House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Memoranda

Memorandum submitted by The European Sudanese Public Affairs Council (ESPAC)

OBSTACLES TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN DARFUR

SUMMARY

This submission seeks to present perspectives on several of the above issues, examining some of the obstacles to peace and reconciliation in Darfur and focusing on two inter-related questions. The first is what was it that triggered the systematic outbreak of violence in Darfur in February 2003? This question is at the heart of understanding the dynamics of the conflict. The second question is the extent to which flawed interpretations and questionable projections of the crisis—some of them the sort of propaganda invariably associated with war and particularly civil war—hinders both reconciliation and peace-building while at the same time skewing and adversely influencing international opinion.

INTRODUCTION

The inquiry by the International Development Committee has indicated interest in the following issues: "the nature, causes and chronology of the crisis in Darfur; the international community's response, including that of the United Nations, the African Union, humanitarian agencies and the UK Government; conflict prevention and peace-building at national and local levels; the nature of the aid relationship with developing countries affected by conflict."

THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE CRISIS IN DARFUR

The war in Darfur began in February 2003 when two armed groups, the "Justice and Equality Movement" (JEM) and the "Sudan Liberation Army" (SLA), launched attacks on policemen, government garrisons and civilians in the area. Darfur is an ecologically-fragile area and had already seen growing—and often armed—conflict over natural resources between some 80 tribes and ethnic groups loosely divided between nomads and sedentary communities. These conflicts, some between nomadic communities and farmers, and some within nomadic and farming communities themselves, inter-tribal and intra-tribal, scarred the 1970s and 1980s. Much of this violence also had cross-border implications, with communities often straddling the Sudan-Chad frontier.

In perhaps the most objective reading of the present crisis in Darfur, the UN media service has made this analysis: "The conflict pits farming communities against nomads who have aligned themselves with the militia groups—for whom the raids are a way of life—in stiff competition for land and resources. The militias, known as the Janjaweed, attack in large numbers on horseback and camels and are driving the farmers from their land, often pushing them towards town centres." [40]

The rebel groups appear to have been closely identified with two or three "African", sedentary, communities such as the Fur and the Zaghawa tribes. The systematic murder by the rebels of several hundred policemen and the destruction of over 80 police stations created a security vacuum, which together with the rebel targeting of tribal leaders and tribesmen from several "Arab" tribes, led to an explosion of inter-communal violence. [41]It is clear that a variety of armed groups have been active in Darfur over the past year or so, either as participants in the war or taking advantage of the turmoil the conflict has caused. This has clearly included heavily-armed criminal gangs from both sides of the Chad-Sudan border. The conflict has spiralled out of control and caused a growing humanitarian crisis. [42]Over one million civilians have been displaced by the conflict.

On 19 April 2004, the government and rebels signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement mediated by the Chadian government as a first step towards a lasting peace. In November 2004 African Union mediation resulted in the Government and rebel movements extending the ceasefire and aid access agreements. [43]The African Union will be providing both a forum for continuing peace talks and ceasefire supervision. It is essential that agreements are honoured, monitored and followed through as the international community attempts both to address the humanitarian aid needs of those hundreds of thousands of civilians who have been displaced by the war and to facilitate a political solution to the conflict. While the ceasefire has been violated from time to time by all parties to the conflict the bulk of events now in focus happened before the April ceasefire.

WHAT HAS CAUSED THE UNREST?

The insurgents in Darfur claim to be acting because of Darfur's marginalisation and underdevelopment. That Darfur is underdeveloped is self-evident. It is no more underdeveloped, however, than several other parts of Sudan. It is also clear that this historic underdevelopment, however it is measured, does not adequately explain the inter-communal violence in past decades. It is difficult to accept that underdevelopment and marginalisation accounts for the level of focused and orchestrated violence aimed at the Government of Sudan since early 2003, and clearly planned for some considerable time beforehand. It is also difficult to ignore Khartoum's assertions with regard to development in Darfur since the present government came to power in 1989. [44]

