UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 67-iii

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

 

 

Darfur, Sudan: Crisis, Response and Lessons

 

 

TUESDAY 21 DECEMBER 2004

RT HON HILARY BENN, MP, DR ALASTAIR McPHAIL and MR BRIAN THOMSON

Evidence heard in Public Questions 100 - 152

 

 

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the International Development Committee

on Tuesday 21 December 2004

Members present

Tony Baldry, in the Chair

John Barrett

Mr John Bercow

Ann Clwyd

Mr Quentin Davies

Tony Worthington

________________

 

Examination of Witnesses

 

Witnesses: Rt Hon Hilary Benn, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for International Development, Dr Alastair McPhail, UK Special Representative for Sudan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Mr Brian Thomson, former Head of FCO/DFID Sudan Unit, examined.

Q100 Chairman: Thank you very much for giving up time on what is the last day of sitting of the House before the Christmas adjournment, but I think this is for all of us an important and increasingly distressing topic. Firstly, we thought, if it is all right with you, we would include the speech you made last week to the Humanitarian Policy Group of the ODI[1] in the evidence of the Committee's inquiry in its entirety, as it is actually rather relevant.

Hilary Benn: That is absolutely fine by me. Thank you.

Q101 Chairman: I do not think, this afternoon, anyone in this room doubts the sincerity on your part or, indeed, on the part of the UK Government for trying to see what they can do in Darfur. I think the issue is, pretty much, what can be done. We have seen today Save The Children, rather unprecedentedly, in the sense that I do not think it has been done before, withdrawing their team, and the immediate issue seems to be how does one make the ceasefire stick? Who, actually, is monitoring this ceasefire so that one does not get rogue groups just going and...as seems to have happened in the terrible tragedy with Save the Children? Presumably, that is meant to be what the African Union (AU) are doing. As I understand it, they have got something like 850 people in the country when it should be about 3,500. I understand there is a rather good Nigerian now running the AU team in the Sudan, but I just wonder, Secretary of State, when did you think the African Union were going to get up to strength and what can we do to further help the African Union? Unless one can enforce the ceasefire, then the whole thing is going to be totally chaotic.

Hilary Benn: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Chairman. Can I begin by just concurring with what you said at the beginning about all of us being concerned about what has been happening in Darfur. The truth is we are all wrestling with the issues which the Select Committee is wrestling with. That is the first thing. Secondly, to say about Save the Children that I met Mike Aaronson yesterday because he came to tell me about the decision and, frankly, given the two separate incidents in which they have lost four of their staff - as you will know, the first two because of a land mine and the second two were killed by someone from it now seems the SLA - I understand entirely why they have taken the decision that they have, because Save the Children's primary responsibility is the safety and security of its staff. I hope very much it may prove possible - and certainly Save the Children will do all that it can; obviously, its operations have been suspended since the murder of the two staff - to find others to pick up that work. I am not aware of any sign of other humanitarian agencies pulling out, but in the end each agency has to take a decision based on its assessment of circumstances on the ground. Now, you are absolutely right that the principal priority, at the moment, is to try and get the agreements - both the original ceasefire agreement of April of this year and the Humanitarian Security Protocol which was signed, I think I am right in saying, in November - honoured by the parties. In the last couple of months, what we have seen is that the degree of attacks that the SLA/SLM have been responsible for is increasing (that has come across very clearly from Jan Pronk's reports) and that is a change from where it was before, where the principal concern was about what the Janjaweed militia and the Government of Sudan was doing. I have, in fact, just come from a meeting with Said Djinnit, the Peace and Security Commissioner who, as you know, is in London at the moment. I asked him the question you have just asked me about when he thinks that the full 3,320 will be deployed. He said the plan was and, in his view, it remains to do that - I think he described it - as D+120. It was, from memory, 20 October when the decision was taken to go with AMIS[2] II and that will be, if my maths is right, around 20 February, and he told me that today or tomorrow a further 190-odd of the soldiers will be arriving. So they are still working very hard to stick to that deadline. The other thing I can tell you is that today it appears - and we are waiting until 4 o'clock when, I think, the parties are going to reconvene in Abuja (I hope this is helpful because this is hot off the press, so to speak) - that following a meeting with President Obasanjo this morning in Abuja the parties have agreed the following: one, reaffirming their commitment to peaceful negotiations under the auspices of the AU; two, the Government of Sudan reiterated its firm commitment (I say, in parentheses, it is made to others who have spoken over the last couple of days) to end the current offensive and to withdraw its forces to their previous positions, as agreed at the Joint Commission. The SLA and the JEM undertook to cease attacks against humanitarian and commercial (it says here "actors" but I think you know what I mean) and to refrain from attacks against government infrastructure, including police posts, and to withdraw their forces to their previous positions as agreed at the Joint Commission. Thirdly, the parties requested the AU to ensure rapidly (the point you have just raised, Chairman) the operationalisation of AMIS - in other words, getting them on the ground. "The parties call on contributing countries to ensure the speedy deployment of the remaining troops", and " ... in order to verify the parties' commitments (that is point two) the Joint Commission should convene as soon as possible to ensure more proactive monitoring of the situation on the ground. Finally, the parties undertook to return to Abuja in January at a date to be confirmed by the AU for a fourth round of negotiations." Now, that is what they appear to have agreed today in Abuja, but the key question is: are people going to stick by the commitment they have entered into? I apologise for the length of the answer but I thought it would be helpful to begin by bringing the Committee bang up-to-date with what is happening.

Q102 Chairman: In your speech on the international humanitarian system one of the things you said was that: "Mobilising staff and financial resources for Darfur has taken far longer than the urgency of the situation demanded. UN agencies need to be more flexible to move operations quickly from development to dealing with an emergency." If I heard you right, you are talking about full mobilisation of the AU peacekeeping by everybody. This does not seem to reflect the urgency of the situation because no-one else seems to be able to effectively police or monitor this ceasefire. February is still a fair few weeks out. How do we actually impress upon everyone that speed is of the essence?

Hilary Benn: To be fair, I think the AU is very conscious of that point. One has to recognise that this is the first big operation that the AU has undertaken. It is a question both of getting contributing nations to come up with either the troops or the monitors or the police personnel, and Said Djinnit is proceeding with all three of those. It is about the practical support that can be provided. One of the things that the UK has done, if I may say so, is to have been very swift in providing support at the time it is needed in the way in which the AU has asked for it, so we were the first country in the world to give financial support to the deployment of, as it turns out, AMIS I. I discussed with Said Djinnit this afternoon the use to which they are now going to be able to put the 143 vehicles that we have provided out of the additional funding that we have put in because that was the practical support that they required. I think, in all honesty, they are doing their best, recognising that there have been logistical problems - because when people arrive they need to have somewhere to stay, they need to get food and rations and that is not just in the places where they first arrive but they have wanted, as you know, to increase the number of places from which they can operate. They do now have vehicles in large numbers, they now have access to more helicopters, and I can say that the latest reporting is, notwithstanding the incident in which an AU helicopter was fired at in the last couple of days, it is not the case that they have ceased operations. Obviously, they had to make inquiries into what happened in that particular circumstance, but the latest reporting I have seen just before coming to the Committee this afternoon is that this has not stopped their operations. I think they are trying their best to get people on the ground as quickly as possible, and I think we should unreservedly welcome the fact that the AU has taken this initiative because I think it makes some things possible that might have been more difficult if other people were trying to do it, in what is a very complex and a very difficult situation, as I think the Committee recognises.

Q103 Ann Clwyd: I find it hard to put into words the urgency that people feel about the lack of success in getting the AU more quickly on the ground and in sufficient number, the slow reaction of the international community and the suspicion that the Security Council has the same old self-interest that has actually dominated decision-making there. While everybody cries "Never again" after Rwanda, the truth is it is happening again, and the international community does not seem to have learnt any lessons at all. How urgently do you feel your own response has been as a department that it will take action in the area and keep off our television screens the kind of terrible pictures we have been seeing for so long of the suffering of people?

