Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Belfast International Airport

1.  INTRODUCTION

  1.1  Belfast International Airport Ltd (BIAL), as the largest and most important civil and military airport in Northern Ireland, welcomes the Committee's invitation for BIAL to make a submission regarding their Inquiry into Air Transport Services in Northern Ireland and commends the Committee's initiative on this vital subject for the region.

  1.2  We believe that such an inquiry is long over-due. The current situation which allows for unstructured and separate development at airports fails to recognise the strategic economic needs of the region and serves to undermine the region's competitiveness when it comes to the development of new routes and services. Two major Inquiries by the House of Commons Transport Select Committee on Regional Air Services in 1998 and Aviation in 2001 have pointed to the need for greater cohesion, but little has happened that would give practical effect to any of their findings. The Department for Transport's "The Future of Air Transport" (December 2003) fell short of expectation and, in our view, gave no firm direction for the future. BIAL believes that there is an onus on the Government to come out categorically with a policy that places Belfast International at the centre of a structured drive for the development of Air Transport Services in Northern Ireland that fully exploits this major strategic asset for the benefit of the entire region.

2.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPACITY AT EXISTING AIRPORTS

  2.1  We contend that Belfast International Airport should be the airport of choice when it comes to meeting the strategic economic needs of Northern Ireland. It is the largest, most important civil airport and the only 24-hour air transport facility in Northern Ireland, catering for both passenger and air cargo requirements (See annex 2 regarding air cargo), including intercontinental flights. The site is also shared with RAF Aldergrove, which plays such a strategically important role in the nation's security.

  2.2  Given its location, size and scope to expand in line with published traffic forecasts, BIAL believes that other existing airports could close with minimal short term adverse economic impact, but the loss of BIAL would be tantamount to a crippling body-blow which would restrict or retard Northern Ireland's wider economic growth.

  2.3  It should be borne in mind that the indigenous population of NI and the surrounding catchment is less than two million people. There is limited current in-bound demand to Northern Ireland, partly due to the lack of a cohesive network of air services as compared with Dublin. Competition for airline assets across Europe is becoming increasingly intense and it is recognised that, unless a critical mass of passenger activity is attained at an airport, major airline investment will go elsewhere. Maintenance of a major commercial airport remains a capital-intensive challenge as much of the prospective growth emanates from low cost operations offering increased passenger throughput at lower margin to the airport operator. It is, therefore, critical for the future prosperity of the region that business at the key air transport facility is not rendered unsustainable through an inadvertent policy of diluting the available traffic base across too many airports.

  2.4  In terms of Northern Ireland, BIAL is unique. It operates on a 24-hour, unconstrained basis with two cross runways, capable of coping with all weather/wind conditions. The main runway can accommodate the largest aircraft in service. Existing runway capacity means that growth can easily be met in line with anticipated demand for the entire region. Planning permission has been granted for a Terminal extension enabling BIAL to cope with up to 10 million passengers per annum (ppa)—more than double its current annual passenger throughput. Further development can easily take place on the 1,000-acre site which has no significant environmental or pollution issues.

  2.5  No other airport in Northern Ireland offers the same combination of strengths. Other facilities are physically constrained by insurmountable obstacles such as location, proximity to built-up urban areas and nature reserves, environmental and noise restrictions, available land and serious infrastructure deficiencies such as surface links, runway limitations and night-time curfews. There is already considerable public concern about the number of aircraft breaking the night-time curfew at BCA and about further growth at the airport.

  2.6  On this basis, the optimum strategy for air transport services is that BIAL would be the only logical facility for future development. BIAL acknowledges the fact that quirks of history have delivered the current spread of airport facilities within the region. However there are clear attractive employment and investment implications inherent in concentrating additional future growth and development in one centrally located, showcase site, in order to benefit the overall competitiveness and economic performance of the Province. At BIAL passenger traffic has now increased to 4.028 million ppa with that number expected to rise to 4.5 million in the current year. BIAL already accounts for approximately 4,000 on-site jobs. For every additional 1 million passengers, 1,000 immediate jobs are created, notwithstanding the secondary, tertiary and catalytic downstream employment implications brought about by large-scale aviation development. The overall benefit can be as high as 3,500 jobs per million passengers.

