Examination of Witness (Questions 1-19)
RT HON
TONY BLAIR,
MP
8 FEBRUARY 2005
Q1 Chairman: First of all, welcome again,
Prime Minister, and may I give a special welcome as well to the
Speaker of the Pakistan Parliament who has come to observe this
session. You are very welcome. As the public probably know, there
are three themes and the Prime Minister has been notified of those
three themes, but he has not been told any of the questions. The
themes we intend to follow today are: firstly, Iraq post-election;
secondly, the economy and public services; and, thirdly, climate
change and the G8 Presidency. Before we start, this may be the
last of these sessions before an election and no doubt during
the morning you will tell us whether that is so or not! Before
we start, can I ask a rather masochistic question, masochistic
in the sense that the more enthusiastic your answer is, the worse
news it means for us and our performance. From your experience
of these sessions, and we have had five sessions, so of the five
you have been to so far, from your perspective, has this process
added anything meaningful to parliamentary accountability or has
it just been another showpiece?
Mr Blair: There is certainly only
one diplomatic answer to that question, but actually, no, put
it like this, it has certainly been an experience I have found
extremely tough. I hope it has been of advantage in helping people
to understand some of the issues; it is very rare you get the
opportunity to explain things at length. Also, by its very nature,
the trouble with Prime Minister's Questions is it is very, very
adversarial and it is almost like a debating joust every week
with obviously the focus particularly on the Prime Minister and
the Leader of the Opposition and the Leader of the Liberal Democrats.
I think with this way of doing things, you are able to get what
is undoubtedly a series of tough questions, but be able to discuss
issues at greater length and with the right degree of formality,
but, nonetheless, also I think doing it in a way that I hope exposes
some of the issues to greater public understanding.
Q2 Chairman: I will be a bit mischievous
and ask you how it compares with your sessions with the lobby,
but I do not want them to be upset, so I will not ask you that
question.
Mr Blair: That would be right.
Chairman: Before we turn to Iraq and
Sir George Young, I bumped into Ann Clwyd who was observing in
Basra during the election and she was telling a story of this
one polling station where the insurgents started shelling and
then the women inside, and there was a nearly 80% turnout apparently
at this centre, the women inside started singing and she asked
her interpreter what they were saying and he said that it was
a song of defiance. I thought, thinking of all the threats they
face, that was very humbling. We will move over now to Iraq post-election.
Q3 Sir George Young: Prime Minister,
we want to divide our session on Iraq into three sections: firstly,
what are the lessons we can learn so far; secondly, where are
we; and, thirdly, what happens next? On the first, the action
against Iraq was portrayed as a crusade against tyranny and against
terrorism and it was carried out in the name of the United Nations
Resolutions. Are you not disappointed that more of the countries
that might have wanted to be associated with that in the event
did not take part either in the military action or in the nation-building
thereafter?
Mr Blair: We would have liked
a bigger coalition, but there were countries obviously that felt
very strongly against the action in Iraq. On the other hand, there
were some 30 countries that joined us.
Q4 Sir George Young: Of those who joined
us, of course some are now pulling out. Ukraine, Portugal, Poland,
the Netherlands and Hungary have said they are going to withdraw
their troops while we are putting more in. There is no sign of
Germany, France or Russia joining the multinational force and
NATO is non-operational. Has there not been diplomatic failure
in spite of the military triumph?
Mr Blair: No, I think that would
be unfair because for a lot of those countries you just mentioned
that are taking out their troops, they continue very strongly
to support the presence of the multinational force there; it is
just that they are bound by certain parliamentary votes to take
their troops out after a certain period of time and in some cases
after the elections and they only went in on that basis. In other
words, it is not that they have changed their mind and are now
withdrawing; they are withdrawing in accordance with a stipulated
pre-condition. I think you may find that at the NATO meeting at
the end of February we get an agreement on help for training the
Iraqi security forces and it is for those other countries to speak,
but I hope that that will see some of the countries, which have
not been involved in either the conflict in Iraq or its aftermath,
join that training exercise.
Q5 Sir George Young: You want to see
a broader coalition. Can we go on to the preparations that were
made before we went to war for nation-building. A former Labour
Foreign Secretary said this: "The failure of George Bush
and Tony Blair to plan wisely to ensure the maintenance of law
and order in Iraq after the successful military invasion is a
tragedy for which many people are still paying a high price".
Fair comment?