Hilary Benn: You raise a number of, obviously, connected but different points in that question. Can I deal, firstly, with our own response because, as you will see from the memorandum that we submitted[3], the UK first began to give humanitarian assistance to Darfur in October 2003, so we are talking a year and two months ago. I visited Khartoum in December, it was the first trip that I made to Africa having become Secretary of State, and, frankly, looking back on it, I wish I had gone two months earlier, but that is down to me - I take responsibility for that. Having gone, it was very clear to me from meetings I had and the discussions that something bad was going on. It was very clear, of course, that the Government of Sudan at that time, as I have said, was in denial about what was happening and, as we all know, was making it very, very difficult for people to see what was happening on the ground. That is part of the reason why the whole of the international community was slow to do something about this. There are slightly different circumstances, in some respects from Rwanda because there has been a ceasefire agreement. The question is, how do you get the parties to honour the ceasefire agreement? I think we have to recognise that. Undoubtedly, what the international community - the UK and others - did as far as the humanitarian operation was concerned was after a slow start, and the speech I made at ODI was principally motivated by my experience in Darfur in June when I went, not to Khartoum but to Nyala and El Fasher to visit three of the camps, because it was clear to me, even at that stage, with all that had happened, that the system was not working as effectively as it might to get the help that was needed at the right time and in the right places. We have seen real progress on that front. I think, from the evidence I have seen that you have received from others, the international community has made efforts to get access, which was the point I first raised when I was there in December 2003, and to get more humanitarian assistance on the ground, and the fact that we are now not looking at the humanitarian catastrophe that many people feared earlier this year is because, in the end, the system did respond. You might want to explore in more detail exactly what some of the obstacles and difficulties were that we experienced. The other thing that comes across very clearly, of course, is that this is a crisis that is political in origin and how do you find a political solution in the complex environment both of Darfur with all of the things that have been going on and against the background of the North-South peace talks? I just say, on that point - and you might want to come on to it - that I think it has been absolutely right and proper to hang on to that North-South peace process - absolutely right and proper - because if that can be fully concluded by the end of the year, as the parties have undertaken to do, then that will, for part of Sudan, be an enormous step forward. One just has to think about the huge suffering that there has been. We have to learn the lessons, but I wish we had been quicker - I wish I had been quicker - and we need to ensure that now we do the right things. The final point I want to make, since you have raised the UN Security Council, is that it is the case that not all people who sit on the Security Council share the same view as the Government of the UK and the Government of the United States of America. We might as well be honest about that. Getting a unanimous Security Council view or getting people not to vote against - or, in some cases, potentially to veto - proposals is one of the things that, frankly, we have to deal with.

Q104 Ann Clwyd: Do you think that the Government of Sudan at this moment is committed to the safe return of the refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs)?

Hilary Benn: Well, there is what the Government of Sudan says but, in the end, like all of us, we should be judged by what we do. In view of the offensive that has taken place over the last few days, it is very hard to reconcile that offensive, which is contrary to the commitments the Government of Sudan has entered into, with a commitment to do the things that will create relative stability, which will allow the political process to happen, which we hope would lead to a deal that, in my view, is the only way people are going to be able to return to their homes, because they are not going to do that unless they think it is safe to do so. You or I in the circumstances would say "Let's see whether the deal is done and we see peace and security and there aren't any more attacks and then we will think about going home." That is what the people that I spoke to in the camps I visited in June said very clearly to me. It is about people's actions that everybody should be judged, including the Government of Sudan.

Q105 Ann Clwyd: Do you think that the other players in the response to Darfur share with you the goal of what actually means reversing ethnic cleansing? Is it a common goal or a shared goal?

Hilary Benn: As far as the international community is concerned, there is no doubt that the world has belatedly given significant attention to what has been going on in Darfur. The resolutions that the Security Council has agreed have been passed. I think the Government of Sudan now gets, and has had for sometime, a very clear message from the international community about the expectations that we have. In my experience it has been consistent pressure which has resulted in movement. On the humanitarian front, and you had evidence on this, there is no doubt that a lot of people working are very hard to, frankly, take up individual cases. I will never forget being told by Médecins Sans Frontières when I was there in June that they still had, as I remember, 30 metric tonnes of medicines and medical supplies still stuck in a container in Port Sudan, I think, for the past month. I raised that when I was there, and the question of travel visas and permits, and so on. If I may pay tribute to our embassy in Khartoum and the Ambassador William Patey, he has been absolutely relentless in pursuit of this - and it has had an effect. There is no question it has had an effect. So in that sense, I think, the international community has been united in trying to improve the conditions for humanitarian access. There are, as we know from discussions on the Security Council, some differences of view about what should be done, if you like, on the political track, but in the end people have to face up to the question: "Are we doing the right things to maximise the chances that people will honour the commitments that they have entered into, which is the only way of enabling peace and security to return to the people who have suffered so grievously?"

Q106 Mr Bercow: Secretary of State, to what extent is UK Government policy towards Darfur and the Sudan driven by (a) fear of Sudan becoming a failed state and (b) by preoccupation - justified or otherwise (I make the point neutrally) - with the pursuit of UK commercial interests?

Hilary Benn: On the latter point I have not seen any evidence whatsoever that that figures at all (I am slightly taken aback by the question) - none whatsoever, in my experience, at all. Are we concerned about what may happen to Sudan if things go wrong? Of course we are, and it is precisely for that reason that the UK has been tenacious. It is also an opportunity for me to pay tribute to the officials and others who have worked consistently hard on this over a long period of time to help shepherd, nurse and encourage the Naivasha process forward, because it is of fundamental importance to the future of that country.

Q107 Mr Bercow: I am grateful for that. I can understand other people's commercial interests might have driven their actions but I was rather hopefully expecting that I would get the robust denial that I have just received. If we are apprehensive, as you are and the Government as a whole is, about the dangers in humanitarian terms and the wider international community of Sudan becoming a failed state, I think a logical corollary of that must be that the longer the crisis politically is unresolved the greater the chance of that descent into failed state status.

Hilary Benn: One of the great complexities of the current situation is you have these two things happening in parallel. The Naivasha process is the result of politicians and those who were fighting, in the end, deciding that they should do something else to bring to an end what we know has been Africa's longest-running civil war. So the fact that a deal was done and now the parties, as we speak, are trying to negotiate the completion of that, is a very positive sign in the context of what has happened in the Sudan over a long period of time. So that is why it is right and proper to do everything to continue to support that process to its successful conclusion. At the very same time as that has been happening, politicians and former combatants getting round a table to negotiate their way out of a very bitter conflict that has led to a huge loss of life, one has in Darfur a civil war breaking out. One of the arguments that we have made - and I think there is enormous force in it - and one of the other reasons we are so keen, not just for the North-South process, that Naivasha should complete is because within there are negotiating principles that can be used if the politicians and currently the combatants to the conflict in Darfur so wish to be used to find a resolution to the very complex in origin and political, economic and social problems that there are in Darfur. So you have got both of these things happening, and what we and others have been trying to do is to nurture one while trying to deal with the other. That is one of the reasons that it is a complex and difficult issue to deal with.

Q108 Mr Bercow: We all hope that firm progress will be made in Darfur, but I think we are duty bound to consider the scenario in which it is not. I would just like, Secretary of State, to press you on this particular point. Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that there is goodwill on one side and not on the other or that there is insufficient goodwill and determination to broker a deal in Darfur as a whole for that deal to be achieved. What then? Your Government colleague in the Foreign Office, Chris Mullin, interviewed for the recent Panorama programme on Darfur said, with his characteristic directness: "The odds are that if any western force did intervene it would become bogged down and that some new cause for all the Jihadists in the world would emerge and we would find ourselves very quickly being shot at by all sides, plus we would probably destabilise the whole of Sudan, which is the size of Western Europe, and the last thing we want is a failed state the size of Western Europe on our hands in Africa." Did that amount, and was it intended to amount, to a declaration that under no circumstances would the Foreign Office (and, therefore, the British Government) be prepared to consider a western military deployment in Darfur?

