Memorandum submitted by Dr Marie Smyth
WHO ARE
THE VICTIMS?
1. Analysis of deaths in the Troubles shows
the differential fatal impact of the Troubles geographically,
by age, gender, religion and occupation. The analysis also shows
who was responsible for these deaths.
2. DEATHS in the Troubles.
1969-1989 (McGarry and O'Leary)
Paramilitary killings of civilians = 44.2% of
all deaths.
The war between Nationalist paramilitaries and
the security forces = 34.8% of all deaths.
Internecine conflict and self-killings within
paramilitary groups = 6.7% of all deaths.
The killing of Catholic civilians by the security
forces = 5.3% of all deaths.
3. COTTS ANALYSIS
Time
Worst year was 1972 when 497 people died, roughly
14% of all deaths; deaths concentrated in early years of the Troubles.
Age
Death rate peaks in the 19 year-old age group.
Gender
91.1% of all deaths are male; 8.9% are female.
Religion
Deaths Rates By Religion (per 1,000 Population)
| 1991 Census
| Average 71, 81 & 91
|
| C | P
| C | P |
| Civilians | 2.48 | 1.46
| 3.01 | 1.26 |
| Civilians + Security | 2.5 |
1.9 | 3.1 | 1.6
|
| Excluding "Own" Deaths | 1.9
| 1.6 | 2.3 | 1.4
|
| | |
| |
Deaths by perpetrator
Geographical variation
Areas of high concentrations of deaths: North and West Belfast,
the border regions, the Portadown triangle.
Northern Ireland overall death rate = 0.22%;
for example: the Ardoyne death rate = 2.2%;
— If Northern Ireland overall had the same death
rate as Ardoyne, between 33,000 and 35,000 people would have been
killed;
— if the UK had the same death rate as Ardoyne,
1,064,320 people would have been killed;
— If the Troubles had happened in Scotland and had
the same death rate as Northern Ireland, 11,244 people would have
been killed;
— If the UK as a whole had had the troubles at the
same death rate, 106,432 people would have been killed;
PERCEPTIONS OF
THREAT
Who killed the Catholics?
Who killed the Protestants?
3. This analysis challenges some of the popular assumptions
about victimhood in Northern Ireland.
Culture of victimhood
4. There is a comprehensive culture of victimhood in
Northern Ireland, with a majority of people feeling like victims,
laying claim to victim status, and few if any identifying as perpetrators.
This culture provides a major obstacle for reconciliation.
5. This culture leads people to look for solutions outside
themselves and their community, to have high expectations, which
are often disappointed thus compounding the victim position.
6. People are rarely purely victims or perpetrators,
most of us have not led blameless lives in that we have at least
harboured thoughts and desires that are less than charitable or
reconciliatory, and few of us have escaped unscathed from the
conflict in Northern Ireland. Therefore it is divisive and simplistic
to divide people into simplistic categories such as victim or
perpetrator. Reality, and we, tend to be rather more complex.
7. Victimhood is also often politically appropriated,
and victims' cases used to further the interests of various political
interests. This is partly because of the moral authority that
is associated with victimhood, and the desire to exploit that
authority is irresistible to some. The moral high ground is the
most overcrowded political turf in Northern Ireland.
Purpose of dealing with the past/truth recovery
8. For this reason, it is crucial that any attempt to
deal with unresolved issues of the past are grounded in a clear
understanding of the irreconcilable nature of the losses sustained
in the Troubles.
9. In our desire to be helpful and caring to victims,
we obscure that basic truth. It seems cruel to point out that
the loss sustained is irredeemable, that nothing will bring back
the lost loved one, the lost livelihood, the lost home. Yet, only
when the pain of the permanent nature of the loss is lived through
and not avoided, can the prospect of healing and recovery present
itself.
10. We need to be clearer that the needs we serve are
not our own needs to feel less powerless in the face of human
misery and loss, but rather the needs of victims to have their
anger and pain witnessed, and their reality confirmed. For those
of us who help, we must learn to live with the pain that there
is no "fix", no remedy, only compassion, and a gradual
accommodation over time. And some are able to turn the leaden
weight of suffering into positive, creative artworks, human endeavours—what
the Cambodians called "positive revenge"—not allowing
the perpetrator any more control over your life, but triumphing
in spite of what has happened.
11. As a culture, we are very uncomfortable with anger,
yet victims are understandably and legitimately angry, often requiring
no more than to have their anger heard and validated. A better
understanding of and insight into the valuable place that anger
has in recovery would greatly improve policy and practice with
victims.
Reconciliation
12. It is necessary to review the overall aim and direction
of reconciliation work in Northern Ireland. In the past, it has
carried a moral cachet, and has been identified with do-gooders,
religious movements, rather than something that is an integral
part of citizenship. We need to move from a situation where community
relations work and activity is a minority pursuit, to one where
community relations work, including the practice of respect for
and protection of minorities of all kinds is the universal duty
of all citizens.
