Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Civil Aviation Authority

SUMMARY

  1.  The Sub-Committee's examination of air transport services in Northern Ireland concerns:

    —  The development of capacity at existing airports;

    —  Specific challenges facing Northern Ireland as a peripheral region of the UK;

    —  The effectiveness of the Route Development Fund; and

    —  The potential impact for Northern Ireland of wider air transport issues on the island of Ireland.

  2.  This submission addresses these points in the context of what the CAA sees as the main issues facing the Northern Ireland market. Our comments below are based on factual statistical data, experience of the aviation market over many years, and the messages emerging from a visit we recently made to Belfast as part of a wider study of services at regional airports. The principal points the CAA makes are as follows:

    —  Northern Ireland is clearly more dependent on adequate air links to the rest of the UK than most other UK regions because of the lack of a suitable surface alternative.

    —  The evidence suggests that the market is currently providing adequate, frequent air services between Northern Ireland and the UK, including London, without the need for external intervention which could impose high and hidden costs.

    —  However, the network of international scheduled services is very limited at present. In the main this would seem due to the relatively small catchment areas which the Northern Ireland airports can draw upon, but some limited intervention may be justified in bringing forward direct international scheduled services through the use of a carefully controlled Route Development Fund so as to share the risk between airline, airport and those directly benefiting from the service. The use of such a fund should also ensure that only routes with a reasonable prospect of long-term viability are funded.

INTRODUCTION

The CAA's role

  3.  The Civil Aviation Authority ("the CAA") is responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport for duties in the areas of aviation safety regulation, airspace policy, consumer protection and economic regulation.

  4.  The CAA's Economic Regulation Group (ERG) regulates airports, air traffic services and airlines and provides advice on aviation policy from an economic standpoint. Its aim is to secure the best sustainable outcome for users of air transport services. ERG's main tasks are to promote liberalisation through the removal of Government-imposed restrictions to entry to the airline market and to facilitate the optimal supply and regulation of aviation infrastructure. ERG acts as expert adviser to the Government and collects, analyses and publishes statistical information on airlines and airports.

Visits to Belfast

  5.  ERG is currently putting together a study of regional air services in the UK, which it hopes to publish early in the new year. As part of our research, on 21 September 2004 we visited Belfast and spoke to the Managing Director of Belfast International Airport, the Chief Executive of Belfast City Airport, and representatives from Invest Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce. There were differing opinions on some points, but there were other areas where a consistent message came across.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR SERVICES IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Traffic in 2003

  6.  There are three airports in Northern Ireland which report traffic statistics to the CAA. In the calendar year 2003, these three airports had a total throughput of 6.2 million passengers, comprising 4.0 million at Belfast International, 2.0 million at Belfast City and 0.2 million at the City of Derry Airport. 84% of the total were passengers on domestic flights, 14% were international charter passengers and 3% were international scheduled passengers. The bulk of the international scheduled passengers flew on the Belfast International-Amsterdam route, but there were also services during the year between Belfast International and Toronto and between Belfast City and Cork. Nearly one million passengers at Belfast International were on international flights but Belfast City is essentially a domestic airport at present.

Traffic development 1993-2003

  7.  Over the last 10 years the Belfast airports have grown at an average annual rate of 7.9%, higher than the UK average of 5.9%. The growth rate at Belfast City (8.8%) has been greater than that at Belfast International but even the latter at 6.1% has grown faster than the UK average (Figure 1 and Table1).

Figure 1:  Traffic at Belfast airports 1993-2003


Table 1

TRAFFIC AT BELFAST AIRPORTS 1993 AND 2003


1993
2003
Average
growth rate %

Belfast City
Domestic
845,359
1,960,352
8.8
International scheduled
0
9,959
International charter
919
3,725
15.0
846,278
1,974,036
8.8
Belfast International
Domestic
1,629,462
3,003,698
6.3
International scheduled
60,558
119,666
7.0
International charter
489,989
831,068
5.4
2,180,009
3,954,432
6.1
City of Derry
Domestic
162,025
International scheduled
28,974
International charter
14,506
205,505
Total
Domestic
2,474,821
5,126,075
7.6
International scheduled
60,558
158,599
10.1
International charter
490,908
849,299
5.6
3,026,287
6,133,973
7.3
Total
Domestic
82%
84%
International scheduled
2%
3%
International charter
16%
14%
100%
100%


  Source:  CAA airport passenger-related statistics.