Hilary Benn: We have said very clearly that we are not considering that currently, and I shall come on to the reasons why. It is a hypothetical question, which you fairly put, Mr Bercow, and what may happen in the future, depending on how things develop, in all honesty, I cannot say. However, the reason that I said that what the African Union was doing was so important is because it seems to me that the African Union, to date, has been able to achieve things that in a sense have not run the risk that you posit in that hypothetical question. In a sense, I put the same question to Said Djinnit in the conversation that I had this afternoon - what if? - because this reflects the thoughts that we are all having. The options, in those circumstances, if things were to continue to deteriorate, are, firstly, the question: would the AU wish to look again at the mandate of its force? Question (and these are all genuine questions): would the AU wish to consider, at some point, increasing further the size of its force - just as it has done from the 500 it did have to the getting on for 1,000, in view of today's or tomorrow's deployment, to the 3,300 they hope to have there by the end of February? Question: what would the UN Security Council then choose to do if the situation were further to deteriorate? I think that is the order in which we should take it. That is why we have been so keen to give support to the AU who are there on the ground and are arriving in larger numbers, because that is what we have got available currently to try and ensure that the parties honour the commitment they have entered into. I cannot say what the future is going to hold or how we, or other countries, or the UN Security Council are going to react; it depends on the circumstances. However, I am clear about what we now need to do and I am clear about one other thing: if the situation continues to deteriorate then the UN Security Council will have to look at this again and will then have to decide what action it is going to take, because it seems to me the parties have been given quite a long time to demonstrate that they are going to honour their commitments, and if we are going to maintain the credibility of what the UN Security Council has been doing then we have to demonstrate that if the parties fail to do that there are some consequences. That is my view.

Q109 Mr Bercow: If the increased AU deployment either does not materialise or is not effective, is an international deployment of police an alternative option under consideration?

Hilary Benn: As you will know, part of the increased AU deployment - part of AMIS II - is a policing element. As we speak, the AU is in the process of pulling together the people that they need; the target remains 800 or so - 800 police people who would come in. If I may say, there is one other option, potentially. If the North-South process is concluded, then the UN, of course, will be turning its attention to deployment of peacekeepers in the south, and one other potential option in due course (and it depends in part on what view the AU will take of this) is whether, as some people have suggested, the AU force might be blue-hatted. We are just exploring what the potential options are. As part of that, if that were to occur, you could look at the policing needs. The other thing that we are looking at ourselves at the moment is the extent to which we might be able to do more for the policing front, because the immediate priority is, indeed, security for those around the camps; that is what has been the subject of a lot of discussion over the last few months, and, frankly, we should be prepared to look at the practical steps we can take to try and deal with the problem. One other thing, while I am up-dating the Committee: the UN Security Council will be discussing Darfur today. I hope that is helpful.

Q110 Tony Worthington: I want to return to what Ann Clwyd said earlier where, post-Rwanda, we said "Never again". What this has demonstrated is that it can happen again and again and again. That is what we have somehow got to put right, because this is not a surprise thing with the Sudanese Government; they are recidivists. This happened before in the Nuba Mountains and it has happened North-South; we know the nature of that government, and expecting them, after 15 years, or however long the Bashir Government has been in, to have reformed and to keep their word is a little optimistic, is it not?

Hilary Benn: I hope no one will be accused of naivety in this. What we have to do is to take what we think are the right steps in the circumstances. In answer to the earlier question, I said we have to judge people, in the end, by what they do rather than just by what they say they intend to do. I do believe that what the international community has done by way of pressure has had an impact; the fact is that the humanitarian situation has moved from where it was, where nobody had any access and it was very hard to see what was going on, and it was while all that was happening that the humanitarian crisis emerged. The fact is that that has changed, that now people will say "There isn't a humanitarian catastrophe." There is a big challenge but the world has got round to gearing up to make sure that we could deliver food and medical supplies to people in very difficult circumstances, and part of the security problems that have arisen have been as the humanitarian operation has spread its operations into parts of Darfur which it was not possible to get access before. That is part of the story. I think that is one of the lessons to be learned, and it is very important that we do learn the lessons. Secondly, frankly, the world is seeing what is going on; it is a sad reflection but if there are television pictures of what is going on then it does tend to have a very powerful motivating effect. Now, it should not be like that but it is. Therefore, when I went in June a modest contribution that arose out of that was the fact that Hilary Anderson of the BBC came with me and stayed and filed a lot of reports, which have had a very powerful effect. So that is the second lesson. I think the third lesson has been having the capacity to gear up when a situation like this arises so we can bring in help in sufficient quantity at the right time and in an efficient and effective way. There are basic problems, like recruiting enough people to come and work in those circumstances. I am just reflecting on the lessons that we do need to learn. Fourthly, making sure that the UN system, which is at the heart of this, is fit for purpose, and that is why I made the proposals that I did in the ODI speech, because it seemed to me, based on that experience, that it was not as effective as it could be in doing something about the problem that it was having to deal with.

Q111 Tony Worthington: I am excluding you from this because it does seem to me that you were very alert to what was going on, but you did say that no one knew what was going on. With respect, that government has been "going on", doing that, since it came in. There is no evidence that there is, as it were, a united foreign policy on that government; we are not at the stage yet, for example, of thinking about what sanctions could have been imposed upon the leading lights in that government over a considerable period of time. When Rwanda was on, from reading about Rwanda afterwards, one of the striking things was that a lot of people in the world were doing their best not to see what was going on in the Security Council; they were finding ways of doing nothing. What has changed?

Hilary Benn: Notwithstanding what I have said about the world having been slow to respond - and I think we all acknowledge that - I do not think you could describe what has happened, certainly over the last 12 months, as the world finding lots of reasons not to know what is going on or to do anything about it. I do not think that would be a fair characterisation - I am not suggesting that you are making that point - of what has gone on, both in terms of the humanitarian and, also, the considerable political effort that has gone in both to shepherding Naivasha on (and it would not be happening if the parties were not prepared to be negotiating and to reach agreements) and in relation to what the AU has done. It is very significant. Everybody is frustrated about the speed with which things happen or do not happen - everybody - but I think we just do have to recognise that this is a very significant moment in the history of the AU. They sense it and we should sense it. Why? Because this is Africa saying, "We have responsibility for dealing with conflict on our own continent and we intend to take the lead." That is why the UK has worked really, really hard to give political and practical support to the African Union as it has sought to do that. They, of course, have brokered the talks in Abuja which have led to some agreements not honoured, but agreement we hope is being reached as we speak, and I think that is different from Rwanda. So, in that sense, lessons have been learned. Has it been perfect? Are there other things that we can reflect upon about what has not gone right? No, it has not been perfect, and, yes, of course, we can reflect upon those lessons, and it is important that we do so, so we can be more effective in the future. I do not think it is, in that sense, a parallel with Rwanda because Rwanda the world did watch, frankly, and did nothing while it went on; I do not think you can say that the world has done nothing.

Q112 Tony Worthington: It has been very, very slow to get under way. For example, if you ask me what has Europe done, apart from ourselves, I am finding it difficult to think of anything.