  2.7  In reality the concentration of air services leads to greater sustainability. Bmi's transfer of Heathrow services from BIAL to Belfast City Airport three years ago has been detrimental for "NI plc", due to the implicit restrictions present at that airport. Had bmi been exclusively in situ at Belfast International Airport when British Airways announced termination of their six daily services from Belfast to Heathrow in Autumn 2001, bmi would have had the unconstrained option to increase capacity on their existing schedule between Belfast International and Heathrow.

  2.8  Sustainability of routes out of NI is a major issue. Diluting critical mass by trying to operate to the same destination from three airports does not make economic sense either for the airlines or Northern Ireland. Over the last decade, several routes have disappeared and airlines have come and gone. Three airports are not commercially sustainable given the size of the catchment area. In our opinion, there is too much capacity to several of the UK airports and there will be "casualties" within the next year. If we are to pursue a two-airports for NI philosophy, then complementarity rather than competition is a sensible way forward. This can only be achieved if the Planning Agreement at Belfast City Airport remains intact. Moves to develop piecemeal operations around various airport locations in the Province at inherently reduced frequencies weakens the general sustainability of all routes and, in terms of long-term contribution to the region's economic development, amounts to moving "deckchairs on the Titanic". The possibility of Government infrastructural aid to extend the runway and enhance facilities at City of Derry Airport on the basis of an underlying plan to develop business by "poaching" from other airports in the region would appear to only serve to compound the problem.

  For the sake of comparison an analysis of other world cities which have two or more airports, and an assessment of the population they serve is included as Annex 5.

  For the sake of completeness we have enclosed Annex 6 in respect of issues at City of Derry Airport and BIAL's ongoing challenge to maintain a level playing field in terms of airport investment and funding transparency.

3.  SPECIFIC CHALLENGES FACING NORTHERN IRELAND AS A PERIPHERAL REGION OF THE UK

  3.1  We consider that there has been a historic absence of a co-ordinated strategy for the development of airport capacity for Northern Ireland as a region. A fragmented approach to the development of air transport services will only continue to undermine Northern Ireland's wider competitiveness and economic prospects. It is imperative for Northern Ireland to be treated as a single unit with decision-makers adopting a focused and unwavering attitude in order to achieve the necessary strategic objectives for the Province.

  3.2  The template already exists. It is perhaps worth taking some time to consider a cameo of another community in Western Europe which has been beset by strife and division and now faces similar challenges of economic regeneration and social integration to those faced currently within Northern Ireland.

  3.3  For many years the city of Berlin has been served by three separate airports—Tegel, Tempelhof and Schoenefeld—albeit under common ownership. The city centre airport of Tempelhof was a member of the erstwhile "Conference of City Airports" in the early 90s, along with Belfast City, London City, Stockholm Bromma and Toronto Island. All of these city centre airports operate under very strict environmental conditions and notwithstanding the future of Tempelhof there are major questions over the future development and operation of Stockholm Bromma and Toronto Island.

  3.4  In recognition of the need to make a huge infrastructure statement about the new Berlin, the German authorities made a consensus decision in 1996 clearing the way to combine all of Berlin's aviation activity and create Germany's third largest airport (Berlin Brandenburg International) on the least environmentally constrained site of Schoenefeld in the former Eastern Bloc. The final construction permit for BBI has recently been secured following the biggest such approval process ever conducted in Germany and this includes strict environmental requirements. Tempelhof is now planned to close imminently, while Tegel is expected to close shortly after the completion of development at BBI, in approximately five years time. 20 million annual passengers are expected to use BBI by 2010, around 50% more than the three Berlin airports combined in 2003.

  3.5  This is a prime example of a co-ordinated strategic approach for the broader benefit of a region. In contrast, any semblance of over-arching aviation strategy in Northern Ireland and the prospect of complementarity in respect of air service provision appears to have been effectively eradicated since Short Brothers made their announcement on 5 January 1983 stating that they planned to "develop Belfast Harbour Airport for use by commuter and regional airlines operating passenger services to and from Belfast" not being "at all interested in competing with Aldergrove which is clearly the Province's major gateway airport"!