Mr Blair: No, I am afraid I do
not agree with that. You would expect me to say this, but I think
that in truth the degree of the insurgency and, in particular,
those people that came from outside of Iraq in there, outside
terrorists, al-Zarqarwi most notably, I think that was something
that was difficult to foresee and difficult to plan for. On the
other hand, I think even if we had been able to foresee absolutely
everything that happened, it was still going to be very tough
and very difficult because you had got people who were absolutely
determined to prevent democracy taking hold in Iraq. In the end
in one sense removing Saddam was one part of the conflict and
it then entered into a different phase with the necessity of defeating
the insurgents/terrorists who are not that large in number, I
do not think, and certainly do not have popular support, and the
elections have demonstrated that very, very clearly indeed, but,
on the other hand, are reasonably well financed, reasonably well
armed and are prepared to kill any number of people.
Q6 Sir George Young: Can I just press
you on that a bit more. Before we went to war, I actually asked
you a question about the preparations for post-war nation-building
and this is what you said on January 21 in this room: "If
we come to changing the regime, if we come to removing Saddam
as the only way of dealing with the issue of weapons of mass destruction,
then I think it is extremely important we make the most detailed
preparations and work within the international community as to
what happens afterwards". Did that actually happen? Was there
not actually more chaos than there need have been after the war
was over?
Mr Blair: No, again I think there
is a great deal of misunderstanding over what people thought at
the time with the risks that we would have to face. The biggest
risk, the thing that we spent most time focusing on, was the possibility
of a humanitarian disaster as a result of the conflict. Indeed,
there were a lot of stories coming out before the conflict took
place and its immediate aftermath where people were saying that
there were going to be large numbers of people displaced, you
may have difficulty getting food to them, there may be a tremendous
problem with refugees and so on. Essentially, we managed to plan
and guard against that eventuality. We then had reconstruction
plans that we basically rolled out. The thing that has been most
difficult has been this terrorism/insurgency and the reason that
has been difficult is that what these people have done, and it
is astonishing almost in its wickedness actually because it is
wicked because were they to stop doing it, Iraq could make progress
very, very quickly, but what they have actually done is kill anybody
or disrupt anything that might make the country better. Now, that
is something, frankly, you can foresee and try to plan against,
but if there are people carrying out these actions, the only thing
you can do is to get after them as quickly as possible and to
build up the intelligence about them and their activity, and that
is what we have done.
Q7 Sir George Young: We may want to press
you a little bit more on that later, but can I just ask a question
about Fallujah. The assault on Fallujah dispersed the Sunni insurgents
throughout the rest of Iraq and we now hear from the CIA that
it is a recruiting ground for anti-Western terrorism. Was that
managed as well as it might have been?
Mr Blair: Well, again there is
a dilemma in relation to Fallujah and the advice very strongly
from the Iraqi Government, even though there were people within
the Iraqi Government who themselves were in two minds about this,
but the dilemma was perfectly simple and it was this: that they
were using Fallujah as a base of operations, they were effectively
taking over and were running Fallujah as a city, and the local
tribal leaders, incidentally, were wholly opposed to these insurgents
and terrorists operating out of there, but could do nothing about
it. The question is: did you leave them there with all the dangers
of that or did you take action to remove them? Now, we were never
under any illusions at all; removing them was going to be difficult
and bloody, indeed it has been, but, on the other hand, we took
the view, and I think, in retrospect, this judgment actually has
been proved right not wrong, that it was absolutely necessary
to show to the Iraqi people that there was going to be no no-go
area for the Iraqi forces and the multinational force and their
support. There is a very basic, simple thing here, George. What
is happening is that you have got, as I say, probably not that
many and probably without much support even locally, but they
are well armed and they are well financed and they are prepared
to kill anybody. Now, in those circumstances, the most important
thing for Iraqis is to have the elections, to demonstrate to these
people that the vast majority of Iraqis want to make progress
and become a proper democracy, and, by a combination of the political
process and military pressure, to weed them out and destroy them
because that is the only thing that is going to allow us to make
progress.
Sir George Young: On military pressure,
perhaps I can now hand over to Bruce George to continue the theme
of questioning.
Q8 Mr George: Prime Minister, however
many insurgents there are, a combination of the largest army in
the world and probably one of the very best armies in the world
should maybe have had a greater impact on the insurgents. Now,
is there a possibility that the coalition approach to the insurgency
and perhaps counter-insurgency tactics have not been really up
to the mark? I am thinking of the fairly poor co-ordination between
the US military and the Iraqi police forces where the army do
not appear to be in the loop, so I wonder whether there is time
even at this stage to review the whole ethos of our presence for
as long as it is going to be and the strategy and tactics we are
using against the insurgents.
