Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-99)

23 JUNE 2004

RT HON DAVID HEATHCOAT-AMORY MP AND MS GISELA STUART MP

  Q80 Chairman: I think we are anxious to grapple with the central dilemma. The issue of making Parliament's view clear, can this be done by a back bench committee? How does that compare with doing it by a parliamentary motion?

  Ms Stuart: It has its practical problems. If you take a closer look at the Grand Committee system in Finland, which is cross-party, it is a regular slot, so people keep engaging on a very regular basis and it is the ministers who give evidence depending on the business that comes up, that is really the best way forward.

  Q81 Chairman: But there are no votes there.

  Ms Stuart: No, there are no votes there.

  Q82 Chairman: A private consensus emerges.

  Ms Stuart: Yes.

  Q83 Martin Linton: You mentioned about the value of the Standing Committee on the Convention and how helpful it has been to you in fulfilling your role as representatives. Could you say whether you think all of that experience can be transferred or retained in a Grand Committee which is largely based on the experience of that committee?

  Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I thought it was very useful for us as a Committee to report back to the House so that interested Members could get a feel for what was happening. It was not party political in the sense that there were no whips there, although sometimes we wish there had been and then we might have got a better quorum. There was a feeling that Parliament was asking us what was being done on their behalf. As a long-term structural change I would have certain doubts. It could eventually become rather ceremonial, perhaps not very well attended and fall victim to the problem I have mentioned of not having any real power. It would not even have the existing Scrutiny Committee's ability to question ministers closely with supplementaries and perhaps pass critical motions. In the case of the European Scrutiny Committee we have this very important right to hold up measures before the scrutiny reserve is lifted. That is not always observed but it is at least a weapon we have. I think it is very important to retain all those features in any replacement. The overriding need here is to turn pious expressions of concern into reality. Governments of all sorts, Parliament and occasionally the Commission say they must do less but do it better, but it never happens, instead this engine of regulation is practically out of control. That is why there is this feeling of despair and alienation by the public. It has got to get back to the idea that there are important measures which can only be done on a cross-border international basis. That ought to be reflected in the work programme, but I am afraid there is no sign of that message having been learned. I would like to be able to go to these negotiations as a British minister with the House of Commons as an institution backing me up. So I will not agree to things because I will say, "I can't convince Parliament and through them I cannot convince the public."

  Q84 Ann Coffey: There is a lot of domestic legislation which goes through this House, but bits and pieces of it people do not know about and the public are not aware about it, some issues are of more interest than others. Could you not argue that that is actually the same with European legislation? The EC Directive on vitamins aroused a great amount of interest and lobbying and MPs suddenly became concerned about what on earth this EC Directive was about and started writing letters and stuff like that. Maybe if we had a Grand Committee that was open ended so that Members could come and go and have equal status in speaking and things like that, the lobbying groups outside, which at the end of the day perform a very important function in bringing things to MPs that they are interested in because they follow legislation quite closely, would see it as something that was of value to do, to write to MPs about particular Directives they did not like or things that were coming out of Europe and MPs would then be engaged in the process because they would have to justify to their constituents what they were doing about it. They could not say it was nothing to do with them because there would be a committee they could attend if they wanted to. Would that not raise the whole awareness issue about what was happening? By not engaging MPs but by engaging a wider audience. That EC Directive lobby was very effective. I did not know anything about this EC Directive at all.

  Ms Stuart: That brings me back to my point about the two things we should not lose sight of. The first one was that it was the Commons and the Lords. My experience of giving evidence to both Houses is that the Lords have far greater long-term memory and technical expertise which was very helpful on European matters. The second thing is again the ability to take evidence from non-ministers and to look at the Lords and the Commons and to look at, for example, bringing rapporteurs from the European Parliament on certain Directives here to give evidence because these are immensely influential people, that would be a very helpful way forward.

  Q85 Mr Shepherd: What difference does it make? The fact that you have got these committees and they sit and deliberate, whatever their deliberations, what difference does that make to the outcome?

  Ms Stuart: The real difference at the end of the day is that as MPs we can no longer go back and say, "We've never heard of it, we've never been asked about it, no one told me", and what is more to the point, we can no longer say, "It's nothing to do with me, guv, it's them out there," because it is not. It is like with any other legislation, ultimately the will of the Government with the majority in the House of Commons prevails, that is the bottom line of our system and I am extremely attached to that one. There is contentious domestic legislation where an opposition MP can say I do not agree with the Government and you still may say so, but at the European level for the last 30 years we have been able to deny all responsibility because we closed our eyes to it and we have blamed others for it.

