrition, many agencies are sensibly linking are carrying
out complementary wat/san programmes in order to help deliver
adequate supplies and therefore maximise the impact of feeding
programmes.
Key actions:
— Sustain support to UNICEF to enhance
its interventions in water and sanitation.
— Encourage the relevant agencies to
focus their response on water and sanitation and ratchet up their
response to meet critical shortfalls.
Health
23. The public health situation across Darfur
remains acute, but progress is being made in improving access
to primary and secondary health care, disease outbreak preparedness
and control, epidemiological surveillance and reporting. Despite
these improvements, there is a need to focus on quality of assistance
as well as quantity.
Key actions:
— Encourage WHO to complete its survey
in South Darfur and undertake regular monitoring surveys of morbidity
and mortality throughout the Darfurs.
— Provide additional support to WHO
to sustain its operation.
— Continue to support NGOs engaging
in the health sector.
Agriculture, food security and environment
24. An FAO/WFP food and crop assessment
is due to be undertaken by the end of November. FAO predicts that
those that have been able to engage in agriculture will have been
further impacted by the below average rains, particularly in North
Darfur. The major focus is now on preparations for the May cereal
season, as well as continued emergency support to the livestock
population (notably donkeys retained by IDPs).
Key actions:
— Finalise agreements with FAO for
the provision of support for emergency veterinary assistance and
cost-efficient bulk buying of seeds and tools.
— Consider support to livelihoods/recovery
based programmes where appropriate.
Recovery and returns
25. The issue of returns will play a large
role in humanitarian planning in the medium to long term. When
conditions are deemed appropriate for voluntary return, agencies
and donors will come under new pressure to support the return
process and to expand activities into communities over a wide
geographical area. During this transition, the war-affected population
will continue to need significant assistance in all sectors. In
addition, recovery in Darfur could occur at the same time as that
in other parts of the country. This will further stretch agencies.
To respond to these demands, planning needs to be advanced and
agencies prepared and resourced.
Key actions:
— Engage with OCHA, IOM and UNHCR to
promote effective co-ordination between agencies leading the return
process.
— Consider support UNDP engagement
in Darfur.
Refugees (Chad)
26. A mission to monitor operations in eastern
Chad was undertaken in August. Of particular concern were the
camps in the central and northern areas of eastern Chad,. Emphasis
was placed on assistance being provided to host communities, whose
livelihoods have been affected by the influx. As a result of the
mission it was recommended that approximately £5 million
be allocated for support to the international humanitarian response.
Key action:
— Programme funds for humanitarian
operations in eastern Chad including UNHCR, WHO and and WFP, targeting
the priority Central and Northern camps in the sectors of health
and nutrition and water and sanitation.
NGO funding
27. With the funds we have available and
critical needs on the ground, we must continue our NGO engagement
as they represent the bulk of the operational capacity. However,
sustaining this level of engagement well into 2005 will be an
issue if other donors do not increase their funding.
28. Further NGO funding should also look
to establish programmes outside the major settlements and into
the poorly serviced rural areas. We should consider support to
NGOs that can clearly demonstrate that they have the ability to
deliver services rapidly.
RISKS
29. The following risks are envisaged.
— Collapse of the ceasefire agreement
and deterioration of security within Darfur and eastern Chad.
— Militia are not contained and continue
to undertake violent attacks and sexual abuse of civilians.
— Lack of progress in reaching a political
settlement in Darfur and the IGAD (North/South) peace process.
— Delays in the expansion of AU ceasefire
monitors
— GoS and SLM/JEM renege on agreements
and obligations to allow unfettered humanitarian access.
— Reduced access means that more people
are attracted to fewer distribution points and acute problems
for public health.
— Tensions and violence breaks out
in overcrowded camps.
— Targeting of humanitarian workers
and the contraction or suspension of humanitarian delivery.
— Collapse of international political
consensus on sustaining political pressure on GoS and SLM/JEM.
— Government forcibly resettles or
relocates civilian populations.
— Agencies fail to expand operations
and increase the number of experienced and professional humanitarian
workers.
— Impact of increased aid allocation
for Darfur on other humanitarian and development programmes (Sudan
and elsewhere).
— Overstretch of aid agencies and the
impact for recovery in the event of a comprehensive North-South
peace agreement.
Sudan Unit/British Embassy Khartoum
30 September 2004
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