What is becoming increasingly obvious is that whatever legitimate issues may have arisen out of concerns about underdevelopment they have been hijacked by various opportunistic forces to serve different ends. The question that must be answered is what was it that turned a limited, low-intensity conflict between the pastoral and arable farming groups in Darfur into a well-organised, well-armed and well-resourced civil war? Rebel claims that the war is simply the inevitable result of marginalisation have been contradicted by reputable, independent observers. A particularly credible observer is Ghazi Suleiman, Sudan's most prominent human rights activist. He has publicly stated that: "The conflict in Darfur has nothing to do with marginalisation or the inequitable distribution of wealth. Inherently it is a struggle between the two factions of the Sudanese Islamist movement, the (opposition) Popular Congress party and the ruling National Congress (party)". [45]

Suleiman is referring to the conflict within the Sudanese Islamist movement following the government's sidelining of the Islamist eminence grise Dr Hasan Turabi, a figure seen as having been an obstacle both to the normalisation of relations with the United States and a peace agreement with southern rebels. The ruling National Congress party split with hard-liners under Turabi, many of them from Darfur, forming the Popular Congress party in opposition to any engagement with Washington and the West and peace in southern Sudan. (Noted anti-government critic and Sudan analyst, Alex De Waal, has observed: "It is almost unbearably ironic that just as southern Sudan is on the brink of peace, Darfur-and with it the entire north-is convulsed by another war. The linkage is not accidental"[46]).

The Justice and Equality Movement, led by Turabi proteégeé Khalil Ibrahim, and at the heart of the Darfur conflict, is widely recognised as being part and parcel of the Popular Congress. In November 2003, the Popular Congress admitted that some party members were involved in the Darfur conflict. [47]In January 2004 Turabi admitted supporting the Darfur insurrection: "We support the cause, no doubt about it . . . we have relations with some of the leadership." [48]In the same month, Turabi admitted that 30 members of his Popular Congress party had been arrested in connection with activities in Darfur. [49]

It is clear that Turabi and Popular Congress deliberately chose Darfur to be the cockpit of their war against Khartoum. They also cold-bloodedly projected a racial element to the issue. Popular Congress activists originated and distributed a publication known as "The Black Book" alleging Khartoum's marginalisation and neglect of Darfur and claiming that Sudan's political elite was dominated by a northern Arab clique—seemingly the same clique once led by Dr Turabi. The Financial Times confirmed that the "Black Book" had been written by Justice and Equality Movement activists. The newspaper also noted that "the appearance of the Black Book did coincide with a deep split in the regime, which has exacerbated tension in society." [50]Alex de Waal has also commented on the importance of the "Black Book" in subsequent events in Darfur: "The Islamist split quickly took on regional and ethnic dimensions. The west Africans and Darfurians who had come into the Islamist movement under Turabi's leadership left with him . . . In May 2000, Darfurian Islamists produced the "Black Book" . . . The Black Book was a key step in the polarization of the country along politically constructed "racial" rather than religious lines, and it laid the basis for a coalition between Darfur's radicals, who formed the SLA, and its Islamists, who formed the other rebel organization, the Justice and Equality Movement." [51]

The linkage between Darfur's violence and the Popular Congress has an additional dimension. In February 2001, Turabi and the Popular Congress signed a joint memorandum with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the southern rebel movement led by Dr John Garang, which called for the "the escalation of popular resistance" against Khartoum. A secret codicil to the Popular Congress/SPLA memorandum was an agreement by the SPLA to train Darfur rebels. The International Crisis Group, an organisation very critical of the Sudanese government, has noted that "numerous sources link the SPLA to the beginning of the SLA rebellion by providing arms, training, and strategy . . . It allegedly trained as many as 1,500 Darfurians near Raja, in western Bahr el-Ghazal, in March 2002." [52]These trainees subsequently formed the basis of the Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement.

It is worth further noting that in March 2004, military officers linked to the Popular Congress attempted a coup d'eétat in Khartoum. The BBC noted that: "Those detained are also being linked to the uprising in the Darfur region." [53]In September 2004, the Khartoum authorities foiled another attempted coup by Popular Congress and Justice and Equality Movement activists. The government captured a large arms cache "with which the conspirators planned to kidnap and kill 38 government officials and destroy strategic targets in Khartoum." [54]

If true, the intimate involvement of Islamist extremists such as Dr Turabi and his Popular Congress party in the Darfur insurgency has worrying implications for those eager to end and resolve the war. It is very difficult, for example, to end a conflict said to be about marginalisation and underdevelopment when at least one of major participants would appear to have a hidden agenda of overthrowing the Government of Sudan and replacing it with a more hard-line Islamist regime. Building schools and roads and drilling more water wells in Darfur, while doubtlessly useful, is not going to satisfy hard-line Islamist rebels in Darfur any more than reconstruction projects in Iraq have satisfied Islamist insurgents in that country.

EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE DARFUR CONFLICT

It is additionally clear that the Darfur insurgents have had considerable external assistance. The Justice and Equality Movement for example, are now also said to be receiving assistance from al-Qaeda. [55]The "Sudan Liberation Army" were reported by Agence France Presse to have "weapons, vehicles and modern satellite communications".[56] UN media sources have also noted claims by tribal leaders that the rebels have better weapons than the Sudanese army. [57]The insurgents have also been receiving military supplies by air. [58]And, in a disturbing resonance of the gunmen who have dominated parts of Somalia in four-wheel drive "technicals", the rebels have also been operating in groups of up to 1,000 men in four-wheel drive vehicles. [59]Eritrea has also militarily, logistically and politically assisted the Darfur gunmen in its continuing attempts to destabilise Sudan. Khartoum has lodged official complaints with the United Nations and African Union. [60]The Sudanese government has also pointed to the agreement signed in the Eritrean capital between Darfur gunmen and elements of the Beja Congress, an armed anti-government group based in Eritrea. [61]The Sudanese government has had grounds to doubt the credibility of their counter-parts in the Naivasha process, Dr John Garang and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). While engaged in peace talks with Khartoum, the SPLA have both trained and armed the Darfur rebels. As noted above the International Crisis Group has noted SPLA involvement in training Darfur rebels. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, SPLA spokesmen were still claiming as recently as September 2004 that the SPLA "has nothing to do with the present rebellion in Darfur".[62]

Any study of the conflict in Darfur can now no longer ignore the involvement of al-Qaeda with some of the insurgents. Mr Tom Vraalsen, the UN secretary-general's special envoy for humanitarian affairs for Sudan, has pointed out the regional implications of the Darfur conflict: "A continuation of the problems in Darfur could have serious political repercussions in the sense that it could destabilize the area along the Chad-Sudan border and it could have repercussions also regionally if it continues. It has to be brought to an end." [63]This is precisely why groups such as al-Qaeda are interested in Darfur. American counter-terrorism expert, Richard Miniter, in his latest book, Shadow War: The Untold Story of How Bush is Winning the War on Terror, has reported that the al-Qaeda network has for some time been establishing itself in the Sahel area, an area which is made up of Niger, Mali, Chad and Sudan. Dozens of al-Qaeda terrorists were killed in Chad in 2004. Miniter states that al-Qaeda instructors, including specialists in guerilla and urban warfare and logistics, have been involved in training Justice and Equality insurgents in Darfur. He further states that al-Qaeda involvement in Darfur "dovetails with other reports from North Africa. The desert wastes have become al-Qaeda's latest battleground." [64]It is clear that any Western military intervention in Darfur would serve as a rallying point for Islamist extremists, both within and outside of Darfur and Sudan.

PROPAGANDA AND SENSATIONALISM WITHIN THE DARFUR CRISIS

To address the Darfur crisis it is essential that events in Darfur are evaluated as objectively as possible. To do so observers must cut away the pressure group politics— especially within the United States—war-related propaganda and media sensationalism that has already distorted perceptions of the Darfur crisis and Sudan. [65]The government has stated that: "Those with their own agendas are trying to give a very sad view of what is happening. The propaganda in the west is trying to exaggerate what is taking place in Darfur." [66]That the Darfur issue has been enmeshed at least in part in propaganda images and claims is clear. It would be naive not to factor such a dimension into any study of the crisis. There have been allegations of genocide, ethnic cleansing and the use of chemical weapons in Darfur. Recent claims, for example, of the use of chemical weapons in Darfur have unravelled. A prominent German newspaper alleged that the Syrian and Sudanese governments had used chemical weapons against civilians in Darfur. [67]This claim, although exposed as misinformation, was widely repeated and serves as a further illustration of the propaganda war surrounding Darfur. [68]Similarly sensationalistic claims, while serving any number of short-term political goals, complicate and distort an already complex issue. Any solution to the Darfur crisis has to cut through this propaganda wall and move on. It is useful therefore to assess some of the major allegations that have been made with regard to events in Darfur.

