Memorandum submitted by the Darfur Relief
and Documentation Centre (DRDC) [13]
1. SUMMARY
This paper was prepared in response to the request
of the International Development Committee of the UK House of
Commons for information from non-governmental organisations and
individuals to assist the Committee conduct its inquiry entitled
DARFUR, SUDAN: CRISIS, RESPONSE AND LESSONS. The purpose of this
paper is twofold. On the one hand it gives some brief background
information about the Darfur region and the origin of the current
humanitarian crisis. In this regard, it provides analysis of the
root causes that underpin the present situation as well as the
new pattern of violence that devastated the region since the 1990s.
The paper will place certain emphasis on some little known features
of the Darfur crisis including the situation of people originating
from the region especially members of the Fur, Massaleet, Zaggawa
and other African tribes who live in other parts of the country
as they are being systematically victimised and harassed because
of their blood ties with the victims of the tragedy in Darfur.
In addition it includes a chronology of some of the events that
occurred in the few months that preceded the escalation of the
conflict and ignited the present rebellion.
On the other hand the paper intends to outline
the important role being played by the international and regional
communities in protecting the victims of the crisis in the region,
meeting their necessary humanitarian needs and also in persuading
the warring factions to sit at the negotiating table with a view
to working out a negotiated political solution to the conflict.
Finally the paper draws lessons and conclusions from the tragedy
that engulfs the region with the view that decision-makers gain
further knowledge of the extent of the crisis in order to help
them make informed decisions.
Tribal disputes among ethnic groups in Darfur
especially those between the sedentary African tribes and Arab
nomads are not new phenomena in the region. This is because of
the tribal nature of the region and the different living patterns
between the settled farmers and the nomad herders. Yet in the
past tribal disputes—both inter and intra-tribal disputes—were
characterised by their sporadic, unmeditated and limited nature.
No previous tribal conflicts in Darfur or Sudan were capable of
displacing more than 1.5 million individuals or forcing more than
two hundred thousands to cross the international borders into
neighbouring countries. Tribal conflicts in Darfur were fought
against many backgrounds but they have never acquired the form
of an all-round assault based on collective ethnic or tribal affiliation.
They have rarely devolved into the present conspicuously polarised
racial stands that are increasingly being assumed by the two broad
tribal groupings in the region ie Arab tribes and African tribes.
Politicisation of tribal differences is the main force that drives
the current conflict. In fact since 1989 the national government
started relying heavily on militia groups from Darfur and other
parts of Sudan to fight a proxy war in South Sudan and the Nuba
Mountains and to crush rising dissent in Darfur, including an
SPLA-inspired rebellion in 1992. This gave the nomads leverage
with the government, which rewarded them with positions at the
local and national administrative levels as well as at the federal
sovereign level as cabinet ministers and other portfolio holders.
Most importantly the governments accorded the nomad groups unlimited
economic, financial and military backing at the expense of other
communities.
The present armed conflict and associated humanitarian
tragedy in Darfur date back to the 1980s when low profile yet
protracted violent tribal disputes started rearing their ugly
heads in the region. These disputes and atrocities have continued
unabated since then without being heeded nationally or noticed
internationally. A number of reasons have contributed to the build
up of the present tragedy. Darfur and its people have been ignored
and marginalised both economically and politically by the successive
national governments since Sudan's independence in 1956. Natural
disasters that have hit the country—in particular drought
and desertification experienced by Darfur in the 1980s—caused
famine in some areas of the region and consequently it was followed
by massive migration of nomads into areas inhabited by sedentary
African tribes. Local efforts to end the growing crisis in Darfur
were frustrated by the government's overt support of nomad groups
against indigenous Africans and its lack of interest and political
will to work out a viable and just national solution to the problems
of the region. Dismantling of the hitherto well-established traditional
chieftains systems that organise the life of people and solve
intra and inter-communal disputes in the region. The influx of
large quantities of weapons into Darfur and the nomad groups'
encouragement of their kinsmen to emigrate from neighbouring countries
into the region. This cross-border immigration, which continues
unabated until now has been consolidated manifold by the ongoing
conflict and the support the immigrants receive from the national
and regional governments. Added to this burning situation was
the irrational interference of national and regional governments
in favour of the nomad groups.
As of late the international community became
increasingly involved in the crisis in Darfur. This involvement
comes amidst accusation that the international community did too
little and too late. After long months of atrocities, destruction,
killings and protest the UN Security Council adopted two weak
resolutions that even failed to authorise economic and military
sanctions against the government in Khartoum, let alone deploying
the much needed international military force to protect the defenceless
civilian victims of the carnage in Darfur. Yet it should be stressed
that it was only in response to pressure from the international
community that the warring factions agreed to undertake some steps
such as the signing of ceasefire arrangements, commitment to allow
unrestricted humanitarian access to the needy and the overall
political engagement for a negotiated settlement of the crisis.
Regional and international efforts are currently underway to persuade
the warring parties to speed up political negotiations in order
to end the conflict. As such there is a long way to go before
durable stability and, eventually, peace can be regained in the
region. In the meantime, protecting civilians will remain a priority
for some years to come. Indeed, the daunting humanitarian and
other life-saving needs of the displaced and refugee populations
must be addressed before these needs further develop into massive
silent killers. However there are serious difficulties facing
relief operations mainly the lack of safety and security and little
financial contributions. This is the present situation despite
repeated calls from the UN Security Council, Secretary General
and the African Union (AU) to the world community to extend possible
help.
However, the international community—in
particular Western European governments, UN agencies and humanitarian
relief organisations—has played a cardinal role in helping
ease the humanitarian situation in Darfur since the beginning
of the conflict. Thanks to the medical and relief service of groups
like Médecins Sans Frontie"res, MEDAIR, Save the Children,
CARE, Oxfam, USAID, etc, which saved the lives of millions of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in Darfur and
eastern Chad. The international community still encounters serious
difficulties in its work, yet success was achieved in many respects.
The role of the British government will be discussed in a separate
section of this study. The paper will attempt to make some critical
analysis of the effectiveness of the response of the international
community towards the crisis. Our objective is to shed some light
on the potential benefit to the people of the region and the world
community that could be achieved through a change in the current
modus operandi. This is necessary as it helps to introduce a more
suitable approach to promote effective response especially in
the post-conflict rehabilitation and rebuilding phase. Some ideas
will be put forward on the importance of the involvement of independent
national and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil
society groups in helping the ongoing process. The paper will
touch on some of the aspects and role that indigenous civil society
groups are expected to play in helping the regional and international
efforts to end the crisis in Darfur and regain peace and stability
as well as their role in rebuilding the region during the post
conflict period.
The paper concludes by drawing attention to
the fact that armed conflicts, displacement and humanitarian needs
in Darfur are expected to continue for some years to come before
peace and tranquillity are regained in the region. The political
process that could help bring an end to the crisis is expected
to be complicated, painstaking, time consuming and volatile. New
rebel groups have recently emerged in Darfur, which are not represented
at the Abuja talks and may well need to be considered in the future
talks. Building the destroyed lives and livelihoods of the war-affected
people in the region requires vast mobilisation of human and material
resources. Because of the tremendous damage done in Darfur there
is an urgent need for critical strategic thinking of the whole
approach so far used to address the situation. Efforts should
also be invested to planning for the post-conflict reconstruction
and rehabilitation phase.
2. BACKGROUND
The Darfur region is one of the richest—in
unexploited natural wealth—yet severely underdeveloped regions
of Sudan. It is the second largest region of the country and stretches
over a large area with a land mass estimated at about 160,000
sq miles between longitudes 22°E-27°E and latitudes
10°N-16°N. Darfur is a remote region located in the
extreme west of the country adjacent to Sudan's borders with Chad,
Central African Republic and Libya. Darfur was an independent
Muslim kingdom known as the Fur Sultanate for a period of about
448 years (1450-1916) with a short interval of alien rule during
the Turko-Egyptian and Mahadist States. The Sultanate of Darfur
was a well-established Kingdom with its own written laws, system
of government and external diplomatic relationships with some
of the major political capitals of the world of that time. Towards
the end of 1916 the independent Sultanate of Darfur was finally
annexed to present-day Sudan by the then British colonial rulers
of the country. The British invasion of Darfur was partly in retaliation
to the position of Sultan Ali Dinar, the last ruler of Darfur,
when he decided to camp with the Turkish Islamic caliphate during
World War I.
Darfur is a promising land where large parts
of the region, especially in Western and Southern Darfur States,
are blessed with fertile soil, huge water sources and a rich fauna
and flora. As such, the region is host to considerable domestic
and wild livestock populations. Domestic livestock includes sheep,
goats, cattle and camels estimated at over 25% of Sudan's livestock
population and accounts to about 30% of the country's livestock
trade. Darfur's livestock wealth was the backbone of Sudan's economy
especially in its foreign export earnings in the period before
the country started exporting crude oil and gold. Although the
Darfur region has lost some of its forests and grazing land because
of drought and desertification, it is still suitable for investment
especially in the fields of agriculture, horticulture and livestock
development with experienced and cheap labour force in these fields.
The region's prospective underground mineral wealth including
crude oil reserves and other valuable minerals is yet to be exploited.
The people of Darfur believe that the government is reluctant
to embark on major mineral exploration projects in the region
despite the fact that commercial quantities of crude oil are expected
in the region. With effective policy to preserve the environment,
cultivate the land, revive the ecological system, introduce suitable
development projects and rehabilitate basic infrastructure, future
investments in Darfur in particular in the fields of mineral exploration,
game sport, agriculture, horticulture and animal husbandry would
be a highly profitable enterprise.