Mr Blair: That is a perfectly
reasonable point. We do review constantly the tactics that we
are employing. The problem is this: that the most effective way
ultimately of dealing with the insurgents and terrorists is to
build up the Iraqi capability itself. It is when the Iraqis are
able to go into cities and towns and run the security themselves
that the insurgents and terrorists have the least traction on
the Iraqi population, so what we have to do is to try and build
their capability. Now, we are doing that, but we are starting,
and have started, pretty much from scratch. It is difficult. There
was no proper police force of any nature or civil defence. The
army, yes, there was an army, but there were all sorts of problems
obviously to do with the former Ba'athists and so on connected
with it, so what we are trying to do is we are trying to build
that Iraqi capability. Now, to be fair, in the elections the Iraqi
forces acquitted themselves pretty well, but at the moment they
still need the multinational force there in support. I hope that
over the next few weeks, as the picture emerges more clearly and
we get a new Iraqi Government come into being, I hope we can then
set out for people exactly what we then think is the way forward
for the Iraqiisation of security, for outreach to some of, in
particular, the Sunni areas where I think there are people who
maybe have not participated in the elections, but who also have
now seen the election process at work and may be prepared to work
with others in Iraq for the future.
Q9 Mr George: One of the problems or
two of the problems is whether we are going to be asked to remain
by the new Government, so have you any inkling as to what they
might do and, if we are asked to remain, up until what point?
I understand an American general, General Luck has produced a
document. We have not seen it. I am sure you have, Prime Minister.
Is there any indication from that document and existing thinking
as to our future presence in Iraq and in what numbers?
Mr Blair: What we always say is
that we will remain in Iraq for as long as is needed, but, as
I have said before, it is our desire, it is the Iraqi Government's
desire and it is the Iraqi people's desire that we go from Iraq
as soon as is possible. The question is: what is as soon as is
possible? As soon as is possible means when the job is done, and
the job is building up that Iraqi capability. Now, in the paper
that I hope we can publish, because we are still looking at it
and considering it now, that General Luck and his colleagues have
drawn up, I think we will be able to give some idea of what the
next steps and over what period the Iraqiisation of security will
take place because there is a need obviously for quantity in terms
of police and army, but there is also a need for quality, for
crack troops and forces that are able to go in and handle the
insurgents. I think the other thing it is just worth pointing
out is that when you have got people who are prepared to be suicide
bombers and when you have got terrorists who are prepared to kill
innocent civilians, as we know to our own cost here in this country
when even at the height of the Irish troubles, I do not know how
many people exactly were in the IRA actively, but probably not
that many and yet with everything that we had at our disposal,
it was very difficult to deal with it, that is why the political
process going alongside the action against the insurgents is so
important.
Q10 Mr George: The imminent return of
the bodies of those soldiers who were killed on election or polling
day in Iraq raises questions as to whether the British Government
is doing enough to compensate financially those who are left behind,
whether there is adequate compensation for soldiers and military
personnel who have been injured, and the Defence Committee has
been pretty irritated at the pension and compensation arrangements.
Have you had the opportunity to review whether something is maybe
done differently to give assurance to those who go out and if
they are injured that we are more prepared to look after them
and their families should they be killed?
Mr Blair: Well, we have studied
very carefully what the Defence Committee has said about this
and, as you know, we are reviewing the situation now and I hope
that we will be able to say something about that in the days and
weeks to come. I would once again like to state my sympathy and
condolences to the families of the RAF and the other people that
have died in the Hercules crash.
Q11 Mr George: Well, Adam Ingram is appearing
before the Defence Committee tomorrow, Prime Minister. Maybe you
can have a word with him to clarify a bit further what you have
been saying. I doubt it, but we can hope.
Mr Blair: I do not think we will
have to wait very long for it, but there are various issues that
need to be decided there, but we do want to make sure—
Q12 Mr George: Will it be a new package
of some kind?
Mr Blair: I hope it will be a
new package, yes.
Q13 Chairman: If the new Iraqi Government
asks us to leave before we think it is an appropriate time, who
is going to prevail?
Mr Blair: The Iraqi Government
is sovereign. I made that clear, I think, at the time that the
United Nations Resolution was passed that gave authority to the
new Iraqi Government, that the new Iraqi Government is sovereign.
My own very strong view of this, talking to all sorts of different
people in Iraq, is that their view is that we need the multinational
force for as long as the Iraqi capability is not sufficiently
well trained and equipped and capable, but that capability is
building the whole time. As I say, the elections were a very big
test for the Iraqi security services. They acquitted themselves
extremely well, they came out, they performed, even when under
fire they did not retreat, there were people who actually sacrificed
their own lives from the Iraqi security forces rather than yield
up polling stations to the terrorists and insurgents, and I think
those are all very hopeful signs for the future.