ALLEGATIONS THAT GENOCIDE IS TAKING PLACE IN DARFUR

In September 2004, the American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, responding to domestic pressure from conservative and anti-Islamic constituencies, declared that events in Darfur constituted "genocide". This was despite having previously stated two months before events in Darfur did not "meet the tests of the definition of genocide".[69] His September comment, in the lead-up to the US elections, was widely seen as an attempt to divert media attention away from the disastrous events in Iraq. The American record for crying wolf, in the wake of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction fiasco, is clear. The United Nations Secretary-General Mr Kofi Annan has contradicted American claims: "I cannot call the killing a genocide even though there have been massive violations of international humanitarian law." [70]The African has also gone on record as stating: "Even though the crisis in Darfur is grave, with unacceptable levels of death, human suffering and destruction of homes and infrastructure, the situation cannot be defined as a genocide".[71] Washington's genocide claims have been criticised by well-respected humanitarian groups such as Meédecins Sans Frontie"res (MSF). [72]MSF President Dr Jean-Herveé Bradol subsequently described American claims of genocide in Darfur as "obvious political opportunism".[73] Dr Bradol had previously stated that the use of the term genocide was inappropriate: "Our teams have not seen evidence of the deliberate intention to kill people of a specific group. We have received reports of massacres, but not of attempts to specifically eliminate all the members of a group".[74] Dr Mercedes Taty, MSF's deputy emergency director, who worked with 12 expatriate doctors and 300 Sudanese nationals in field hospitals throughout Darfur at the height of the emergency has also warned: "I don't think that we should be using the word `genocide' to describe this conflict. Not at all. This can be a semantic discussion, but nevertheless, there is no systematic target—targeting one ethnic group or another one. It doesn't mean either that the situation in Sudan isn't extremely serious by itself." [75]Meédecins Sans Frontie"res is an exceptionally credible observer with regard to allegations of genocide for two reasons. Firstly, MSF was amongst the first humanitarian groups to establish a presence in Darfur as the conflict unfolded. MSF is very heavily involved in the provision of medical and emergency services in all three of the states that make up Darfur, deploying two thousand staff. [76]It has been actively assisting 250,000 people displaced by fighting throughout the region. Secondly, MSF's reputation is quite simply beyond reproach. Meédecins Sans Frontie"res was the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999. It has also received numerous other awards recognising its outstanding humanitarian work throughout the world.

ALLEGATIONS THAT THE DARFUR CONFLICT IS RACIAL

One of the other sensationalist themes is that the conflict in Darfur has been a racial one in which light-skinned "Arab" tribes have been engaged in the "ethnic cleansing" of black "African" tribes. [77]These sorts of claims are particularly inflammatory and very questionable. The simple fact is that there is very little, if any, racial difference between the many tribes of Darfur, "Arab" or "African". Both communities are black. The London Observer newspaper has reported, for example, that "[c]enturies of intermarriage has rendered the two groups physically indistinguishable".[78] The UN media service noted: "In Darfur, where the vast majority of people are Muslim and Arabic-speaking, the distinction between `Arab' and `African' is more cultural than racial." [79]This reality has been confirmed by prominent anti-government critics such as John Ryle and Alex de Waal. [80]Ryle has noted that Arabs and non-Arabs "are generally physically indistinguishable".[81] Alex de Waal has stated that "Characterising the Darfur war as `Arabs' versus `Africans' obscures the reality. Darfur's Arabs are black, indigenous, African Muslims—just like Darfur's non-Arabs." [82]The New York Times has exemplified contradictory reporting on this issue, with articles on one hand by their columnist Nicholas Kristof alleging, for example, that "black Africans have been driven from their homes by lighter-skinned Arabs in the Janjaweed"[83] while also publishing subsequent articles such as "In Sudan, No Clear Difference Between Arab and African".[84] Even "African" Darfurian anti-government figures such as Dr Eltigani Ateem Seisi contradict the dangerously lazy shorthand of the New York Times. Speaking at a conference in Brussels he stated with reference to "Arabs" and "Africans" in Darfur that "we all look alike" and that one "can't tell from the features if he is Arab or African". He added that he, an "African", had a lighter skin than many "Arabs".[85]