  3.6  Due to our location as an island to the west of an island there is also significant cost in being remote. It is vital for the region to remain competitive and maintain efficient transport links in order to move people and goods to market. However, remote location by definition adds to an airline's operating costs and makes the balance between incurred cost and revenue potential more marginal. Cohesive, imaginative thinking can make the difference between operators developing or bypassing services into Northern Ireland.

  3.7  The current make-up of the Northern Ireland economy also presents a major challenge. A large proportion of the workforce are employed within the public sector, there is a low manufacturing base, limited extent of private enterprise and comparably few SMEs. The make-up of the economic landscape is best illustrated through the fact that small firms, employing fewer than 50 people, make up more than 95% of all businesses and provide 56% of all jobs in the private sector (Northern Ireland Yearbook—2002), a circumstance which impacts upon levels of inbound business travel.

  3.8  The challenge, however, for Northern Ireland is most vividly illustrated in relation to our neighbours and competitors within the island market. Due to the geographic location of Northern Ireland within the UK (having a land border with another EC State) the onus is on the region to match and exceed competitiveness levels.

  3.9  In sharp contrast to Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland has forged ahead through a combination of effective Government-driven and co-ordinated, business-friendly capital-intensive measures. A common sense of purpose and a cohesive, buoyant and "can-do" approach have led to the aviation, travel and tourism sectors receiving fillips such as the abolition of Government Air Passenger Duty and significant tax breaks in order to create an access bedrock upon which the wider economy can flourish. The VAT rate in the Republic of Ireland stands at 13.5%, while Northern Ireland imposes a rate of 17.5%, in line with the rest of the UK. BIAL wholeheartedly shares the view expressed by NITIC in its Manifesto, namely "VAT should be reduced for accommodation or the difference in VAT rates between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (4 percentage points) should be ringfenced and these funds used to support tourism product and promotion.". These legislative breaks have combined to assist wide-scale development of private enterprise (including high-tech industry, e-commerce and financial services) in the Republic of Ireland, which continues to sustain annual economic growth rates significantly ahead of the rest of Europe.

  3.10  Another key challenge for Northern Ireland is to develop and sustain links to key airport hubs so that travel to and from the region becomes "one stop from anywhere". Although Boeing's decision to commit to development of the B7E7, in expectation of greater future demand for point-to-point air services, bodes well for increased direct access from Northern Ireland and similar geographic regions in the longer term, dependence upon interline access to one major hub (London Heathrow) operated by one legacy (full service) carrier is not a healthy position for the economy of any region.

  3.11  BIAL recognises that world links or connections to major hub airports, remain critical to Northern Ireland's competitive status. New services to long-haul hubs, (eg, North America, Middle East) will help offset the requirement for services to London hubs. Current traffic analysis of the Belfast City to London Heathrow service (CAA Survey) indicates that 25% of the 800,000 annual market transfers to international destinations. Upwards of 50% of these passengers transfer to destinations in North America. A direct New York service would save time, and link directly into one of the biggest hubs in the world. For example, Continental Airlines, and its partners, connect to over 170 destinations in the USA out of the same Newark Terminal. Direct services into Europe will again reduce the demand for interlining over Heathrow. Likewise, direct flights to Frankfurt/Dubai would service the Middle East and Asian markets.

  3.12  Currently, PSO's can only be issued on a city-to-city basis, not city-to-airport. Therefore, it is unlikely that Government would consider PSO's to Heathrow and/or Gatwick as the city of London is well served with flights to Luton and Stansted. In the short term, access to Heathrow is important to NI. However, its importance should decrease as direct services are developed from Northern Ireland. It is in this area that we should be seeking support from ARD and the various other Government bodies.

  3.13  In summary, Northern Ireland critically needs to lose any hang-ups and impediments to expansive thinking. The joined-up progressive approach inherent within bodies such as Tourism Ireland must take precedence if the region is to develop wide-scale, cheaper access and help practically overcome the obvious image problems which have dogged the last few decades of our history.