  Q86 Mr Shepherd: I understand what you are saying. The fact is that in half of life we do not know what is happening and we try to get up to speed. I am talking about outturn. What difference does it make? Before your time, Gisela, but certainly within David's time we had a Merchant Shipping Act and there the Government of the day thought it was working along the lines suggested and agreed by the European Commission; it enacted a Bill. It was acting within what it thought was its own competence and authority in this matter, our High Courts and on appeal it ultimately overturned the effect of the law, ie it was the European Court that enacted it but still recognised parliamentary sovereignty so that we could indeed assert the law, because all this is only directly in British law through an Act of Parliament and yet we have somehow got this omerta", which is the very point that David started off and you reinforced, which is that it does not seem to make any difference and there is no outcome.

  Ms Stuart: I will tell you where it would make a difference. If you are a domestic minister—and I have been to the Health Council as a minister in the Department of Health—what happens in health, for example, is it is very much on the periphery of your radar, it is health questions, waiting lists and intensive care beds which drive you. As a minister you only really take notice of what you have to do the day before you are told you are going to Brussels and you get the briefing by the civil servant. If months before that I have to go to a committee which starts raising the vitamins Directive and those kind of debates, if we engaged much earlier then I am sure that would influence the position the minister would ultimately take on occasions.

  Q87 Chairman: Can I probe a little more on that? On the question of the European Grand Committee proposal from the Foreign Secretary, you have in a sense discussed it in general. Do you both think it is a good thing?

  Ms Stuart: Yes, I think so.

  Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I think it would have a role to play in ventilating the system and giving us an opportunity to question not just ministers but maybe Commission officials and perhaps put on an emergency brake system. If we were seriously concerned about the system we could insist on getting somebody over to explain it here. The Commission's idea of Government is that you have to go there; they like lobby groups to go and explain their concerns over there. This does not work for small businesses and for people—to take the earlier example—running food supplement shops. They do not have the time or the knowledge, the contacts or the money to do that, they like us to do that, that is what they elect us for. Therefore the decisions have got to come back to us, not all of them but certainly the filter has got to operate here, we must have a real influence on the programme and on an exceptional basis we ought to be able to pull an emergency brake and stop something and unless we have that power there will be a general disillusionment with the entire system. No one really believes that this is our government at the moment—I am talking about the European Union. That is going to reach epidemic proportions unless we can be seen to act on behalf of people who have got well-founded concerns and at the minute that is not operating. As well as a Grand Committee to find out what is happening we also need to strengthen the smaller scrutiny Standing Committees' system, you will have your own idea about that, so that we can pin down specifics and get something done about it at that level.

  Q88 Mr Kidney: I would like to ask David about our involving commissioners in our work and Gisela about our involving MPs in our work. David, first of all, how realistic is it for the Member States' parliaments to demand the commissioners come to be scrutinised in person when there are 25 disparate national parliaments? If it is realistic, where is the right place in our system for it to be? If there were this European Grand Committee, is this the right place or are you talking about your Scrutiny Committee sitting in public or the Select Committees individually making bids for a commissioner to attend? How would you see it working?

  Mr Heathcoat-Amory: There are 25 Member States but there are also 25 commissioners and I do not know what they are all going to be doing. Perhaps some of them could spend at least part of their time travelling round Member States' parliaments listening and taking instructions from us for a change before they draw up their annual programme. We do find it difficult to get actual commissioners to come here. In fact, in my own Committee I do not think we have ever done that, we get their more junior officials. I think that is not good enough, particularly when I do not detect any real sympathy for this concept of subsidiarity. The dynamic to over-govern is something in modern societies we suffer from down here, but at least at national level there is a countervailing force, which is you have got to raise the money to do it, you have an electorate watching you and your constituents and your lobby groups are active and have good access to you here. That is rather absent at the European level. I repeat, the decision-making must be redistributed, must be devolved back down, unless of course it is a genuine emergency in foreign affairs where everyone has to act quickly. At the minute, the agenda and timetable is set wholly artificially by people who want to get these things through either in the European Parliament or the Commission and we are often seen as irritants. I do not think we are irritants, I think we ought to be an absolutely indispensable element in this because we hold the popular consent.

  Q89 Mr Kidney: The Leader of the House had this idea that the European Grand Committee would have joint attendances by the appropriate Minister of the Crown and the appropriate Commissioner. Does that not therefore suggest to you that is the right place in the system for Commissioners to appear before us?

  Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Yes, provided one can get the close follow-up, the supplementary questioning, and even an adversarial relationship developing with a Commissioner wanting to do something and perhaps a general feeling that this was peripheral to British interests. If you could recreate that in a Grand Committee, I think that would be suitable.

  Q90 Mr Kidney: Gisela, you mentioned the rapporteurs, who did you have in mind back here who would be asking the rapporteurs to join them? Is that Select Committees, the Grand Committee proposal, or Scrutiny Committees, Standing Committees? How generally should we involve MEPs in the work we do as a national parliament?

  Ms Stuart: The European Parliament as co-legislator has extensive powers. An impact assessment for any of their amendments does not really happen at the moment, which is why I think our Select Committees ought to have MEPs here but also rapporteurs, who would either report to that Grand Committee or the particular Select Committee. That would bring that rapporteur in. Also there are government departments—we always try this but somehow it never works out in practice—when you have ministerial meetings you could bring in some of your MEPs. The key thing is to have a link when the European Parliament makes amendments which ought to have proper impact assessments at domestic level, we need to make them aware of what the impact is domestically of what they are suggesting.

  Q91 Chairman: What if they were not British MEPs?

  Ms Stuart: I think if it is not British MEPs we should still be able to ask them to come, because the rapporteur's function on that occasion is not a national one. That would pull together what the European Parliament does.

  Q92 Mr Pike: I wanted to push a little more on the UK MEPs if we did have this Grand Committee and joint attendances. Is it a good idea and how should we develop it? I know when I came into the House in 1983, one of the first debates we had when I came here was should we allow MEPs into the building or should we treat them as totally members of the public, and it was decided to give them some limited access. If we are supposed to be working together in this country's interests, is it not important we do have them on the Grand Committee and that we do look positively to ensure we are both working on the same wave band?

  Ms Stuart: I remember the debate about whether MEPs should be given dining rights in the House because we were afraid of them flooding our dining rooms. I do think they ought to be given the same access to the House, just as we have access to the European Parliament as MPs. We ought to much more, as a matter of course, as we debate something, think of the relevant MEPs even if it is no more than an exchange of information. I think it is extraordinary that the European Voice, which is the gossip sheet of Brussels, is not available in the House of Commons, in the Library, together with the Times and the FT, we ought to be able to pull it out and see what happens there.

  Q93 Mr Pike: What do you think, David?

  Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I am afraid I do not agree with this. By all means let them into the dining rooms and let's talk to them and meet them and allow them to come to our party meetings, but this is a separate institution, it is a self-regulating parliament, and one of their tasks is to stand up for their own institution. Certainly on the Convention on the Future of Europe the 16 MEPs did unmistakeably fight for their own institutional interests and they succeeded in getting a lot more powers for the European Parliament. I think to have them as members of a very grand committee, including the other place and them, would just dissipate the focus or intention, which is that the House of Commons or Parliament should exercise the scrutiny function. I think it would complicate that to include members of another Parliament. Even if one interviewed them, I think it might be resented that we were getting another Parliament to come before us to explain itself. So I think there is a division of powers here, we all have separate duties and I think we ought to concentrate on our own.

  Ms Stuart: May I just mention one practical experience I had with the Working Time Directive. It was negotiated in the early 1990s, it then came to a point where we would have a problem in the Health Service if that Working Time Directive was applied to doctors without a phase-in period. The Commission was not very sympathetic to that phase-in which we were negotiating and we only succeeded in getting that phase-in by getting the support of all MEPs, irrespective of their party, because it was an issue which they realised had tremendous significance to the United Kingdom which went beyond narrow party politics. That was a practical example of where we actually benefited from working with our MEPs.

  Q94 Mr Pike: If there is a British interest, sometimes that British interest should be equally shared by MPs and MEPs?

  Ms Stuart: Indeed. David and I managed to work on the Convention on the Future of Europe on some points when we did know what the British interest was!

  Q95 Mr Shepherd: To revert to something David said at an earlier stage about meeting in public with his own committee. He put in a submission to this Committee in which he says, we meet ". . . in private unless taking evidence from witnesses. It cannot be right to exclude the public from the scrutiny process in this way." More important, "The Committee last year requested that standing orders be changed to permit the Committee to meet in public but nothing has been done." Why is that?

  Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I cannot say. It requires a change of standing orders, which is not up to our committee. We requested this be done and I imagine the issue has been subsumed into this inquiry. There is a slightly bizarre contrast between our own work and what we have been urging in Europe, and indeed we succeeded in getting into the European Constitution in Article 49 a requirement that Union institutions shall conduct their work as openly as possible.