ALLEGATIONS THAT THERE IS A POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN DARFUR

There has obviously been a vast displacement of civilians within Darfur. A sensationalist media and human rights industry has claimed that the government has pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing in Darfur. [86]Meédecins Sans Frontie"res has noted that "there is no systematic target—targeting one ethnic group or another one". The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr Egeland, has also stated that the term "ethnic cleansing" did not fit events in Darfur: "I think we have more reports actually of a kind of scorched earth [policy]—and that nobody has taken over. . . . It's complex, because some have said that it doesn't fit the legal definition of ethnic cleansing. The same tribes are represented both among those who are cleansed and those who are cleansing." [87]Mr Egeland's views have been echoed by key human rights experts. Asma Jehangir, the UN rapporteur on extra-judicial summary and arbitrary executions, for example, has said: "I wouldn't categorise as ethnic cleansing at the moment because that is not the impression that I am getting. It could be an unintended purpose but the numbers are staggering, the situation is terrible." [88]Allegations of ethnic cleansing have also been clearly contradicted by Sudanese government actions. Far from wishing to see the displacement of "African" Darfurian communities, the government has self-evidently been very eager to see these communities returned to their homes. In October 2004, Khartoum reported to the UN that 70,000 displaced people had been returned to their places of origin. [89]Jan Pronk, the UN Special Envoy to Sudan, was said to be concerned because neither the UN High Commissioner for Refugees nor the UN Organisation for Migration had been consulted prior to the repatriation. While there may well be some concern as to whether all the returns were voluntary Khartoum's eagerness to return refugees to their place of origin is manifest.

ALLEGATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLS THE "JANJAWEED"

Assertions that the government controls the "Janjaweed", the gunmen and bandits that have been associated with much of the violence in Darfur, and can turn their activities off and on like a tap have also distorted the reality of events. Part of the problem has been defining the term "Janjaweed". A sensationalist media has lumped together as "Janjaweed" regular army forces, popular defence forces, police units, tribal militias, armed robbers through to any armed "Arab" tribesman. It is a bit like claiming that the British government controls all loyalist organisations, paramilitaries, gunmen and criminal rackets in Northern Ireland. The simple fact is that virtually all of Darfur's 80 tribes will have members who are armed, some with members on both sides of the conflict. Some tribal militias will not disarm unless rival tribes also do so. A western diplomat in Khartoum has noted: "There are many gangs or groups that (the Sudanese government) doesn't control or who may be partly under their control or controlled by the local authorities. So this is not a clear-cut picture. That makes you understand how difficult (disarmament) is logistically." [90]According to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr Jan Egeland "There are many armed groups and many armed criminal gangs in Darfur." He referred to the Janjaweed as "a monster that nobody seems to be able to control".[91]

CLAIMS THAT ALL MILITIAS IN DARFUR CAN BE DISARMED IN 30 DAYS

Unrealistic expectations often based upon naive claims have not assisted with a resolution of the problem. One issue has been the problem of disarming the many armed groups and individuals in Darfur. In July 2004, for example, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution threatening action against Sudan if it did not disarm gunmen in Darfur within 30 days. [92]Charles Snyder, a former acting assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and the State Department's senior representative on Sudan, has stated, however, that there are no "30-day, 90-day quick fixes" to the problem. He also admitted: "This is going to take, in my view, 18 months to two years to conclude the first phase" of making the region safe for people to return to their homes. [93]Clearly, every effort must be made to both remove weapons and the motivation or need to carry weapons from the Darfur situation. Increasingly shrill demands for an immediate disarmament of armed forces within Darfur in the face of the reality outlined by Mr Snyder serve no purpose other than enflaming an already fraught situation.