Hilary Benn: The three largest donors - if you talk about the humanitarian effort - have been, first of all, the United States of America, the European Community (ECHO) and, thirdly, ourselves. At one point, we were bearing - I think I am right in saying - about 75 % of the responsibility.[4] The last figures that I have seen put those three at about just under two-thirds - 57 %. One of the things I have done since December last year is to say to my colleagues and others "Come on, come on, come on; you need to do something too"; it is a shared responsibility, but it has not stopped us doing what we thought was the right thing. Not to be immodest about it, I think the UK contribution, both in terms of political support, support for the AU and humanitarian effort - colleagues of mine from DFID who have gone out and used their expertise to provide practical support to OCHA[5] to help with the logistics - all of that which flows from the visit that I made in December, I think, has made a real contribution to what has happened. You are right, it has not been an even response from the international community, hence one of the recommendations in my ODI speech that we need to find a mechanism for ensuring that crises like this are properly funded. One practical proposal is to give OCHA some money it can call on straight away; the second is for ECHO to act as a sort balance funder - funder of last resort - so that when you add up all of the contributions that have been made by people, and you find that some emergencies are funded better than others, you can even it out. It seems to me those are two practical lessons that I have tried to learn in making these proposals.

Q113 John Barrett: One thing that has come through from every speaker is the feeling of frustration everybody has at the speed that things have or have not moved over the months and years. We are now waiting on the AU building up to February the number of monitors moving in, and you have mentioned that the Security Council is discussing today the situation. How can we make sure that the AU is not a "get out of jail card" and that everybody says, "It is up to the AU and we will sit back?" Or are the Security Council, or others, saying "Well, we will monitor and see how things go from now on and if action is not taken quickly enough we will have a plan B in place"? My concern is that come February we will be more concerned and more frustrated and we will be in exactly the same situation in the end.

Hilary Benn: I hope very much that is not the case. I really would not describe the AU as a "get out of jail card". One, for the reasons I have just indicated, I think this is a very important moment, the fact that they have taken the lead, and the fact they have been able to do what they have done, in very, very challenging and difficult circumstances. I think the best thing for the international community is, yes, to look and see what the AU is doing and encourage it but, frankly, to give practical support. That is the best thing. If we really want more people on the ground quicker the initial funding we gave is an example but the fact that we helped to pay to airlift some of the, as I recollect, Nigerian peacekeepers in the first round, that we put in money for ration packs and that we put 143 vehicles on the ground is my idea of really practical support to help the AU to do what precisely you are looking for. You are right, it does not absolve the UN Security Council from its responsibility, having passed three resolutions, to then follow up what it says to the Government of Sudan and to the JEM and the SLA because they are very much part of the problem. Frankly, in the last few months, they are an increasingly important part of the problem because they have been stepping up their level of attacks, including attacking humanitarian workers - the killing of the two Save the Children staff, which is a terrible crime - and interrupting convoys. The international community has to be clear that on the parties you have obligations, you have to fulfil them and we will get to a point where there are consequences if you do not do that. It seems to me essential for credibility.

Q114 John Barrett: Can I also touch on something that was mentioned when we had witnesses giving evidence a week or so ago? You mentioned yourself earlier about the Naivasha peace process. One of the concerns was that Darfur was, effectively, put on the back burner and people did not want to rock the boat over the Naivasha peace process and Darfur would have been dealt with afterwards. Is that a feeling of concern that you share? We now know what the priority is and the emphasis has changed, and with the benefit of hindsight do you think these two processes were correct to be dealt with sequentially or whether, knowing what we know now, we may have had a different emphasis?

Hilary Benn: Clearly, knowing what we know now, if we went back in time, I would certainly do some things differently - let us be honest. That is a luxury we have. I said what I said earlier about those who were supporting the Naivasha peace process being absolutely right to maintain their attention and focus on it, and I would not utter a word of criticism of that because two million people - two million people - have lost their lives in the last 20 years in the Sudanese North-South civil war. One just has to reflect upon that and say "Should we do everything we can to ensure that that peace process comes to a successful conclusion?" I think that is the first thing. Secondly, it was a process that was already under way before Darfur blew up. Thirdly, I do believe very strongly that successful conclusion of Naivasha can provide part of the answer to the conflict in Darfur. So that is right and proper. As I say, I would make absolutely no criticism of anybody; I think people have done it absolutely right in dealing with it in that way. Looking back on it, could we have been louder earlier about Darfur? Yes, we could - I could have been, actually, if I was being self-critical - and it is important that we do learn those lessons. My eyes were really opened when I went in December; things flowed from that in terms of the activity that we entered into and then, again, when I went in June. We have had six British ministerial visits, the Prime Minister has been, and I think that has been a lot of effort and attention. The final point I would make, because it does go to the heart of this, is that you are trying to balance a number of things here, because you need to continue to motivate the parties to the Naivasha process to do the deal to bring to an end the civil war in which two million people have lost their lives while, at the same time, saying to some of the same parties "Come on, Darfur, this will not do." I want to be honest with the Committee, it is quite a difficult process and one is having to make judgments and having to balance different considerations. That is the best answer I can give to what is a very fair question.

Q115 Ann Clwyd: You mentioned the Prime Minister's visit to Khartoum in October and presenting the Government of Sudan with a five-point plan for increasing aid from the UK. I wonder if we could go through the points. Perhaps you could give a tick or a cross as I put them to you. Number one was active co-operation with an expanded AU mission. Has that happened?

Hilary Benn: I suppose, in one sense yes, in enabling the mission to deploy, but in terms of honouring the ceasefire in the light of, particularly, the events of the last few days, no, we have not yet seen that, so I suppose that is a mixed answer in relation to that.

Q116 Ann Clwyd: Secondly, the identification of the location of Government of Sudan forces and militias in Darfur.

Hilary Benn: I think the answer is yes, in terms of identifying the government-backed forces, the regular forces, but not in relation to the militia, as I understand it. I am sorry, I am receiving instructions from Dr McPhail on my right here. Obviously, that has had an impact on the ability of the AU to monitor them. Clearly where it has got the information it is able to monitor, and where it has not it cannot.

Q117 Ann Clwyd: The third point is: agree to confine Government of Sudan forces to barracks and the use of wholly civilian police for internal security.

Hilary Benn: Following this and following earlier commitments given to, for example, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the Government of Sudan has deployed additional police to Darfur, as I think we know. Confining forces to barracks, no, in relation to the recent incidents, and ditto for the rebels.

Q118 Ann Clwyd: The fourth: commitment to conclude the comprehensive peace agreement by the end of 2004.

Hilary Benn: Yes, they are negotiating as we speak, and there has been a very clear commitment on that front.

Q119 Ann Clwyd: The fifth is the immediate implementation of the Abuja humanitarian protocol.

Hilary Benn: On the security protocol, which is not mentioned here, obviously there have been difficulties. I might ask Brian Thomson here. I was very rude at the beginning; I did not introduce Brian Thomson, who until very recently was Head of the Sudan Unit, and Alastair McPhail, who is our Special Envoy. In terms of the humanitarian situation, overall, and the Government of Sudan's commitments?

Mr Thomson: In terms of facilitating access, a key issue is security, which we have been talking about. In formal terms they have loosened up their restrictions on humanitarian access but the security situation has deteriorated recently and that has been the main constraint.

Hilary Benn: So I suppose mixed would be the answer.

Q120 Ann Clwyd: What is the nature of the aid carrot offered to the Government of Sudan?

Hilary Benn: We have been very clear about that: only if there is a comprehensive peace agreement and if there is progress in dealing with the problems in Darfur. I have certainly made that point very, very clear in the conversations I have had with the Government of Sudan. One of the motivating factors, and it is a good motivating factor, behind the Naivasha process is this is a country in desperate need of development. In the south of the country, I think I am right in saying, 98 % of children do not complete their education. The development need is huge, and part of the reason is they know it is going to be very hard to progress that if they do not reach a political deal, and that is a good motivating reason behind trying to negotiate a peace deal. What I have made very clear is if anybody thinks in negotiating Naivasha that Darfur carrying on as it has is going to unlock long-term development assistance (which is what people want) no, it is not. So both of those issues have got to be dealt with. In return for peace and stability and a new future for Sudan, of course, the international community is going to be willing to come in and give support to enable development which is desperately needed to take place. However, it is on those two principal conditions.