Sir George Young: That brings us very
neatly to Alan Beith who wants to look ahead.
Q14 Mr Beith: Prime Minister, I think
it is perhaps a good time to assess where we are up to in the
War on Terror, by which I mean not our domestic protection, but
going after terrorists in their safe havens. We are still necessarily
committed in Afghanistan and you opened up a new front in Iraq,
which is now a major crucible of terrorism. What other countries
are you worried about?
Mr Blair: First of all, I should
say that I do think one of the most important things at stake
in Iraq is the defeat of this global terrorism through the defeat
of terrorism in Iraq. I think if Iraq is able to—
Q15 Mr Beith: It cannot be defeated in
Iraq alone, can it, because they have many other havens?
Mr Blair: That is true, but I
think we all know that this, what I would call, "new form
of global terrorism" recruits on the back of propaganda against
the West, against America and against countries like ourselves.
I think Afghanistan and democracy coming there was a big blow
to them, I think democracy in Iraq would be a big blow, I think
progress in the Middle East and over the Palestine/Israel issue
would be a big blow to terrorism, and I think the interesting
thing is that nobody, and this includes, in particular, the United
States, now believes that this terrorism can be defeated by security
or military methods alone and it has also to be defeated by progress
on democracy, on human rights and on bringing freedom to people,
so I think that is also at stake in Iraq. When you say what other
countries are we thinking of, I do not think we are thinking of
any other countries, but we are continually trying to make sure
that the opportunities for terrorism to exist, to get access to
weapons and finance are shut down. I think one of the benefits
of the action in Iraq is that we have actually had significant
progress and movement on WMD issues, with Libya giving up its
WMD—
Q16 Mr Beith: That raises a question
though. What is the priority—democratisation or removal
of WMD programmes? In the case of Libya, we reached an agreement
which did not involve any change in the Libyan political system;
it was an agreement designed to secure the ending of a nuclear
programme.
Mr Blair: Well, I think you are
trying to do both the whole time. Obviously it is important to
get co-operation. Even if you have a regime that is not democratic,
to get co-operation over WMD is important. That is why it was
important to make sure that the Libya programme was shut down.
It has been important, for example, that the network of A Q Khan
has been shut down, it has been important that Iran is back in
dialogue at least with the Atomic Energy Authority and that North
Korea is back in six-party talks. Now, none of that means, however,
I think, that ultimately the situation will be stable. I think
that one major lesson that we are learning is that wherever there
is repression, wherever there are failed states, those are places
where terrorism can breed.
Q17 Mr Beith: Do you think Iran is either
a failed state or, in President Bush's words, "the world's
primary state sponsor of terror"?
Mr Blair: Well, it certainly does
sponsor terrorism, there is no doubt about that at all, and I
hope very much, if we can make progress in the Middle East, that
Iran realises it has got an obligation to help that, not hinder
it.
Q18 Mr Beith: But is the constructive
approach the British Government has up to now taken in your view
likely to prove effective in dealing with what you always said
was the most dangerous threat of all, one which did not actually
turn out to be the threat in Iraq, the combination of accumulating
nuclear power and being prepared to hand it over to terrorists?
Mr Blair: Well, I hope it does
work. I think it is a good sign that Europe and America are working
together over it. I think it is a good sign that France and Germany,
with whom we have disagreed over Iraq, are working very closely
in relation to Iran. Iran has now been given a set of obligations
that it has got to fulfil and I hope they fulfil them.
Q19 Mr Beith: Just going back to the
implication of that for Iraq, I presume that it is a major objective
of the British Government to try and get the Sunni Muslims in
Iraq to support the legitimacy of government there. Is that effort
going to be undermined by the delicacy of the relationship between
Iran and the Shi'ite population of Iraq?
Mr Blair: That is an interesting
question. My assessment is this, and this is only from talking
to people about it, but also talking to the United Nations staff
in Iraq when I was there before Christmas: that in respect of
Sunnis in Iraq, certainly the UN view was that the vast majority
of them would have voted if they had been able to vote, in other
words, the numbers that were prepared to boycott as a matter of
principle were very, very small. In respect of Iran, again I think
that the majority view, as far as I can make out, from Iraqi Shias
is that they want Iraq run by Iraqis, not by any outside power,
including Iran.
Sir George Young: On Iran, I think Edward
Leigh has a question to put to you.
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