CLAIMS ABOUT HUMANITARIAN AID ACCESS

There has been considerable sensationalism with regard to humanitarian aid access to Darfur. There have been attempts to claim that the Government has been systematically denying humanitarian access to Darfur. It is worth examining the aid issue in some depth. Humanitarian access to war-affected communities in Darfur is essential in addressing the crisis. The international community must be aware of the extent to which emergency relief and food aid in such circumstances can and has been manipulated. In September 2003, the Government of Sudan and the SLA signed an agreement allowing "free and unimpeded" humanitarian access within Darfur. [94]

The international community must be aware of the extent to which humanitarian issues can be manipulated for political effect. [95]For rebels a humanitarian crisis is a no-lose situation. A humanitarian crisis always reflects badly on the government in the country affected. And a humanitarian crisis is something which can be created and deepened. One of the goals of most insurgencies is to internationalise the conflict to which they are a party. One of the easiest means of doing so is to provoke a humanitarian crisis. This is precisely what the Darfur rebels succeeded in doing. Merely starting the war in Darfur initiated a humanitarian crisis in western Sudan. The escalating of the conflict and the government's response to it led to a deepening crisis and considerable displacement of populations—a feature of most wars. The rebels, however, have deliberately sought to heighten the humanitarian crisis they created by starting the war by additionally seeking to escalate food insecurity knowing full well that this would be the focus of immediate international attention. The UN news service, for example, has reported rebel attempts to disrupt food security in the affected areas: "SLA rebels regularly attacked and looted villages taking food and sometimes killing people...The attacks present a real threat to people's food security and livelihoods, by preventing them from planting and accessing markets to buy food." [96]

Quite simply put, insecurity means severely curtailed humanitarian aid access. The UN humanitarian relief spokesman has quite simply stated: "You can't give aid when there are bullets flying." [97]In January 2004, for example, UN media sources reported that "about 85 percent of the 900,000 war-affected people in Darfur...are inaccessible to humanitarian aid, according to the UN, mainly because of insecurity." [98]In December 2003, the UN quoted the Government as saying "The problem is in areas controlled by the SLM. Our experience has made us hesitant to send relief to areas under the SLM because of kidnapping and attacks on trucks." [99]On 11 February 2004 the Equality and Justice Movement declared its intention to close down every road within Darfur aware of the devastating consequences this would have on the ability of the Government and aid agencies (national and international) to provide emergency assistance to those communities suffering in Darfur.

The rebels also further escalated humanitarian access difficulties by deliberately targeting aid workers. They murdered nine World Food Programme truck drivers, and wounded 14 others, in an attack on a relief convoy in October 2003. [100]All this followed a set pattern by rebels in other parts of Sudan, tactics which succeeded in creating a humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan. The veteran American journalist, Robert Kaplan noted, for example: "On June 1, 1986, twelve Kenyan truck drivers bringing food into the south from the Ugandan border town of Nimule were ambushed...The drivers were bound by ropes to their steering wheels, and then grenades were lobbed at the trucks. This put a virtual halt to the World Food Program's overland relief operation. Only 600 of the 90,000 tons had been delivered." [101]

The then extent of the insecurity for humanitarian workers led to the United States government asking the Sudanese government for help with security and access. [102]One month later, rebel gunmen killed two other relief workers and abducted three others. [103]Rebels have also kidnapped other relief workers. In a further example of interference with humanitarian work, JEM gunmen admitted abducting five aid workers working for the Swiss humanitarian group Medair. [104]Rebel harassment of aid workers and humanitarian relief has continued throughout the crisis. The Spanish branch of Meédecins Sans Frontie"res (Doctors Without Borders, MSF) and the Irish GOAL aid agency were forced to leave the Jebel Marra area of Darfur after "repeated" acts of aggression targeting humanitarian personnel and the relief supplies intended for people in need. Rebels had also attacked aid vehicles. [105]

The provision of humanitarian relief such as food aid and medical supplies have historically been a bonus to rebel movements. Firstly, international access impinges upon the national sovereignty of the country concerned. Secondly, international agencies but food and emergency supplies also help to sustain communities within rebel-controlled areas and can often be diverted by rebel forces. It was widely acknowledged that vast amounts of food aid were diverted during the war in southern Sudan. In July 1998, for example, the Roman Catholic Bishop of the starvation-affected diocese of Rumbek, Monsignor Caesar Mazzolari, stated that the SPLA were stealing 65% of the food aid going into rebel-held areas of southern Sudan. Agence France Presse also reported that: "Much of the relief food going to more than a million famine victims in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan is ending up in the hands of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), relief workers said".[106]