Q121 Ann Clwyd: Can you tell us what proportion of the Government of Sudan's spending is on defence compared with other items?

Hilary Benn: Off the top of my head I cannot. I do not know whether, Alastair, you can help?

Dr McPhail: It is very difficult to say. Estimates range from 40 % to 80 %. I think most of us take it as read that it is probably more than half.

Q122 Ann Clwyd: Will the aid be made conditional on reducing the percentage spent on military hardware?

Hilary Benn: I discussed two issues when I met, from memory, the state minister of finance in Khartoum a year ago. One was about transparency of the budget. Dr McPhail has just made the point that nobody is entirely sure, and, clearly, transparency of that budget spending is going to be very important. Clearly, one of the benefits of a comprehensive peace agreement that means there is an end to the conflict is that the Government can spend less on defence. In those circumstances, one would certainly expect to see that there would be a reduction in the share of expenditure that was going on defence. The straight answer is we will come to that when we get to the point, but what I am interested in, if we get to the point of providing long-term development assistance, is it will then support prioritisation by the new Government of Sudan, which is what we have been talking about, when Naivasha becomes a comprehensive agreement, which can increase expenditure on health and education, reduction of poverty, which is what everybody wants for that country - above all the people.

Q123 Tony Worthington: I want to look at the European Union response here. I think we agree that it was unsatisfactory, but to link with that and your speech at the ODI last week, where you were saying that ECHO was one of the more effective bits of the European Union development system, as I understand it you have been saying that to overcome politics and to energise various states in order to get resources going into somewhere like Sudan you would be providing ECHO with something like a float, I suppose, to say, "We are going to give you a budget and you, as commissioner (whoever the commissioner is) will do what you think appropriate for these crises." Is that what you think?

Hilary Benn: What I proposed in the speech was that, in effect, a float be given to OCHA not to ECHO. Can I just say, on the European Community, I think it is very important we have a clear distinction between the response of the European Community and ECHO to this crisis, which I think has been ----

Q124 Tony Worthington: I am sorry, but in the speech I have got it is ECHO, the world's second largest donor.

Hilary Benn: I beg your pardon, there are two separate points. The fourth proposal in my speech was a substantial humanitarian fund under the control of Jan Egeland (that is the one above), which would allow OCHA to draw on funding to get on with dealing with crises first of all. The second is that ECHO's role should be, as I described it, a stronger role as financier of last resort. Those were the two proposals. Can I just finish the point about the EC? The response of the EC has been very good, and one should distinguish between what individual Member States have chosen to do bilaterally and the fact that the EC has provided €57 million through ECHO. The peace support facility (I am sorry, this was the other point) that Poul Nielson originally thought of, and enormous credit to him for doing so, has provided very substantial support to the AU operation. So I think it is important, for the record, to praise the EC for what it has done; not all the Member States have put in as much cash bilaterally as I would have liked.

Q125 Tony Worthington: This expression about "financier of last resort": is it not a "financier of first resort" we want, in the sense that when nations are too slow to respond you realise there is a crisis, whereas what we need is somebody with a large pool of money which bridges that gap, because money spent now may prevent problems?

Hilary Benn: What I was getting at here was, in a sense (and, maybe, "financier of last resort" was an infelicitous phrase) trying to address the issue that you have identified, Mr Worthington. The problem is not the humanitarian crisis that gets a lot of funding, and I gave an example in the speech of the contrast between the Mozambique response and the response to Chechnya where there were vast disparities. In a sense, the ones that are well-funded and can get on shows exactly why we need more funding for the forgotten crises, the awful crisis, and is why I am proposing that ECHO should take on that particular responsibility. I did not mean, by "last resort" (and that is why, perhaps, I could have picked a better phrase), "wait until we see that nobody has given anything, wait a bit more and then say 'okay, here's the cash'"; you act as a balancer of international contributions so that we get more evenly funded responses to humanitarian crises. This is not just an issue in humanitarian operations, it is also a much bigger issue of development. One of the things that we need to address in the system is imbalance of development assistance, because at the moment there is no mechanism globally which says, "We add up all of the decisions taken bilaterally with the multilaterals and country X gets X dollars per head in development assistance and another country gets Y dollars", and they can be very disparate. I think that is an issue we will need to address over time. In relation to the OCHA proposal, I suggested a fund of one $1 billion per year, to which the UK would be prepared to contribute £100 million, and that would also be available to allow OCHA to respond quickly to whatever it regarded as being an important crisis that currently was not receiving sufficient funding from the bilaterals that have been made. I hope that is clear.

Q126 John Barrett: Secretary of State, you may be aware that between March and June 2004 the UN's Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan left and there was a gap then. Are you content that there is enough leadership and enough effort taken to make sure that gaps in leadership do not arise again and keep the pressure on so that things do move forward?

Hilary Benn: It was very unfortunate that was the case because it did mean there was a gap, and I think if we are doing what we are doing, which is reflecting on the lessons, then one of the lessons is that it is very important that you do have continuity.

Q127 John Barrett: Is there somebody at the UN now who hears the discussions today who you feel has got a grip on the situation at the UN and can say, really, "This is where the buck stops"? There is a sense of frustration and not just within the Committee and the Government but I think the general public now are saying, "Who has actually got a grip on the situation out there? Who is representing us at the EU, the UK Government and at the UN? Who is driving this?"

Hilary Benn: I think, to be fair, the UN tired to fill the gaps. Kevin Kennedy and Eric de Mul both came and did, in a sense, periods of cover. My first proposal in the speech, to give OCHA, in these circumstances, greater power is, in my view, the most important lesson, and I proposed the Secretary General should designate in those circumstances. What was most striking to me at my meeting in June with the UN agencies was that there were bits of things that needed to be done that did not clearly fall within the mandate of the existing institutions, and the system did not seem, even after those months had passed, to have found a way of ensuring that someone was going to take responsibility for that. So it was out of that experience that I came away and reflected and said: "Actually, if you have got a range of tasks that need to be undertaken the sensible thing to do is to have someone who is going to say, 'Right, this is what we need to do; you are going to do that, you are going to do that and you are going to do that.'" It is a sensible way to operate and then you can ensure that all of the things get covered, including shelter. The other thing I would say is that now, of course, there is a very strong team: Jan Pronk is doing a good job, but, yes, the lesson is do not have gaps like that because it makes it more difficult.

Q128 Ann Clwyd: I am not quite clear about why Dr Mukesh Kapila was required to leave at that time. Why was that leadership vacuum at that very important time allowed to happen?

Hilary Benn: I am not sure that I know.

Mr Thomson: I am not sure that I know either.

Hilary Benn: I will have to give you an answer.[6]

Q129 Mr Davies: On that point, Chairman, I think the United Nations, like any other institution is responsible to its constituent bodies. I would hope that each member of the Security Council knew why there had been such an obvious case of mismanagement: either he had done a bad job and he had to be removed, in which case we should know about it, or, if that is not the case, we should also know why he had to be removed. I hope, perhaps, we can hear, when the British Government finds out, what the explanation for that abrupt termination was. Can I also say, as my colleagues have already said, how much I appreciated your speech, Secretary of State? I have given up reading ministerial speeches; they are mostly full of nothing but the most predictable platitudes and you actually came up with some rather more striking and concrete suggestions. So it was certainly worth reading. As I understand it, your proposal for OCHA, if that is right, is really inspired by the success of ECHO, is it not; that you are suggesting setting up a kind of ECHO on an international level under the UN structure?