  8.  However, underlying these relatively similar growths at the two Belfast airports there have been some significant gains and losses by each airport. These are summarised in Table 2 which shows the domestic traffic at the two airports in 1993 and 2003.

Table 2

DOMESTIC TRAFFIC AT BELFAST AIRPORTS 1993 AND 2003


Domestic passengers
between:
and:
1993
2003

London
Belfast International
1,255,987
1,060,533
Belfast City
169,418
1,026,880
Other UK
Belfast International
431,849
2,054,471
Belfast City
671,939
940,421


  Source:  CAA airport passenger-related statistics.

  9.  In 1993 nearly 90% of the passengers travelling to/from London used Belfast International; by 2003 this share had fallen to 50%. In contrast, over the 10 years Belfast International's share of the passengers to other regional UK airports rose from 39% to 69%.

  10.  Underlying these changes are two important developments; a change in the way the London market is served and the entry of low-cost carriers, which first emerged in the mid-90s following the liberalisation of the EU air transport market.

THE LINK TO LONDON

Recent market developments

  11.  Until 2001, British Airways and bmi British Midland both offered services between Belfast International and Heathrow (six and eight per day respectively). Their combined traffic was around 1.2 millon passengers a year. However, these services were said to be unprofitable. In August 2001 bmi announced it was moving its service to Belfast City as from the winter season. Following the effects of September 11, BA decided to withdraw its service altogether,[1] also effective from the winter season. Consequently bmi maintained a limited additional service at Belfast International to replace BA, until the summer 2003 season when it withdrew altogether, leaving Belfast International without a Heathrow service. Since these changes bmi has increased frequency at Belfast City to eight per day and now uses larger aircraft (Airbus A321). It carried just under 0.8 million passengers in 2003 and the route is reportedly a good performer. CAA origin and destination survey data shows that in 2003 some 37% of bmi's Heathrow passengers were connecting to other flights.

  12.  It would, however, paint an unbalanced picture to say there had been a reduction in service to London. Low-cost carriers entered the Belfast-London market in 1998 (easyJet to Luton) and 2000 (Go to Stansted).[2] Having absorbed Go and introduced Gatwick services in 2003, easyJet now offers five services per day to Luton and Stansted and four per day to Gatwick. In addition, British European, which (as Jersey European) began operating to Gatwick in 1993 (and between 2001 and early 2003 to London City), re-branded itself as a low-fare airline, Flybe, in 2002. Figure 2 shows how the BA and bmi Heathrow services dominated the London-Belfast market in 1992, and how easyJet has increased its presence in the market since 1998. Note that easyJet's traffic to London now exceeds 1 million passengers, and is approximately equal to the carryings of bmi and Flybe put together.

Figure 2:  Traffic on London-Belfast routes by airport-pair 1992-2004



  13.  When visiting Belfast, the CAA asked about customers' perception of these non-Heathrow services. The consensus was that London was well-served, with a choice of airports at each end, a choice of airlines, and, most significantly, value for money that was lacking a few years ago. No longer did business passengers regard other London airports such as Luton and Stansted as inferior substitutes for Heathrow; indeed rail links from those airports could be more convenient than Heathrow for meetings in the City of London. Nor were business passengers deterred by the "no-frills" service to those airports. The overriding factor, given a convenient and frequent schedule, was cost. As a result of the competitive changes in the market and consumer expectations, bmi also now offers lower fares to Heathrow without the restrictive Saturday-night stay and other conditions that previously denied those fares to business passengers (a typical business trip would previously have required a fare well in excess of £200 return).

  14.  Our conclusion is that services have developed such that airlines are delivering products well attuned to the demands of the market. Although Belfast International clearly would like to see a Heathrow service reinstated, it is not apparent to us that there is evidence of "market failure" and we see no obvious call for government intervention in this market, at least at present.

Access to the global air network

  15.  CAA origin and destination survey data for 2003 shows that 37% of passengers departing Heathrow for Belfast on bmi's service were connecting from another flight. About two-thirds of those were connecting from services from the USA. The survey also reveals that the vast bulk of business passengers who were connecting at London did so at Heathrow; indeed, they outnumbered the total of the other London airports combined by more than two to one.