  3.14  While not strictly a peripherality issue, we at Belfast International Airport carry substantial costs due to the need to maintain a police force. We will always put safety and security first; however, this additional cost is over and above those which are normally incurred by airports throughout the UK. There is an ongoing need to ensure that the activities that we carry out actually make sense in view of the terrorist threat.

4.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROUTE DEVELOPMENT FUND

  4.1  In the opinion of BIAL, the Northern Ireland Air Route Development Fund has been a good initiative. However, to keep the impact of the Fund in context, it has not changed basic airline rationale in terms of route development, rather altered the timing of certain developments. For instance, it has proven valuable in pump priming discussions with Continental Airlines regarding scheduled transatlantic access from Northern Ireland, where the basic quantum of necessary support would have been preclusive for a private airport operator/PLC to speculate upon.

  4.2  It is critical to bear in mind that the core issue in respect of route funding is sustainability. Recent experience in Scotland has illustrated that a "scatter-gun" approach towards certain developments can be detrimental to the image of such a Fund, not to mention wasteful of taxpayers' money. It is critical that the use of such funds needs to be applied consistently and carefully.

  4.3  It is also our contention that use of funding to simply shift passengers within the general round of the region (cf support for new Derry—Manchester/Birmingham services) is a misuse of resource and counter-productive to the overall aims of the initiative.

  4.4  We suggest that alternative/supporting approaches should be considered in order to level the general playing field within the island, for example:

    (a)  Abolition (or ringfencing of monies for route development) of UK Government APD (£5 within EU/£20 to Rest of World) on routes from Northern Ireland, as already accepted in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland (which would have a much wider and more meaningful impact upon airline economic performance and route development), and

    (b)  Designation of Public Service Obligation (PSO) status for marginal routes which are of economic importance for the region. It seems highly invidious that the only current PSO route from Northern Ireland links Derry with Dublin, effectively taking traffic out of the Northern Ireland system, and by association, money out of the economy.

  4.5  Ultimately all of these initiatives would contribute to overall job creation and economic competitiveness for Northern Ireland. It cannot be overstated how fundamental it is for international air access developments to take place into the region.

  4.6  It is perhaps pertinent to place the competitive conundrum in full context. A £12 million annual budget is presently ascribed by various tourism bodies for international marketing and promotion of the island of Ireland. However Northern Ireland currently gains minimal value from 75% of this expenditure due to the blanket absence of direct access from core markets such as USA, Germany, Italy and Belgium, and value can only now be extracted from a further 16% of this expenditure due to the recent introduction of services from France (Paris, Nice), Spain (Barcelona, Malaga, Alicante) and Eastern Europe (Prague). Meanwhile 83% of all European visitors coming to Ireland arrive through Dublin Airport. For Northern Ireland to benefit more from the £12 million investment, direct access into the region is critical.

5.  THE POTENTIAL IMPACT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND OF WIDER AIR TRANSPORT ISSUES ON THE ISLAND OF IRELAND

  5.1  Dublin Airport (DUB), backed by effective and concerted Government action, regards the entire island of Ireland as its marketplace. In the aggressive search for business opportunities, it ignores the border and, with the range of routes served from the airport, has considerable success "poaching" passengers from Northern Ireland.

  5.2  Investment in roads (M1) has dramatically cut travel times, thus creating further pressure on Northern Ireland airport operators and the National Roads Authority in the Republic of Ireland has committed investment to make further major improvements on the Belfast-Dublin road corridor. In contrast a proposed single carriageway link estimated to cost £13.8 million (the 6.5km M2/A57 project) which would link Belfast International Airport to the M2 to/from Belfast, has been relegated by DRD(NI) to the Reserve List rather than being included in the schedule of works for the 10-year period up to and including 2011/2012. BIAL contends that this project would be a more substantial application of Government money than investment in City of Derry Airport infrastructure. Further evidence of surface displacement comes in the form of a recently launched coach service from Belfast city centre to Dublin Airport which operates 15 return trips per day with the potential to carry 480,000 passengers per year. With two home-based airlines to assist, Dublin Airport's goal is to bring passenger numbers up to 44 million ppa by 2030 and with no alternative or competition to DUB on the eastern seaboard of the Rol, this growth level is viewed as achievable.