Hilary Benn: Thank you for what you said about the speech. I would not quite describe it like that. I think it was trying to address two things: one is to give OCHA greater clout in the process, because if OCHA has money to spend then it can have influence on the purposes on which that money is spent, and, secondly, to try and speed up the process. What happens at the moment is all the different agencies, the NGOs and the UN bodies, make their own assessments and sometimes they overlap or they do not ensure that all the gaps are filled, so it gives OCHA, in the form of the Coordinator, the means, having identified what the needs are, to then bring some resource to bear on doing something about it.

Q130 Mr Davies: Is that not what ECHO does - a rapid reaction capability which currently is lacking at the international level? That is the point. Can I come on to the African Union? It has been the position of the Government for a long time, and very sensibly so, that, where possible, African problems are solved by Africans. It makes complete sense. Is it not the case that ceasefire monitoring and peace‑keeping requires some technical capabilities which the African Union might not have? One thinks of strategic lift and the more technical problems. One thinks of tactical lift which probably means the availability of quite substantial Chinook‑type helicopters. One thinks of surveillance ‑ aerial surveillance, satellite surveillance. Those are capabilities which the African Union does not have. That is the reality. You cannot simply lend these things. You would have to put in your own troops and your own manpower to run these things if you were going to contribute. Is that not the case and is that not the problem with the concept of letting the African Union take responsibility hereinafter for ceasefire monitoring and peace- keeping in Africa?

Hilary Benn: It is undoubtedly the case that because this is the first big mission that the African Union has done, it is learning its way and trying build its own capacity to address the issues that you have rightly identified, Mr Davies. It is understandably keen because it is its first big operation to try and do it for itself. I just have to be honest about that. What the international community has been trying very hard to do is to offer practical support to help build that capacity so that it can be more effective in doing the job that it has taken on. Undoubtedly over time, as this peace and security capacity increases down the line with proposals for an African Stand‑by Force, the AU will need to build more of the capacity that you have just described to be able to do such operations in the future. Yes, it is the case that this is the first time and therefore it is taking them some time to get that capacity together to do it. We should praise them for what they are doing and give them support to help them address the issues that you have identified.

Q131 Mr Davies: Of course we should but let's be realistic, the African Union is not going to develop the capabilities that I have just described - the AWACS capabilities, satellite surveillance, even the large helicopters - nor would we want African countries in their present state of economic development to spend their precious resources on such things and nor would they have the technical bases to actually run the training programmes for spares and logistics. Let's just be realistic. Those things are not possible purely in an African Union context in the foreseeable future. If we had to contribute them, however, that means we have to contribute the trained personnel to run them at the same time so this is where I am saying it is very nice to assume that the African Union can do everything but in practice, as my colleague Mr Bercow has already suggested, we may from time to time need to deploy our own equipment and personnel because the technical challenge may be such that it is necessary as a part or as an adjunct to an African Union peace‑keeping or the ceasefire supervision role. Do you accept that logic?

Hilary Benn: I would not disagree with that argument and we have said consistently to the AU if you require support from us do ask. The second thing is I would just say in fairness to the AU that there are examples of the way in which they have gone about their work in Darfur which have diffused situations that they have found, and I think one should acknowledge the effort they are already putting in on the ground to try and ensure that the parties do hold to the ceasefire.

Q132 Mr Davies: I do pay tribute to that effort and we know to some extent quantitative improvements will help, just getting more numbers there, and they are doing that, as you have explained to us already. My point is that in addition certain qualitative enhancements of their capability may be beyond their immediate reach. If I can move to another aspect of the African Union's role, you yourself have said at the end of the day no ceasefire monitoring process makes any sense unless there are sanctions for non‑compliance and sanctions for non‑compliance means basically a Security Council resolution. We are thinking here possibly of the Government of Sudan but in other contexts there might be other people whom we need to focus on in this way. I think you used the phrase this afternoon ‑ I noted it down ‑ if the parties failed to observe their obligations there must be consequences, you said, and I think you were really using your own language to say the same thing. Is it not right that the best chance of getting a Security Council resolution would indeed be if the African Union formed that judgment and urged the permanent members and the other members of the Security Council to go along those lines? Am I right in thinking at the present time there is no indication that they have formed such a judgment?

Hilary Benn: If you mean, Mr Davies, have they requested that specifically in relation to sanctions of the UN Security Council, no, they have not. If I could just finish on the earlier question to say that one of the things we have done practically is to deploy military planners to help them set up AMIS, just as an example of the way we are trying to provide practical support on building that capacity. What the AU is now going to have to do in the light of what has happened, after what we hope is going to be today's agreement confirmed, from memory, just to get this right, the Joint Committee will need to meet and then there will be the Peace and Security Council, which is meeting in early January (and I discussed this with Said Djinnit today) and what the AU will then have to do is look at what the situation is in early January, have the parties honoured the commitment that we hope will be agreed today, and if they do not, then I think everybody recognises that the AU and ourselves and the UN Security Council are going to have to decide what do we do if the security situation worsens. In saying it would be helpful if the AU formed a judgment about what ought to be done, I would welcome that because I think they are playing, rightly, a very important role in trying to do something about this.

Q133 Mr Davies: Is it not the case that we are most unlikely to get a Security Council resolution unless it is clear that the African Union as a whole supports it?

Hilary Benn: That goes back, I suppose, to my earlier point that not all the countries represented on the Security Council have been as keen on pushing more strongly, if I may put it like that.

Q134 Mr Davies: Precisely. If there was African Union support some of those reservations might be ‑‑‑

Hilary Benn: --- The more there is international agreement about what needs to be done, clearly that would be helpful, yes.

Q135 Mr Davies: Let me be more specific then and put forward my judgment if you do not want to put forward yours, and that is you will not get a Security Council resolution unless there is visible African Union support, and it would be sensible for the Foreign Office to be working towards that end if in fact we do think that sanctions are going to be required as a weapon in our armoury before we finally solve this problem in Sudan. Can I just finally ask you a question clearly the answer to which cannot be exclusive guidance to us (we have to use our own judgment) but I think it would be very helpful to have your own views. As you know, the Committee is visiting Sudan next month. You might say a little belatedly. I personally think that we should be looking ourselves, as a Committee, to see how we can improve our rapid reaction capability to international crises. More of that in due time. We are going next month, God willing, and I shall be there as well. What is your view as to what we might usefully focus on, the questions we ought to have uppermost in our minds and generally how we can best help constructively towards the solution of this problem which we all desire?

Hilary Benn: I would normally be very reluctant to give advice to the Select Committee which knows its own mind only too well but since you have invited me I will do so. I am sure that you would want to be clear in your own mind about the continuing capacity of the humanitarian operation to ensure that the people who are in camps are getting what they need. Secondly, to send a very clear message to all of those whom you meet that the international community remains focused on what is happening, remains determined that progress should be made. Thirdly, to stress the importance of participating in the political process as a solution. I would have thought that you would want to look very carefully at the AU operation because it is the key, if the parties are willing to honour the commitments they have entered into, to ensuring that is the case. To ask some of the questions you have asked me this afternoon about the AU's capacity and how the world can help. I think part of the continuing flow of people going to Sudan is about continuing to send the message that the world is watching what is going on. All my experience has been that pressure, effort, support and encouragement applied on different people in different measure according to the circumstances is essential if we are going to keep this show on the road so that it is not going to deteriorate in the way that none of us wants to happen because the consequences, frankly, do not bear thinking about. I suppose that would be my shortlist of things and I wish you a very successful visit because it is a very important one.