  16.  The message we derived from our visit to Belfast backed up these figures. The Heathrow service was there for those who needed connectivity.[3] That didn't mean that airports like Stansted and Luton were not used for connections, but Heathrow was the more obvious choice. EasyJet, for example, does not offer a connecting flight service, and requires two separate tickets; it will presumably not accept responsibility if the connection is missed because the first flight is delayed, and recommends a minimum two-hour connection time because baggage is not through-checked (ie passengers need to check-in again for the second leg). Similar considerations apply to other connecting possibilities involving low-cost carriers at regional UK airports such as Liverpool or Manchester.

  17.  Our visit to Belfast also revealed that flying from Dublin was likely to be a feasible alternative to connecting at Heathrow. This would depend on the destination, and the usual considerations of price and schedule, but one noteworthy development was Aer Lingus' re-structuring as a low-fare airline and recent network expansion. Dublin was only two hours' drive away, and this would soon be reduced further by road improvements. There could, therefore, be a saving in both time and convenience by cutting out the connecting flight.

LINKS TO OTHER UK AIRPORTS

  18.  Belfast is also linked by air to other major UK business centres. Our visit to Belfast made it clear that these links can be just as important to Belfast businesses as London, and potentially more important to them than say a direct service to a European destination that might primarily cater for outbound tourism. The link is particularly valuable if low fares allow a relatively cheap day return that can potentially generate new business without significant travelling costs. The current UK links from Belfast are to Aberdeen, Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Exeter, Glasgow, Leeds/Bradford, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham/East Midlands, Southampton and Teesside, as well as Guernsey/Jersey and the Isle of Man. Seven different airlines are offering services, those with multiple routes being Flybe (10), easyJet (5) and bmibaby (4). Eastern Airways, Air Wales, British Airways CitiExpress and Jet2.com operate a single route each. In other words, the bulk of services are now operated by low-cost carriers. A number of these services are operated from both Belfast airports in parallel, with a choice of airline, and some city-pairs enjoy a relatively high combined frequency of seven or more per day.

LINKS TO POINTS IN EUROPE

  19.  The links from Belfast to international destinations are, by comparison, relatively sparse. While KLM's service to Amsterdam has been replaced by easyJet, currently offering a daily service, Sabena's service to Brussels has not been replaced. There is no service to Germany. There was no Paris service for some years, until June this year, when easyJet, with assistance from the Northern Ireland Route Development Fund (RDF), started a daily service to Paris and also to Nice (four per week). At the same time, but without RDF assistance, easyJet has begun services to Alicante and Malaga (each five per week), and also this year another low-cost carrier, Jet2.com, based in Leeds, has begun daily services to Prague and Barcelona.

  20.  These new services are to be welcomed, but there is likely to be a limit to the extent that the Northern Ireland market can be expected to sustain direct services to international destinations. With Northern Ireland's population of around 1.7 millon, plus perhaps catchment from Donegal and other areas of the Republic close to the border, there has to be some limit to the amount of traffic stimulation that even a low-cost carrier can generate.

  21.  One scenario to be avoided is where an airline begins a service, perhaps to much fanfare, only to withdraw it because it is unviable in the long term (or the airline itself fails). Businesses may have set up contracts and links that depended on the service. On our visit to Belfast we were given the example of Belfast-Cork, where a service by JetMagic was discontinued when the airline failed after less than a year. The service was in the event replaced by Aer Arann, but with an awkward gap in service in between.

  22.  With Dublin reasonably accessible from Northern Ireland by road, there is likely to be a degree of overlap. If a destination is already only supporting a relatively low frequency from Dublin, it would seem questionable whether a service to the same destination would be viable from Belfast.

POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

  23.  Two Government policy initiatives concerning regional air services that were mentioned in the December 2003 Future of Air Transport White Paper are of particular potential relevance to Northern Ireland.

Route development funds

  24.  The above analysis suggests that the air services from Northern Ireland that may warrant assistance are those on international scheduled routes. The CAA notes that the Northern Ireland Air Route Development Fund has been used to launch services from Belfast to Paris and Nice, and from Derry to Birmingham and Manchester. The CAA sees certain circumstances where using RDFs could be justified, if the market is reluctant to offer a new air service because of risk aversion or the lack of awareness of potential for example. The CAA also recognises that there may be positive externalities connected to the provision of regional air services, and because these may not be captured through the decisions of carriers based solely on the profit motive, this may justify short-term financial support. The CAA believes that the support should be provided by those benefiting from the positive externalities arising from the service (ie regional stakeholders) so that they will accurately price the value of the service and expose what they are truly willing to pay for.