Darfur—which means homeland of the Fur
people—is host to approximately six million or one fifth
of Sudan's population of about 30 million. [14]The
people of Darfur are divided into two main ethnic groups viz,
(1). Indigenous, African sedentary groups; and (2). Migrants,
nomadic groups of Arab mixed origin. Within these broad ethnic
groupings the Fur people constitute the majority of the inhabitants
of the region. Among the largest tribes of the region the Fur,
Massaleet and Zaggawa are indigenous Africans while the Rezigat,
Missiriya, Bani Halaba and Ta'aisha are nomad tribal people of
Arab-mixed origin. Together with these main groups many other
distinct tribal groups live in Darfur such as the Tama, Burti,
Tunjour, Dajou, Bergou, Bergid etc which are considered as indigenous
Africans and the Ma'alia, Bani Hussien, Mahariya, Mahameed, Um
Jallool, Taisha, Salamat, Awlad Rashid etc which are considered
as Arab nomads. Historically all migrant ethnic groups in Darfur
have made valuable contribution to the State in all fields of
life and accepted to live under the Fur rule. Accordingly, each
one of these groups was accorded a piece of land known as "Dar"
or homeland where they lived and organised their affairs.
The nomad camel herders in Darfur usually inhabit
the northern parts of the region where the majority is African
Zaggawa who live side by side with the African Medoub and other
nomads of Arab-mixed origin. The western parts of Darfur including
the fertile landscapes surrounding the Jabal Marra massive are
the traditional home of the sedentary African groups such as Fur,
Massaleet and other non-Arab tribes. In the southern parts of
Darfur there is noticeable presence of the Rezigat, Missiriya
and other tribal groups of cattle herders who trace their origin
to the Arab peninsula. This mosaic of indigenous African tribes
and the migrant tribes of Arab-mixed origin managed to co-exist
in the region for many centuries.
Although most of the indigenous African tribes
of Darfur are farmers and the bulk of Arabs are herders, interactions
between individuals and sub-groups of both ethnic groups were
peaceful rather than hostile. In different occasions complementary
relationships developed between the herding and farming communities.
[15]The
nature of the complementary relationships was based on the provisions
of the African farming communities to the Arab herders and vice
versa. The farmers provided herders with agricultural produce
such as millet, sorghum, vegetables and fruits whereas the herding
communities provided farmers with animal products such as meat,
milk, hides and butter etc. More so, herders made their animals
graze on the stalks of millet, sorghum and tomatoes after the
harvest and the animals maintained the fertility of the farmlands
with their manure. [16]In
addition farmers used to rely on herders who take some of their
animals to distant pasturelands during the dry seasons and the
latter leave their weak animals and heavy belongings with the
farmers. This process created friendship between members of the
two groups to the extent that in some cases they intermarried
and borrowed from each other's cultures. As the case of the relationship
between the Fur and the Bani Halba in the south-western part of
Darfur. [17]As
a result of this peaceful interaction between Arabs and indigenous
Africans in the region, the indigenous languages of groups such
as the Berti, Burno and Tunjur died and they now mainly speak
Arabic. Many Arabs also speak languages of groups whose individuals
closely interacted with them.
However, Darfur society was not a conflict free
society. Wars were fought between individuals and groups but most
of the wars that were fought before mid 1980s were mainly between
the sub-divisions within the Arab clans. For example the major
wars between Rezigat and Ma'alia in 1960s in south-eastern Darfur,
Mahariya and Bani Halba in the 1970s in south-western Darfur and
the Gimir and Fallata in early 1980s in the southern corner of
Darfur. All these conflicts involved groups of people that identify
themselves as Arabs. [18]The
only major conflict in recent history, which involved a group
of indigenous Africans and Arab nomads was in early 1960s between
Zaggawa and Mahariya camel herders. However, these conflicts were
fought in a limited scale mainly over access to pasture or economic
privileges. Local authorities were able to contain them within
a few months. These wars can largely be considered as common inter-clan
conflicts in a tribal society rather than ethnic or racial wars.
During these wars local and national governments successfully
played the role of an impartial arbitrator. Traditional leaders
eg Magdoum, Shartaye, Nazir and Omda) were powerful mediators
to settle differences between the warring groups. The traditional
administration regulated the movements of nomads between the areas
of sedentary population. Conflicts that may arise between individual
herders and farmers were effectively and expeditiously resolved
usually through efforts of tribal leaders or the local authorities.
Since 1988 Darfur has been experiencing overt
politicisation of ethnic and tribal difference with the formation
of the Arab Congregation[19]
and the increased reference to Zurga, which is a racist connotation
that includes the non-Arab indigenous population of Darfur. [20]After
Sudan's national reconciliation in 1977 between the then government
of General Gaffar Nimeiri and the exiled Sudanese political parties,
Darfur became a fertile ground for clandestine activities mainly
by the National Islamic Front and Umma Party. These two political
parties were in a coalition aimed at the overthrow of Nimeiri's
regime. As both parties were supported by Libya and under the
influence of its political discourse of Arab Nationalism, they
successfully transmitted this idea to Arabs among their constituencies
in the region. As a result of this doctrine the latter invented
a term of difference, Zurga, in early 1980s as a label for the
non-Arab population. The word Zurga is charged with stereotypes
related to the legacy of slavery in Sudan (eg lower human species,
or those who deserve to be enslaved, uncivilized, pagans, etc).
The line was thus demarcated between Arab and African populations
in the region. Since then, the Arab clans/tribes largely acted
as a unified group whereas the indigenous African populations
continued to act as individual ethnic groups. It was only in 1998
and after intensive attacks of the Arab militias, which were later
accompanied by regular government forces, that the African tribes
of Darfur were compelled to grasp the term Zurga and charge it
with their own meanings (eg indigenous, original, African, owners
of the land and so forth).
At the time when the term Zurga was invented
as a signifier of a particular category of the population in the
region, the idea of Al-Hizam Al-Arabi (the Arab-Belt) was widespread
among the Arab populations of western Sudan. Al-Hizam Al-Arabi
aimed at transforming the area that lies between the Red Sea and
the Atlantic Ocean, which includes African Sahelian countries
like Chad, Niger and Mali into an Arab region. Following the overthrow
of Nimeiri's regime in 1985, the people of Darfur often noticed
military vehicles loaded with different types of weapons, military
equipment and personnel penetrating into the region through the
northern border and heading to the areas where Arab nomads camped.
Since 1985 the Ministry of Defence in Khartoum started providing
weapons to the nomad herders of western Sudan under the pretext
that they needed the weapons to defend themselves from possible
SPLA attacks.
For more than a decade the Darfur region has
been facing an organised campaign of destruction of life and livelihood
as well as systematic plunder of property and wealth. An incredible
state of lawlessness and armed robbery mainly against the Fur
and other peaceful African populations of the region accompanied
this campaign. The already burning situation has further worsened
manifold under the rule of General Omar Al Bashier especially
as he actively pursues implementation of aggressive and radical
policies inside Sudan and abroad. From July 1989 to December 2002
it was estimated that more than 10,000 persons were summarily
executed in the three States of the Greater Darfur Region (Western,
Southern and Northern). An equal number of persons could have
perished because of conflict-induced famine; disease, agony and
lack of safety and security while many other thousands especially
women and children have been traumatised, wounded or maimed for
life. Attacks by militia groups collectively known as the "Janjaweed"—that
are armed and supported by the government of Sudan—are at
the origin of the current crisis. These attacks were so coordinated,
organised and so widespread that they caused an unimaginable agony
and suffering to the people of the region throughout the 1990s.
The situation became so dramatic with the involvement of the army
to the extent that it was characterised as crimes against humanity,
war crimes or ethnic cleansing by highly authoritative reports
by UN agencies. However, some circles such as the US Congress,
Senate and the State Department[21]
in addition to some human rights organisations and experts considered
the crimes committed in Darfur as genocide.
To face the challenge posed by the destruction
of life and livelihood in their region, and as a sign of their
lost confidence in the willingness of national and local governments
to protect them against attacks of the Janjaweed, the people of
Darfur have developed their own militia groups for self-defence,
resistance and recovery of stolen objects and livestock. The formation
of small tribal groups for self-defence continued throughout the
second half of the 1990s. It should be noted that rebellion against
the government policies in Darfur started in reality in 1992 when
the late Mr Daoud Yahya Bolad, a one time leading member of the
ruling party of General El Bashier, became aware of the government
complicity in the campaign of destruction that targets the African
tribes of Darfur. Mr Bolad quietly broke ranks with the government,
forged a link with the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army and
Movement (SPLA/M) and started organising members of his Fur clan
in the Jabal Marra area. He was able to establish a western faction
of the SPLA/M and get the support of some followers in the western
parts of Darfur. Mr Bolad was speedily arrested and summarily
executed by the security forces in 1992 and consequently his movement
ceased to exist.
Conflicts and disputes in Darfur witnessed a
dramatic development in February 2003 when the desperate representatives
of the indigenous African tribes came together and organised themselves
in the Sudan Liberation Army and Movement (SLA/M) and declared
war against the government authority in the region. The SLA/M
achieved remarkable success in few months and rapidly developed
into a famous movement that draws membership mainly from the indigenous
African tribes of the Darfur region. The SLA/M was followed by
the formation of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which
established its own army and political wing in April 2003. The
government's immediate response to the insurgency in Darfur was
violent and aggressive. It excluded all venues for a negotiated
settlement of the conflict and instead used the army and further
increased its dependency on the Janjaweed and other paramilitary
formations to fight a proxy war on its behalf. To crush the rebels
native base the government and its allies used scorched-earth
tactics including aerial bombardment of civilian targets accompanied
by joint ground assaults by the army and the Janjaweed. This policy
is responsible for the large-scale and protracted displacement
of people as it rendered 3.5 million people destitute as war-affected
people and their livelihoods (including homes, schools, places
of worships, medical centres etc) were systematically destroyed
in whole or in part. By June 2004 it is believed that at least
2,600 villages inhabited by the African tribes of Darfur were
totally or partially destroyed or burned down.