Q136 Mr Bercow: I want to come in, Secretary of State, if I may, in amplification first of what Mr Davies has just said. I do not wish to plagiarise him nor to misrepresent him but I think what he is saying on the importance of sanctions and the need to up the pressure is that we do need to be prepared ‑ and I would certainly go along with this ‑ to name and shame those members of the Security Council who in relative obscurity are the block on any effective pressure. If they want to oppose action it ought to be very publicly known and open to condemnation. Can I just pursue this question of the AU mission? I feel sure that you would be the last person, Secretary of State, to suggest for one moment that the African Union should be allowed or encouraged or would wish to treat Darfur as a guinea pig for its fledgling operations. I am sure you would not suggest that it should and doubtless it would not want to do so, but it is incredibly important, is it not Secretary of State, when we are talking about the African Union mission in light of the fact there is still so much progress to be made, to focus on two things over and over and over again with monotonous regularity. One is numbers and the other is mandate. Nobody doubts your commitment but a lot of us feel that we have done well on the humanitarian aid front; we have not, frankly, as an international community done remotely well on the foreign policy front. Can I just ask you on numbers, how do the number of troops in Darfur today compare with the number of troops utilised in cases which are similar in terms of geographical extent, the level of insecurity, and the scale of humanitarian need?

Hilary Benn: It depends what comparisons you are making.

Q137 Mr Bercow: Can I offer one?

Hilary Benn: Yes of course.

Q138 Mr Bercow: Just as a prompter because it does seem to me important. Take Bosnia, a much smaller area, Secretary of State, you will tell me if my memory serves me wrongly but I thought the NATO troop deployment there was of the order of 15,000 and here we are knocking it back and forth as to whether we can scrabble together 1,000 or 1,500 people.

Hilary Benn: The answer is smaller undoubtedly given the size of the area and the nature of the challenge. That is self‑evidently the case. I hope I did not give the impression that somehow the AU was treating this as a guinea pig at all. I was just reflecting on the fact that this is their first operation. It is a hugely important one and I do believe that we should unreservedly welcome what the AU has done. I feel that very, very strongly. It is very important we do not send the message that, "Ah well, this is the African Union" because, let's be honest, one of the problems - and your question goes absolutely to the heart of this, Mr Bercow - in a broad sense is a lack of capacity in the world, however you care to define it, to do something about these problems, so when the Africa Union comes along and says, "Hey, we want to build our own capacity to do something," I think we should absolutely welcome it with open arms, both because it adds to the total sum of the capacity and because it is a sign of Africa taking responsibility and, frankly, we could have done with this kind of effort a long time ago and I think the AU should be supported and applauded for that. I just think it is very important in terms of tone that while everybody recognises the important point you are making, in a sense the numbers depend on the extent to which people are going to do the things that they have promised because we have seen in the Sudan, as you will know, say in the Nuba Mountains when I was in Khartoum and met General Wilhelmsen, it was very clear with a very small number of people and capacity to move about that the joint verification mission, or whatever its title was, was incredibly effective in making sure that the agreement was honoured. So it does depend on the circumstances.

Q139 Mr Bercow: I very much take the spirit of what you have said and a great deal, Secretary of State, of the content, but very briefly, before I get into trouble with the Chairman, on the subject of the mandate you will be aware, I am sure, in the interview that he did for Panorama programme that Commander Mensah of the African Union Ceasefire Commission stated: "We do not have the capacity as at this time to go and act as a buffer force between the armed parties, but most of the times it happens before we know. At this level what we do is just respond to the complaints, investigate it and submit our report, but we cannot go and stop the fighting, no." Dr Suliman Baldo told us three weeks or so ago[7] that a first step would be to strengthen all the components of the operation on the ground by making sure the AU is given a mandate to protect civilians specifically and a second which would again send a strong message to Khartoum would be to have stand‑by tactical support capability to intervene in situations in which civilians are under direct attack. Do you agree and what are we doing about it?

Hilary Benn: Can I just refer to the current mandate because it partly answers your question. Part of the mandate is "to protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity within resources and capability;" It then refers to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan and it having overall responsibility for protection. "To protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations; to provide visible military presence by patrolling and the establishment of temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population." May I give you one practical example of what happened in Keabkabiya on 2 December? The AU learned of an impending attack by a large number of Arab militia on the market. The AU fortified its base there, let the NGOs into the compound, a separate AU team flew to meet the militias, informed them of their readiness to protect citizens ‑ I just give this as an example ‑ if attacked as per their mandate and managed to persuade them against attack. One of the consequences was that 500 women marched a few days later outside the AU HQ to say thank you very much for what they had done. That shows what they can do in those circumstances. I said in answer to an earlier question one of the things that I am sure the AU will want to reflect upon if the situation deteriorates further is, one, their mandate and, two, their numbers.

Q140 Mr Bercow: We come back to our old friends Mr Resources and Mr Capability, do we not, and it seems pretty clear that Mr Mandate is very much the son, if I can put it that way, of Mr Resources?

Hilary Benn: Clearly the two are inter‑linked but I think the AU has already demonstrated its willingness to reflect upon the mandate, has already reflected its willingness to reflect on the resources, and it has strengthened one and increased the other. I have no doubt if the situation were to deteriorate further ‑ and we hope that it does not ‑ that the AU would be perfectly capable of doing the same thing again.

Q141 Mr Bercow: Just lastly, Secretary of State, what lessons need to be learned about IDP crises and the ability of the international humanitarian system to deal with them, very much down the street of your recent oration? Specifically is it not ridiculous that a person whose safety and security is being threatened by his or her own state has to cross that state's borders before the international community accepts responsibility for looking after him or her?

Hilary Benn: A very blunt answer, yes it is, and if one looks at what has happened, the number of refugees internationally, I referred in the speech to this, has gone down and the number of internally displaced people has gone up and, frankly, it should not matter whether people cross the border. Some of them may not know where the border is. What should matter is that we have an effective system in place that provides for people's needs wherever it is they happen to flee to. That is my view.

Mr Bercow: That could not be clearer.

Q142 Chairman: Secretary of State, getting back to capacity, perhaps we ought to at some stage, and we may well not have time to this afternoon, look in greater detail at the report of the UN High-level Panel[8] because it seems to me before you get capacity for the mandate there needs to be some decision taken by the UN. One has the impression at the present moment that the only view the Security Council is taking round that table is who is friends of whom. You earlier on today said let's be honest about it, not everybody around the Security Council has the same view as Her Majesty's Government about how to approach this so one has the veto. If the High-level Panel is right and there should come a time when the international community collectively should be able to take a judgment about whether to prevent genocide, large‑scale killing, ethnic cleansing, and serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved unable or unwilling to prevent - and you talked in your speech about the Peace Building Commission and the peace-building support which I assume, as we are a collective government, represents the Government's views collectively - what kind of oomph do you think there is in New York particularly amongst colleagues in the United States and elsewhere to actually give that bit of the UN architecture some real substance and reality? We say "Rwanda: never again" but one of the reasons why the international community has been slow on this, as you said yourself, is that the Sudanese were in self-denial, their particular friends assisted that self‑denial in the UN institutions, so it was only very late in the day when the overwhelming burden of international public opinion has forced a different set of realities upon them.

Hilary Benn: Well, this is the really big question that you have raised, Chairman, and this is indeed what the High-level Panel was all about and it flowed from Kofi Annan's "fork in the road" speech where he said the challenge is the international system needs to be more effective. In one sense when it comes to taking decisions, as your question implies, the UN is as effective as the member states allow it to be. I draw a parallel with the Trades Union Congress (TUC) because I spent many years of my working life in the trade union movement and people would say, well, the TUC has not done this, and people would point out, actually, the TUC is as powerful as its affiliates permit it to be. That is one truth that we have to recognise. I think there is an appetite because this issue is not going to go away, of that I am absolutely convinced because we have talked about Rwanda today, we are grappling with Darfur, there are other countries we could talk about, and the world is going to have to find more effective ways ideally of trying to prevent these conflicts before they arise but, if they do, more effective ways of dealing with them because we cannot stand on one side and watch these things happen and do nothing. I think the establishment of the High-level Panel was a clear indication of Kofi Annan's appetite to do something about this and it is up to us as members of the UN to respond, which comes back to Mr Bercow's point about the will to do something and then providing the means to do it. It is difficult. These are really difficult problems that we are grappling with.