  Q96 Chairman: You mean there is something in the Constitution you approve of, David!

  Mr Heathcoat-Amory: We worked together on that one, Chairman, on a rather exceptional basis in the British interests! We at least partly succeeded on that one but we have not amended our own procedures. We sit in public when we take evidence, as we did from the Commission, but when we are deliberating about what to do about things, about whether the Treaty bases are valid or whether the Commission has exceeded legal powers, whether it is important to recommend for debate, all of that is still in secret. The only reason we are given is that it would all be misunderstood by the public and official advice would not be as candid. Frankly, these are the sorts of arguments we used to keep reporters out of the House of Commons in the 18th century, so I think we do need to move forward here and start to trust the public. Maybe not many of them would turn up, but at least they would have the right to do so.

  Ms Stuart: I think that, combined with the Council of Ministers meeting in public when they legislate, opens it up, because we need to know what positions people take to hold them to account.

  Mr Shepherd: I think it would educate too the wider public in the processes which take place, and maybe on the sheer volume, which exercises David very much, of the burdens being placed on Parliament. David also mentioned the quantum of legislation, the clerk to your own committee was unable to say, because it is an outcome rather than a preliminary stage, what is the volume of legislation, and we have a paper from the Cabinet Office website no less which says it is only 40%. Whichever it is, it is a huge and important part of our domestic legislation which does not receive scrutiny. I go back to the point, what is the outcome? Even if the Government, the Committee, the entire backbenchers of all parties, are united in opposition to a matter, it breaks that link—

  Chairman: I think we have the point, Richard.

  Mr Shepherd: You always say that, Chairman, but it is a point which is often obscured.

  Q97 Chairman: I think our witnesses take the point.

  Mr Heathcoat-Amory: It worries me actually that not all legislation from Brussels does come through. There are statutory instruments, complicated implementing regulations which do not even come through, so I am not sure we are getting the full count. Certainly the volume is enormous and growing. We are talking here not always of important things but quite a lot of them are about the coercive force of law whereby the state will in time require compliance of our constituents, and that is what Parliament is for, to at least check this is desirable and if it is not get something done about it. We are not doing that. The main thing is that not only can we not influence it very much but in many cases we do not even know it is happening and we are often taken by surprise afterwards. People say, "You are on the Scrutiny Committee, did this go through quickly?", and I look back and that was one of the matters that went through, I am afraid, rather on the nod because its full implications were not apparent at the time, and that rather shocks me.

  Q98 Chairman: Can I follow up Richard's point about the technicalities of this. What do you think this would do? Do you think it would make the Committee more partisan if it was in public? Do you think there would be more grand-standing? Given the fact there is an enormous volume of work here, and that the clerks are involved in providing expert advice on the documents and their roles are very, very critical to the whole process—as I understand it, I have never sat on a committee—how would those two factors play into making it public?

  Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I am aware of that danger and one of the problems with the Standing Committees is that at that stage there is a whip on and the Committee lines up traditionally across the floor and only very exceptionally do people work together on behalf of the House of Commons. The European Scrutiny Committee is rather impressive in that people on occasions at least do put party politics aside and take a House of Commons' view. So there is a sufficient grit and abrasion there which comes from party political considerations, but nevertheless we do on many occasions pull together particularly on aspects of subsidiarity and so on. So I would not wish to lose that but I do not think allowing the public in would seriously jeopardise that. What would attract me is to try and make Standing Committees in some way adjuncts of the scrutiny committees so one retains this feeling it is the House of Commons doing a scrutiny job on behalf of the public, without it becoming excessively party political. I think the other place does something along these lines. That is the balancing act we must all achieve. We cannot ignore the party divisions, but if one can somehow also feel we are collectively doing a job on behalf of everyone, I am sure at least greater openness would not seriously jeopardise that.

  Q99 Mr Heald: How accessible is the programme of work which the Commission produces on an annual basis? Is it possible to use it as an early warning system or is it utterly impenetrable?

  Mr Heathcoat-Amory: The programme we had was very long. It was rather general but it did contain in our view some breaches of subsidiarity, of which I have mentioned one. I should say in the Constitution now there is another one, where there is a declaration we must all tackle domestic violence. I am sure it is highly desirable to end domestic violence but it is there in the text now so we start off with the problem and we must do something to correct that. To answer your question, the annual work programme—and the Council also has one— could be used but they should be required to make it more detailed and to stick to it, and in my view it should be cleared formally by all the European Committees of all Member States at least in principle before they launch the initiatives and turn them into legislative proposals when in many cases it is already too late.


 
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