3. THE JANJAWEED
The Janjaweed is a coined Arabic word used by
the local people to refer to gangs of outlaws and robbers. These
groups are usually composed of criminal elements from different
nomad Arab tribes of the region. The Janjaweed who are uneducated
and barely civilized individuals were manipulated and politicised
by the present government and by racist organisations in the region
such as the Arab Congregation and Gouresh Group to the extent
that it could be argued that all the Janjaweed are Arabs; while
not all the Arabs are Janjaweed. They acquired international fame
when the government commenced drafting the nomad tribes in Darfur
to fight a proxy war on its behalf against the SLA/M and JEM.
The government took advantage of the Janjaweed lusts for destruction,
theft and the nomad's need of rich pastureland and immediately
started organising, arming and unleashing them on civilian areas
inhabited by the Fur, Massaleet, Zaggawa and other African tribes
of Darfur. The government reliance on the Janjaweed was a calculated
attempt to break the backbone of the rebel movements in particular
as the government lacks enough troops in Darfur. Another element
that could have played a role on the government's dependency on
the Janjaweed was the fact that the rank and files of the Sudanese
army is dominated by men from Southern Sudan, Darfur and Kordofan.
Some of the forces that were deployed in Darfur reportedly refused
to fight their kinsmen, threw their arms and ran away from services.
Although some whole Arab tribes in Darfur—especially
those landless recent immigrant nomad tribes of Chad—have
joined their ranks, the Janjaweed do not necessarily represent
all the Arab tribes of Darfur especially those tribes who refused
to take part in the government military policy to end the armed
conflict in Darfur. The major nomad tribes that are known to be
active within the Janjaweed ranks are those belonging to the nomads
of Northern Darfur or Rezigat al-Shamal who are camel herders.
These groups include the Ziadiyah, Mahariya or Mahameed, Um Jalool,
Eriqat, and the Aiteifat. They also include groups such as Bani
Hussein, Awlad Taqo, and Awlad Halim. In Western and Southern
Darfur groups that took active part within the Janjaweed formation
include some elements of Rezigat al-Janoub or cow herders as well
as the Tarjam, Saada, Salamat, Awlad Rashid, Um Shishi, Shiteyah.
Some of the distinctively notorious Janajweed field
commanders are (1) Musa Hilal, overall Janjaweed Commander from
Mahameed nomads, (2) Abdallah Abu Shinebat, Mournay Area, (3)
Omer Baboush, Habila and Furbranga area, (4) Omda Saif Ma'adi,
Nirtiti area, (5) Ahmed Dikhairy, Mournay area and (6) Ahmed Abou
Kamasha. Ranking officials in the government service that are
believed to be part of the Janjaweed leadership are (1) Abdalla
Ali Masar, Governor, River Nile State, (2) Abdulhamid Musa Kasha,
Minister of Foreign Trade, (3) Gen Abdullah Ali Safi Al Noor,
Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, (4) Gen Suliman Abdullah
Adam, Governor of West Darfur State, (5) Gen Hussein Abdullah
Gibril, Member of Parliament. See annex one for a list of persons
suspected of supporting the Janjaweed.[22]
The irony of the Darfur crisis is that the people
of the region both Africans and Arabs, have more common denominators
than differences. With some few exceptions, all the tribal groups
in Darfur developed complementary socio-cultural systems. All
the people of the region practice Sunni Islam and many among them
use Arabic as lingua franca. The Janjaweed are majority dark-skinned
Arabised savannah Bedouins—whose immigrant ancestors intermarried
with the indigenous African people of the region. In reality the
Janjaweed share common idiosyncrasies and destiny with their victims
more than with other Arabised tribes of the river Nile basin.
In most occasions it could be difficult—for external observers—to
draw clear distinctions between the Arab and African tribes of
Darfur based on their physical appearance. This is because the
differences between Arab and non-Arab groups in Darfur—as
the case in other parts of Sudan—are based more on cultural
and linguistic heritage rather than genealogy or physical anthropology.
Indeed the word Sudan derives from the Arabic Bilaad-ul-Sud, which
means "the land of blacks." However, the distinction
between Arabs and Africans is real and very important to the Sudanese
people. It has been used throughout Sudan's history by the Arabised
tribes that inherited the country's colonial rulers as a means
to maintain economic and political power in the hands of few elite
tribes from the northern part of the country and exclude other
groups from any benefits.
4. ORIGIN OF
THE HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS IN
DARFUR
Four interrelated factors played a major role
in the deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation
in the Darfur region. These factors that need to be thoroughly
addressed are the following:
First: natural disasters that have hit
the country—in particular drought and desertification experienced
by Darfur in the 1980s—caused famine in some areas of the
region and consequently it was followed by massive migration of
people from the arid and semi-arid northern parts southward to
the rich wetlands in the western, southern and central parts of
the region. These areas are inhabited in majority by African agriculturalist
tribes. Those affected by the famine and forced to move southward
are nomad tribes. Movement of nomads and their settlement in areas
occupied by sedentary groups brought new patterns of skirmishes
and disputes over water sources and pasture.
Second: Darfur has been neglected by
successive national governments, which explains the lack of sound
sustainable development projects to mitigate the negative effects
of natural calamites and to meet the growing needs of thriving
human and animal populations in a zone of ecological decline.
Persistent neglect of the region and denial of the demands of
its people for development and equality left a deep sense of exclusion
and economic and political marginalization among the people of
Darfur.
Third: the deliberate policy of government
to dismantle the well-established and historically preserved traditional
leadership structures in Darfur. Traditional chieftains have played
a cardinal role in organising the life of people and in solving
intra and inter-communal disputes. These structures are especially
important in regions where tribal allegiance is deep-rooted in
the social and economic set-ups. Of particular concern was the
government's decision in 1995 to embark on a geographic and administrative
redemarcation programme in Darfur through which it replaced the
historical chieftain system and its traditional title (Nazir)
with a new system. They appointed pro-government elements as traditional
leaders and gave them the title (Amir) to replace the old title.
As a direct consequence of this policy the government delegated
administrative powers and allocated land owned by the African
tribes to the newly migrant nomad tribes in complete disregard
to the traditional methods for the distribution of land or consideration
for the serious protest of the original inhabitants of the land.
Fourth: influx of large quantities of
weapons in the region from neighbouring countries, the spread
of racist doctrines such as the expansion of Al-Hizam Al-Arabi
and the encouragement by the nomad groups of their kinsmen to
emigrate from neighbouring Chad, Niger, Mauritania and other west
African countries into Darfur. The cross-border immigration of
nomads into the region still continues unabated and has been further
consolidated by the ongoing conflict and the support and encouragement
the immigrants receive from the national and regional governments.
The combination of these four factors, in addition
to the irrational interference of national and regional governments,
led to the unprecedented culture of violence and ethnic hatred
currently experienced by the region. The government policy has
unequivocally fostered the present conspicuously polarised positions
assumed by the two broad ethnic groupings that live in the region
ie Arabs and Africans. Manipulation of ethnic differences as well
as the biased behaviour of the national and regional governments
against the indigenous African tribes of Darfur are the main reasons
that the crisis reached the present stage where the conflict can
no longer be considered as a tribal dispute generated by competition
over a scarce natural resource base in a zone of ecological decline,
but a coordinated strategy to do away with Darfur's indigenous
African inhabitants because of their ethnic or tribal affiliation
and to confiscate their land and wealth. In short two criminal
aspects underlie the human tragedy in Darfur: viz (1) The premeditated
mass killing and physical destruction—in whole or in part—of
the agriculturalist African tribes of Darfur because of their
tribal backgrounds; and (2) The appropriation of their land, the
confiscation of their livestock and other material wealth (in
some cases for extortion of money for protection by the Janjaweed
militia groups) in the presence of government authority.
5. EVENTS IN
THE IMMEDIATE
BUILD-UP
OF THE
2003 DARFUR REBELLION
In 2002 the conflict in Darfur reached new dimensions
with a sharp increase in the number and intensity of the Janjaweed
raids in different parts of the region and consequently an increase
in the number of casualties among the indigenous African people.
[23]In
April-May 2002 concerted attacks by the nomad militiamen against
the area of Kabkabiya and Jabal Marra Massive left 101 persons
dead, more than 200 wounded and thousands of livestock rustled.
The local people expressed fears that the escalation of attacks
against their regions constitutes part of a concerted campaign
to depopulate vast areas replacing the original inhabitants with
the tribes of the invading militia groups. At least 38 villages
in southern Darfur between Nyala and Jabal Marra have been forcefully
evacuated of their original inhabitants during this period. For
instance two villages known as Danga and Tambasi, situated at
about 70km and 80km from Nyala respectively, inhabited by the
Fur tribesmen for many centuries, are now being occupied by the
invading nomad tribal groups. In a bid to conceal their real identity
the two villages were renamed with Arabic names (Um Al-Gura and
Um Dawan-Ban).
On 11 September 2002, the Arabised tribes in
southern Darfur held a Conference in Kass town under the auspices
of the Commissioner of Kass Province Mr Gourashi Mohamed Abdalla.
During the Conference the indigenous African tribes were especially
singled out for abuse and accusation. They were labelled as pagans,
disloyal and rebels to justify new and widespread aggressions
against them. An unprecedented escalation of devastating attacks
against areas inhabited by the indigenous African tribes followed
the convening of this conference. Between 12 September 2002 and
30 September 2002 it was reported that many villages around Kass,
Zalingei, Kabkabiya, Jabal Marra and Nyala were systematically
attacked during this period. As a result of these attacks 30 persons
were killed in the area surrounding Kass, an unknown number was
injured and about 714 livestock were looted. In Zalingei province
two persons were killed and about 600 livestock were looted. In
Kabkabiya province 17 persons were killed, 12 were injured and
five villages were burned to the ground. In Jabal Mara Massive
13 persons were killed including five soldiers. In Nyala 18 persons
were killed including Police Major Bashier Frarah Khatam.