Q143 Tony Worthington: Can I stick, first of all, with the African Union and what we mean by that. I can see the appeal of saying let's build up the African Union because it takes the white colonial bit out of it, it is taking responsibility for your neighbours, but what do we mean by the African Union? When I have an image of the African Union it is of not the Arab African part of the continent. Who are the troops who are involved? Who are the forces that are coming? What I have heard is that they are from Rwanda and so on. Are there any North African states involved because you have got this tension in Sudan going back generations between the Arab Africans and the Negro Africans. What role is being played in this by the North Africans and, taking it further, by the Middle East and Egypt and so on to put pressure on the Government of Sudan to act. We may say that it is good the Africans are looking after it but the tension in Sudan has been between those who are now the peace keepers and those who are in the Government of Sudan. The role of the Arab Africans seems to be a missing element in this.

Hilary Benn: In answer to your specific question, from memory, those who are providing participants in AMIS II are Rwanda, Nigeria, I think, and The Gambia. I remember Said Djinnit said today that they are hoping to get police officers from South Africa.

Mr Bercow: And Senegal.

Q144 Tony Worthington: So they are sub‑Saharan Africans?

Hilary Benn: That is correct. That is the first point. I think the second thing is just to acknowledge that Libya has taken an initiative, as I am sure the Committee is aware, to try and promote dialogue and reconciliation between the tribes of Darfur. We might be able to say a bit more about this Libyan initiative, but that is a step which one North African country has done to contribute to the process of tackling this conflict because there are issues that are part of the origins of the conflict in Darfur. The AU itself has its Peace and Security Committee. To be honest, I cannot remember who is on it, but it represents the whole of the African Union. I am sure it would be very interesting at some point for the Committee - and I do not know whether he is coming to give evidence ‑ to take evidence from Said Djinnit, the Peace and Security Commissioner, because certainly in discussions I have had with him I have found him extraordinarily useful and I have been very impressed by what he is doing. It is not for me suggest who you see but since they are developing this capacity and they are very committed to the peace and security work with the African Stand‑by Force (and we are going to see more of this) and how they do it is very, very important. In the end the Peace and Security Committee forms a political view on what it is it wants to do but, to be honest, I cannot remember who the specific members are. I assume there will be North African representation but we need to check and let you know, if that would be helpful.[9]

Q145 Tony Worthington: That would be very helpful.

Hilary Benn: Of course I will do that.

Q146 Tony Worthington: In this there is the area which we have been talking about right through which is DFID's area of responsibility ‑ the humanitarian response and so on ‑ but going into the political area is it really a dead duck to say there can be any kind of effective sanctions and who is doing the work on that?

Hilary Benn: You are talking about potentially through the UN?

Q147 Tony Worthington: I am talking about targeted sanctions, asset freezes, oil embargoes, and the extension of the arms embargo which, as far as I am aware, is not the currency in which DFID works. It is going to need other players to move those areas forward.

Hilary Benn: Clearly a decision on sanctions would be a matter for the UN Security Council and you have listed most of those that could potentially be looked at. There is of course an EU arms embargo which has been in place, I think I am right in saying, for a decade, and certainly were a decision to be taken to implement some sanctions we would welcome as part of that the arms embargo that the EU has currently got and which we are observing being extended more widely, but it would obviously fall to the Security Council to take those decisions and for the UK Government to form a view on what we do in those circumstances.

Q148 Tony Worthington: What is our view?

Hilary Benn: My view is if the situation were to continue to deteriorate then it seems to me the UN Security Council is at some point going to have to weigh in the balance, firstly, the benefit it has got from threatening sanctions, which is what it has done up until now, bearing in mind it is a delicate balance because it is important that we see what is happening in Darfur (which we are very focused on) in the context of the Sudan as a whole and the prize in the North‑South peace agreement fully done (two million dead in 20 years) is a very, very important thing not to lose, as against demonstrating that the international community means what it says and if people do not honour their commitments then what are we going to do about it. That is the dilemma which people have been wrestling with. Let's be absolutely straight about it. That is the dilemma. At some point if it were to get worse, and I pray it does not, it seems to me that what the UN Security Council would then have to consider is what form those further steps might take because it would be about credibility. What I hope is that the deal today will stick and we can retrieve the deterioration there has been in the last couple of months. That is what everybody hopes as AMIS increases its deployment and gets on with its job of trying to ensure that the parties stick to the things that they have promised to do.

Q149 Mr Bercow: Secretary of State, you will be aware that the report of the international inquiry into human rights abuses in Darfur is due at the end of January 2005. Will the United Kingdom support, without qualification, a Security Council referral of the perpetrators and instigators of crimes against humanity in Darfur to the International Criminal Court?

Hilary Benn: Yes, we are very strong supporters, as you know, of the International Criminal Court. We have said all along that those who are responsible for crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, whatever the Commission of Inquiry finds, should be called to account. We have this mechanism. We are also aware of course that there are some in the international community who do not share an enthusiasm for an International Criminal Court. In the end what is most important is that we find an effective venue at which people can be called to account for what they have done. That is my view.

Q150 Mr Bercow: The reason why I inserted the words "without qualification", suggesting that the referral should be unqualified, was that there is some concern amongst people I have spoken to, who are anxious that this should take place and we should take the lead in sponsoring it, that we should not start from a position or even, frankly, settle lightly for a position which says that some relatively key people could be referred to the court but the 'big cheeses' cannot possibly be referred because apart from anything else they have got important negotiations to take part in on the North‑South peace accord, big limousines to climb into, press conferences to hold, and so on and so forth, and that therefore they would be allowed to get off scot-free. That would not be satisfactory, would it?

Hilary Benn: No, it would not be satisfactory. What this is about in the language is making people realise that they cannot behave with impunity and we should support what the Commission of Inquiry comes up with. As you know, we were very strong supporters of the Commission of Inquiry being established in the first place and I do believe people have to be called to account for what they have done.

Q151 Chairman: Secretary of State, thank you very much. We promised to finish by four o'clock and I think we are nearly there. I thought it was very interesting in a speech in the chamber to which I was listening earlier on today that a parliamentary colleague when commenting on Africa made reference simply to The Sudan and to Zimbabwe. It seems to me that with the Commission for Africa and the work that you are hoping to do on the Commission with the Prime Minister and others, actually all these issues we have been discussing this afternoon are crucially important because all the good work that is done on the Commission and so forth will not only set against this but with people's appetite to engage on Africa it is also important they do not just look at the worst case examples. That is always the danger, which is why it is crucially important that the African Union and others can make some progress on this.

Hilary Benn: I could not agree with you more. Just let's balance that with Mozambique which is a country which having got peace and stability is on its way and making progress. That is why I have said that one of the tasks for the Commission and indeed for the world is to see Africa in all of its potential as well as its problems, and if we can tap the potential then that is the best way of dealing with the problems. Thank you very much for this afternoon.

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[1] Reform of the international humanitarian system: speech given by Hilary Benn, UK Secretary of State for International Development, addressing the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute, Wednesday 15 December

[2] African Union Mission in Sudan

[3] Memorandum submitted by the Department for International Development

[4] The "we" in "we were bearing" refers to the top three donors - the USA, the European Community Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) and the UK.

[5] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

[6] Answer to follow from UK Government

[7] Oral evidence taken on Monday 29 November.

[8] A more secure world: Our shared responsibility: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: http://www.un.org/secureworld

[9] HMG to provide information on the workings and membership of the AU's Peace and Security Committee.