The Government of Sudan would appear to have acted responsibly with regard to humanitarian access to Darfur. The facts speak for themselves. In less than twelve months the Sudanese government has agreed and facilitated an increase in aid workers present in Darfur, from two foreigners and a few dozen nationals in September 2003 to just under six thousand aid workers—over seven hundred of them expatriates—by August 2004. [107]The signing of the April 2004 ceasefire made it much safer and thus much easier for aid agencies to operate in Darfur. On 6 July 2004 the government issued fifteen decrees which addressed, amongst other things, the easing of aid and relief access to Darfur. In total, there are now 155 locations assisting with internally displaced people in the three Darfur states, and the World Food Programme is present in 136 of these centres. [108]There are now dozens of international and national non-governmental organisations working in Darfur. [109]Speaking in June 2004, the outgoing UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Sudan, Mr Kevin Kennedy, confirmed that visas were generally being granted within 48 hours—as promised by the Government of Sudan—and that "people are experiencing very few visa difficulties".[110] That there have been propagandistic attempts to claim that the government was deliberately blocking access to Darfur by aid workers is clear. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr Jan Egeland, speaking in July 2004, commented on some of these claims, noting: "It is strange to see that there is still the notion in the world that nothing is happening and we're completely blocked from accessing Darfur. We are reaching some 800,000 people at the moment with some sort of assistance and food." [111]By September 2004, the World Food Programme was feeding some 940,000 conflict-affected people in Darfur. [112]The presence of several thousand aid workers in Darfur provides clear evidence of the Khartoum government's commitment to the provision of food and medical relief to Darfur's war-affected communities.

CONCLUSION

The Darfur crisis is a very complex one. The international community has already played a vital role in both striving to reach a political solution to the conflict as well as addressing the immense humanitarian crisis the conflict has brought with it. The ceasefire must be extended, enforced and monitored. The mission of the African Union monitors must be supported and assisted. The ceasefire monitoring and verification teams which have so effectively policed the ceasefire in southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains must be introduced to Darfur. The Darfur peace talks must be encouraged and all parties to the conflict must be held to account by the international community. In addition to focusing on all parties to the conflict international pressure must also be brought to bear upon external forces—such as Eritrea—that have been fuelling the fighting. The humanitarian needs of those who have been displaced must be met until those affected are able to return to their homes. Khartoum must address the criminality and armed banditry that has undermined law and order in Darfur.

It is essential to evaluate, and where necessary discount, at least some of the sensationalism that has clouded the Darfur issue. The issue is far too important to leave to extremists, propagandists, flawed analysis and those who wish to see continued conflict in Sudan. The Sudanese government has spent several years successfully normalising its relations with the international community and is on the verge of signing a landmark peace agreement with southern rebels. The Naivasha peace process addressing Sudan's decades long civil war in southern Sudan is the end result of a process of reform, liberalisation and engagement in Sudan that can be traced back to the 1999 ouster of the Islamist leader Dr Turabi. In April and in mid-May 2000, Khartoum indicated its readiness to enter into "an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire" and to restart negotiations for the achievement of a lasting peace. Throughout 2001, the Sudanese government repeatedly called for a peaceful resolution of the southern conflict. It called upon the SPLA to do the same. [113]With the Bush Administration's support, the ensuing peace process resulted in the 2002 Machakos protocols and 2004 Naivasha agreement which have brought southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains to the brink of peace. This process must be seen through to its conclusion.

Similarly, it is essential that Sudan remains committed to the course of normalisation of its relations with the international community that had preceded the Darfur crisis. In 1999, for example, the European Union entered into a political dialogue with Sudan, noting improvements within the Sudanese situation. [114]There had also been a similar regional shift in attitudes towards Sudan and the Sudanese conflict. [115]In 2001, for example, Sudan held the presidency of both the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development as well as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, a body which brings together eleven north African states. [116]The then newly elected Bush administration and Sudan entered into a new relationship, with extensive Sudanese support in counter-terrorism both before and after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks within the United States. It is also clear that from 1999 onwards the political situation within Sudan has changed significantly. The former Prime Minister, Umma party leader and key opposition figure, Sadiq al-Mahdi, declared in 1999, for example, that: "There are now circumstances and developments which could favour an agreement on a comprehensive political solution".[117]

Criticism of the Sudanese government is legitimate and necessary but it must be measured and properly focused. Knee-jerk responses by the international community to sensationalist and often questionable claims about Darfur serve only to enflame an already tense situation, endanger the Naivasha peace process and slow Sudan's re-engagement with the West.

November 2004