The rampage in Darfur went hand in hand with
a vicious campaign of intimidation, harassment, threat, vilification
and accusation against the indigenous people by the local authorities,
national media and even top government officials. Their strategy
was to incriminate the African tribes in Darfur and label them
as bandits, disloyal, pagans or potential SPLA/M elements in a
bid to prepare the ground for a massive attack against them. On
Saturday 2 November 2002 and during his official visit to Al-Fashir,
capital city of Northern Darfur State, the First Vice-president
of Sudan Mr Ali Osman Mohamed Taha warned the African tribes of
Darfur of total destruction and that their areas will be "pulled
backward for many years" if they join the rebel SPLA/M. These
insensitive remarks, which came at the peak of the destruction
of African villages in Darfur added insult to injury and were
used by extremist elements within the Arab Congregation as additional
fuel to recruit new fighters and throw them into the already burning
situation in the region. The Vice-president's remarks provided
a further cover for the massive attacks against the indigenous
tribes witnessed by the region in November and December 2002.
Information we gathered has indicated that in
the period between 1 October 2002 and 31 January 2003 at least
160 indigenous African people in south-western Darfur have been
killed, hundreds of villages were burnt and thousands of livestock,
foodstuff and other material wealth were looted or destroyed.
It should be underscored that the identified causalities were
those of persons killed around the main towns of the region. This
clearly indicates that many more persons killed in remote areas
especially in north Darfur were not documented.
Below is a brief description of the raids by
government supported nomad militiamen during the last three months
of 2002. These incidents, which were reported to human rights
organisations in the year 2003, represent only a fraction of the
number of incidents that were committed in the region during the
same period and which were not accounted for.
1. On Tuesday, 31 December 2002 and again
on 1, 2 and 3 January 2003, a number of armed Tarjam and Missiriya
Jabal tribesmen attacked Sinkita village about 70 km to the west
of Nyala town. In this massacre 25 persons were killed and more
than 40 others were injured. Around 800 huts were burned to the
ground in Sinkita and their inhabitants were rendered destitute
without access to basic human needs such as food, shelter and
medicine. Following theses attacks the security forces abducted
four village leaders.
2. On Tuesday, 24 December 2002 militiamen
attacked Dumma village to the north east of Nyala. They killed
at least 12 persons and injured 20 others.
3. On Wednesday, 27 November 2002 militiamen
attacked Tegueraiss village. They killed 11 persons and wounded
eight others.
4. On Sunday, 24h November 2002 militiamen
attacked the villages of Sabunogna, Turra and Mukgjar killing
at least 20 persons and wounding 24 others and burned down more
than 20 huts.
5. On Wednesday, 13 November 2002 a group
of about 300 armed militiamen attacked a number of villages in
Wadi Gounda to the north of Kass, including the villages of Elayba,
Wastani and Shawa. In total they killed 15 persons including a
pregnant woman from Elayaba (Ms Hanouna Abdalla Suliman). They
injured 14 persons and burned down 33 houses.
6. On Wednesday, 9 October 2002 militiamen
attacked a civilian convoy between Golo village in Jabal Mara
and Nyala. They killed two persons including Mr Mohamed Ibrahim
Musa, a 40-year old lawyer, and injured five others.
7. On Tuesday, 1 and Saturday, 5 October
2002 militiamen attacked Kidingeer village, 71 km to the north-west
of Nyala town. They killed six persons and injured 10 others including
women.
Unlike other parts of Sudan, systematic human
rights violations were committed against the indigenous tribes
of Darfur by the security forces throughout the 1990s. These violations
were committed under the disguise of combating robbery, banditry
and outlaw activity. In reality since the present military government
ascended onto power on 30 June 1989, the Darfur region has virtually
been under a state of emergency regulations, which invested the
security forces with unlimited powers to commit all sorts of human
rights violations against the people of the region with complete
immunity let alone impunity. Based on the state of emergency regulations
a number of Special Courts were also established in the region
to try persons suspected of committing criminal offenses and other
activities including political opposition and pro-democracy activists.
In 2001 alone eight such Special Courts were established in Darfur.
Heavy sentences including death and cross-amputation were issued
by these Special Courts within a matter of weeks and defendants
were denied basic legal protection or assistance. According to
the Minister of Justice Mr Ali M Osman Yassin, "the procedure
adopted in Darfur was a hurried one" and that "cross-examination
is lacking in these courts." [24]
Early warning signals about the imminent military
action from the indigenous African people to resist government
complicity with the Janjaweed attempts to expel them from their
land were made long before the eruption of the rebellion in Darfur.
On 9 August 2002 and after a month of his arbitrary detention,
a Sudanese lawyer from Darfur Mr Abdel-Wahid Mohamed Ahmed Nour
issued an appeal from his detention cell in Zalingei, western
Darfur, drawing the World's attention to his plight and the tragedy
of his Fur clan. In February 2003 Mr Ahmed Nour led the Sudan
Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and commenced the current armed
rebellion against the government. For its revealing nature Mr
Nour's appeal is reproduced below. [25]
"I am making this appeal from my cell
in Zalingei Security Forces detention centre. The cell is 16 sq
meters and is overcrowded: there are 12 of us in this small room
without ventilation or windows. Food is very scarce. I have only
one lung and I am diabetic. When I was arrested I was suffering
from Malaria. The security forces refused to allow me to see a
doctor.
I would also like to highlight the suffering
of my Fur people. The security forces act with virtual immunity,
terrorising the Fur people, raiding randomly and arresting people
including the elderly and children and detaining them without
charge or trial. Many have been subjected to torture. Many Fur
men have fled to the mountains to find a safe haven and have left
their lands. The Arab tribes attack their land, looting their
properties and stealing their livestock. Many Fur villages have
been completely deserted.
I call upon the international community and
human rights organisations to intervene to free us and protect
the people of Darfur from the government aggression."
The formation of the SLA/M was a desperate,
uncalculated and unorganised attempt by the indigenous people
who lost any confidence in the local and national governments
to protect them. Although military action by the SLA/M started
early in February 2003 it was only on 13 March 2003 that they
were able to issue a political declaration that outlined its objectives.
The declaration stated; "The brutal oppression, ethnic cleansing
and genocide sponsored by the Khartoum Government left the people
of Darfur with no other option but to resort to popular political
and military resistance for purposes of survival." It added
"The objective of the SLA/M is to create a united democratic
Sudan on a new basis of equality, complete restructuring and devolution
of power, even development, cultural and political pluralism and
moral and material prosperity for all Sudanese."
National response to the rebellion in Darfur
can only be qualified as catastrophic. From the very beginning
of the rebellion the government adopted a strategy of persistent
denial of the grievances of the people of the region and considered
their protest as a security threat to the government and the country.
As such the government ruled out any possibility for a negotiated
political solution of the conflict and decided to pursue a military
campaign allowing the security forces carte blanche to commit
all sorts of atrocities. It intensively used helicopters and Antonov
warplanes to indiscriminately drop shrapnel-loaded barrel-bombs
on civilian targets. Joint operations of the army and militiamen
have wrecked havoc in Darfur. After aerial bombardments they cordon
off villages to kill survivors, burn houses, dynamite wells, ruin
agricultural produce, destroy schools, medical centres and deport
people. This policy reached its peak in the first quarter of 2004.
The government also employed a tactic of deception and blackout
of information flow about the actual situation in the region.
The government instructed national media not to report about the
situation in Darfur under any circumstances as of Saturday, 3
May 2003. The instructions were relayed by phone on Wednesday,
31 April 2003 and Thursday, 1 May 2003, to the Chief Editors of
all national newspapers in Khartoum. As a result of this policy
copies of some dailies including Al-Sahafa, Al-Shari' Al-Siyasi
and Khartoum Monitor were confiscated on different occasions.
6. AREA OF
PARTICULAR CONCERN
The result of the human tragedy in Darfur since
the insurgency was declared in February 2003 to date is that at
least two million persons, in particular members of the Fur, Massaleet
and Zaggawa tribes, have become IDPs or refugees. IDPs live in
precarious conditions in different locations in Darfur and also
in other parts of Sudan mainly Khartoum, Gedaref and the Blue
Nile States. The Fur people who constitute the majority of IDPs
are the most affected victims of the crisis as their traditional
areas in the Jabal Marra massive were severely affected by the
fighting and blockades. The Fur areas are located away from Sudan's
international borders as such few relief organisations were able
to establish themselves in the area, consequently little relief
material was delivered to the affected people in that part of
Darfur. No one knows the exact figures of the innocent civilians
who were killed since the destruction campaign started in the
region or the number of those persons who are under imminent threat
of death in the coming months. All the ingredients for a humanitarian
disaster on a large scale are in place in the Darfur region.
In addition to the growing refugee population
in Chad other unaccounted for numbers of people from Darfur were
forced to flee Sudan into other countries such as Libya, Central
African Republic, Egypt, etc. Yet the ordeal of those persons
forced to seek refuge abroad did not end by crossing international
borders. There are documented incidents in which the army and
Janjaweed militia groups have attacked refugees across the international
borders in Chad territory killing some of them and looting their
livestock and other belongings. Persons who seek refugee status
and legal protection from the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Libya and Egypt are facing serious difficulties.
Most of these people are not provided with the necessary shelter,
food and medication, which they are entitled to whether by the
UNHCR or other humanitarian agencies. It seems that Khartoum was
successful in convincing the UNHCR in Tripoli and Cairo, indeed
through the authorities of these two countries, not to provide
refugees from Darfur with legal protection or resettlement in
third countries despite the genuine risk to the safety and personal
security of most of these persons.