  25.  The CAA does, however, urge caution. There is a need to avoid a proliferation of subsidies because of the potential distortion this creates in the market. Decisions need to be taken against the backdrop of strong growth in unsupported regional services, which suggests that the market can work well. Any support should be based on non-discriminatory criteria and open to any carrier, and should be no more than is necessary to kick-start a route and support it for a short period while it becomes established. In other words, it should accelerate development of a route that might otherwise have been a marginal decision at present but which would be viable in the medium term, with the risk shared between airline, airport and those directly benefiting from the service.

  26.  Airlines are now much more sophisticated in the way they deploy aircraft, and airports in Northern Ireland find themselves in competition with other European airports to secure a new route. In other words, with all the prime markets already served, there is a so-called "European league table" of lesser routes that have varying profit potential for, say, a low-cost airline. We understand that the availability of RDF support moves the route up the table, thus bringing forward when it will operate.

  27.  However, we would not want to see public sector funds being used to encourage airlines to operate routes that are not actually commercially viable in the longer term, such that when the funding ends the route is discontinued or the airline's financial position is more precarious. Any RDF policy should seek to minimise these downside risks and, clearly, be compatible with State Aid rules.

  28.  The CAA recognises the success so far of the Scottish RDF and will follow developments with this and the much more recent Northern Ireland RDF with interest.

Using Public Service Obligations to protect services to London

  29.  The Government is currently consulting on the criteria that it should use to trigger consideration of whether and how to maintain an adequate service on existing regional routes to London using Public Service Obligations (PSOs). A PSO must meet the criteria set out in European law. The consultation document states that in assessing "adequacy" it is necessary to consider the link provided between two cities or regions, not between a city or region and a specific airport. Therefore a reduction of service to Heathrow, for example, will not be enough to trigger the consideration of a PSO as long as it is considered that there is an adequate service provided by the combined services offered to other London airports. It should be noted that, under European law, factors such as interconnectivity opportunities or the final onward destination of passengers are not relevant to the consideration of adequacy.

  30.  The CAA recognises that there may be instances where PSOs are a necessary and useful tool for delivering air services to regional points. However, we believe that any proposals need to be seen in the context of what the market has delivered already, and the impact the imposition of PSOs would have on market development. The CAA's view is that PSOs are primarily designed to protect "lifeline" services such as flights in the Scottish Highlands and Islands. A PSO on a London route would potentially allow landing and take-off slots at congested London airports to be ring-fenced for those services which would impose a high and hidden cost on the airline industry and on the economy generally.

  31.  The CAA's formal response to the Government consultation will explain our position in more detail.

AIRPORT CAPACITY

  32.  At present the annual number of air transport movements (ATMs) to/from Belfast City's relatively short runway is limited to 45,000, and there is also a limit on the annual number of seats that can be provided which restricts the passenger throughput to around 2.2 million passengers a year. The airport also has a night curfew of 9.30 pm. In contrast, Belfast International's runway is capable of supporting long-haul services and the airport has adequate space to cope with foreseeable demand levels.

  33.  The CAA supports the sustainable development of regional airports and of local solutions to local environmental problems. However, given the existing operational restrictions at Belfast City and the night curfew, from an economic perspective the CAA is unsure what purpose is served by having both a cap on seats offered and a limit on total movements. We would support the Government's proposal that the form of the planning "cap" should be reviewed if and when the operator of Belfast City so requests.

COMPETITION BETWEEN THE AIRPORTS

  34.  If both airports are profitable we see no economic reason why the two Belfast airports should not operate in competition with one another, and indeed with the City of Derry airport where catchments overlap. This should act in the interest of consumers in promoting competition and providing a choice of airports. There is an argument that competition between the airports exists only to the extent that they compete for short-haul airlines for the best deal to operate there; once the airlines are established, competition is then between airlines rather than airports. But maintaining a choice of airports and therefore the ability of a short-haul airline to switch airports would seem a preferable situation to creating a monopoly position.

  35.  Equally, we welcome competition between the Belfast airports and Dublin. As noted above, residents in Northern Ireland appreciate the ability to fly from Dublin to destinations which may never be viable from Belfast and which save them the inconvenience of having to take a feeder flight to London and of making a connection there.

29 September 2004





1   BA's press release of 27 September 2001 said that the Belfast-London route had a history of unprofitability and that over the previous four years losses on the route totalled £38 million. Back

2   There were Luton and Stansted services by other airlines prior to this. Back

3   And of course for those point-to-point passengers for whom Heathrow was the more convenient or preferred London airport. Back


 
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