  5.3  Dublin Airport is a serious competitor to the fragmented airport and air services structure in Northern Ireland, made all the more so because of the planned and structured manner in which growth has been concentrated at the facility.

  5.4  A proposal by Ryanair to develop commercial operations from the Irish Air Corps airfield at Baldonnel on the western outskirts of Dublin was rejected by Government in recent times, a decision that avoided damaging fragmentation and dilution of the business base at DUB. A similar single-minded commitment is required from the UK Government.

  5.5  Dublin Airport has been nurtured by Government policy to the point where it now offers 90 scheduled destinations, two-thirds of which are outside the British Isles, not to mention an extensive range of charter and air cargo services.

  5.6  Clearly, the experience in the Republic of Ireland has been to husband resources in such a way as to ensure that internal competition does not undermine or threaten their principal "gateway" and that gives tangible expression to the importance that aviation plays to the Irish economy.

  5.7  The break-up of Aer Rianta, the state-owned airport operator in charge of Dublin, Shannon and Cork, presents both a threat and an opportunity.

  5.8  On the one hand, Dublin, as the only serious revenue generator, could end up having to shoulder the burden of the significant, ongoing debt accumulated at both Shannon and Cork. In order to offset part of the financial handicap and service the debt of the smaller airports, Dublin may well have to increase charges. This would have an adverse effect on their competitiveness and could have consequential benefits for Northern Ireland.

  5.9  The break-up might also provide Dublin with greater autonomy to develop new air-links without the retarding arrangements currently in place to maintain Shannon services. The advent of Dublin/Shannon de-coupling would most likely result in operators gaining added impetus to gravitate towards Dublin. However, the prospect of offering direct unconditional access for international airlines to Ireland through Belfast is an opportunity which could be exploited for the benefit of Northern Ireland plc under the prevailing conditions.

  5.10  At present, the Rol is considerably ahead of Northern Ireland when it comes to trips per capita (approximately 5.2 trips per capita in Rol against 3.7 trips per capita in NI). A number of factors contribute to this situation including available disposable income, the absence of Government Air Passenger Duty and, most importantly, greater choice of destination and frequency. The difference of 1.5 trips per capita already leaves Northern Ireland with 2.5 million less annual passengers than would be the case if it matched Dublin performance. That would in turn create a further 2,500 direct on airport jobs and more than 8,000 additional jobs for the Northern Ireland economy.

  5.11  Greater choice, cost and access will enhance DUB's ability to further erode the Northern Ireland customer base. A suggested spur from the main Belfast-Dublin line at Balbriggan, to connect rail passengers directly into Dublin Airport, could exacerbate the situation.

  5.12  While the Republic of Ireland has been single-minded in the development of modern surface infrastructure on the approaches to DUB, Northern Ireland has seemed content to put major investment on the long finger or to content itself with less capital intensive schemes and leave the development of air transport services without any structure or cohesive direction. BIAL believes this is short-termism of the worst kind, as it does little or nothing to address our regional infrastructural shortcomings which are certain to place barriers in the path of future inward investment and tourism growth.

6.  CONCLUSIONS

  6.1  Northern Ireland needs a coherent air service strategy that embraces all key commercial, economic, tourism and social policies for the region. The Government "Future of Air Transport" White Paper has failed to provide a strategic direction for air services in Northern Ireland.

  6.2  Northern Ireland needs a single focus for future airport and air service development to enable it to compete effectively with Dublin and other airports across Europe. That focus should be BIAL. This will maximise service provision, increase the economic contribution from air services and potentially generate thousands of new jobs. The current policy has fragmented traffic and services, reducing Northern Ireland's competitiveness.

  6.3  Northern Ireland Air Service Policy priorities should include:

    —  BIAL should be allowed to grow to fulfil demand as outlined within the Aviation White Paper.

    —  Belfast City Airport should continue to operate within existing planning constraints.

    —  No further Government infrastructural aid should be given to any airport in Northern Ireland.

    —  Improved roads should be constructed from BIAL, both to Belfast via the M2 motorway and to the north west of the Province.

    —  UK Government APD should be removed on services from Northern Ireland, and VAT levels should be harmonised with those of the Republic of Ireland.

29 September 2004



 
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