The victims of the crisis in Darfur are not
only confined to the unfortunate individuals who currently live
in the region as IDPs or the refugees in Chad. Growing numbers
of persons originating from Darfur, especially members of the
African tribes who live in other parts of Sudan are affected by
this conflict often for no reason other than their blood tie with
the victims of the crisis in Darfur. Hundreds of people are summarily
executed or held incommunicado in different parts of Sudan on
suspicion of supporting or acting as a Fifth Column for the rebels
of Darfur. The government is especially targeting influential
community leaders, intellectuals and educated persons from Darfur
in a massive campaign of arrest and dismissal from public services.
The list of such targeted persons is long. It includes politicians,
businessmen, scholars, students, army and security officers, human
rights and pro-democracy activists as well as presumed combatants
and supporters of the rebellion in Darfur. The government's dismissal
and arrest campaigns did not even spare members of the ruling
party and elected members of the National Assembly or Parliament
who come from Darfur. All these people have had their lives shattered
and the wellbeing of their families endangered. They need special
material and psychological assistance.
The government's horrendous spate of human rights
violations unleashed against the people of Darfur is taking the
form of an all-round economic war against individuals from the
region such as the merchant class in Khartoum and Omdurman. Aggressive
administrative measures through excessive taxation and excise
duties have impoverished thousands of these merchants. Since May
2003 the government is conducting a secret security operation
targeting the main market places in the suburbs of Khartoum and
its twin cities Omdurman and Khartoum North where there is high
concentration of merchants from Darfur. On 29 May 2003 the government
launched a 3,000 man-strong military operation targeting Souk
Libya and Souk Abu Zaid, which are two market places in the suburbs
of Omdurman the national capital twin city. The security forces
arbitrarily closed down shops, confiscated merchandise and arrested
merchants. Since June 2003 the security forces routinely confiscate
private wagons and trucks owned by individuals from Darfur anywhere
in the country. They especially target four-wheel driven vehicles,
which are widely used as means of transportation and interstate
trade. [26]This
ban is especially harmful to the people of the region due to unavailability
of asphalted roads or railways network as well as the vast areas
of desert or semi-desert that cannot be easily crossed with other
types of vehicles. This measure was tremendously devastating on
the lives of these merchants and their households, as most of
them have lost their only property and means of existence. No
compensation whatsoever has been paid to those individuals who
have had their properties confiscated.
Since the second half of 2003, the government
is conducting a massive campaign of demolition of houses in the
poor residential areas in the environs of Khartoum and Omdurman,
which are inhabited by an overwhelming majority of people from
Darfur, Southern and Western Sudan. These people were displaced
from their original homes by the situation of insecurity prevailing
in their war-devastated regions. Some of these people lived in
the targeted areas for over 10 years. Demolition is conducted
at short notice and without financial compensation or alternative
accommodation. By the end of October 2004, thousands of families
were left without shelter in El Salama and Soba al-Arradi squatter
areas (South Khartoum) as well as El-Salaam and Wad el-Bashier
IDPs camps in (North Omdurman) where massive demolition activities
have started earlier in the year. More than 5,000 households in
el-Saliheen and el-Sareeha squatter areas are also made homeless
in October 2004. Some 300 IDPs in Soba Arradi have so far been
arbitrarily denied allocation of plots of land. In addition, 17,500
households, who were entitled to plots in Wad el-Bashier and El
Salaam camps and in El-Saliheen and El-Sareeha squatter areas,
have been waiting without shelter since their houses were demolished
during March-July 2004.
This policy is expected to increase the number
of homeless IDPs in Khartoum manifold. The winter season is approaching
and most IDPs now live in precarious conditions without shelter,
food or hope. Poverty and unemployment compounded with poor health
services and sanitation continue to aggravate the living conditions
of IDPs in these areas with serious threats to the health of vulnerable
age groups like children and the elderly. The government claims
that this measure is intended to redemarcate the area and provide
legal titles to its dwellers. However, the amount of land fees
asked from the IDPs is so extortionate and excessive that they
can hardly afford the required fees. It is reported that government's
agents are active in the area persuading IDPs to sell their land
titles for small amounts of money and consequently relinquish
their rights to own the land. Many IDPs were already forced to
do so and moved elsewhere in the country. The affected people
believe that the whole plan is a security measure to expel them
from Khartoum as they are considered potential supporters of the
Darfur rebellion.
The living conditions of people trapped in the
rebels' held territory is bleak. The rebels, both the SLA/M and
JEM, are believed to be in control of a vast area in the three
States that constitute the Greater Darfur Region. Because of the
nature of the guerrilla military operations in the region geographic
boundaries of the area under rebel control are mobile and consequently
the number of people they cater for is subject to constant change.
In the northern parts of Darfur most of the Zaggawa nomads have
voluntarily moved for protection to areas controlled by the rebels.
These groups seem to be self-sufficient as they depend for food
on their cattle produce. In the Jabal Marra massive we find the
largest concentration of people under rebel-held territory. These
people who mainly belong to the Fur tribe are relatively secure
as the high mountains represent a natural barrier against the
Janjaweed attacks. Yet they are in dire need of relief assistance
as they usually depend on fruit trees and other agricultural produce
to supplement their food. The Jabal Marra massive is under tight
siege both from the government and some rebel factions in the
north and therefore the people in this area have very little access
to relief material. In the rich southern parts of Darfur the situation
is relatively better as the people there still have some of their
old production systems intact. It should be noted that in all
rebel-controlled areas there are no operational systems of civil
administration, law enforcement, public order or accountability.
Although military operations by the rebels are mainly against
the army and the Janjaweed militia, it was recently reported that
they have killed and abducted individuals from the nomad tribes,
obstructed relief work and confiscated vehicles.
7. INTERVENTION
OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
After many wake-up calls the reluctance, indifference,
inaction and lack of knowledge about the plight of the people
of Darfur that characterised the world's reaction throughout 2003
finally started to fade away since April 2004. At present the
situation is increasingly becoming the focus of attention of political
decision-makers in many parts of the world. Thanks to the influx
of more than two hundred thousands of refugees across Sudan's
international borders. The plight of the people of Darfur was
also made public by efforts of UN agencies and other human rights
and humanitarian organisations that documented the atrocities
in the region and seized attention of the international community.
The current vigilance was manifested by visits of heavyweight
regional and international personalities to Sudan, Darfur and
the eastern parts of Chad to oversee the situation of IDPs and
Refugees and ask the government to do more to end the violence.
Personalities that conducted such visits included Presidents Olusegun
Obasanjo and Alpha Oumar Konaré, UK Premier Tony Blair,
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, US Secretary of State Colin Powell,
UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and the EU Foreign Policy Chief
Mr Javier Solana as well as a host of other top politicians from
Western Europe and other corners of the world. Darfur was also
present during the first debate in the US presidential elections
on 9th October 2004 when both President Bush and his challenger
Senator Kerry agreed that it is a genocide that needs to be stopped.
The dangerous nature of the crisis in Darfur
provoked many world political leaders to voice their serious concerns
about the situation on different occasions. On 7 April 2004 the
UN Secretary General expressed a deep sense of "foreboding"
about the crisis in Darfur and called on the international community
to prepare itself for intervention in Sudan—including military
intervention—to save the lives of the people in the region.
In a joint statement issued at the conclusion of their annual
summit on 10 June 2004, leaders of the Group of Eight industrialised
countries (G-8) expressed concern about the situation in Darfur.
The statement, which was full of compassion and solidarity with
the plight of the people of Darfur, underscored the ". .
. continuing reports of gross violations of human rights, many
with an ethnic dimension . . ." They appealed to the international
community to help end the crisis in Darfur by stating that: "We
look to the United Nations to lead the international effort to
avert a major disaster and will work together to achieve this
end." Furthermore, leaders of the G-8 pledged their ".
. . countries' assistance in ending the conflicts in Sudan and
in providing humanitarian aid to those in need." The statement
rightly emphasised the importance of a negotiated solution that
tackles the root causes of the humanitarian crisis in the region
by calling on ". . . the conflict parties to address the
roots of the Darfur conflict and to seek a political solution."
Once again, at the conclusion of their Summit on 18 June 2004,
leaders of the 25 nation-strong European Union expressed deep
concern about the crisis in Darfur.
7.1 Regional and International Intervention
Regional and international intervention into
the Darfur tragedy has assumed two interrelated tracks viz (i)
provision of humanitarian assistance and ii) initiation of political
dialogue between the government of Sudan and its opponents in
Darfur. Both the humanitarian and political tracks did not generate
the required results for a number of reasons. The world did not
invest in efforts to address the crisis in Darfur throughout 2003
for fear that confrontation with Sudan over Darfur will thwart
the Naivasha process that promises to end Sudan's 20-year old
war in the South. Political negotiations did not start until heavy
pressure from the world community forced the warring factions
to sit at the negotiation table in Abuja (Nigeria) in August 2004.
The provision of life-saving relief material to the needy people
in Darfur still faces serious impediments. Lack of security and
the government's policy to hinder delivery of relief material
especially during the first 15 months of the conflict were the
main obstacles encountered. Another dimension was the reluctance
of the donor community to provide the necessary financial means
to the UN and its specialised agencies to enable them procure
the necessary relief material and deliver it to the needy people
in the region. As a direct result of these obstacles, the lack
of food, medicine and other necessities have developed into silent
wholesale killers in vast rural areas of the region especially
in the Jabal Marra massive where the affected Fur people have
not received relief material until recently.
7.2 The UN Security Council
Action of the UN Security Council represents
the legal basis for the response and eventual intervention of
the international community in the Darfur crisis. On 25 May 2004
the UN Security Council adopted Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2004/18)
endorsing the report of the Office of UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights. Although such a Statement has no mandatory power
in the same sense as a Security Council Resolution, it has set
the tone for action to follow. Despite the pressing situation
it was only in July 2004 that the UN Security Council moved forward
with the adoption of Resolution 1556/2004 followed by Resolution
1564/2004, which was adopted in September 2004. Both the two mandatory
Resolutions were adopted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter implying
that the situation in Darfur is a threat to international peace
and security and that the international community could adopt
mandatory punitive measures against the government of Sudan if
it failed to put an end to the ongoing violence. It is to be noted
that both Resolutions 1556/2004 and 1564/2004 placed shared obligations
on the warring parties to allow relief convoys unfettered access
to the region, cooperate with the AU mediation efforts and respect
their ceasefire and other commitments. They also asked the government
to ameliorate the security situation in the region by dismantling
the Janjaweed and apprehending and bringing to justice the leaders.