13. Previous strategies have suffered as a result of
the apparent lack of challenging leadership within communities.
Political, community and church leaders have shied away from challenging
racism or sectarianism amongst their followers. An initiative
aimed at supporting leaders to offer positive challenges might
address this issue, otherwise there is the risk of leaders being
seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
14. The goals of reconciliation work need to clearly
stated, and related to specific community conditions. What represents
progress or achievement in Ardoyne/Glenbryn in terms of community
relations is rather different that what might be achievable in
the University area of South Belfast, Limavady or the border regions.
15. Benchmarking, and more scientific methods of targeting
areas for intervention and evaluating the effectiveness of intervention
need to be developed. Public money should not be provided for
people to simply mix, but money should be deployed in areas where
there are substantial problems with sectarianism and racism.
16. Strategy needs to be sensitive to the need to avoid
rewarding sectarianism and racism, and needs to be implemented
alongside a vigorous enforcement of the anti-hate crime laws by
the police.
17. Public sector organisations should implement a policy
of contract compliance, whereby they ensure that all private sector
companies that they do business with are equal opportunity employers,
have a balanced workforce and maintain neutral workplaces.
18. Lessons from South Africa would suggest that rolling
out community relations work into the private sector are crucial
to learn. Yet in Northern Ireland community relations are seen
to be primarily the duty of the public sector and the responsibility
of the non-governmental independent body and the NGO sector. This
must be addressed.
Truth recovery
19. There is merit in the idea of a truth commission
for Northern Ireland that is a legally constituted, independent,
international, non-adversarial research and investigatory mechanism
for both victims and perpetrators who wish to come forward and
place their experiences in the public domain.
20. The timing of such a venture is key to its success,
and whilst the present climate is hardly conducive, preparatory
groundwork for the day when the climate is more opportune should
begin right away. This should take the form of public consultation
about models for the mechanism, its aims and remit.
21. Healing Through Remembering (HTR) make the useful
point that the process could usefully begin with an acknowledgement
on the part of all the key players of their part in the conflict.
Such acknowledgement can "loosen up" the resistance
to reconciliation. HTR argue persuasively that governments should
provide a lead in this regard, and Prime Minister Blair's apology
in the House of Commons recently was a useful contribution to
this process.
22. The purpose of such a commission would be to address
unresolved issues in the past, in a restorative framework, in
order
(a) to compile an account of the context of the conflict
and the reasons for its initiation and duration;
(b) to achieve some kind of closure for victims and perpetrators;
(c) to build confidence in relationships within and between
communities that have been damaged by the violence of the past;
(d) to build confidence in the criminal justice system
and the rule of law, through re-establishing some sense of due
process being available to people, and reassuring them that any
wrongdoing within the system has been addressed;
(e) to create a collective account of the past;
(f) to foster greater public understanding, debate and
explorations of the reasons for the conflict, how conflict might
be prevented in future, using a variety of methods—cultural,
ceremonial, emotional, intellectual, in line with the HTR recommendations
for a diversity of approaches;
(g) to assist in the vexed questions of the allocation
of responsibility, the discovery of truth, the decision-making
about the pursuit of civil and criminal prosecution and the awarding
of amnesty;
(h) to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated.
23. Issues of amnesty for perpetrators should be addressed
only after extensive public consultation. This is likely to be
one of the most difficult issues. However, in some quarters (Republican)
there is a growing willingness to forgo prosecution in return
for discovery of truth.
24. It will be important for any mechanism to address
the issue of the equivalency of certain actions, and whether certain
actions, such as torture or rape for example, are regarded as
equivalent to some others, and whether some activities are reserved
from any amnesty process, and always prosecuted.
25. It would also be important that the "coverage"
of such a commission should fairly reflect the pattern of victimization
and damage inflicted during the Troubles, and should pay due attention
to the balance of cases it reviews, proactively seeking to include
cases in order to achieve that balance. It would therefore cover
all killings and adverse events in the Troubles.
26. Alongside this, it is proposed that a range of public
inquiries be conducted on a thematic basis, on matters of urgent
public concern, such as Republican violence, Loyalist violence,
state killings and allegations of collusion, the role of institutions
such as the churches, the media, education and so on in the conflict.
It is important that the range of themes reflect both communities'
concerns. The legal relationship between such inquiries and a
truth commission requires careful consideration.
27. Finally, consideration should be given to a Disarmament
Demobilisation and Reintegration strategy for Northern Ireland,
to address the issues of continuing paramilitarism, the role of
former combatants, the blurring of political and criminal violence,
and the need for a formal process under the control of the authorities
which draws paramilitarism to a close, and facilitates alternative
and non-violent roles for those who participated in it. In the
absence of such a strategy, there is a real danger that Northern
Ireland will follow the South African pattern where a huge increase
in criminal violence followed the ending of political conflict.
28 February 2005
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