However, the Resolutions did not yield the required results within
so far as both the warring parties especially the government of
Sudan quietly refused to comply with their provisions.
On Tuesday 26 October 2004 the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 1569/2004 in which it decided to hold a series
of special meetings on Sudan in Nairobi on 18 and 19 November
2004. The agenda for these meetings will include "The Reports
of the Secretary-General on the Sudan" and discussions with
AU and IGAD officials on diplomatic efforts underway to bring
peace to Sudan. The forthcoming Security Council's meetings are
the last chance for the region of Darfur to remain intact. Warning
signals about imminent complete anarchy in Darfur, which were
aired on Thursday 4 November 2004 by the Special Representative
of UN Secretary General on Sudan Mr Jan Pronk, should be taken
very seriously if the world community is to avert another Somalia
from reproducing itself in Darfur. In Mr Pronk's words "The
government does not control its own forces fully." "The
border lines between the military, the paramilitary and the police
are being blurred," and that within the rebel SLA/M and JEM
"There are splits. Some commanders provoke their adversaries
by stealing, hijacking and killing, some seem to have begun acting
for their own private gain." [27]At
the UN Security Council, western European countries and other
like-minded nations are assuming a clear position against Sudan's
handling of the crisis in Darfur and therefore all the hopes of
the people of the region rest with their resolve and persuasion.
The USA and the UK are taking the lead in urging the Council to
adopt meaningful measures against Khartoum yet they have refrained
from taking any concrete unilateral action to protect the people
on the ground despite the declaration of the US Executive and
Legislative that acts of genocide were committed in Darfur. Members
of the Council from the Arab and Islamic Worlds as well as Russia
and China are lagging behind to varying degrees in their support
of Khartoum's policies in Darfur.
China, which is a permanent member of the UN
Security Council, has played an amoral role in escorting Sudan
free from effective international action. By and large, China
bears the prime responsibility for the weak response of the international
community to the crisis in Darfur by watering-down language in
the draft US-sponsored Resolutions at the Security Council that
envisaged punitive measures against Sudan if it failed to comply
with its obligations and end the violence in the region. It has
even threatened to wield its Veto power. China's conscienceless
stand is driven by its own political and economic interests in
Sudan rather than the suffering of the people of Darfur. It is
protecting its investment in Sudan especially its 40% stake in
Sudan's growing oil industry, including refineries, pipelines
and import of crude oil. As such reference to Sudan's oil industry
at the Security Council was largely considered as a threat not
only against Sudan but also against countries like China, France,
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and others that have oil interests in
Sudan. Chinese companies are complicit in the depopulation of
vast areas in southern Sudan to clear the way for oil exploration
activities. In addition China's oil purchases have enabled Sudan
to buy arms from Beijing and other sources thus fuelling the violence
in Darfur.
7.3 The African Union (AU)
Actions of the 3rd Ordinary Session of the AU
Assembly of Heads of State and Government as well as those of
the Peace and Security Council are the basis for the AU political
and military interventions in the Darfur crisis. [28]In
fact the newly created AU Peace and Security Council started its
work in May 2004 with the adoption of a resolution on the situation
in Darfur. The involvement of the AU in the political mediation
efforts as well as their pioneer role in the protection of civilians
is especially important because of the dangerous nature of the
crisis. Involvement of the AU in the Darfur conflict also better
serves the geopolitical interests of the government of Sudan thus
it is their preferred option. This explains why the government
continues to hinder attempts of the international community to
extend a helping hand to end this humanitarian crisis. Africa
has its own fears since on numerous occasions the Janjaweed and
the Sudanese army have conducted cross-border military operations
inside Chad territory. It was reported that military tension in
the eastern regions of Chad is on the increase and it is most
likely that Chad rebels may start their own military operations
in the region, which threatens the fragile socio-political system
in that country. It is, therefore, of great concern that the conflict
in Darfur is posing serious threat to peace and security in Chad
and the whole region especially as the Janjaweed are increasingly
forging military links with their kinsmen in Chad. In an interview
with the UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), on
Thursday 17 June 2004, Mr Ahmad Allami, Personal Advisor of President
Idriss Deby and Chief Mediator in the Darfur peace talks, said
that: "The Janjaweed are recruiting elements in Chad. These
are exclusively Arabs. This situation risks degenerating into
an inter-ethnic war between a coalition of Arabs and other ethnic
groups in the region."
After some hiccups the first round of meaningful
political talks under the AU auspices commenced in Abuja (Nigeria)
on 23 August 2004. However, pressure on the warring factions to
agree on a negotiated solution of the conflict has not yielded
the desired result so far. The government continues to consider
the armed conflict in Darfur as an internal security threat and
rejects the demands and grievances put forward by the rebel SLA/M
and JEM. Notwithstanding its bilateral talks with the SLA/M and
JEM, the government insists on the convening of an All Darfur
Conference. This is an attempt to strip the rebel groups of political
legitimacy to represent the people of Darfur and eventually maintain
the status quo. As such there seems little prospect of progress
despite the successful conclusion of the second round of talks
in Abuja and the signing on Tuesday 9 November 2004 of a series
of breakthrough agreements touching on security and humanitarian
issues. There is hope that more efforts will be done to ensure
that these measures are respected and negotiations for a comprehensive
political solution for a lasting end of the crisis will be achieved.
We are persuaded to admit that only mounting pressure from the
international community—placing more and more emphasis on
the political nature of the crisis and the need for a negotiated
solution of the conflict—could speed up the process for
political negotiations to end the crisis.
On 19 October 1994 the AU agreed to upgrade
its team of 150 ceasefire monitors in Darfur that are backed by
a 300-strong protection force into a full-scale military force
of about 3,320 men with an extended mandate to protect humanitarian
operations and deter armed groups from attacking civilians. However,
key questions about the expanded operation remain unanswered.
One of the questions that need answer was the extension of the
mandate of the AU force from providing security for observers
to protecting civilians. Communiqué PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII)
adopted by the Peace and Security Council on 20 October 2004 and
which organises the deployment of additional AU troops dramatically,
failed to make a clear and unambiguous language on this important
subject. It speaks about "protecting civilians whom it encounters
under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, with resources
and capability, it being understood that the protection of the
civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS."
On the other hand efforts of the AU to send
troops to Darfur are crippled partly by the lack of necessary
financial means and logistical support[29]
but also because of Khartoum's manoeuvring within the AU institutions
especially the Peace and Security Council. Khartoum diplomacy
was successful in slowing down the AU efforts and could render
them meaningless despite the international unanimity of opinion
that the presence of AU peacekeepers will have salutary effects
on the victims of the conflict. This is due to the fact that the
rebel SLA/M and JEM were not represented during meetings of the
AU Peace and Security Council and also because interested civil
society groups were not present to influence the process. [30]It
also seems that Western European countries including the UK are
not investing enough energy for lobbying with members of the AU
to ensure that the valid concerns of the international community
as manifested in UN Security Council Resolutions 1556/2004 and
1564/2004 are fully and unambiguously taken into account by the
AU Peace and Security Council during their consideration of the
Darfur issue. What is urgently needed in the region is a resourceful
and strong internationally supported force of at least 50,000
troops and support service in order to effectively protect the
more than two million IDPs and refugees and ensure their safe
return to their original villages. Any other measures that fall
short of providing sound security and restoring the rule of law
in Darfur simply means that the IDPs and refuges are confined
to living in their present camps indefinitely while their victimization
and harassment continue.
7.4 Humanitarian Intervention
The dramatic unfolding of the Darfur crisis
has taken the international community especially the donor agencies
with surprise. It seems that no government or international agency
could have imagined the level of destruction and humanitarian
need experienced by the region within the first nine-month period
since the rebellion started in February 2004. This perhaps explains
the inadequate response of the international community to the
appeals for humanitarian assistance made by the UN and some of
its specialized agencies to provide relief material to the needy
people in Darfur. The Sudan Assistance Programme (ASAP) of the
UN consolidated appeal for Sudan for 2004, which was estimated
at about US$ 639 million has generated less than one third of
the required funds. The UN Donor Conference on Darfur held in
Geneva on Thursday, 3 June 2004 appealed for US$ 236 million to
aid the more than two million people affected by the conflict
in Darfur. In response donor nations made pledges of only US$
126 million. Another equally important aspect was the lack of
knowledge and information about the level of destruction in the
region and the needs of its people. This is due mainly to the
policy of information blackout so maliciously imposed by the Khartoum
regime on the news from Darfur throughout 2003. The involvement
of development agencies in a coordinated effort to meet the humanitarian
needs of the internally displaced persons and refugees should
be further consolidated not only by the provision of financial
means but also by knowledge of the situation and other political
and organisational measures.
As the world is still under the shock of the
level of destruction of live and livelihood in Darfur and its
inability to put a halt to the ongoing carnage, it is all too
natural that most available resources are mainly devoted to meeting
the immediate humanitarian needs. As such very little attention
was devoted to strategic thinking or critical investment in future
plans to help the people rebuild their destroyed lives in the
post-crisis phase. Strategic thinking and eventually the designing
of practical policies and plans to rebuild the region and rehabilitate
its people are very crucial at this stage in particular when such
efforts target to fill the existing gap of policy research and
documentation. Strategic thinking and documentation are indispensable
for informed decisions that are expected to play a cardinal role
in generating the appropriate political solutions for the conflict.
Such thinking should address, but not be limited to, the questions
of the political, institutional, developmental, economic, social,
ethnic, racial, religious and cultural dimensions of the crisis.
It is also necessary to ensure a broad and effective mobilisation
of the region's material and human resources to treat the effects
of the tragedy on the lives of people in the post-conflict phase
and also to help mitigate the negative effects of the damage done
to the social fabric as well as to live and livelihood in the
region. At present it is understandable that there is no sound
advocacy campaigns to educate the victims of the conflict and
the people of the region and Sudan in general about their rights
and duties or the moral values of accountability, responsibility,
tolerance, forgiveness and reconciliation. Yet it is time to undertake
the spadework and erect appropriate organs. Such a project can
be done more effectively with the involvement of local people
and their independent civil society organisations that are part
and parcel of the culture and tradition of the region and its
people.
The present negotiations both on the political
arena and those on the humanitarian and security issues are essentially
conducted between the government of Sudan and the rebel groups
to the exclusion of other equally important actors in the region.
Some segments of the people of Darfur—those targeted by
the campaign of destruction of life and livelihood—and their
representative civil society structures and organisations are
not fully accommodated in the ongoing process. Inability of these
social actors to contribute their knowledge and expertise during
the negotiations, indicate that they will, indeed, be absent or
ineffective in shaping their role in the post-conflict rehabilitation
and reconstruction phase. Perhaps the most visible absentee victim
group were women. This happens despite the fact that women are
ubiquitously present as the first and foremost victims of the
current conflict and will be present as pawns in the post-conflict
phase yet they are conspicuously sidelined in the decision-making
process. This is true as far as the negotiations for a settlement
of the conflict are concerned, and by consequence during the post-conflict
rebuilding phase. As far back as the UN Women's Conference held
in Nairobi in 1985, UN member State affirmed that: "equality
is important for development and peace because national and global
inequities perpetuate themselves and increase tensions of all
types." While it is obvious that the conflicting parties
will not prefer engaging some of the absentee stakeholders it
could be helpful if the international community places some emphasis
on the importance of a multi-disciplinary approach that engage
and mobilise some key indigenous partners to help resolve the
crisis in Darfur.
8. THE ROLE
OF THE
UK GOVERNMENT
The UK government was among the first external
powers to gain a clear understanding of the real situation in
Darfur. Since the end of 2003 the UK government became aware of
the destruction that has been taking place in Darfur through its
diplomatic mission in Khartoum. In fact a UK national (Mr Mukesh
Kapila) was the first person that dared to break the taboo about
the situation in Darfur when he publicly voiced his concern about
the nature of the crisis and sent out a strong warning signal
to the world community by describing the situation as ethnic cleansing,
drawing a link with the early days of the 1994 Rwanda genocide.
He described the situation in Darfur in clear words stating that:
"This is ethnic cleansing, this is the world's greatest humanitarian
crisis, and I don't know why the world isn't doing more about
it." [31]As
the former colonial power that annexed the independent Sultanate
of Darfur to present-day Sudan in the beginning of the twentieth
century, the UK government and its people must be in a unique
position of moral responsibility towards the plight of the people
of Darfur. This explains the UK's candid engagement with the crisis
in Darfur. The UK was the first world power to take the bold stand
of threatening Khartoum with the deployment of British troops
in Darfur when the head of the UK Army[32]
declared late in July 2004 that a brigade of 5,000 British soldiers
could be sent to the violence-wracked Darfur region of Sudan at
very short notice. The UK bold position was also translated into
the fact that Britain was the only country that has dispatched
two of its top political decision-makers to Sudan to raise their
concerns about the situation in Darfur and ask the government
of Sudan to do more to end the crisis and ameliorate the situation.
[33]These
trips were successful in conveying a decisive message to Sudan
from the international community that it must comply with its
obligations as a State member of the United Nations and honour
its commitments to the international community and put an end
to the violence in the region. These visits were concrete steps
that gave more weight to Britain's involvement in the Darfur crisis
and indirectly helped save innocent lives by making the government
of Sudan honour its promise to allow more AU troops to deploy
to Darfur, and most importantly persuading the government to accept
the security and humanitarian protocols that were signed in Abuja
(Nigeria) on Tuesday 9 November 2004. No doubt that such efforts
would eventually help regain peace in Darfur and should therefore
continue.
The UK diplomacy also played an important role
in building up and maintaining the ongoing momentum about the
crisis in Darfur within the EU and the UN institutions. The UK
is part of the team of "international facilitators"
that helps bridge differences during the political negotiations
between the government and the rebel movements. Although the British
government and legislatives declined to join the US Congress and
Administration in accusing Sudan of committing acts of genocide
in Darfur, it has backed the US-sponsored resolutions on Sudan
that were adopted by the UN Security Council in July and September
2004. On the question of genocide it seems that the UK government
has left confirmation of the commission of this crime to the UN
investigators. However, it is time for the UK government to conduct
its own appraisal of the situation and come to a conclusion on
this issue. On the humanitarian field the British government ranks
among the largest donors for relief operations in Darfur. Added
to the official government efforts there is an army of UK-based
charity organisations now active on the ground in Darfur and eastern
Chad providing live-saving relief material to the affected IDPs
and refugees. Britain allocated £62.5 million or the equivalent
of ($112 million) in aid to Sudan in the year 2004.
The extraordinary efforts of the UK government
in helping the Sudanese people come out of their current impasse
should not over look some important political and social aspects
of the crisis that engulfs the country. These aspects are at the
heart and origin of the current crisis, which the UK decision-makers
should take on board if they are to leave a lasting imprint on
the country's future course. The Sudanese elite that inherited
the rule of the country from its British colonial rulers in 1956
have built a structurally deformed system designed to serve their
own vested interests and the interests of certain ethnic groups
to whom they belong. This elite group, which represents less than
40% of the country's population, has imposed a self-proclaimed
totalitarian Arab-centric cultural vision in a multi-ethnic, multi-racial,
multi-cultural and multi-religious country. [34]Such
an ideology that strips Sudan's African population of their indigenous
heritage and identity is the breeding ground for exploitation,
discrimination, social injustice and unrest, destruction and instability
with costly human, economic and financial implications. These
hitherto taboo subjects in Sudan's political discourse must be
addressed with courage and determination for the sake of unity
as well as peace and security not only in Sudan but also in neighbouring
African countries that are likely to experience the same tragic
fate in the future. Any other measures that fall short of looking
at these realities and treat their root causes will remain an
attempt to address the symptom while leaving the disease uncured.
This is the only way to enable Sudan achieve—as envisaged
in the Machakos Protocols—a comprehensive solution that
replaces war not just with peace, but also with social, political
and economic justice which respects the fundamental human and
political rights of the Sudanese people.
9. CONCLUSION
The human rights and humanitarian crisis in
Darfur is an integral part of Sudan's overall failed system of
governance fostered by unwise State policy that manipulates ethnic
and tribal differences to maintain political and economic power
in the hands of the Arabised groups of the country. The crisis
is not only the result of conflict between Africans and Arabs
over the control of scare natural resources in a zone of ecological
decline but the creation of the government which has manipulated
the nomad tribes on racial and cultural grounds. The situation
witnessed this tragic unfolding when the government chose to accord
its full military, political, diplomatic and economic backing
to the nomad tribes of the region. Such a discriminatory policy
is dangerous as it represents a breeding ground for social unrest,
hatred and mistrust among the diverse ethnic groups that have
co-existed in the region for many centuries.
The people of Darfur share common denominators
such as the practice of Sunni Islam, a relatively homogenous social
behaviour and the use of Arabic as lingua franca. The unprecedented
mass killings, pillage of resources, destruction of livelihood
as well as the abduction, gang rape of women and other crimes
committed against the African tribes have left deep scars on the
consciousness of their victims. In light of the complicated tribal
nature of Darfur, the armed conflict and revenge in the region
are expected to continue for some years to come. This painful
fact should be addressed with determination, zeal and courage
before it engulfs other parts of the country. This reality is
especially imminent if there is no profound change in the declared
policy and the actual practice of national and regional governments.
Relentless pursuance of draconian religious and cultural policies
in a volatile multi-ethnic and multi-cultural region has inevitably
injected hitherto effectively controlled violent dimensions into
the current conflict. Potential manifestation of similar violence
cannot be ruled out in Darfur in particular as the region still
experiences a fragile ecology, ethnic manipulation, a quasi-absence
of infrastructure and where the traditional chieftain structure
has been virtually dismantled.
The Janjaweed have the ability and potential
to continue a long-term destruction campaign in the region for
a number of reasons. They have developed a full-blown racist mentality,
a sustained warrior culture, vast knowledge of the region and
its people, abundant sophisticated weapons, suitable means of
transport and communication and most importantly the full backing
of the state security apparatus. They are motivated by their pathological
desire to destroy life, looting and war-booty, which they easily
conduct with complete impunity. As such it will be a real challenge
to bring an end to the conflict in Darfur—a region the size
of France—even if there is strong political will among the
international community to do so. This should not be inferred
as an invitation for the international community not to act. To
the contrary, it should be an additional inducement for all of
us to face the challenge and find additional means to do a lethal
blow to this growing crisis.
The current relief efforts in Darfur have focused
on getting life-saving and other emergency relief material to
refugees in eastern Chad and also to the IDPs inside Darfur. Beside
providing emergency relief material to the needy, the main objective
of the international engagement with Darfur should be to get the
political negotiations onto a speedy track that sets out measures
conducive to the safe return of IDPs and refugees to their original
homes where they can restart normal life, take care of their needs
and end the growing external aid dependency syndrome. Only at
home do these unfortunate victims have a better chance of survival.
Protracted exposure of these victims to insalubrious, congested
and to insecure conditions in IDP camps and refugee centres is
a recipe for death, despair and hopelessness let alone meeting
the exorbitant and painful international protection and relief
operations. No efforts were made to address the root causes of
the crisis through political or intellectual exercise. While providing
life-saving relief material to the needy is meritorious, yet what
good it makes to concentrate on relieving the symptom rather than
treating the disease. The multifaceted crisis faced by the people
of Darfur is a chronic structural crisis that requires a combined
pool of political and scientific solutions in order to address
it effectively. Political neglect, social injustice, uneven distribution
of wealth and the associated underdevelopment, socio-economic
exclusion as well as marginalisation are at the root of the current
crisis. In this regard we can conclude that one of the most effective
ways of resolving the problems faced by Africa's war-devastated
country was through political and economic empowerment of the
underprivileged regions to be conducted through a sound affirmative
action programme protected by legal guarantees.
It is to be emphasised that the end of the security
dilemma in Darfur and the associated destruction of facilities
signify the beginning of ardent work to rebuild the destroyed
social-fabric and livelihood of the people of the region. Equally
important are efforts to restore the lost confidence and trust
between the different ethnic groups in the region. The return
of peace and tranquillity should also signify the beginning of
sincere and concerted efforts to bring a fresh start to the destroyed
socio-economic systems and to reorganise the relationships along
the lines of the respect of democratic participation, good governance,
prevalence of justice and the rule of law as well as advocacy
of the concepts of tolerance and peaceful co-existence between
the different tribal groups that live in the country without prejudice
or discrimination. To help realise these objectives civic and
human rights education should be one of the major programmes to
be embarked upon as a matter of priority. High moral values of
non-violence, non-discrimination and the respect of diversity
should be the centre of future initiatives. Such an educational
programme cannot be effectively implemented unless it is introduced
in a long-term process that necessitates the involvement of different
partners including local, regional and national governments, UN
agencies and NGOs in a spirit of partnership and cooperation.
In this regard it is necessary that the framework
for a comprehensive multi-disciplinary development plan for Darfur
be initiated as a matter of priority. The plan should be incorporated
into the final peace arrangement and that its implementation commences
as soon as the situation returns to normality. Such initiative
should be supported not only by the warring factions but also
by the regional and international development partners. Timely
preparations for such a policy stems from the unsatisfactory political
and humanitarian response of the international community to the
crisis in Darfur. It is obvious that the combination of lack of
knowledge about the crisis and the region as well as the absence
of genuine local structures or mechanisms to be integrated into
the work of governments, relief organisations, agencies and other
actors involved in the Darfur crisis clearly indicate that effective
intervention in the region needs solid future perspective to regain
peace and prevent the recurrence of such a humanitarian crisis.
The prevalence of peace and tranquillity in the region will effectively
alleviate or reduce the current need for costly military protection
missions and the endless humanitarian relief operations in the
region.
However, it should be underscored that the people
of Darfur, Africans and Arabs alike, have no other option but
to live together in the region and to accommodate each other.
They are the only real guarantee for lasting peace and tranquillity
in the region. The warring factions need a kind but firm helping
hand to assist them to come out of the current situation. Assistance
from the international community, therefore, is much needed at
this dangerous juncture of the region's history. The high moral
values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence between the different
groups of people inhabiting the region should be inculcated in
the coming generations. These values were the rule and norm in
the past and should be restored and preserved for the future generations.
Under the circumstances the government of Sudan should work out
a nation-rebuilding plan that advocates a culture of peace, tolerance
and reconciliation as a matter of top priority in its national
agenda. A nation-rebuilding plan should be supported by comprehensive
sustainable development strategy and socio-economic projects in
the region. This is the only way to ensure that the negative effects
of natural calamities in the region were mitigated without being
used by warmongers to advocate violence.
An important component in the rebuilding process
would be the establishment of strong, independent and effective
native civil society organs to help the international community
as well as national social actors—including the antagonistic
parties—in their efforts to end the crisis and assist the
people of Darfur in restoring their shattered lives. The ultimate
objective should be empowering the victims of atrocities in Darfur
to further mobilise regional and international public opinions
to help them in their plight.
November 2004
13 Some parts of this Study were partially drawn from
the DRDC's Paper entitled Background Information and Area of
Concern issued in July 2004. Back
14
According to the United Nations Population Fund, Sudan's population
in 2003 is estimated at about 28,363,000. These figures exclude
the war-torn regions of Southern Sudan. http://www.unsudanig.org/JAM/output/data/retreat/costings/unit-costs-population.doc. Back
15
It should be understood that some Zurga like Zagawa and Medoub
were largely herders (camel herders) and many Fur mixed farming
with herding (cattle). Back
16
Gunnar Haalan (1969), in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Fredrick
Barth (ed), pp 53-73. Back
17
It was rare to find in this part of the region a Fur or a Bani
Halba identifying her/himself as a Fur or Bani Halba only without
adding that but one of my parents is Bani Halba or a Fur. Back
18
The Fallata and Gimir are black African tribes. Their classification
as Arabs is based on the self-identification of these groups as
Arabs in recent history and since the current Arab-centric regime
took over control of the country in a coup d'etat in June
1989. Back
19
In 1988 the representatives of about 13 Arab tribes in Darfur
met came together and formed what is known as the Arab Congregation.
This is a racist organisation. Although their declaration issued
in 1988 addressed some political demands but their hidden agenda
aims at driving the original inhabitants of the region from their
rich homelands and replacing them with nomads that are being affected
by drought and desertification. Members of this organisation advocated
war against all the Blacks or non-Arab populations in the region.
Since then the organisation has been actively lobbying for official
financial and political backing from the central government and
political parties to support their cause in the region. So far
they have been successful in both objectives. Two of the current
governors of the three States of Darfur are from the Arab tribes.
The Secretary General of this organisation Mr Abdalla Ali Masar
is the Governor of the Nile Valley State or (Wilyat Nahar El Nil)
in northern Sudan. Other prominent members of this organisation
hold Ministerial Portfolios such as the Minister of External Trade,
Mr Abdulhamid Musa Kasha, General Abdallah Safi Al Nour, Minister
of State for Presidential Affairs etc. Back
20
Some but not all the indigenous African groups that live in the
region are the Fur, Zaggawa, Bergid, Dajou, Bigo, Berti, Tunjur,
Hawara, Bagirma, Hawssa, Burgo, Burno, Binga, Kara, Massaleet,
Areigna and Abudareg. On 18 December 2003 the representatives
of these tribes signed a document affirming their rights in the
region in response to the document that the Arab Alliance signed
on 15 November of the same year. Back
21
On 22 July 2004 both Chambers of the U.S. Congress adopted concurrent
resolutions condemning the continuing atrocities in Darfur as
"genocide" and asking the international community to
join with the United States to help bring an end to the humanitarian
catastrophe that is under way there. The U.S. House of Representatives
passed its version (House Concurrent Resolution 467) in a vote
of 422-0, with the U.S. Senate approving its version (Senate Concurrent
Resolution 133) by voice vote. Back
22
Not printed. Back
23
See Annex One for a brief description of some incidents, which
involved large-scale human rights violations that were documented
during the last three months of the year 2002. [Not printed] Back
24
Declaration of the Minister of Justice in a meeting with Mr Gerhart
Baum, former UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights
in the Sudan held in Khartoum in March 2003. For more details
see the Report of the Special Rapporteur to the 59th Session of
the UN Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/2003/42) dated 6 January
2003, page 17. This document can be consulted at the Webpage http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/100/60/PDF/G0310060.pdf?OpenElement. Back
25
This transcript was a translation from Arabic of the appeal issued
by attorney Abdel-Wahid Mohamed Ahmed Nour on 9 August 2002. Back
26
See Albayan Arabic Daily Newspaper dated 26 May 2003. Back
27
Report of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
on Sudan Mr Jan Pronk to the UN Security Council in a briefing
held in New York on Thursday, 4 November 2004 on Secretary-General
Kofi Annan's monthly report to the Security Council on the situation
in the war-torn region. Comments can be consulted at http://allafrica.com/stories/200411050001.html Back
28
Decision AU/Dec.54 (III) adopted by the 3rd Ordinary Session
of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis
Ababa 6-8 July 2004 as well as Communique« PSC/PR/Comm.(XIII)
and PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII) adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council
at its 13th Meeting on 17 July and its 17th meeting on 20 October
2004 respectively. Back
29
To secure logistics, support services and other provisions the
AU has to resort to the international donor community. By the
beginning of November 2004 the AU sources indicated that out of
the estimated US$ 221 million to meet the cost of deploying the
AU troops in Darfur the international community pledged only US$
114.9. Back
30
Unlike other similar institutions, the AU Peace and Security
Council allows interested African civil society organisations
and groups directly concerned to contribute during the proceeding
of its meetings and provide unbinding ideas and proposals. Back
31
Mr Mukesh Kapila, then Humanitarian Coordinator and UN Resident
Representative in Sudan, BBC Interview on the situation in Darfur,
19 March 2004. Back
32
Comment by General Sir Michael Jackson, Head of the British Army,
BBC News, 24's Hardtalk Programme in which he said "If need
be, we will be able to go to Sudan," adding that: "I
suspect we could put a brigade together very quickly indeed."
See the Guardian Unlimited (http://www.guardian.co.uk/sudan/story/0,14658,1268219,00.html). Back
33
On 6 October 2004 UK Premier Tony Blair paid a one-day visit
to Khartoum on his way to Addis Ababa during which he met with
President Omar El-Bashier and other top government officials.
The visit of Mr Blair was preceded by a visit by Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw, who went
to Khartoum and Darfur in the period 23-24 August 2004. Back
34
According to the Population of Sudan: Ethnic Census of 1956-which
was the only ethnic census conducted in the country to date-"The
population of Sudan consists of: 39% Arabs 30% Southerners 13%
Westerners, 6% each for Nuba and Beja, 3% each for the Nubians
and for Foreigners and Miscellaneous. These figures are not necessarily
correct (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/appendixa.pdf). Back
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